Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 4980 Del
Judgement Date : 10 October, 2011
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 10th October, 2011
+ W.P.(C) 4357/2011
VIJAYA LAXMI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Sapra, Sr. Adv. with Ms.
Shama Sharma, Adv.
Versus
ARCHAEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA
& ORS .... Respondents
Through: Mr. J. Tripathi, Adv. for R-1 ASI.
Mr. Shivram, Mr. Nikilesh & Mr.
Shantanu Singh, Advocates for R-2.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported yes
in the Digest?
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petition impugns the letter dated 8th June, 2011 of the
respondent no.1 Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) extending the time
for construction activity on property No. A-10, Nizamuddin (East), New
Delhi and further seeks to prohibit any further construction activity on the
said property for the reason of the same being situated within the 100 mtrs.
"prohibited area" from the ancient monument of Humayun Tomb.
2. Notice of the petition was issued and vide ex parte order dated 17th
June, 2011 the respondent no.2 M/s Emca Construction Company (ECC)
raising construction on the said property was restrained from carrying out
any further construction; the respondent no.4 MCD was also directed to
ensure compliance of the order. The respondent no.2 ECC has applied for
vacation of the said interim order. Pleadings have been completed and
counsels have been heard.
3. The petitioner claims to be a practicing Advocate having her office
at A-14, Nizamuddin (East), New Delhi and thus affected by the
construction on property No.A-10 in her neighbourhood.
4. The construction on property No.A-10 has a chequered history.
Earlier W.P.(C) 7889/2009 titled Gaurang Kanth v. Archaeological
Survey of India & Ors. was filed for restraining the said construction
permission wherefor had then been granted by respondent no.1 ASI vide
letter dated 1st August, 2008. Interim orders dated 31st March, 2009 and 4th
August, 2009 directing status quo to be maintained qua the construction
were issued. Aggrieved therefrom the respondent no.2 ECC preferred LPA
No.417/2009 which was decided on 30th October, 2009. The Division
Bench of this Court held:-
a. that the challenge to the construction was for the reason
of the Central Government having vide Notification
dated 16th June, 1992 prohibited any construction
within 100 mtrs. of a "protected monument". The said
Notification was subject matter inter alia of order dated
23rd July, 2004 of the Division Bench of this Court in
FAO (OS) No.414/2002 titled Archaeological Survey
of India v. Narendra Anand. The Division Bench
directed the Central Government to review the
Notification in the light of the discussion in the
judgment;
b. in compliance with the said directions of the Division
Bench the Director General of the respondent no.1 ASI
vide note dated 8th June, 2006 constituted a Committee
to recommend grant of permissions for construction
within the prohibited / restricted areas of the protected
monuments. The said Committee started making
recommendations for allowing construction within the
prohibited area on case to case basis and on the basis of
which recommendations the respondent no.1 ASI
started giving no objections for constructions within the
said area. One such permission was granted to the
respondent no.2 ECC also for raising construction on
property No.A-10;
c. the Division Bench however found the constitution of
the Committee to be ultra vires the Ancient Monuments
Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. The
Division Bench however noted that the Committee had
processed over 400 applications from all over the
country and of which 150 were from Delhi itself. The
Division Bench accordingly while prohibiting the
Committee from processing any further application(s),
also directed the respondent no.1 ASI to take steps to
re-consider all permissions granted in pursuance to the
recommendations of the Committee and take
consequential steps after giving the affected parties an
opportunity of being heard;
The Division Bench accordingly directed status quo to be
maintained with respect to property No.A-10 till re-consideration by the
respondent no.1 ASI.
5. To resolve the situation which had arisen owing to the judgment
aforesaid of the Division Bench, first an Ordinance dated 23rd January,
2010 to amend the provisions of the Act was promulgated and thereafter on
30th March, 2010 an amending Act enacted. When W.P.(C) No. 7889/2009
aforesaid preferred by Mr. Gaurang Kanth came up before this Bench on
23rd September, 2010, all counsels agreed that in view of the said
Ordinance and amendment to the Act, the said writ petition did not survive;
the same was accordingly disposed of. However while doing so this Court
also observed that merely because the interim order in force till then would
stand vacated on the disposal of the writ petition, would not entitle the
respondent no.2 ECC to continue with the construction if required to obtain
any fresh permission therefor.
6. Since the property No.A-10 is situated within the prohibited area of
100 mtrs. from the ancient protected monument of Humayun Tomb, the
respondent no.2 ECC for raising construction thereon, besides requiring
the permission from the respondent no.4 MCD also required the
permission from the respondent no.1 ASI. The Committee constituted by
the respondent no.1 ASI pursuant to judgment supra in Narendra Anand
for considering the applications for such permission, considered the case of
the respondent no.2 ECC for construction on the said property and the
Superintending Archaeologist of the respondent no.1 ASI vide letter dated
1st August, 2008 (supra) intimated to the respondent no.2 ECC the accord
of permission on 26th June, 2008 to raise construction of a building
comprising ground, first and second floors at property No.A-10,
Nizamuddin (East), New Delhi subject to the compliance by the
respondent no.2 ECC of the conditions mentioned therein. It was further
stated in the said letter that the said permission/licence was valid for a
period of one year only from the date of issuance thereof.
7. It has emerged that the respondent no.2 ECC being not satisfied with
the aforesaid permission/licence, represented and which representation
resulted in the letter dated 6th March, 2009 of the Director General of the
respondent no.1 ASI to the Superintending Archaeologist, Delhi Circle.
The said letter records that the case was examined by the members of the
Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) in the meeting held on 22nd January,
2009 and the said Committee had recommended that respondent no.1 ASI
may accord permission for re-construction up to the maximum height at
par with the height of the neighbouring authorized buildings which exist as
on date and may consider allowing the construction of basement provided
the neighbouring buildings have a similar feature. Finding the residential
buildings adjoining property no.A-10 on the North & South sides to be
having a height of 12.5 mtrs. and 9.5 mtrs. respectively, the Director
General of the respondent no.1 ASI permitted re-construction on property
No.A-10 up to a maximum height of 12.5 mtrs. only besides mumty over
the terrace. The counsel for the respondent no.1 ASI has during the hearing
handed over a copy of letter dated 6th March, 2009 addressed by the
respondent no.1 ASI to the respondent no.2 ECC on the same lines.
8. On the basis of the said NOC of the respondent no.1 ASI, the
respondent no.4 MCD also on 20th March, 2009 passed the plans valid up
to the year 2014 for construction on the said property up to the height of
12.5 mtrs. with 2.5 mtrs. mumty.
9. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid permissions, the
construction could not be completed owing to the stay orders in the earlier
writ petition aforesaid. However in the interregnum when the stay was not
in force, it is informed that construction up to a height of 9 mtrs. has
already been raised on the property which is lying half built.
10. Though the Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 30th
October, 2009 (supra) held the constitution of EAC to be ultra vires the
Act and directed ASI to re-consider the cases but as aforesaid, to get over
the said situation, the Act itself was amended. The first proviso to Section
20A(3) of the amended Act provides as under:-
"Provided that any area near any protected monument or its adjoining area declared, during the period beginning on or after the 16th day of June, 1992 but ending before the date on which the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains (Amendment and Validation) Bill, 2010, receives the assent of the President, as a prohibited area in respect of such protected monument, shall be deemed to be the prohibited area declared in respect of that protected monument in accordance with the provisions of this Act and any permission or licence granted by the Central Government or the Director-General, as the case may be, for the construction within the prohibited area on the basis of the recommendation of the Expert Advisory Committee, shall be deemed to have been validly granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as if this Section had been in force at all material times:
Provided further that nothing contained in the first proviso shall apply to any permission granted, subsequent to the completion of construction or re- construction of any building or structure in any prohibited area in pursuance of the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Culture (Archaeological Survey of India) number S.O. 1764,
dated the 16th June, 1992 issued under rule 34 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Rules, 1959, or, without having obtained the recommendations of the Committee constituted in pursuance of the order of the Government of India number 24/22/2006-M, dated the 20th July, 2006 (subsequently referred to as the Expert Advisory Committee in orders dated the 27th August, 2008 and the 5th May, 2009).".
11. The only ground on which the senior counsel for the petitioner now
impugns the construction is that the proviso aforesaid validates only those
permissions which were in force as on 30th March, 2010 being the date of
coming into force of the amending Act. It is contended that the permission
granted on 1st August, 2008 for a period of one year only which expired on
31st July, 2009 would not stand re-validated notwithstanding the
amendment to the Act. It is further contended that when the letter dated 1 st
August, 2008 specified the period of one year only for completing the
construction, the letter dated 6th March, 2009 without any such limitation is
bad in law.
12. I have at the outset enquired from the counsel for the respondent
no.1 ASI whether the proviso aforesaid is intended to validate only the
constructions already completed in pursuance to the recommendation of
the EAC or can be made applicable also to the permissions though granted
on the recommendation of the EAC but in pursuance whereto no
construction had been carried out.
13. The counsel for the respondent no.1 ASI states that what has been
validated is the permission which had become null and void in view of the
judgment dated 30th October, 2009 supra of the Division Bench and not the
construction. It is contended that it would thus be irrelevant whether in
pursuance to the permission the construction had been carried out or was
yet to be carried out. He contends that if the intent of the legislature had
been to save only the construction already carried out, the legislature
would have validated the constructions already carried out in pursuance to
the recommendations of the EAC and not the permission itself. He has also
invited attention to the opinion obtained by the respondent no.1 ASI from
the Solicitor General in this regard. It is contended that owing to the
judgment of the Division Bench, a large number of ongoing constructions
including of several public projects had come to a standstill and it was for
this reason only that the Ordinance and the amendment to the Act was
brought about. It is contended that in pursuance to the Ordinance and the
amendment the construction activity in pursuance to the permissions
granted at the instance of the EAC has continued.
14. The counsel for the respondent no.1 ASI with reference to clause in
the letter dated 1st August, 2008 of the permission contained therein being
valid for one year only has also contended that though there was no such
time frame provided in the recommendations of the EAC or the permission
issued by the Director General of the respondent no.1 ASI but such time
frame was stipulated in the letters issued by the Superintending
Archaeologist for the reason of the said Superintending Archaeologist
being required to supervise the said construction to ensure that the same
was carried out in compliance of the conditions. It is contended that the
same clause is to be found in the letter dated 6th March, 2009 issued by the
Superintending Archaeologist to the respondent no.2 ECC even though not
in existence in the internal letter dated 6th March, 2009 under challenge in
these proceedings.
15. The senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that what has
been validated by the proviso aforesaid is only what had already been done
and no power has been granted to do anything further; that the permission
already granted was valid for one year only and the said one year having
expired, the respondent ASI in the garb of the said proviso cannot extend
the time for which permission for construction was granted. Reliance in
this regard is placed on State Inspector of Police v. Surya Sankaram
Karri (2006) 7 SCC 172 and on Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi
Development Authority (2009) 1 SCC 180.
16. The counsel for the respondent no.2 ECC has also contended that the
respondent no.2 ECC owing to the stay orders in the earlier writ petition
has never had the time of full one year for raising the construction. It is
contended that the respondent no.2 ECC had only 88 days without stay and
in which time the construction as now existing up to 9 mtrs. was
constructed. It is contended that the respondent no.2 ECC ought not to be
made to suffer for the reason of the orders of stay which have now become
infructuous/redundant owing to amendment aforesaid of the Act.
17. The counsel for the respondent no.2 ECC has also contended that the
petitioner is but a mere proxy for Mr. Gaurang Kanth who was earlier
targeting the respondent no.2 ECC and qua whom the Division Bench
returned adverse findings. It is contended that he has put up the petitioner
to continue targeting the respondent no.2 ECC. It is argued that when all
other similarly situated persons, in pursuance to the amendment of the Act,
have been allowed to complete their construction, it is unfair to deprive the
same benefit to the respondent no.2 ECC.
18. I am satisfied with the argument of the counsel for the respondent
no.1 ASI that the proviso aforesaid validates the permissions and not the
constructions already carried out. The question which thus arises is,
whether the said permission was time bound and if so, whether the
validation by amendment aforesaid of the Act, of the said permission
permits the extension of time for raising construction.
19. The permissions for raising construction notwithstanding the
prohibition came to be granted on case to case basis, as aforesaid, pursuant
to the direction of the Division Bench of this Court in Narendra Anand.
Neither the judgment in Narendra Anand nor the note dated 8th June, 2006
(supra) constituting EAC for recommending grant of such permissions is
shown to be containing any such condition requiring the permissions to be
time bound. It is the case as aforesaid of ASI and which I have no reason
to disbelieve that the permission as recommended by the EAC and as
granted by the Director General ASI were not time bound and such
condition of time was added by the Superintending Archaeologist while
communicating the permission to the applicant, to ensure compliance.
What is to be gauged in the said scenario is the weightage to be given to
such condition. I am of the view that the condition of time incorporated in
such backdrop cannot be said to be going to the root of the permission,
when neither the EAC nor the sanctioning authority had deemed it
appropriate to make the permission time bound and when condition of time
was introduced only by the authority which was to oversee compliance.
The Apex Court in V.P. State Road Transport Corpn. V. Assistant
Commissioner of Police (Traffic) Delhi 2009 (3) SCC 634 noticed the
difference between conditions imposed by the primary authority and
conditions imposed by the "countersigning authority" in that case. It was
held that the jurisdiction to cancel the permit for breach of conditions
imposed by the primary authority, is of the primary authority only and not
of the counter signing authority. Similarly the proviso to Section 20(A) 3
with which we are concerned in the present case also talks of permission
by the Director General, ASI on the recommendation of the EAC and
which permission is not found to be time bound. Thus the said permission
cannot be said to have ceased to be in existence for the reason of lapse of
time imposed by the Superintending Archaeologist.
20. Time in such circumstances cannot also be said to be of essence.
When time is not of essence, it is extendable. In the facts of the present
case there are more than sufficient reasons for the respondent no.2 ECC
having not been able to avail the permission within the time granted. Time
is even otherwise not shown to have any relevance to the permission
granted. During the course of hearing, the Minutes of the 15th and 19th
Meetings of EAC held on 7th May, 2008 and 22nd January, 2009 were
handed over. A perusal thereof shows that the conditions which weighed
with the EAC for recommending permission for construction on subject
property, were existence of several buildings between the protected
monument and subject property and allowing construction on subject
property of same height as other existing buildings not affecting the
skyline any further. The said factors which resulted in grant of permission
are not found to have any relevance to time. It is not the case of the
petitioner that the buildings earlier existing and owing whereto it was
earlier felt that construction on subject property will not affect the skyline,
have now ceased to exist.
21. Even otherwise, ASI save for within the prohibited/restricted area is
not concerned with construction which is otherwise regulated generally by
the municipal body. The Municipal body generally while granting
sanction for construction limits the time therefor but which time is
extendable. Imposition of such time is also to ensure compliances of the
conditions subject to which such sanction is granted.
22. There is nothing in the Act also to show time to be of any relevance.
Once the EAC and the Director General, ASI had in accordance with the
state of affairs then prevailing permitted construction and which
permission has now been validated by amending the Act, there is nothing
to show in the amending Act that only those permissions time whereof had
not expired were intended to be validated and not others. The Act was
amended on 30th March, 2010 to allow/validate something which had been
invalidated vide judgment dated 30th October, 2009 of the Division Bench
of this Court. The Legislature cannot be held to be oblivious of the
permissions so granted being time bound. The Legislature however chose
to validate the permissions and which include permissions validity
whereof, as fixed by the overseeing authority, had expired. The
Legislature did not make any distinction between the permissions time
whereof had expired and permissions time whereof had not expired. The
only conclusion is that the benefit of the amendment is intended for all
permissions. There is even otherwise no reason for discriminating between
the two types of permissions.
23. I am therefore of the opinion that the permission was not time bound
and the time fixed by the Superintending Archaeologist was neither part of
the recommendation of the EAC nor the permission of the Director
General, ASI.
24. Though the aforesaid is enough to dismiss the Writ Petition but I
may add that there is nothing in the Act as amended, prohibiting extension
of time. The counsel for ASI has stated and again I have no reason to
disbelieve that in other such permissions also made time bound by the
overseeing authority, extensions have been granted and construction
carried out. There is no reason for discriminating against the petitioner.
Once the Legislature has required certain state of affairs to be
deemed/imagined, what was observed by Lord Asquith in East End
Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council (1951) 2 All ER 587 that
unless prohibited from doing so, one should also imagine as real,
consequences and incidents and one should not permit one's imagination
to boggle when it comes to inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs is
squarely applicable. The proviso to Section 20A(3) requires the
permission to be deemed to have been validly granted. If it had been
validly granted, ASI then would have also had the power to extend the
time fixed by its Superintending Archaeologist for raising the construction
and there is nothing in the Act prohibiting us from assuming so also. There
is nothing in the Act to prohibit extensions of time by which the
permission was limited.
25. There is another aspect of the matter. The respondent no. 2 ECC as
aforesaid has had only 88 days out of the one year's time granted; during
rest of the time there was a stay against construction, granted earlier at the
instance of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 7889/2009 and now in this
petition. The Division Bench of this Court in order dated 30th October,
2009 held the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 7889/2009 to be not entitled to
stay. Similarly the petitioner herein is also found to have failed in the case
brought before this Court. The settled principle of law is that none should
suffer owing to the act of the Court. The respondent no.2 ECC in the
present case could not avail of the permission owing to the said interim
orders which were /are found to have been wrongfully obtained and have
ultimately not been sustained. The respondent no.2 ECC cannot be
allowed to suffer on account thereof.
25. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed. The petitioner being an
Advocate, I refrain from imposing any costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) OCTOBER 10 , 2011 pp
(corrected and released on 14th November, 2011)
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