Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 5793 Del
Judgement Date : 29 November, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No. 771/2002
% 29th November, 2011
ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION PVT. LTD ..... Appellant
Through : Mr. Anil K. Kher, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Ankur Bansal, Advocate.
versus
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through : Mr. L.K. Tyagi, Advocate for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (ORAL)
1. The challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal (RFA) filed
under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is to the
impugned judgment of the trial Court dated 1.10.2002. By the impugned
judgment, the trial Court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff/insurance
company against the defendant No.1/transporter on account of loss/damage
caused to the goods which were transported by the appellant/defendant No.1
for the owner/respondent No.2/defendant no.2. Essentially, the insurance
company subrogated itself to the rights of the owner/respondent
No.2/defendant No.2 after paying the amount of loss to respondent
No.2/defendant No.2 under the insurance policy and thus filed the subject
suit for recovery which has been decreed.
2. The facts of the case are that the appellant/defendant No.1 entered into
a contract for transportation of the goods/milk products of the respondent
No.2/defendant No.2 vide goods receipt/lorry receipt Nos. 9556 and 9552
dated 22.7.1986. The goods were to be transported from Ghaziabad, U.P. to
Bangalore (Karnataka). The truck which was carrying the milk food
products of the transporter/appellant met with an accident en route at Jhalra
Patan in Rajasthan. On account of damage to the goods which were being
transported, the owner/respondent No.2 gave a notice dated 17.12.1986
making a claim upon the appellant/transporter for Rs.2,92,572/-. This letter
was acknowledged by the appellant/transporter on 17.12.1986 itself,
however, it was defended that the accident was beyond the control of the
driver and therefore the claim may be raised on the underwriters/insurance
company, as the appellant was said not to be liable for the loss. The
respondent no.1/plaintiff appointed its surveyor who gave the survey report
dated 5.9.1986 recommending payment for the loss caused to the
owner/respondent No.2. The plaintiff/respondent No.1/insurance company
paid the amount to the owner/respondent No.2 and obtained the letter of
subrogation and power of attorney from the respondent No.2 and then filed
the subject suit for recovery.
3. The appellant/defendant No.1 took up various defences to the suit.
The first defence was that the suit was barred under Section 3 of the Carriers
Act, 1865. Secondly, it was pleaded that no notice was served under Section
10 of the Carriers Act, 1865. It was also pleaded that the accident was a
result of an act of God and, therefore, the appellant/transporter was not
liable. It was denied for want of knowledge that respondent No.2 had
received any amount from respondent No.1/plaintiff towards full and final
settlement of the claim. Authority to institute the suit was also questioned.
After the pleadings were completed, the trial Court framed the following
issues:-
"1. Whether the plaint has been filed and instituted by duly authorized person? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount claimed in the suit from the defendant No. 1? OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the interest from defendant No.1? If so, at what rate, on what amount and for what period? OPP
4. Whether the claim of the plaintiff is barred by the
provisions of the Carriers Act against defendant No. 1? OPD
5. Whether the defendant No.2 had suffered the loss for the negligence and carelessness of defendant No.1? OPD
6. Whether the accident took place because of the act of the God and natural calamity and beyond the control of the defendant? OPD
7. Whether this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to decide this suit? OPD
8. Relief"
4. Learned counsel for the appellant argued the following points before
this Court:-
1. The suit was barred by Section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865 as
it has not been proved that any notice was served by respondent
No.2/owner on the appellant/defendant No.1/transporter.
2. It was also argued that the suit was liable to be dismissed as the
owner/respondent No. 2 had failed to comply with the provision of
Section 3 of the Carriers Act, 1865.
3. The next point argued was that the suit was barred by
limitation.
4. The final point which had been argued was that the suit was not
properly instituted on behalf of respondent No.1/plaintiff.
5. So far as the argument that no notice was served under Section 10 of
the Carriers Act, I find that though in the pleadings the appellant disputed
having received any notice, however, when the witness on behalf of
respondent No.1-Sh. Bodh Raj Punj, PW1,deposed of having sent the notice
dated 17.12.86, the appellant did not cross-examine the witness on this part
of his deposition, and therefore, the objection/defence with respect to not
giving of the notice under Section 10 of Carriers Act, 1865 was apparently
given up. It is for this reason that, no other evidence was led on behalf of
respondent No.1/plaintiff to show the service of this notice. In any case,
there is no doubt that this notice dated 17.12.86 was infact served upon the
appellant/transporter/defendant No.1 inasmuch as the appellant itself on that
very day i.e. 17.12.86 replied to the notice of damages dated 17.12.86 given
by respondent No.2/owner. This reply/certificate dated 17.12.86 has been
filed and proved before the trial Court and has been given an exhibit mark as
Ex.PW1/10. I, therefore, hold that the notice under Section 10 of the
Carriers Act, 1865 was duly given by respondent No.2/owner to the
appellant/transporter/defendant No.1.
6. The next argument urged on behalf of the appellant of the suit being
barred under Section 3 of the Carriers Act 1865, is an argument again
without any substance inasmuch as Section 3 of the Carriers Act, 1865
applies only to the goods which are mentioned in the Schedule of this Act.
A reference to the Schedule shows that they pertain to very precious and
costly goods like jewellary, gold, Government bonds, etc. This Section,
therefore, will not apply with respect to the goods in question which were
transported namely, milk food products. I, therefore, reject this argument
raised on behalf of the appellant.
7. So far as the issue of the suit being time barred, I find that no such
plea was taken up in the written statement and nor was any issue framed. I,
therefore, disallow the appellant/defendant No.1 to raise this issue for the
first time in this appeal. I may, however, observe that the suit in this case
may not be governed by Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 because such
a suit is basically a suit by an owner against a carrier, whereas the present
suit is a suit by an insurance company against the owner, and with respect to
such a suit the cause of action will arise only when an insurance company
makes payment of the value of the goods to the insured under the policy. It
is not disputed that the suit in the present case has been filed within three
years as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 from the date when the
insurance company/respondent No.1/plaintiff paid the amount to the
respondent No.2/defendant No.2/owner.
8. The final argument that the suit has not been validly instituted, is once
again an argument which I would reject inasmuch as it is now settled law
that once a company, such as a banking company, or even an insurance
company has pursued/contested the suit to the hilt, then the suit cannot be
thrown out on technicalities. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court in
the case of United Bank of India v. Sh. Naresh Kumar & Ors., AIR
1997 SCC 3 has held that it must be held that the suit has been validly
instituted in terms of Order 29 CPC.
Another aspect that was noted by the trial Court was that in the
relevant portion of the written statement, in reply to the portion of the plaint
which deals with filing of the suit, there is only a general or simple denial
and therefore the contents of the plaint under Order 8 Rule 5 CPC are
deemed to be admitted. I, therefore, hold that the suit was validly instituted
for and on behalf of respondent No.1/plaintiff.
9. A civil case is decided on the balance of probabilities. The balance of
probabilities shows that loss was caused. The appellant/defendant No.1 was
a carrier under the Carriers Act, 1865 who was served with the requisite
notice dated 17.12.86. The insurance company/defendant No.1/plaintiff paid
the amount to respondent No.2/owner under the insurance policy and on
obtaining the letter of subrogation and a power of attorney filed the subject
suit for recovery. The suit of the respondent No.1/plaintiff has thus been
rightly decreed by the court below.
10. No other point was urged or argued.
11. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the appeal and the
same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Trial Court
record be sent back.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
NOVEMBER 29, 2011 AK
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