Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 5435 Del
Judgement Date : 11 November, 2011
$~30
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P. (C) 1286/1995
% Date of Decision : 11th November, 2011.
M/S WIRE & FABRIKS (SA) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. C. Mukund, Advocate with Ms.
Firdouse Qutb Wani, Advocate.
versus
APPROPRIATE AUTY. INCOME TAX DEPTT. ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Rashmi Chopra, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V.EASWAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
SANJIV KHANNA,J: (ORAL)
M/s. Wire & Fabriks (S.A.) Ltd. has filed the present Writ Petition for
issue of writ of Certiorari and quashing of the order dated 22nd March, 1995
passed by the respondent No. 1-Appropriate Authority under Section 269
UD(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act, for short).
2. The petitioner had entered into an agreement dated 18.12.1994 with
Mr. K. A. Sethi and Ms. C.K.Handa, respondents No. 3 & 4 to purchase
Flat No. 802, Madhuban, 55, Nehru Place, New Delhi measuring 896 sq.ft.
(hereinafter referred to as the property) for total consideration of Rs.
24,19,200/-, which included an amount of Rs. 1,18,200/- towards cost of
wood-paneling, fixtures, carpets etc. This bifurcation was mentioned in the
agreement to sell dated 18.12.1994.
3. On 19.12.1994, the parties to the agreement to sell filed an
application/statement in Form No. 37-I under Rule 48-L of the Income Tax
Rules, 1962. Thereafter, vide letter/notice dated 30.12.1994, the petitioner
was asked to furnish information/details required by the Appropriate
Authority. These details/information were furnished on 9.1.1995. On the
same date the Appropriate Authority had physically inspected the property,
and carried out measurements of the built up area of the property. The
physical measurement of the property was required as in the valuation
report, the built up area of the property was stated to be 981 sq. ft. and not
896 sq. ft., as declared in the agreement to sell/Form 37-I. On actual
measurement, it was found that the built up area of the flat was, in fact,
981 sq. ft. Therefore, it was decided to treat the built up area of 986 sq. ft.
declared in Form No. 37-I as correct.
4. Before dealing with the proceedings and the impugned order passed
by the Appropriate Authority, it would be relevant to refer to some orders
passed in this writ petition. On 17.4.1995 notice was issued and accepted
by the respondent No. 1. By order dated 17.4.1995, the court had directed
that status quo regarding possession the property should be maintained
and the Central Government need not pay the consideration amount as
required under Section 269 UD (1) of the Act. Respondents No. 3 & 4 later
on entered appearance and had moved an application for modification of
the said order, being CM No. 4020/95. The said application was disposed
of on 30.08.1995 stating that the period for making payment by the Central
Government in terms of Section 269 UG (1) would commence from the
date of this order. The stay order dated 17th April, 1995 was accordingly
vacated. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application being CM No.
523/96 seeking stay of auction of property scheduled for 22nd January,
1996. The auction was stayed subject to the condition that the petitioner
should deposit with respondent No.1 within a period of 10 days a sum of
Rs. 24 lakhs, which would be without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties. It was made clear that in case, this amount was
not deposited, the respondent No. 1 would be free to re-auction the
property forthwith.
5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application being CM No. 2321/98,
which was disposed of on 17.4.1998. The court in this order noticed the
factual background and the orders passed including judgment of this Court
in Kailash Suneja Vs. Appropriate Authority, (1998) 231 ITR 318 (Del.)
and passed the following directions:
(i) subject to the petitioner filing an undertaking on an affidavit through its attorney or a senior official duly authorized under a resolution of the Board in the terms indicated hereinafter, the possession of the property shall be delivered to the petitioner; the possession of the petitioner shall be in the capacity of a receiver; he shall not alter the status quo, nor create third party interest, nor part with possession nor create any encumbrance in favour of a third party;
(ii) The petitioner shall undertake that in the event of the petition being dismissed and respondents No. 1 and 2 being held entitled to compulsory purchase of the property, the petitioner shall hand over peaceful vacant possession to respondents 1 and 2 within the time appointed by the court".
6. In terms of the said order, an undertaking has been furnished and
the petitioner is in the possession of the property. As noticed above, the
sellers-respondents No. 3 & 4 have been paid and have not entered
appearance at the time of arguments. It appears that they have nothing to
state in view of the factual background of the case noted above.
7. The petitioner, in the present proceedings, has challenged the order
of the acquisition dated 22.3.1995 principally on three grounds:
(1) Appropriate Authority's failure to grant adequate time and fair hearing to the petitioner, resulting in violation of principles of natural justice;
(2) Appropriate Authority has taken into consideration the material which was not confronted, stated and mentioned in the notice dated 10th March, 1995 issued by the Appropriate Authority to the petitioner why the property should not be acquired under Section 269 UD (1);
(3) Failure of the Appropriate Authority to take into consideration the material and relevant factors and taking into consideration irrelevant factors in deciding and determining whether there was under-statement of consideration.
Other aspects connected with and intertwined with the three
contentions have been noted below.
8. Contention Nos. 1 and 2 are somehow interconnected and are being
taken up together. Form No. 37-I was filed with the Appropriate Authority
on 19.12.1993. Therefore, the Appropriate Authority was required to either
grant permission or acquire the property under Section 269 UD on or
before 31st March, 1995. Appropriate Authority called for information by
letter/notice dated 30.12.1994, which was replied and furnished on
9.1.1995. Appropriate Authority had also officially inspected and
measured the property on 9.1.1995. The Appropriate Authority thereafter
issued notice on 10.03.1995. In this notice, it was stated :-
"3. That the subject flat consists of 895 sq. ft. as per information given in the Agreement to sell dated 18.12.1994, However, on actual measurement, the built up area of the flat has been found at 981 sq. ft. The apparent consideration of Rs. 24,19,200/- includes an amount of 1,18,200/- account of value of furniture etc. Therefore, the declared rate of the subject flat comes to Rs. 24,19,200/- minus 1,18,200 = Rs. 23,01.000/- divided by 981 = --2346 per sq. ft. The apparent consideration disclosed is considered low if sale instances of similar other properties in this locality are considered. Your attention is invited to the sale instance of flat no. 512 Ansal Tower, Nehru Place, New Delhi for an apparent consideration of Rs. 15,53,750/-. This sale instance property was agreed to be sold as per Agreement dated 30.11.1993 and consisted of built up area of 424 sq. ft. Therefore, the unit rate per sq. ft. comes to Rs. 15,53,750/- ÷ 424 = Rs. 3665/- per sq. ft. If an adjustment of time gap @ 1% per month at +13% and floor difference of (--) 3% is made, the rate on the basis of this sale instance comes to Rs. 3665 X 1.10 = Rs. 4031 per sq. ft. Therefore, the value of the subject property/flat on the basis of their sale instance works out to Rs. 4031 X 981 sq. ft. Rs. 39,54,411/- as against the apparent consideration disclosed at Rs. 23,01.000/-
4. You are hereby given an opportunity as being heard in this matter and show cause as to why pre-emptive purchase order U/s 269 UD (1) of the Income Tax Act should not be made. For this purpose, you may appear before the Appropriate Authority on 21.3.1995 at 10.30 A.M. either personally or through (sic) your authorized representative. You are also requested to produce
before the Appropriate Authority on the aforesaid date and time the original title deed of the property together with photo copies thereof for verification and return. In case of failure to arrange representation on the aforesaid date and time, necessary orders will be passed in accordance with law on the basis of material already available on record without any further reference to you."
9. As stated above, the hearing was fixed before the Appropriate
Authority on 21.3.1995 at about 10.30 a.m. On 21.3.1995, the petitioner
filed their response which was dated 18.3.1995. They raised two
contentions, that the building "Madhuban" cannot be compared with the
building "Ansal Tower", as in the cause notice dated 10th March, 1995,
which has been reproduced above, the respondent No. 1 had referred to
the sale instance of the Flat No. 512, Ansal Towers, Nehru Place, which
was sold as per the agreement dated 30.11.1993 for Rs. 15,53,750/-. The
petitioner pointed out the difference between two buildings in a chart
enclosed with the reply dated 18.3.1995. The said chart is relevant and is
re-produced below:
"Statement comparison of the building Madhuban with Ansal Tower.
Madhuban Ansal Tower
1. It is a building construction of which has 1. It is building construction of been completed about 20 years back and an which has been old type building. completed about 1½ years back only and a modern type building.
2. Its quality of construction is not as good 2. It's quality of construction as that of Ansal Tower. is very good than Madhuban.
3. Residual life of the building is much less 3. Residual life of building is than that of Ansal Tower because it is a much more than Madhuban old building and construction is not so good. because it is a new building.
4. It is not as prestigious building is Ansal Tower 4. It is a prestigious building th because only Eighth floor is occupied by the as most of building Ist to 15 private sector organization and rest of the floor floor is occupied by the th i.e. Ist to 7 floor are occupied by the Hindustan Multinational companies. Fertilizer corporation.
5. It is not maintained as good as ANSAL Tower. 5. It is maintained better than Madhuban.
6. Common area had facility is much less 6. Common area and
than Ansal Tower. facility is much more than
Madhuban.
7. At (sic) the time of construction of Madhuban 7. At the time of
DDA regulations were not so restrictive than as construction of Ansal Tower
at present when the building Ansal Tower is D.D.A. regulations were more
constructed. restrictive than at the time of
construction of Madhuban.
8. The building Madhuban is inside and not 8. The building Ansal Tower is on
on main road and have no private parking main road and have better
facility. approach and have private
parking facility.
th
9. The office in question is in eight floor which 9. The office compared is in 5 is
a top floor just below the roof which is also in a 15 storied building.
a shed back to the value of the office space.
Note: An office accommodation of about 2000 sq. ft. in the building Ansal Tower
th
has been agreed to be sold in 14 floor some time in May 1994 for a total consideration of Rs. 54.64 lacs i.e. Rs. 2732/- per sq. ft. Thus agreement for sale of th office space in a old building on 8 floor at Rs. 2568/- per sq. ft. is at a fair market price in Dec. 1994."
10. The second contention raised in the reply dated 18.3.1995 was that
difference of one per cent for each floor referred to in the show cause
notice dated 10th March, 1995 was merely an presumption without any
evidence and deduction on account of the higher floor should be much
more.
11. Hearing took place on 21st March, 1995. As noticed above, the
impugned order for acquisition of the property under Section 269 UD (1) of
the Act was passed on 22.03.1995 i.e. one day after the hearing had taken
place.
12. In the impugned order dated 22.3.1995, the Appropriate Authority
has referred to another sale instance in Chiranjeev Tower, which was sold
by public auction by Income Tax Department on 15.2.1995. As per the
Appropriate Authority, the flat in Chiranjeev Tower was sold for Rs. 4558/-
per sq.ft. The impugned order dated 22.3.1995 in paragraph 3 specifically
states that during the course of hearing on the same date, the sale
instance of the flat of Chiranjeev Tower, Nehru Place admeasuring 2919
sq. feet was brought to the notice of the petitioner. As noticed above, the
sale instance of the flat in Chiranjeev Tower, Nehru Place was not
mentioned in the show-cause notice dated 10th March, 1995 and thus was
relied upon by the Appropriate Authority for the first time only at the time of
hearing. The petitioner was not given any time to rebut or offer any
explanation or distinguishing factors in respect of Chiranjeev Tower, Nehru
Place. This was a serious lapse and failure on the part of the Appropriate
Authority. As the Appropriate Authority did not adjourn the hearing or give
even a day's time to the petitioner to respond and an offer an explanation
with regard to the said sale instance, reliance placed on the said sale
instance in the impugned order makes it vulnerable and bad in law.
13. Records produced before us shows that the petitioner, on 22.3.1995,
had prepared and had filed a detailed submissions going into about three
and a half pages. The said submissions, it appears, were not accepted by
the Appropriate Authority and had to be filed at the Dak counter. On the
submission, the Appropriate Authority has recorded "Received at 10.30
a.m. placed on file, signed 23.3.1995". As noticed above the impugned
order was passed on 22.3.1995.
14. In the statement enclosed with the reply dated 18.3.1995, the
petitioner had highlighted the difference between the Madhuban Tower
and Ansal Tower. Madhuban Tower was constructed 20 years back and is
an old building. This is not disputed but an admitted position. Madhuban
Tower does not have any private parking facility. Further, Madhuban
Tower is located inside and is not on the main road, whereas Ansal Tower
is on the main road and has private parking facility. Another distinguishing
factor pointed out by the petitioner was that the property in question was
located on the 8th Floor, the top floor, and the built up area was 896 sq. ft.,
whereas the sale instance of Ansal Tower relied upon to the Appropriate
Authority was of a flat on the 5th Floor in a fifteen story building and of a
smaller size having a built up area of 424 sq. ft.
15. The Appropriate Authority did notice the said differences in their
order dated 22.3.1995 and has stated that in view of the said differences,
they would adjust 5% for superior location and another 5% towards other
amenities. The order dated 22.3.1995 does not state or explain on what
basis, only 10% adjustment in all was allowed. Formula and rational 10%
deduction in all for factors mentioned above is not stated and cannot be
fathomed from the impugned order. The differences pointed out by the
petitioner are substantial and not innocuous or insignificant. These were
relevant and material considerations which are taken into account by every
seller or purchaser before purchasing a property. It is noticeable that the
Valuation Officer of the Appropriate Authority had stated that due to
locational disadvantage (as Ansal Tower was facing main road, whereas
Madhuban Tower was located inside the complex) 10% adjustment was
required. The valuation report did not take into consideration other
aspects like the age of the two properties and the factum that in Madhuban
Tower, there was no parking facility inside the complex. Age of the building
is an important and relevant consideration and a 20 years old construction does
not fetch the same price as a newly constructed commercial flat with
modern amenities. Purchasers and tenants normally have preference for
new buildings, which are better in quality and have more facilities and
considered a better address. Frequent maintenance and expenditure or
cost and inconvenience caused in 20 years' old building are other factors,
which depreciates the market value.
16. Appropriate Authority noticed that the two flats i.e. the flat in
question and the sale instance were located on the different floors i.e. on
8th and 5th floor respectively. Accordingly, deduction of 3% on account of
the floor difference has been given. This may be acceptable and
reasonable. However, no deduction and difference for the area of the flat
in the sale instance has been accounted for. Size of the flat in the sale
instance was smaller by almost 50%. Normally, smaller flats fetch a better
price than larger flats. It is also noticeable that the property in question
was located on the top floor.
17. The agreement to sell in the present case, as noticed above, is
dated 18.12.1994 whereas the agreement of the flat at Ansal Tower relied
upon by the Appropriate Authority is dated 30.11.1993. There is,
therefore, a gap of about 13 months between two sale deeds. Appropriate
Authority has added 1% per month on the sale price of the Ansal Tower
building to compute and calculated the acceptable sale price as on
18.12.1994. This adjustment is on hypothetical basis. Addition of 1% per
month equal to 13% is substantial, cannot be accepted and has been
adversely commented in Kailash Suneja Vs. Appropriate Authority,
(1998) 231 ITR 318 (DEL) wherein at page 352, it has been held as
under:
"What has been done by the Appropriate Authority is 1% is added for every month as if every month there is increase of 1% in the property. The basement potential of the properties considered and barsati potential is taken into account. Taking into account the subject properties tenanted, 6 years deferred value at 8% is calculated and 6 years rent is added to the value arrived at by the above process."
18. In the same judgment, it has been further observed at page 449 as
under:
"The agreement in respect of property G-8, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi, had been entered into in June, 1991, whereas the agreement for the property in question is dated July 1, 1993. We find no legal basis by adding 24 per cent on the hypothetical basis that there would be an increase of 1 per cent every month."
19. The aforesaid decision was made subject matter of the challenge by
Appropriate Authority before the Supreme Court in the case of
Appropriate Authority Vs. Kailash Suneja and the said decision is
reported in (2001) 6 SCC 563. The Supreme Court noticed the adverse
observations of the High Court on the mode of calculation of fair market
value by adding 1% per month in view of the time gap and did not interfere
with the said reasoning.
20. It may be noticed here that the appropriate authority, on the basis of
the sale instance, has come to the conclusion that the differences between
fair market value and the value declared in the agreement dated
18.12.1994 was about 41% less. This was calculated after giving
deduction of 10% on account of superior location and other factors.
However, while calculating the said amount, respondent No. 1 had added
13% adjustment increase because of the difference in the dates of the sale
instance relied upon by them, which is dated 30.11.1993 and the
agreement to sell in the present case, which is dated 18.12.1994. If we
exclude 13% from the said amount, the difference will be about 28%. As
noticed above, there are several other factors which have to be taken into
consideration for downward adjustment for comparison with the price
mentioned in the sale instance. As per the statute for acquisition of a
property under Section 269 UD, the difference between the fair market
value and the apparent consideration in the agreement should be more
than 15%. Keeping in view the facts of the present case, we are not
inclined to remand the matter for a fresh decision. It may be noticed that
there is a substantial time gap between the date of the impugned order
and the present decision. The petitioner has been in occupation of the
property as noticed above. In Kailash Suneja's case (supra), it has been
observed:-
"(15) Normally such cases where the pre-emptive purchase orders are passed in violation of the principles of natural justice may be remanded for fresh decision by the authority but in cases where reasons given by the authority in the order are found to be erroneous, ordinarily the question of remand would not arise and the said cases would be decided on the basis of the material on record."
In the present case, not only was there violation of natural justice, but even
the determination was not done on correct basis.
21. In these circumstances, we allow the present writ petition and quash
the order dated 22.3.1995 and set aside the said order. In the facts and
circumstances, no order as to costs.
SANJIV KHANNA,J
R.V.EASWAR, J
NOVEMBER 11, 2011 akb/vld
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