Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 1693 Del
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ I.T.A. No.1604/2010 & ITA No. 1778/2010
1. I.T.A. No.1604/2010
% Date of Decision: 25.03.2011
Reserved on : 04.03.2011
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - VI ... APPELLANT
Through: Ms.Prem Lata Bansal, Sr. Advocate
with Mr.Deepak Anand, Advocate
Versus
THREE DEE EXIM PVT. LTD. ...RESPONDENT
Through: Dr.Rakesh Gupta with Dr.Raj K.
Agarwal, Ms.Poonam Ahuja, Ms.Rani
Kiyala and Mr.Johnson Bara,
Advocates.
AND
2. ITA No. 1778/2010
Reserved on : 18.03.2011
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - VI ... APPELLANT
Through: Ms.Prem Lata Bansal, Sr. Advocate
with Mr.Deepak Anand, Advocate
Versus
THREE DEE EXIM PVT. LTD. ...RESPONDENT
Through: Dr.Rakesh Gupta with Dr.Raj K.
Agarwal, Ms.Poonam Ahuja, Ms.Rani
Kiyala and Mr.Johnson Bara,
Advocates.
ITA No.1604/2010 & 1778/2010 Page 1 of 20
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in YES
the Digest?
M.L. MEHTA, J.
*
1. These appeals are filed against the common order dated 25th
September, 2009 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") whereby cross-
objections filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1999-
2000 were allowed and consequently appeal of the Income Tax
Officer, Ward 16(2), New Delhi (for short "the Revenue") was
dismissed. Vide this common order both the appeals are being
disposed.
2. The issue raised in the present appeal centered around a narrow
compass. With the consent of the counsel for parties, we heard
the matter finally and propose to dispose of the appeal on the
following substantial question of law:
1. Whether ITAT was correct in law and on facts annulling the assessment framed by the AO under Section 147/143(3) of the Act?
2. Whether ITAT was correct in law in holding that since notice under Section 148 had not been served upon the assessee and therefore, assessment framed by the AO was bad in law?
3. The facts in brief are that the respondent/assessee filed return
for the assessment year 1999-2000 declaring its income at
Rs.4,91,550/-, which was assessed under Section 143 of the
Income Tax Act (for short "the Act"). Thereafter information was
received from DIT (Inv) that the assessee had received
accommodation entries from M/s.Parivartan Financial Services
Pvt. Ltd. and Victoria Advertising Pvt. Ltd. On this information, a
notice dated 27.03.2006 under Section 148 of the Act was issued
by the Assessing Officer (AO) at the address at which the return
of the said year was filed by the assessee. A notice under
Section 142(1) dated 28.02.2006 followed by another notice
dated 6th November, 2006 was issued to the assessee. In
response to this notice, counsel for the assessee appeared
before the AO on 14th November, 2006 and sought adjournment.
On that date, the counsel was given a photocopy of the notice
dated 27th March, 2006 issued under Section 148 of the Act.
Vide letter dated 11th December, 2006, assessee stated that the
return originally filed by it may be treated as return filed in
response to notice under Section 148 of the Act. The AO
proceeded with the assessment proceedings. Certain queries
were raised to which assessee filed details. Thereafter
assessment order was framed by the AO at the income of
Rs.2,11,67,640/- making various additions.
4. The order of the AO was challenged in appeal before the
Commissioner, Income Tax (Appellate) [CIT(A)] on as many as
eleven grounds. One of the grounds on which the impugned
order was passed and which is challenged before us was with
regard to want of service of notice under Section 148 of the Act
on the assessee before finalization of the assessment for the
assessment year 1999-2000. The CIT(A) repelled this contention
of the assessee with the following reasoning:
"It is true that the Assessing Officer has sent the notice dated 27.03.2006 at the address of 3/81 basement, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi. It is also true that the assessee has been filing its return for A.Y.2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 at another address i.e. 5/2, Punjabi Bagh Extn., New Delhi- 110015. The Assessing Officer had also sent one notice under Section 271(1)(c) for AY 2001-02 on 14.02.20056 at the above said address of Punjabi
Bagh only. However, the perusal of the assessment order reveals that the notice dated 27.03.2006 was dispatched by registered post which has been supported with the copy of postal receipt sent by Assessing Officer along with the remand report. The contention of AR is also that the postal receipt should be backed with the evidence of dispatch at RPAD and in absence of the same service is not in accordance with law. He has relied upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Hotline International Pvt. Ltd. 161 Taxman 104 (Del) holding that under order V, Rule 19A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the notice sent by registered post should have been sent along with acknowledgment due and in absence of the same service was not valid. I am not able to convince myself with the arguments of the Counsel for at least three reasons. One, this notice has not been received back. It is settled law that when the notice is sent by the registered post, it is presumed to be served. Second, it is further perused from the assessment order that in any case photo copy of the notice under Section 148 was served upon the AR of the appellant who appeared during the course of the assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer on 24.11.2006. Therefore, the grievance of the assessee regarding non service of the notice no more survives. Three, it can be further sent that the AR of the assessee has been participating in the assessment proceedings from time to time. Queries were given by AO and details were filed by him. In any case it cannot be said that there was been violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the ground of the appellant on this issue is dismissed."
5. The Revenue filed appeal against the order of CIT(A) and
assessee also filed cross-objections before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal allowed the cross-objections of the assessee and
dismissed the appeal of the Revenue on the following reasoning:
"5. ..........Therefore, it could not be said that there had been violation of principles of natural justice. In the case before us it is not a question opportunity of being allowed to the assessee but it relates assumption of jurisdiction u/s 147 of the Act. Providing of opportunity of being head comes next to assumption of jurisdiction to reassess the income. From the above facts, it is clear that the assessee was not served in the notice under Section 148 of the Act. The notice was sent at the address other than the present address of the assessee. Therefore, the service of notice under Section 148 of the Act does not exist and hence the assessing officer, in the absence of proper notice under Section 148 could not have assumed jurisdiction to reassess the income of the assessee. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the assessment made is bad in law."
6. From the impugned order of the Tribunal, it is seen that while
allowing the cross-objections of the assessee, the Tribunal
annulled the assessment holding it bad in law on account of want
of service of notice under Section 148 of the Act. The Tribunal
did not choose to examine the findings of the CIT(A) on
remaining grounds.
7. The question for our determination is to see if the assessment
was bad in law as held by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has arrived
at this finding on the ground that no valid notice under Section
148 of the Act was served upon the assessee before making
assessment by Assessing Officer. This will require interpretation
of Section 148 of the Act. Relevant part of this Section read as
under:-
"148. Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment.
(1) Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under Section 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under Section
8. Referring to the provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 148 of
the Act, learned counsel for the assessee has vehemently argued
that the issue of notice before assessment was a pre-condition
under the sub-Section (1) and since admittedly no notice was
issued at the correct address of the assessee, notice issued at
the wrong address could not be said to be a valid service in the
eyes of law and as such the assessment based on such a notice
was bad in law. In this context, he has relied upon the
judgments of R.K. Upadhyaya v. Shanabhai P. Patel, 166 ITR
163 (SC), CIT v. Mintu Kalia, 253 ITR 334 (Gau),
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji
Kapasi (Decd.), 66 ITR 147 (SC), CIT v. Harish J Punjabi 297
ITR 424 (Del), CIT v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma 311 ITR 235 (Del),
P. N. Sasikumar v. CIT 170 ITR 80 (Ker), CIT v. Mani Kakar
18 DTR 145 and an order of this court in CIT v. Eshaan Holding
P. Ltd. ITA No. 1171 of 2008 dated 31-08-2009.
9. In the case of R.K. Upadhyaya (supra) it was held by the
Supreme Court that since the Assessing Officer had issued notice
of re-assessment under Section 147 by registered post on 31 st
March, 1970, which notice was received by the assessee on 3rd
April, 1970, nevertheless, the notice was not barred by limitation
and retained its legality. A distinction was drawn between "issue
of notice" and "service of notice" on the following observations:-
"...A clear distinction has been made out between "the issue of notice" and "service of notice" under the 1961 Act.
Section 149 prescribes the period of limitation. It categorically prescribes that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued after the prescribed limitation has lapsed. Section 148(1) proves for service of notice as a condition precedent to making the order of assessment. Once a notice is issued within the period of limitation, jurisdiction becomes vested in the Income-tax Officer to proceed to reassess. The mandate of Section 148(1) is that reassessment shall not be made until there has been service. The requirement of issue of notice is satisfied when a notice is actually issued. In this case, admittedly, the notice was issued within the prescribed period of limitation as March 31, 1970, was the last day of that period. Service under the new Act is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to deal with the matter but it is a condition precedent to the making of the order of assessment. The High Court, in our opinion, lost sight of the distinction and under a wrong basis felt bound by the judgment in Banarsi Debi v. ITO [1964]53ITR100(SC) . As the Income-tax Officer had issued notice within limitation, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated. The Income-tax Officer shall now proceed to complete the assessment after complying with the requirement of law. Since there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents, we make no orders for costs."
10. In the case of Mintu Kalita (supra) following R.K. Upadhyaya
(supra) it was held that service of notice under Section 148 for
the purpose of initiating proceedings for reassessment is not a
mere procedural requirement, but it is a condition precedent to
the initiation of proceedings for reassessment. To the same
effect was the finding in the case of Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji
(supra). In the case of Harish J. Punjabi (supra) no notice
under Section 148 was sent or served upon the assessee,
through any manner whatsoever and that being so assessment
was held to be void.
11. The facts of the case of Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra) are
somewhat similar to the instant case inasmuch as in that case
also notice under Section 148 was issued at the old address of
the assessee. The assessee had also appeared before the AO in
response to notice under Section 142(1) of the Act, but, the
assessee had filed his return under protest making it abundantly
clear that he has not received the notice under Section 148.
However, in the present case, the notice under Section 148 was
issued to the assessee at the address as given by it in the return
of the relevant year. The counsel for the assessee had also
appeared before the AO on 14th November, 2006 in response to
notice under Section 142(1) of the Act and was given copy of the
notice under Section 148 of the Act. Then the assessee had also
written letter within a few days thereafter, i.e., on 11 th
December, 2006 stating that the return as originally filed under
Section 143 of the Act be treated as return in pursuance to
notice under Section 148 of the Act. Not only this, various
queries were also raised to which detailed replies were filed by
the assessee. It was only thereafter that the assessment was
framed. That being the position in the present case, the case of
Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra) is distinguishable from the present
case.
12. The reliance has also been placed on the order of this Bench in
CIT v. Eshaan Holding, ITA No.1171/2008 decided on 31st
August, 2009. In this case also, notice was said to have been
served at the old address, whereas the assessee had filed return
for the subsequent years at the new address. In this case, it was
also held that before issuing the notice under Section 148 of the
Act, it was expected of the AO to see if there was any change of
address because valid service of notice is jurisdictional matter
and this a condition precedent for a valid reassessment. The
facts of the said case are also distinguishable from the present
case inasmuch as in this case the assessee had written a letter
to the AO denying the service of notice under Section 148 of the
Act and the entire proceedings were of the same assessment
year. As noted above, in the present case, the counsel for the
assessee had appeared and was given copy of the notice under
Section 148 and a few days thereafter a letter was received from
the assessee stating that the original return be treated as return
in response to notice under Section 148 of the Act. Further in
the present case, the assessment year was 1999-2000 for which
notice was issued at the given address, whereas new address
was given by assessee in the return of AY 2004-2005 & 2005-
2006. Above all, another factor which weighed with the Court
Eshaan Holding (supra) was the tax effect of that case being
about Rs.4.00 lakhs and not thus appealable.
13. The learned counsel also relied upon the case of Haryana
Acrylic Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax
& Anr. (2009) 308 ITR 38. The facts of this case are not
applicable to the present case. This case came to be considered
by the Division Bench of this Court in another case titled
Mayawati v. CIT & Ors. (2010) 321 ITR 349, wherein, issues
were substantially the same as before us in the present case.
Before adverting to the facts and issues in that case, it may be
noted as to what the Division Bench had noted about the factual
matrix of the case of Haryana Acrylic (supra). The Court
observed as under:-
"Various issues had arisen in that case, none of which, in our opinion, are of any relevance to the determination of the questions which fall for determination by us. In Haryana Acrylic it had, inter alia, been opined that for Section 147 to become operational it is essential that it should be alleged that escapement of income is a consequence of the assessee having failed to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for the comprehensive completion of the assessment. What had transpired in that case was that whilst the initiation of the proceedings by the AO for approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax mentioned the failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts relating to the alleged accommodation entries, the "reasons" disclosed to the Assessee on its request merely mentioned those accommodation entries as being the foundation for the belief that income to the extent of Rupees 5,00,000/- had escaped assessment. The distinction between these two situations has been perspicuously emphasised and adumbrated. The finding was that a reason to believe, without the essential concomitant of it being a result of the failure of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts, would render the reassessment under Sections 147/148 unsustainable. In order to overcome this difficulty, it has been argued on behalf of the Revenue that since the AO had duly recorded the failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts this notation should be acted upon and the reasons conveyed to the assessee which were predicated on the Commissioner's noting, should be ignored. The contention of the Revenue was that the assessee had been made aware of the opinion of the AO in the Counter Affidavit of the Revenue filed on 5.11.2007. It was in that context that it was observed
in Haryana Acrylic that six years had elapsed by that time. GKN Driveshafts (India) Limited v. Income Tax Officer (2003) 1 SCC 72 was applied to emphasise the fact that the reasons should have been furnished within a reasonable time. It was clarified that "where the notice has been issued within the said period of six years, but the reasons have not been furnished within that period, in our view, any proceedings pursuant thereto would be hit by the bar of limitation inasmuch as the issuance of the notice and the communication and furnishing of reasons go hand-in- hand. The expression "within a reasonable period of time" as used by the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (supra) cannot be stretched to such an extent that it extends even beyond the six years stipulated in Section 149". The factual matrix in Haryana Acrylic is inapplicable to the sequence of events before us...
14. In the case of Mayawati (supra) this Court referred to various
decisions of different High Courts and noticed that in the context
of Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, it has been held that the
word "issuance of notice" and "service of notice" are not
synonymous and interchangeable, and accordingly, the notice
under this section would lose all its legal efficacy if it had not
been actually served on the assessee within the scheduled and
stipulated time. In this dialectic, a fortiori, since the word
„served‟ is conspicuous by its absence in Section 149, and the
legislature has deliberately used the word „issue‟, actual service
within the period of four and six years specified in the section,
would not be critical. It was further held as under:-
5. On a plain reading of these Sections it is palpably plain that Section 148 of the IT Act enjoins that the AO must serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish a return of his income, in respect of which he/she is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year. Firstly, the notice contemplated by this Section relates to the furnishing of a return and not to the decision to initiate proceedings under Section 147 of the IT Act; secondly, the period of thirty days (omitted by the Finance Act, 1996) is with regard to the furnishing of the return.
6. In stark contrast, Section 149 of the IT Act speaks only of the issuance of a notice under the preceding Section within a prescribed period. Section 149 of the IT Act does not mandate that such a notice must also be served on the assessee within the prescribed period. Speaking for the Division Bench of this Court, I had occasion to observe in CIT v. Shanker Lal Ved Prakash (2007) 212 CTR (Del) 47: (2008) 300 ITR 243(Delhi) the decision in CIT v. Jai Prakash Singh (1996) 132 CTR SC 262: 219 ITR 737 (SC) to the effect that failure to serve a notice under Section 143(2) would not render the assessment as null and void but only as irregular. The decision of the Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Gyan Prakash Gupta (1986) 54 CTR (Raj) 69: (1987) 165 ITR 501 (Raj) opining that an assessment order completed without service of notice under Section 143(2) is not void ab initio and cannot be annulled was noted. Furthermore, from a reading of that judgment, it is evident that it had not been seriously contended that the notice under Section 149 of the IT Act must also be served within the period set-down in that Section since the discussion centered upon Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 which specifies that service of such a notice would be presumed to be legally proper as it would be deemed to have been delivered in the ordinary course at the correct address. It had, inter alia, been expressed that: "while there would be no justification for enlarging the period of limitation prescribed by the statute itself, we should also not lose sight of the fact that disadvantage or discomfort of the assessee is only that he has to explain the correctness and veracity of the return filed by him. A reasonable balance of burden of proof must also, therefore, be maintained. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that because notice was dispatched on August 25, 1998 and was duly addressed and stamped, the Department has succeeded in proving its service before August 31, 1998. On the other hand, the assessee has failed to prove a statement that he received the notice only on 1.9.1998. Where a statute postulates the issuance of a notice and not its service, a fortiori the presumption of fiction of service must be drawn on the lines indicated in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
15. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Division
Bench in the aforesaid case of Mayawati (supra) that what is
contemplated under Section 149 is the "issuance of notice"
under Section 148 and not the service thereof on the assessee
and further that the "service of notice" under Section 148 is only
required before the assessment, reassessment or re-
computation.
16. Learned counsel also relied upon the case of Kanubhai M.
Patel (HUF) v. Hiren Bhatt or his Successors to Office &
Others, (2010) 43 DTR (Guj) 329 to substantiate that the notice
issued six years after the expiry of assessment year was barred
by limitation and assessment made thereon was void ab initio.
In this case, a notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was
apparently held to be issued after the expiry of six years and in
that way of the matter, the notice was held to be bad in law. It
was in this background that it was held that there was no need of
filing of objection by the assessee against the reopening of the
assessment under Section 147 of the Act as no useful purpose
was to be served by asking the petitioner to undertake the said
exercise. So, that case is also absolutely distinguishable from
the present case.
17. Learned counsel for the assessee also relied upon the cases of
Fateh Chand Agarwal v. CWT, 97 ITR 701 (Orissa); B. Johar
Forest Works v. CIT, 107 ITR 409 (J&K) and R.L. Narang v.
CIT, 136 ITR 108 (Del). All these cases relate to service of notice
on persons, not authorised by of the assessee. That being not
the position in the present case, these cases are not applicable.
18. In view of our discussions as above, we are of the view that
service of notice, a contemplated pre-condition before
assessment would be a question of fact depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, not
only that no objection was raised with regard to non-issue of
notice dated 27.03.2006, the assessee vide its letter dated 11 th
December, 2006 adopted the return as originally filed as the
return in response to the said notice under Section 148. It was
only thereafter that the AO proceeded with the reassessment
proceedings. During the assessment proceedings, certain
queries were raised to which the assessee gave detailed
response. Even during the reassessment proceedings no
objection was raised of any kind with regard to defect or
irregularity in the notice. In a given situation, as in the present
case when the assessee appears before the Assessing Officer
and is given copy thereof before assessment and also makes
correspondence and participates in the assessment proceedings,
notice issued at old address available on record may constitute
service of notice. In such circumstances, the service of copy of
notice also would be service of notice within the ambit of Section
148(1) of the Act.
19. Learned counsel for the Revenue also submitted that the
Tribunal has ignored the provisions of Section 292BB of the Act
which lays down that where an assessee has appeared in any
proceedings or co-operated in any inquiry relating to an
assessment or reassessment, it shall be deemed that any notice
under any provision of this Act, which is required to be served
upon him, has been duly served upon him in time and the
assessee shall be precluded from taking any objection in any
proceedings or inquiry under the Act that notice was not served
upon him or was served in an improper manner. In this regard,
it may be stated that this provision came to be inserted by the
Finance Act, 2008 with effect from 1st April, 2008 and is not
applicable to the assessment year in question. However, this
provision also substantiates our finding that in the given
circumstances as in the present case, service of notice before
assessment could be inferred. The participation by the assessee
in the assessment proceedings on receipt of the copy of the
notice can be deemed to be service of notice within the ambit of
Section 148(1) of the Act. That is what is the legislative intent of
"service of notice" on assessee under this section that no
assessment under Section 147 can be finalized before the
assessee has sufficient notice thereof.
20. Thus, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not correct on
facts and law to annul the assessment framed by the Assessing
Officer. Consequently, we answer the questions in affirmative in
favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Since the
Tribunal has not dealt with the findings of the CIT(A) on the
remaining ten questions, the matter is remanded back to the
Tribunal to decide the appeals afresh keeping in view our above
findings with regards to the notice under Section 148 of the Act.
M.L. MEHTA (JUDGE)
A.K. SIKRI (JUDGE) MARCH 25, 2011 Dev/AK
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