Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 1488 Del
Judgement Date : 15 March, 2011
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: March 08, 2011
Judgment Pronounced on: March 15, 2011
+ IA No. 7657/2009 in CS(OS) No.655/2008
WIN CABLE & DATACOM PVT. LTD. ....Plaintiff
- versus -
M/S GRASS LINK ADVERTISING
PVT. LTD. & ANR. .....Defendants
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Rohit Jain, Adv.
For the Defendant: Mr. N. Kumar, Adv. for def. no. 1
Mr. Gajinder Kumar with Ms. Kajal
Bhati, Advs. for def. no. 2
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1.
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes
V.K. JAIN, J
1. This is a suit for recovery of Rs. 24,69,079/-. The
plaintiff company is engaged in the business of reception
and distribution of satellite television, broadcast signal and
other electronic signal primarily to various local cable
operators and business affiliates. Defendant No. 1 is
running an advertising agency which procures
advertisements from various companies for advertising
through cable feed of the plaintiff company. Defendant no.2
is a leading multinational company and the case of the
plaintiff is that the defendant no. 1, while placing orders for
running advertisements on the cable network of the plaintiff
company, was acting as an agent of defendant no. 2
company. It is alleged that the plaintiff company, on
request of defendant no. 1 advertised products of defendant
no. 2 through its cable network and raised invoices on the
defendants from time to time. A sum of Rs. 21,09,335/- is
stated to be outstanding against the defendants towards
payment for the advertisements carried by the plaintiff
company on its network. The case of the plaintiff is that the
defendants have failed to pay the outstanding amount
despite repeated requests. It has accordingly sought
recovery of the principal amount of Rs. 21,09,335/- along
with interest amounting to Rs. 3,59,744/-.
2. In its written statement, the defendant no. 2 has
taken a preliminary objection that this is barred by Order 2
Rule 2 CPC, as the suit amount was not claimed by the
plaintiff company in a previously instituted suit which is
pending in the Court of Additional District Judge. It is
claimed by defendant no. 1 that it was maintaining a
running account with the plaintiff company and there was
no system of maintaining separate accounts for each client
of defendant no. 1 company. On merits, it is alleged that
the invoices have been raised by the plaintiff company
immediately on receipt of release order and without running
the advertisements, meaning thereby that they are merely
proforma invoices which get their confirmation only on
successful running of the advertisement as per the release
order, which, in turn, can be established through the
telecast certificate, with the CDs accompanied by a
monitoring report issued by an independent agency, along
with telecast certificate. According to the defendant, no
such monitoring report has been filed by the plaintiff
company.
It is further alleged that on instructions and
specifications from its client, the defendant no. 1 purchased
advertising time/space in various advertising media
including electronic media. It is claimed that defendant no.
2 had assigned the work of carrying out of advertisements to
defendant no. 1, based upon which it had placed release
orders on the plaintiff company.
3. I.A. No. 7657/2009 has been filed by defendant
No.1 under Order VII Rule 11 read with Order 2 Rule 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. The case of the applicant/defendant No.1 is that
the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of the Code of Civil Procedure since it is barred by Order 2
Rule 2 thereof. Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides for rejection of the plaint, if the suit
appears, from the statement made in the plaint to be barred
by any law.
5. The legal proposition in the matter is well- settled.
The Court while considering an application for rejection of
the plaint can look into only the averments made in the
plaint and the documents filed by the plaintiff. The defence
taken by the defendant is not to be considered while
examining such an application and validity of the
documents filed by the plaintiff also cannot be examined at
this stage.
6. A Division Bench of this Court in Inspiration
Clothes & U Vs. Colby International Ltd., 88 (2000) DLT
769, held that the power to reject the plaint can be
exercised only if the Court comes to the conclusion that
even if all the allegations are taken to be proved, the plaintiff
would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. It was also
observed that where the plaint is based on a document, the
Court will be entitled to consider the said document also to
ascertain if a cause of action is disclosed in the plaint or not
though the validity of the document cannot be considered at
this stage. In Avtar Singh Narula & Anr. Vs. Dharambir
Sahni & Anr. 150 (2008) DLT 760 (DB), this Court reiterated
that the power to reject the plaint has to be exercised
sparingly and cautiously though it does have the power to
reject the plaint in a proper case.
In Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of
India Staff Assn. 2005 7 SCC 510, Supreme Court noted
that the real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is to keep irresponsible law suits out of the
Courts and discard bogus and irresponsible litigation. It was
further held that dispute questions cannot be decided at the
time of considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule
11 of CPC.
7. In the present case, the suit cannot be said, on the
basis of averments made in the plaint and the documents
filed by the plaintiff, that the suit is barred by any law. In
fact there is no reference in the plaint or in the documents
filed by the plaintiff, to the suit stated to be pending before
the learned Additional District Judge. Therefore, Order VII
Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure doesn't seem to be
attracted.
8. On merits, the application has been opposed by
the plaintiff. It is stated in the reply that the plaintiff
company has been raising individual invoices in respect of
advertisements which were being carried on its cable feed
on the instructions of defendant No.1 and defendant No.1
had been representing three different multinational
companies before the plaintiff company and each invoice
carried the name of the concerned multinational company
as well as of defendant No.1. It is further stated that the
suits of the plaintiff pending in this Court, before the
Additional District Judge, Delhi and before the Civil Judge,
Delhi are based on various release orders and invoices and
are not based solely on the statement of accounts filed with
the suits. According to the plaintiff, the amounts, which
these multinational companies owe to the plaintiff company
cannot be clubbed in one suit, their liability towards the
plaintiff company being distinct and separate from others.
9. During the course of the arguments, the learned
counsel for the applicant/defendant No.1 stated that he was
pressing the application only under Order 2 Rule 2 of the
CPC.
Order II Rule 2 CPC to the extent it is relevant
provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim
which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause
of action and where he omits to sue in respect of, or
intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall
not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or
relinquished. The explanation below this Rule to the extent
it is relevant provides that successive claims arising under
the same obligation shall be deemed to constitute one cause
of action.
10. The expression 'cause of action', in the context of
Order II Rule 2 of CPC would mean all those facts which the
plaintiff in order to obtain judgment will have to prove, if
disputed by the defendant. In order to succeed, the plaintiff
will have to prove (i) that defendant No.1, while placing
release orders for advertisements to be carried on the cable
feed of the plaintiff, was acting as an agent of defendantNo.2
company; (2) the release orders placed by defendant No.1
with the plaintiff company from time to time; (3) carrying of
advertisements in terms of the release orders on the cable
feed; (4) that the advertisements were carried by it in
conformity with the release orders placed by defendant No.1
and (5) the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled for
carrying the advertisements on its cable feed. When
different orders are placed from time to time and those
orders are executed on different dates, each order for
carrying advertisements of a particular company would
constitute a distinct and separate cause of action. If all the
advertisements are carried on different dates but under a
common/umbrella contract/order for carrying
advertisements, all the advertisements carried pursuant to
such contract/order may constitute a common cause of
action, despite the advertisement being carried on different
dates. But, where the release orders are distinct, it cannot
be said that all of them constitute a common cause of
action. In order to succeed in the suit, the plaintiff will be
required to prove each and every order placed by defendant
no.1 with it as also carrying of advertisements in terms of
those release orders. In a given case, the parties may agree
that despite orders being placed on different dates and also
being executed on different dates, all the executions of such
orders will constitute a common cause of action or will be
deemed to be part of one unified contract for carrying such
advertisements. However, in the present case, this is not
the case of the parties that the advertisements, which the
plaintiff carried on different dates were executed under a
common contract/order placed by defendant No.1 on it nor
do the parties claim that they had agreed to treat all the
release orders placed on different dates as a
common/unified contract thereby converting it into a
common cause of action.
11. In K.E.A.K. Ahmed Sahib & Co. v. M.K. Pakir
Mohamed Rawther, 1924 Rangoon 145, a Division Bench
of the High Court was of the view that each order and
delivery of goods is a separate transaction and a separate
cause of action, unless they are successive claims arising
under the same obligation within the explanation at the end
of rule 2 of Order 2. It was further observed that the
question is really dependent on the contract between the
parties. If all the goods were supplied under a single
contract, it would be within the explanation, unless there
was an express stipulation that each delivery or each
month's deliveries should be deemed to be a separate
contract. It was also observed that it was possible that in a
particular case, there may be either a contract, or a course
of dealing from which an implied contract might be inferred
to the effect that the entire series in a particular month or
for other specific period should be treated as a single cause
of action. However, in the case before this Court, neither
there is any contract between the parties to treat all the
transactions as a single contract giving rise to single cause
of action nor is it the case of the parties that the goods were
supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant on different dates
under a single contract.
12. Moreover, the case of the plaintiff before this Court
is that defendant No.1 was acting as an agent of defendant
No.2 while placing release orders with it for carrying
advertisements of defendant No.2 on its cable feed.
Presumably, same is the case of the plaintiff with respect to
advertisements of the other two multinational companies
carried by it on its cable feed, on the instructions of
defendant No.1. At this stage, the Court cannot go into
merits of the case set up by the plaintiff in this regard and
cannot decide whether defendant No.1 while placing release
orders with the plaintiff company was acting as agent of
defendant No.2 or not. If defendant No.1, while placing
release orders with the plaintiff company was acting as the
agent of various multinational companies represented by it,
it was not open to the plaintiff to implead all the three
multinational companies in the same suit, the cause of
action being different against these separate multinational
companies. Order 1 Rule 3 of the CPC, to the extent it is
relevant, provides that all persons may be joined in one suit
as defendants where (a) any right to relief in respect of, or
arising out of , the same act or transaction or series of acts
or transactions is alleged to exist against such persons,
whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) if
separate suits were brought against such persons, any
common question of law or fact would arise. The plaintiff
company could not have claimed any relief against
defendant No.2 before this Court in the suit, which it had
filed against defendant No.1 M/s Grass Link Advertisement
Pvt. Ltd. and T.C.L. Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and is stated to be
pending in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Delhi.
Therefore, it is difficult to accept that the suit is hit by Order
2 Rule 2 of the CPC merely because in the suit filed against
defendant No.1 and T.C.L. Electronics Pvt. Ltd., the plaintiff
company did not claim the amount involved in the suit.
13. The learned counsel for defendant no.1 has relied
upon the decision of Gujarat High Court in Gujarat
Electricity Board, Baroda and others v. Saurashtra
Chemicals, Porbandar, AIR 2004 Gujarat 83. A perusal
of the judgment would show that the suit in the case before
Gujarat High Court was based on accounts, the subject
matter of the previously instituted suit as well as the
subsequently instituted suit was the same and so were the
parties to the suit, except that State of Gujarat, which was
joined as party defendant in the earlier suit was not joined
as a defendant in the subsequent suit. The Court felt that a
tricky omission of one of the party defendants in whose
absence effective and executable decree could be passed,
would not help the plaintiff in bringing the second suit on
the same cause of action or grievance. It was in these
circumstances that the subsequently instituted suit was
held to be barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC. The facts of
the case before this Court, however, are entirely different.
Each advertisement carried by the plaintiff pursuant to the
release order placed with it by defendant No.1 constitutes a
distinct cause of action and the parties to the previously
instituted two suits are not common since defendant No.2
was not a party to the previously instituted suit whereas
T.C.L. Electronics Pvt. Ltd. is not a party to the present suit.
Since the case of the plaintiff company is that defendant
No.1 was acting as an agent of defendant No.2, it cannot be
said that defendant No.2 is an unnecessary party to the
suit. This judgment, therefore, does not help the applicant
in any manner.
14. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs,
I find no merit in the application and the same is hereby
dismissed.
CS(OS) No.655/2008
The parties shall appear before the Joint Registrar
on 29th March, 2011 for admission/denial of documents.
The matter be listed before the Court on 1st September,
2011 for framing of issues.
(V.K. JAIN) JUDGE MARCH 15, 2011 vkm
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