Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 1394 Del
Judgement Date : 10 March, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% W.P.(C) 7267 OF 2000
+ Date of Decision: 10th March, 2011
# MANAGING COMMITTEE DAISY
DALES SR. SEC. SCHOOL & ANR. ...Petitioners
! Through: Mr. Kuldeep Kumar &
Mr. O.P. Sisodia, Advs.
Versus
$ RAJINDER SINGH MALIK & ORS. ...Respondents
Through: Mr. Duli Chand Malik &
Mr. D.S. Choudhary, Advs.
CORAM:
* HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K.BHASIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? (No)
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? (No)
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the digest? (No)
JUDGMENT
P.K.BHASIN, J:
This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India was filed against the judgment dated 21st September, 2000 of
the Delhi School Tribunal (to be referred to hereinafter as the „the
tribunal‟) constituted under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973
whereby the petitioners herein were directed to take back in service
respondent no.1 herein who was employed by them as a Laboratory
Assistant in Daisy Dales Senior Secondary School, East of Kailash
(petitioner no.2 herein and which shall be referred to hereinafter as „the
School‟) w.e.f. 01/07/96.
2. The relevant facts may first be briefly be noticed before
proceeding further to consider the grounds of challenge taken by the
petitioner in this petition against the impugned judgment of the tribunal.
On 1st July, 1996 the respondent no.1 was appointed as a Laboratory
Assistant in the School. The respondent no.1 claimed that was not being
paid his salary as per the pay scales fixed by the 5th Pay Commission
and when he started claiming that the management of the school
decided to get rid of him and therefore without any rhyme or reason
terminated his services w.e.f. 3rd July, 1998 by not permitting him to
join duty that day when he had reported for duty after the summer
vacations of the school. He was also not paid his salary for the months
of April to June, 1998 when he had gone to the School on 2nd July, 1998
and had asked for his salary ,he was told that the School was not in a
position to pay according to the new pay scales and was offered salary
@ Rs.1900/- p.m. only which he refused to accept. . Feeling aggrieved
by the decision of the School not to allow him duty w.e.f. 3rd July,
1998, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing an appeal on 20th
July, 1998 seeking his reinstatement in service and also for a direction
to the School to pay him his salary as per the new grades and that too
by cheques.
3. The School contested that petition before the Tribunal. In its
reply it admitted that respondent no.1 was appointed as a Laboratory
Assistant and it was also stated that he was appointed in the pay scale of
975-25-1150-EB-30-1540. It also took the plea he was given the
appointment subject to his producing past experience certificate from
any recognized school. However, he did not produce that certificate.
The Director of Education also informed the School vide its letter dated
20th March, 1998 that the respondent no.1 was over age. The respondent
no.1 had then instead of producing the experience certificate stopped
coming to School from 1st April, 1998 onwards and thereafter he came
to the school only on 2nd July, 1998 to claim his salary for the months
of April to June, 1998 but since he was absenting from duty
continuously during that period and had not reported for duty despite
repeated notices he was not paid any salary. It was denied that the
School had offered to pay him salary @ Rs.1900/- p.m. It was claimed
that he was paid Rs.3800/- on 2nd July,1998 but not as his salary and
that money was paid only to enable him to tide over his emergent need.
Regarding the prayer of respondent no.1 for payment of his salary as
per the new pay scales the School‟s reply was that "As the new pay
scales were implemented by the school only after the petitioner
left/deserted his job w.e.f. 1-4-98 hence his ineligibility for the new
pay scales."
4. The learned tribunal accepted the case of respondent no.1 herein
that his services had been terminated illegally as a major penalty
without holding any enquiry and following principles of natural justice
as provided under Rule 120 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973
and directed his reinstatement in service with all the consequential
benefits .Feeling aggrieved the management of the School has filed this
writ petition for setting aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal.
5. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that
the School where the respondent no. 1 was appointed is governed by
the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and the Rules
framed thereunder but it was submitted that this is not a case of
termination of the services of respondent no.1 by the School by way of
removal or dismissal but a case of abandonment of job by him by
absenting from duty from 1/04/98. It was also argued that since the
appointment of respondent no. 1 was conditional upon his producing
past experience certificate and since he had not produced the same his
appointment never got regularized and being temporary employment,
as was evident from the appointment letter dated 1 st July, 1996, it
cannot be in any event said to be a case of dismissal or removal from
service and so the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain his appeal
and order his reinstatement in service with consequential benefits. In
support of these submissions learned counsel cited some decisions of
this Court reported as 2000 IV AD (DELHI) 808, "Delhi Public
School & Ors. Vs. Mrs. Kelki Aggarwal & Anr.", 125 (2005) DLT
797, "Smita Paul Vs. Principal, St. Anthony's Senior Secondary
School & Anr." and 111(2004) DLT 374, "Mrs. P.L. Agarwal (since
deceased through LRs) Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors.". It was also
submitted by the learned counsel that since services of respondent no. 1
were admittedly governed by the provisions of Delhi School Education
Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder, respondent no. 1 by virtue
of Rule 105 was supposed to have been appointed on probation for a
period of one year and that period of probation could be extended by
the appointing authority i.e. Management of the School, with the prior
approval of the Director of Education and his services could be
terminated without any notice during the period of probation. It was
also contended that since in the present case there was no formal order
of confirmation of the services of respondent no. 1 on the completion of
initial period of probation of one year his further continuation in
services was also on probation and therefore, even if it is accepted that
the school had terminated his services the same could not be said to be
illegal for want of any domestic enquiry against him. In support of this
submission learned counsel relied upon another judgment of this Court
reported as ILR (1987) II Delhi 591, "Wing Commander S.K. Singh
Vs. Lt. Governor".
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 had
submitted that it was a clear case of termination of the services of
respondent no. 1 on the ground of alleged absence from duty and
therefore, the learned Tribunal had rightly come to the conclusion that
the services of the respondent no. 1 having been terminated without
holding an enquiry, as provided under Rule 120 of the Delhi Education
Rules, 1973 ,he was entitled to be reinstated in service.
7. As far as the plea taken in the present writ petition to the effect
that the respondent no. 1 had been given appointment purely on
temporary basis is concerned, the same cannot be entertained since no
such case was pleaded nor was any appointment letter placed before the
learned Tribunal. As noticed already, the School had in its reply to the
appeal of the respondent no. 1 before the Tribunal had only claimed
that the appointment of respondent no. 1 was subject to his producing
past experience certificate from any recognized School and it was not
the stand before the Tribunal taken by the School that the services of
respondent no. 1 had been dispensed with because of his failure to
produce the experience certificate nor was its stand before the Tribunal
that the Director of Education had asked the school to terminate the
services of respondent no. 1 because of his being overage or non-
production of past experience certificate by him. Similarly, the
submission made by the counsel for the petitioner before this court that
the employment of respondent no. 1 being on probation could in any
case be terminated without any notice etc. cannot be entertained since
this stand was also not taken before the Tribunal.
8. Now I come to the plea of the petitioner that it had not terminated
the services of the respondent no. 1 but he himself had abandoned his
services by not reporting for duty w.e.f. 1st April, 1998 onwards. It was
submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners and as had been
averred in the writ petition also that since respondent no. 1 had not
reported for duty despite being called upon by the School to do so his
name was removed from the rolls of the School. Thus, the fact remains
that the services of respondent no. 1 stood terminated because of
removal of his name from the rolls of the school by the management by
treating his absence from duty as abandonment of the job by him. In my
view, the name of respondent no. 1 could not have been removed from
the rolls of the School by ITS management on the assumption that he
had abandoned his job since there is no such Rule under the Delhi
School Education Rules, 1973 giving the authority to the management
of a school governed by the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 to strike
off the name of any employee from its rolls because of unauthorized
absence treating the same is abandonment of job by the absentee
employee. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court had in "The Regional
Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Vijay Krishna Neema & Ors.",
AIR 2009 SC 2200 observed that what constitutes abandonment may be
a matter of statutory provision or agreement between the employer and
the employee. Here, there is no statutory provision in that regard and
there was no question of any such agreement between the School and
respondent no.1 since the terms of employment of the employees of the
Schools governed by the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 are
governed by this Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Thus, in the
absence of any such rule permitting termination of services of an
employee of a School on the ground of abandonment of the job by the
employee the management of the school could not have removed the
name of respondent no. 1 from its rolls. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court
had also observed in "V.C., Banaras Hindu University and Ors. Vs.
Shrikant", AIR 2006 SC 2304 that the employer cannot create a new
exit door for the employee to throw him out of service on the ground of
abandonment of job by the employee when the Rules do not give that
authority to the employer. Therefore, in the present case the removal of
the name of respondent no. 1 from the rolls of the School on the
assumption that he had abandoned his job did amount to termination of
his services because of the misconduct of unauthorized absence from
duty on his part which, as rightly concluded by the learned Tribunal
also , could not have been done without holding an enquiry in which it
could be decided whether respondent no. 1 had committed the
misconduct of unauthorised absence from duty or not.
9. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and there
being no scope for any interference in the impugned judgment of the
Tribunal, this writ petition is dismissed with costs.
P.K. Bhasin, J
March 10, 2011/pg
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