Avtar Singh Grewal vs Union Of India
2011 Latest Caselaw 3348 Del

           THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                   Judgment delivered on: 15.07.2011


+            W.P. (CRL.) 1081/2010


AVTAR SINGH GREWAL                             ...           Petitioner


                                   Versus


UNION OF INDIA                                 ...           Respondent

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, Sr Advocate with Mr V.K. Ohri, Mr Maheen Pradhan and Mr Akshay Malik For the Respondent : Mr A.S. Chandhiok, ASG with Mr Baldev Malik, Mr A.K. Wali and Mr P.S. Parmar

CORAM:-

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED HON'BLE MR JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? YES

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed that the order

dated 19.07.2010 passed by the learned ACMM, New Delhi directing the

detention of the petitioner pursuant to the inquiry report dated

09.07.2010 be set aside and the petitioner be set at liberty. The

impugned inquiry report dated 09.07.2010 was made by the learned

ACMM under the provisions of The Extradition Act, 1962 (hereinafter

referred to as „the said Act‟). The impugned order dated 19.07.2010,

whereby the petitioner, being a fugitive criminal, was committed to

prison to await the orders of the Central Government, was also passed

pursuant to the inquiry report under the said Act.

2. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, the learned senior counsel, appearing on

behalf of the petitioner, has challenged the said order on three counts.

The first ground is based on the doctrine of "Speciality" and specifically

on Section 31(1)(c) of the said Act. It was argued that the State of

Arizona in the United States of America, where the petitioner is sought to

be tried, permits an extradited person to also be tried for crimes /

offences other than those for which he was extradited. According to the

learned counsel for the petitioner, this provision is to be found in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 51: Fugitives from Justice and

specifically in Article 51.13, para 26, which, according to the learned

counsel for the petitioner, is the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable

in the United States of America. Thus, according to the learned counsel

for the petitioner, the provisions of Section 31(1)(c) of the said Act are

triggered and, therefore, the fugitive criminal is not to be surrendered or

returned to the United States of America.

3. The second point urged before us by the learned counsel for

the petitioner was that Article 8 of the Extradition Treaty between the

Government of the United States of America and the Government of the

Republic of India entered into on 25.06.1997 in Washington, USA

(hereinafter referred to as „the said Treaty‟) would also come into play

and, therefore, the Requested State may refuse extradition. Article 8 of

the said Treaty deals with „Capital Punishment‟ and stipulates that when

an offence, for which extradition is punishable by death under the laws in

the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the

Requested State, the Requested State may refuse extradition, unless, of

course, the conditions stipulated in clauses (a) or (b) contained therein

are fulfilled. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the

offence, inter alia, made out as per the indictment, includes the death

sentence. He submitted that, according to him, under the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟), the offence would not

amount to murder, but would be one which would fall under Exception

No.1 or Exception No.4 in Section 300 IPC. Thus, it was submitted by

the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence would not be

murder, but would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As

such, it would not be punishable under Section 302 IPC, but under

Section 304 IPC, even if the prosecution case is established. If that were

to be so, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, since the

punishment under Section 304 does not include a death sentence, there

would be a violation of Article 8 of the said Treaty if the petitioner is

extradited to the United States of America.

4. The third and the final point urged by the learned counsel for

the petitioner was that the documents accompanying the request for

extradition were not duly authenticated in accordance with Article 10 of

the said Treaty and, therefore, the procedural safeguard had not been

complied with. Consequently, it was submitted, the petitioner ought not

to be extradited and the impugned order be set aside.

5. Mr A.S. Chandhiok, the learned Additional Solicitor General,

appearing on behalf of the Union of India, controverted the arguments

advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He, first of all, submitted that the

doctrine of "Speciality", that was sought to be invoked by the petitioner,

has not at all been violated in the present case. He submitted that Section

31(1)(c) which enshrines the said Treaty, has not been contravened in the

present case. The reference to Article 51.13 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

misplaced inasmuch as it does not deal with the laws of the State of

Arizona, but it pertains to the State of Texas. Moreover, he submitted

that even if there were to be a similar provision in the Code of Criminal

Procedure pertaining to the State of Arizona, that would be of no

consequence because, in the present case, we are concerned with

international extradition, whereas that provision relates to extradition in

between the States of the United States of America.

6. With regard to the plea based on Article 8 of the said Treaty,

Mr Chandhiok submitted that the arguments advanced by the learned

counsel for the petitioner are once again not in consonance with the plain

meaning of Article 8 of the said Treaty. He submitted that the argument

is based on a presumption that the case against the petitioner is one of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder. He submitted that the facts,

as they stand, are that the petitioner has been indicted for murder and it is

a matter of trial as to whether the prosecution is able to establish this

charge or not. At this stage, it cannot be said, prima facie, that the case

is not of murder. Thus, according to Mr Chandhiok, the petitioner cannot

take any aid or assistance from Article 8 of the said Treaty.

7. Lastly, Mr Chandhiok submitted that even the plea with

regard to documents not being in conformity with Article 10 of the said

Treaty, is not tenable. He submitted that all the documents were certified

in the manner prescribed and they have been authenticated as such. He

also submitted that the documents have been received by the Government

of India from the United States Government in a condition which clearly

indicates that they have not been tampered with inasmuch as the seals are

intact. Consequently, Mr Chandhiok submitted that there is no infirmity

or illegality in the impugned inquiry report dated 09.07.2010 and / or the

order dated 19.07.2010, whereby the petitioner has been committed to

prison by the learned ACMM to await the orders of the Central

Government. He, therefore, submitted that the writ petition be dismissed.

8. Before analyzing the arguments advanced by the counsel for

the parties, it would be appropriate if the background facts leading to the

extradition request are briefly mentioned. As per the documents on

record, the case against the petitioner is that on 30.03.2007, the police

authorities of Phoenix, Arizona, USA found the dead body of one

Navneet Kaur in her home at 4218, East Redwood Lane, Phoenix. The

police also found a broken glass in the kitchen floor, a knife on the bed

of the Master Bedroom and a ceiling fan torn away from the ceiling. The

body of Navneet Kaur was found lying face down in a bath tub located

on the first floor of the said house. There were blood stains throughout

the house and primary indications were that Navneet Kaur had suffered

blunt force trauma and strangulation as a cause of her death. A note

which purportedly was signed by the fugitive criminal (the petitioner

herein), confessing to his killing his wife (Navneet Kaur) and stating his

intent to kill himself also was found in the said home. One Mr Ganesh

Kumar Kodavuru, a neighbour of the deceased, had seen the petitioner

backing out from the driveway of the deceased in a black BMW car. The

petitioner is said to have spoken briefly to the said neighbour and then

parked the said BMW car in the garage of the house and then left the

place in a taxi. The investigation further revealed that the petitioner, who

resides in Abbotsford, British Columbia, Canada, flew to Phoenix from

Vancouver on 29.03.2007 following a discussion with Navneet Kaur

during which she allegedly told him that she wanted a divorce. The

prosecution case against the petitioner is further that friends of the

deceased Navneet Kaur had told the investigating authorities that she

(Navneet Kaur) had narrated to them that she had asked her husband (the

petitioner herein) for a divorce and that he had told her that a divorce

would only happen if she were dead. Further investigation revealed that

from the petitioner‟s credit card activity, the petitioner, following the

death of Navneet Kaur, purchased an airline ticket to Newark to New

Jersey, USA and from there a ticket to New Delhi, India where he arrived

on 31.03.2007. On the basis of the investigation, the Superior Court of

the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa, on 03.04.2007,

passed an indictment charging that in Maricopa County, Arizona:

"COUNT 1:

AVTAR GREWAL, on or about the 29th day of March, 2007, intending or knowing that his conduct would cause death, with premeditation caused the death of NAVNEET KAUR, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1101, 13-1105, 13-3601, 13-702, 13-702.01, 13-703, 13- 703.01 and 13-801.

The State of Arizona further alleges that the offense charged in this court is a dangerous felony because the offense involved the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury upon NAVNEET KAUR, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-604 (P).

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE AVTAR GREWAL, on or about the 29th day of March, 2007, acting either alone or with one or more persons, committed or attempted to commit Burglary, Second Degree, and in the course of and in furtherance of such offense, or immediate flight from such offense, AVTAR GREWAL or another person caused the death of NAVNEET KAUR, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13- 1105, 13-1101, 13-702, 13-702.01, 13-703, 13-703.01 and 13-801."

9. On 21.05.2007, the Embassy of the United States of America

requested for the extradition of Avtar Singh Grewal (the petitioner

herein) to the United States in connection with the said indictment. It

may also be pertinent to mention that the petitioner had been arrested by

the authorities in India at the Indira Gandhi International Airport on

31.03.2007 pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice.

10. Thereafter, by an order dated 28.05.2007 under Section 5 of

the said Act and pursuant to the said Treaty, the learned Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM), Patiala House Courts, New Delhi was

requested to inquire into the alleged offence. The extradition request

alongwith all enclosures received from the Government of USA for the

extradition of the petitioner, including the warrant of arrest issued by the

Superior Court of the State of Arizona was sent alongwith the said order

dated 28.05.2007. Thereafter, the learned ACMM conducted the inquiry

and, after examining the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that

the prescribed procedure had been followed inasmuch as the extradition

had been received through diplomatic channels alongwith the documents

and the required documents as per Article 9(1)(2)(3) of the said Treaty.

He also concluded that (a) the offence alleged against the petitioner was

an extraditable offence; (b) the information and the material furnished by

the Requesting State (USA) alongwith the request for extradition, prima

facie, showed the commission of the offence alleged against the

petitioner; and (c) a prima facie case was made out in support of the

requisition by the Government of USA for extradition of the petitioner.

By virtue of the said inquiry report, the petitioner was also informed of

his right to file a written statement in terms of Section 7(4) of the said

Act for the consideration of the Central Government. Thereafter, on

19.07.2010, by a separate order, the petitioner was directed to be

committed to prison to await the decision of the Government of India on

his extradition.

11. As observed in Daya Singh Lahoria etc. v. Union of India

and Ors. etc: 2001 (4) SCC 516, extradition is always necessary and no

fugitive can be given an impression that he can commit the offence and

flee from a country by taking shelter in a foreign country. The Supreme

Court, however, cautioned that, at the same time, surrender must be

preceded by proper precautions to the effect that nobody is denied the

due process of law and nobody is being made a victim of political

vindictiveness. The Supreme Court further emphasized that extradition

is practised amongst nations essentially for two reasons - firstly, to warn

criminals that they cannot escape punishment by fleeing to a foreign

territory and, secondly, it is in the interest of the territorial State that a

criminal, who has fled from another territory after having committed a

crime, and taken refuge within its territory, should not be left free,

because he may again commit a crime and run away to some other State.

In the same decision, the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of

"Speciality" is yet another established rule of international law relating to

extradition. According to the doctrine, when a person is extradited for a

particular crime, he can be tried for that crime only and, if the Requesting

State deems it desirable to try the extradited fugitive for some other

crime committed before his extradition, the fugitive has to be placed in a

State as existed prior to his extradition. In other words, he has to be

returned to the State which granted the extradition and a fresh extradition

has to be requested for the latter crime. As observed by the Supreme

Court, the said Act makes a special provision to that effect and in view of

Section 21 thereof, an extradited fugitive cannot be tried in India for any

offence other than the one for which he has been extradited unless he has

been restored to or has had an opportunity to return to the State which

has surrendered him. The Supreme Court made it clear that the doctrine

of "Speciality" is, in fact, a corollary to the principles of double

criminality, and the aforesaid doctrine is premised on the assumption that

whenever a State uses its formal process to surrender a person to another

State for a specific charge, the Requesting State shall carry out its

intended purpose of prosecuting or punishing the offender for the offence

charged in its request for extradition and none other.

12. As indicated above, the learned counsel for the petitioner had

sought to invoke this doctrine of "Speciality" as also the provisions of

Section 31(1)(c) of the said Act by contending that, because the Code of

Criminal Procedure of the State of Arizona permits extradited fugitive

criminals to be tried for crimes other than those for which he was

extradited, the petitioner ought not to be surrendered to the United States

of America. We entirely agree with the submissions made by Mr

Chandhiok that, in the present case, there is neither a violation of the

general doctrine of "Speciality" or the specific provisions of Section

31(1)(c) of the said Act. We also agree with Mr Chandhiok in his

submission that Chapter 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is

sought to be invoked by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not,

at all, pertain to the State of Arizona. However, we find that there is a

similar provision in Section 13-3866 (No Right of Asylum) in Title 13 of

the Arizona Revised Statues which deals with the Criminal Code of the

State of Arizona. The said Title 13 of the Arizona Revised Statutes

comprises of 46 Chapters. Article 5 of Chapter 38 is the Uniform

Criminal Extradition Act and Comprises of Sections 13-3841 to Sections

13-3870.02. Section 13-3866 reads as under:-

"13-3866. No right of asylum After a person has been brought back to this state upon extradition proceedings, he may be tried in this state for other crimes which he may be charged with having committed here as well as that specified in the requisition for his extradition."

13. It is, of course, similar to para 26 of Article 51.13, which was

referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, although, that

pertained to the State of Texas. But, notice must also be taken of Section

13-3842 (Fugitives from Justice; Duty of Governor), which reads as

under:-

"Subject to the provisions of this article, the provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state."

14. A plain reading of Section 13-3842 would indicate that

Article 5 of Chapter 38 deals with Extradition between one State and

another State within the United States. In fact, a reading of all the

sections of Article 5 of Chapter 38, which is essentially the Uniform

Criminal Extradition Act, would indicate that the extradition proceedings

referred to therein are in relation to extradition from one State of the

United States of America to another State thereof. This is also clear from

the definition of State given in Section 13-3841 (4), wherein the word

"State", when referring to a State, other than the State of Arizona, has

been defined to mean any other State or territory, organized or

unorganized of the United States. It does not have any reference to a

foreign State, such as India. Therefore, we are clearly of the view that

reference to the Criminal Code of Arizona would not be of any

consequence inasmuch as the international extradition is the subject

matter of the said Treaty and is not a matter of a State law and cannot be

controlled by the provisions of Arizona Criminal Code or the Uniform

Criminal Extradition Act of the State of Arizona. Thus, what would

govern the extradition would be the said Treaty itself.

15. Article 17 of the said Treaty incorporates the rule of

Speciality and reads as under:-

"Article 17 Rule of Speciality

1. A person extradited under this Treaty may not be detained, tried, or punished in the Requesting State except for:

(a) the offense for which extradition has been granted or a differently denominated offense based on the same facts on which extradition

was granted, provided such offence is extraditable or is a lesser included offense;

(b) an offense committed after the extradition of the person; or

(c) an offence for which the executive authority of the Requested (27) State consents to the person‟s detention, trial, or punishment. For the purpose of this subparagraph:

(i) the Requested State may require the submission of the documents called for in Article 9; and

(ii) the person extradited may be detained by the Requesting State for 90 days, or for such longer period of time as the Requested State may authorize, while the request is being processed.

2. A person extradited under this Treaty may not be extradited to a third State for an offense committed prior to his surrender unless the surrendering State consents.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not prevent the detention, trial, or punishment of an extradited person, or the extradition of that person to a third State, if:

(a) that person leaves the territory of the Requesting State after extradition and voluntarily returns to it; or

(b) that person does not leave the territory of the Requesting State within 15 days of the day on which that person is free leave."

It is clear that Article 17 of the said Treaty specifically provides that a

person extradited under the said Treaty is not to be detained, tried or

punished in the Requesting State (United States of America, in the

present case) except for the offence for which extradition had been

granted or a differently denominated offence based on the same facts, on

which extradition was granted, provided such offence is extraditable or is

a lesser included offence. This provision contained in Article 17 of the

said Treaty would clearly govern the extradition of the petitioner, being a

case of international extradition.

16. Section 13-3866 of the Arizona Revised Statutes would,

therefore, not be applicable to the present extradition proceedings.

Consequently, there is no violation of either the generally accepted

doctrine of "Speciality" or the provisions thereof incorporated in Article

17 of the said Treaty and Section 31(1)(c) of the said Act. Consequently,

the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner on this aspect of the matter is

clearly untenable.

17. We now come to the next submission made on behalf of the

petitioner. It was contended, as pointed out above, that Article 8 of the

said Treaty enables the Requested State to refuse a request for extradition

when the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death

under the laws in the Requesting State, but is not punishable by death

under the laws in the Requested State. In the context of the present case,

it was submitted that if the offence for which extradition is sought is

punishable by death in the USA, but is not punishable by death under the

laws prevalent in India, the Government of India could refuse

extradition. It was then contended that from the facts, as laid out in the

extradition documents, the offence that could, if at all be made out,

would be of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and would,

therefore, not be punishable with death under the laws as applicable in

India, although it may be punishable with death in the USA. Thus, as per

the contention, it is reason enough for the Government of India to refuse

extradition. We are not at all impressed by this argument. As rightly

observed and noted by the learned ACMM, this court in the case of Smt.

Nina Pillai and others v. Union of India and others: Cri.L.J. 2359, had

observed that it is now fairly well-settled that the Magisterial inquiry,

which is conducted pursuant to the request for an extradition, is not a

trial. The said inquiry decides nothing about the innocence or guilt of the

fugitive criminal and that the main purpose of the inquiry is to determine

whether there is a prima facie case or a reasonable ground which

warrants the fugitive criminal being sent to the Requesting State. This

court had made it clear in the said case that the jurisdiction in an

extradition inquiry under the said Act is limited to the former part of the

request and does not at all concern itself with the merits of the trial.

18. The objective of Section 7 of the said Act is to ensure that the

fugitive criminal, whose extradition has been sought by a Requesting

State, is in accordance with the procedure set out in the Act and,

secondly, that the offence for which the fugitive criminal is accused or

has been convicted in the foreign state, is not an offence of a political

character or is not an extradition offence. If the Magistrate is of the

opinion that a prima facie case is not made out in support of the

requisition by the Requesting State, he, by virtue of Section 7(3), is

mandated to discharge the fugitive criminal. On the other hand, if the

Magistrate is of the opinion that a prima facie case is made out in support

of the requisition of the foreign State, he, by virtue of Section 7(4) of the

said Act, may commit the fugitive criminal to prison to await the orders

of the Central Government and shall also report the result of his inquiry

to the Central Government. He is also required to forward together with

such report, any written statement which the fugitive criminal may

submit for the consideration of the Central Government.

19. It is, therefore, clear from a reading of the provisions of the

said Act and, in particular Chapter II thereof, that the scope of a

Magisterial Inquiry under the said provisions cannot be equated with a

full-fledged trial. All that the Magistrate has to see is that there is a

prima facie case in support of the requisition. At this stage, the

Magistrate is not required to go into a detailed examination of whether

the offence made out is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and

as to whether it falls under one of the exceptions specified in Section 300

IPC or not. That is a subject matter of trial and can only be determined in

a full-fledged trial. Therefore, the argument raised by the learned

counsel for the petitioner that the offence alleged to be made out against

the petitioner is not murder and, therefore, not punishable with death in

India is not tenable at this stage. A prima facie examination reveals that

the indictment has been correctly made and that a prima facie case has

been made out in support of the requisition by the Government of the

United States of America. Once it is clear, prima facie, that the offence,

for which the petitioner has been charged, constitutes murder under the

Indian law, there is no question of invoking Article 8 of the Treaty

requiring the Government of India to refuse extradition. In any event, we

may also point out that, as in the United States of America, so also under

the Indian Penal Code in India, murder is an offence which is punishable

with life imprisonment or even death. Thus, there is no scope for the

petitioner to take the plea that the Government of India should refuse

extradition in the context of Article 8 of the said Treaty.

20. This brings us to the third and the last plea raised by the

learned counsel for the petitioner and that is with regard to the

documents accompanying the request for extradition allegedly not being

duly authenticated in accordance with Article 10 of the said Treaty.

Article 10 of the said Treaty reads as under:-

"Article 10 Admissibility of Documents The documents which accompany an extradition request shall be received and admitted as evidence in extradition proceedings if:

(a) in the case of a request from the United States, they are certified by the principal diplomatic or principal consular officer of the Republic of India resident in the United States;

(b) in the case of a request from the Republic of India, they are certified by the principal diplomatic or principal consular officer of the United States resident in the Republic of India, as provided by the extradition laws of the United States; or

(c) they are certified or authenticated in any other manner accepted by the laws in the Requested State."

It is apparent that the documents which accompany an extradition request

are to be received and admitted in evidence in extradition proceedings if,

in view of clause (a) of Article 10, in the case of a request from the

United States of America, the documents are certified by the Principal

Diplomatic or the Principal Consular Officer of the Republic of India

resident in the United States of America.

21. Mr Chandhiok had referred to page 57 of the paper book

which is a copy of a Certificate of Authentication dated 16.05.2007

issued by the First Secretary (Consular), Embassy of India Washington

D.C., USA. The Certificate of Authentication clearly indicates that the

said First Secretary / Consular had certified that the annexed papers,

being the official documents provided by the Government of USA

proposed to be used upon an application to the extradition from India of

Mr Avtar Singh Grewal (the petitioner herein), charged with certain

criminal offences alleged to have been committed in USA, are properly

and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received in evidence

for similar purposes by the tribunal in India, as required under the Indo-

US Extradition Treaty. We also note that the Certificate of

Authentication alongwith the annexed papers are sealed with a ribbon

bearing a seal of the Consular Division, Embassy of India. The seal has

not been tampered with. Nor has the seal of the Government of the

United States of America alongwith the ribbon on the annexed

documents been tampered with. Page 58 of the paper book is a copy of

the seal and ribbon affixed by the Department of State and the signatures

thereon of the Secretary of State, USA authenticated by the Assistant

Authentication Officer, Department of State. It is also indicated at the

bottom of the said certificate that the certificate is not valid if it is

removed or altered in any way whatsoever. There is no evidence of any

removal or alteration of any of the documents which have been sealed in

the manner indicated above. Therefore, the entire set of documents,

which accompany the extradition request, is to be admitted as evidence in

extradition proceedings. The learned ACMM has rightly done so.

22. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

based on the evidence of PW-1 (Mr M.R. Qureshi) Under Secretary,

Ministry of External Affairs) that no list of enclosures accompanied the

note from the Indian Embassy and the number of pages accompanying

the note are also not mentioned. It was contended by the learned counsel

for the petitioner that this would reveal that there is no indication as to

how many pages were contained in the annexed papers and which were

those pages and, therefore, the authentication is not proper. We do not

accept this argument inasmuch as the respondents have clearly

established and shown that the documents, as received from the United

States Government, have been transmitted to India. There has been no

tampering with the seals and, therefore, the non-mentioning of the

number of pages or the list of such documents being separately indicated

by the Principal Consular Officer of India resident in the United States, is

of no consequence. The fact remains that the documents which

accompany the extradition request, were certified by the First Secretary

(Consular), Embassy of India Washington D.C., USA, who is

undoubtedly a Principal Officer of the Republic of India resident in the

United States of America. As a result, even this plea of the petitioner is

without any merit.

23. From the above discussion, we find no infirmity or illegality

in the order dated 19.07.2010 or the inquiry report of 09.07.2010 made

by the learned ACMM. We may also point out that we are not sitting in

appeal over the impugned order / report. The petitioner has invoked our

extraordinary writ jurisdiction and, in doing so, we do not have to

examine as to whether the inquiry report / order is right or wrong, but we

have to examine whether the same are legal or illegal and whether the

procedure prescribed in the Extradition Act, as also in the said Treaty,

have been followed or not. We have already pointed out that we find no

illegality in the impugned report / order and we are of the view that the

procedure has been correctly followed.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition has no

merit and the same is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own

costs.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

MANMOHAN SINGH, J

JULY 15, 2011 dutt