Dr. Lalit K. Bhanot vs Cbi
2011 Latest Caselaw 3112 Del

*       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


+                         BAIL APPLN. No. 682/2011

%                                                Reserved on: 2nd June , 2011

                                                 Decided on:    5th July, 2011

DR. LALIT K. BHANOT                                              ..... Petitioner
                  Through:                    Mr. Ramesh Gupta, Sr. Adv. with
                                              Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr. Arjun
                                              Dewan and Mr. Sumit Arora, Advs.
                          versus

CBI                                                             ..... Respondents
                                   Through:   Mr. Gautam Narayan, Adv.
                                              Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Adv.

Coram:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA


1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may              Not Necessary
   be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                     Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported                Yes
   in the Digest?

MUKTA GUPTA, J.

1. By this petition the Petitioner seeks bail in R.C.No. DAI-2010-8-0044

under Section 420/467/468/471 read with Section 120-B IPC and Section

13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (in short

P.C. Act) registered by the CBI.

2. The primary contention of the Petitioner in the present case is that the

Petitioner was arrested in the above mentioned FIR for offences under Section

420 read with 120-B IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act.

Thus, the time frame within which the Respondent was mandated to file the

charge sheet was 60 days and no remand of the Petitioner to judicial custody

could have been granted beyond the period of 60 days. It is contended that

the Petitioner had applied for bail on the ground of non-filing of the charge-

sheet within 60 days on 29th April, 2011 i.e. before the filing of the charge-

sheet and he is, thus, entitled to the statutory bail under Section 167 (2)

Cr.P.C. Relying on State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharati Chandmal Varma @

Ayesha Khan (2002) 2 SCC 121 it is contended that by adding Section 467

IPC to the case, the period of custody can not be extended from 60 days to 90

days, as the time period for filing the charge-sheet would be the one which is

applicable to the facts and penal provisions invoked at the time when the

person is initially arrested. It is further contended that even as per the

allegations set out no offence under Section 467 IPC is made out and, thus,

the Petitioner is entitled to the statutory bail. Reliance in this regard is placed

on Mohammed Ibrahim and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (2009) 8 SCC

751; A.M. Chakraborty Vs. Ved Vrat and Ors. 30 (1986) DLT 165; Daniel

Hailey Walcott and Anr. Vs. State AIR 1968 Madras 349. Reliance is also

placed on Devendra and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2009) 7 SCC 495 to

contend that making of a false document is a sine-qua-non of the offence of

forgery. In the present case no forged document has been prepared by the

Petitioner and, thus, no case under Section 467 IPC is made out.

3. Learned counsel on behalf of the CBI contends that FIR is not an

encyclopedia of the entire prosecution case as laid down in Superintendent of

Police, CBI and Ors. Vs. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175. He further

states that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak and

Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 7 SCC 480 held that once offences are

added to the case which entail an extended period of remand pending

investigation, the prosecution would be entitled to the same. Admittedly, the

charge sheet was filed within 90 days of the remand period. In the present

case Section 467 IPC was added at the time of second remand when the

learned Senior PP for CBI brought to the notice of the learned trial court that

during investigation three more Sections i.e. 467, 468 and 471 IPC have been

added. The learned Court directed that Sections be mentioned in the remand

papers of the accused persons and the case diary be returned. Thus the

investigating agency was entitled to file the charge sheet within the period of

90 days from the first remand. According to the learned counsel the

ingredients of Section 467 IPC are clearly made out. However, this is an issue

which will be considered by the learned trial court at the time of framing of

charge. This Court while deciding a bail application under Section 439 IPC

read with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. will not pre-judge whether Section of 467

IPC is attracted to the facts of the case. He, however, states that Section 467

IPC does not contemplate forgery of a valuable security only. Even where a

person purports to give authority to any person to receive or deliver any

money or movable or immovable property, the same amounts to forgery. The

charge-sheet clearly shows that the Petitioner in connivance with other

officials deliberately bye-passed the Technical F.A. Although the note was

marked to ADG (Technical) for putting on the website, the note was never

routed through ADG (Technical) but was instead routed by the P.A. of the

Petitioner to a junior functionary in Technology F.A. for publication on

Organizing Committee Website on 23rd March, 2009. Thereafter, the co-

accused Surjit Lal ante-dated this note by writing series of false notings with a

view to seek financial approvals by placing an advertisement of EOI in the

newspaper for which Communications F.A. was the competent person.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the

Petitioner has based his case entirely on the decision rendered by the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra (supra). He contends that if the

provisions invoked at the time of arrest of an accused permit a period of

remand of 60 days pending investigation, the State would be bound to file the

charge sheet in 60 days failing which the accused will be entitled to statutory

bail under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. By invoking serious Sections during the

investigation the State does not get the benefit of extended period of 90 days

for filing the charge sheet.

5. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Bharati

Chandmal Varma, (2002) 2 SCC 121 held:-

"7. It is admitted by the learned Sr. Counsel for the State of Maharashtra that the Public Prosecutor has not filed any report before the Special Court showing reasons for the detention of the Respondent beyond 90 days from the date of the first remand order. Hence they are disabled from contending that the proviso to Section 21(2) of the MCOCA would enable the investigating agency to have the pre-trial custody of the respondent extended beyond 90 days. In order to circumvent, the said hurdle learned counsel adopted a twofold contention. First is that the period of 90 days can be reckoned from 21st April, 2001 (the date when the investigation was allowed to be conducted for the offence under the MCOCA). Second is that the provisions regarding bail under the said Act is very stringent as quoted above and the High Court did not consider it from the said angle."

6. The reliance on the said decision and the reading thereof by the

Petitioner is wholly fallacious. In State of Maharashtra(supra) the benefit of

extended period of 180 days permitted under the MCOCA was not given for

the reason that no report was filed before the Special Court showing the

reasons for the detention of the Respondent therein beyond 90 days from the

date of first remand order. In this regard, it would be relevant to note the

Section 21 of the MCOCA Act:

"Section 21

1) ....................

2. Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (2) -

(a) the references to „fifteen days‟ and „sixty days‟, wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty days" and "ninety days", respectively,

(b) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:

"Provided that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the said period upto one hundred and eighty days, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days"

7. Thus, a perusal of Section 21(2) shows that to seek the benefit of the

extended time period, the Special Public Prosecutor had to state reasons

before the Special Court who would extend the period of ninety days to one

hundred and eighty days after considering the report indicating the progress of

the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention beyond the said

period of ninety days. Thereafter, in order to overcome this hurdle, the

learned Public Prosecutor in the said case took the plea that the period of 90

days would be available from the day MCOCA was invoked, which plea was

turned down. In the present case, the facts are totally different. By invoking

Section 467 IPC to the facts of the case and seeking extended period of

remand from 60 to 90 days, the Public Prosecutor was not required to file a

report indicating the progress of the investigation and specific reasons for the

detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days. The

applications for remand as contemplated under the Cr.P.C. were only required

to be filed. This fact was duly brought to the notice of the Court at the time of

the remand.

8. As regards the contention that Section 467 IPC is not attracted to the

facts of the present case, I would like to note that at this stage, it is too early

for this Court to return a finding as that would be an issue which the learned

trial Court will decide at the time of hearing arguments on charge. However,

since it was insisted on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that Section

467 IPC is not made out on the facts of the case, and the prosecution was not

entitled to the extended period of 90 days for remand of the Petitioner this

Court is prima facie of the opinion that there is no merit in the contention. At

this stage it would be relevant to re-produce Section 467 IPC:-

"467.Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.- Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

9. A perusal of Section 467 shows that it is attracted even if the document

purports to give an authority to any person to transfer a valuable security for

delivery of any moveable or immovable property. In the decision referred to

by the learned counsel for the Petitioner in Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. vs.

State of Bihar & Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 751 it was held:-

        "14. xx           xx      xx            xx           xx
                (1)       xx      xx            xx           xx
                (2) The second is where a person dishonestly or

fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person."

10. This being the legal position since the allegations of the

prosecution are that the note was antedated by writing series of false

notings with a view to seek financial approvals, the offence punishable

under Section 467 IPC is prima facie made out.

11. Thus, the Petitioner is not entitled to the grant of bail in view of the

alleged breach of Section 167(2) Cr. P.C. i.e. the charge sheet not having been

filed within a statutory period of 60 days. I find no merit in the present

petition. The same is dismissed.

(MUKTA GUPTA) JUDGE JULY 05, 2011 'ga'