Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 74 Del
Judgement Date : 7 January, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL. APPEAL No.358/1999
% Reserved on: 23rd November, 2010
Decided on: 7th January, 2011
OM PRAKASH ALIAS KALIA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sudershan Rajan with Md. Qamar
Ali, Advocates.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawan Bahl, App.
Coram:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Not necessary
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
MUKTA GUPTA, J.
1. A case FIR No.191/1992 under Section 363/366 IPC was registered at
P.S. Roop Nagar on 3rd September, 1992 on the complaint of one Meena
wherein she alleged that on 30th August, 1992 at about 7.00 a.m., her daughter
aged 15 years, who used to work in the houses as a cook had left her house
without telling anybody. She further alleged that a boy named Om Prakash @
Kalia who resides in their neighbourhood and often came to their house, is
also missing from his house since 30th August, 1992. She has been making
efforts to trace her daughter and she apprehends that the said Om Prakash @
Kalia has enticed away her daughter on the pretext of marrying her. On the
said FIR, investigations were carried out and the girl was finally traced on 10 th
September, 1992 while going on an auto rickshaw along with the Appellant
for the registration of their marriage. The girl was medically examined and
her statements were recorded both under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.,
wherein she stated that the Appellant had taken her away on 30 th August, 1992
on the point of knife, confined and raped her. After investigation a charge
sheet was filed against Kamlesh, Hari Chand, Bal Chand and Om Praksah @
Kalia, the present Appellant for offences punishable under Sections
363/366/376/368 IPC. After recording of evidence, all the other co-accused
were acquitted except the Appellant who was convicted for offences
punishable under Section 366 and 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of three years and a fine of `1,000/- and in default
to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for offence
punishable under Section 366 IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7
years and to pay a fine of `5,000/- and in default to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months for offence punishable under Section 376 IPC.
This judgment of conviction and sentence is impugned in the present appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the statement of the
prosecutrix that she was enticed at the point of knife or that she was raped is
not trustworthy. The evidence on record shows that she had willingly
accompanied the Appellant, lived with him and got married. Only after the
Appellant was arrested and the prosecutrix was sent to live with her parents,
she gave this statement against the Appellant. The consent of the prosecutrix
is evident from the fact that she admits her signature on the marriage
certificate Ex. PW5/DA. This marriage of the Appellant and prosecutrix is
witnessed by two relations of the prosecutrix that is Bal Chand DW2 and Anu
Devi DW4. The prosecutrix has also admitted the photographs of marriage
Ex. PW5/D1 to D-11. Reliance is placed on Sadhu Ram @ Dalip v. The State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi), Crl. Appeal No.836/2009, Manu/DE/2230/2010
wherein it has been held that once the photographs are admitted then the same
are not required to be proved as an admitted document needs no proof.
Though the Appellant is alleged to have taken the prosecutrix from
Chandrawal to Sultan Puri in an auto rickshaw, through a crowded area, at a
distance of about 15-20 km., however, she raised no alarm. Further though she
lived with the Appellant and on 3rd September, 1992 she was taken to a temple
at Mandir Marg for the marriage, however, she did not raise any alarm either
on the way or at the temple. Thereafter also the prosecutrix was staying with
the Appellant till the 10th September, 1992 and was travelling in a TSR,
however she raised no alarm. In her cross examination on a question as to
why she did not raise any alarm, once she stated that she was under constant
threat on the point of knife, whereas later she stated that she was threatened by
showing knife only on the 29th August, 1992. The defence witnesses have
clearly deposed about the marriage and her willingness for the marriage,
which evidence has been overlooked by the learned trial court. The defence
witnesses are also entitled to the same credence as the prosecution witnesses.
The fact that she was a consenting party is also evident from the MLC Ex.
PW12/A which shows no external marks of injury and the history given by the
prosecutrix is "she is living with a man willfully since 29th August, 1992."
The MLC further observes history of "contact present". These evidences on
record clearly prove that the prosecutrix was a consenting party. The age of
the prosecutrix as per the radiological examination Ex. PW9/B is more than
18 years. The mother of the prosecutrix has given the age of the prosecutrix
as 15 years on the date of incident. As per the school leaving certificate Ex.
P1, the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 1st June, 1978, thus giving her age as
14 years and three months on the date of incident. However, the school
leaving certificate cannot be relied upon as it is not based on any documentary
proof of registration with the authorities at the time of birth. Reliance is
placed on Rakesh Kumar v. State, 109 (2004) DLT 826. Even the learned trial
court has arrived at a finding in this regard in favour of the Appellant that the
age of the prosecutrix was more than 18 years on the date of incident. The
judgment of the learned trial court is based on presumptions and in a criminal
trial the conviction can be based only if the prosecution has proved the case
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused and not on preponderance of the
probabilities. Since the prosecutrix is more than 18 years and there is ample
evidence on record to show that she was a consenting party, the judgment of
the learned trial court being based on presumptions, the Appellant is entitled
to be acquitted. In the alternative it is prayed that the Appellant has
undergone imprisonment for a period of more than 4 months and thus he be
released on the period already undergone.
3. Learned APP, on the other hand, contends that on the basis of the
testimony of the prosecutrix, it is evident that she was taken away under threat
and the purpose of marriage was to commit sexual intercourse with her. The
learned trial court erred in discrediting the age given in the school leaving
certificate as the same is the primary evidence. According to the school
leaving certificate the age of the prosecutrix is 14 years, thus her consent is
irrelevant for the offences punishable under Section 366 IPC and 376 IPC. It
is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed being devoid of merit.
4. The two issues to be determined on the basis of evidence adduced are
the age of the prosecutrix and whether she was a consenting party. As regards
the age of the prosecutrix, the mother of the prosecutrix PW2 in her statement
has stated that she was aged about 15 years at the time of incident and the
prosecutrix when she was examined in the court in the year 1996 gave her age
as 18 years. In the school leaving certificate the date of birth was shown as 1st
June, 1978. PW-11 Smt. Sumitra Arora, working as a teacher in Roop Nagar
School has proved this school leaving certificate Ex.P-1. She had brought the
register Ex.PW-11/A wherein the entry at serial number 2093 depicts the date
of birth of the prosecutrix as 1st June, 1978. However, this entry is not co-
related to the date of birth recorded with the Registrar of the Births in the
municipal records. PW11 has not stated the basis on which the date of birth
of the prosecutrix was recorded in the school register. Hence, the same is not
infallible. As per the report of the ossification test Ex.PW9/B, the age of the
prosecutrix is above 18 years. Undoubtedly, there is a possibility of an error
of plus minus two years in the opinion rendered by radiological examination.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, of Govt. J&K,
AIR 1982 SC 1296, held that there can be two years' margin either way in
radiological examination. The relevant portion of the report states:
".....It is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination
is two years on either side"
Even on reducing two years, the age of the prosecutrix would be more
than 16 years, thus capable of consenting to sexual intercourse. However,
when two opinions are possible, the one favouring the accused have to be
taken. Thus, I find no error in the finding of the learned trial court that the
prosecutrix was above 18 years of age at the time of the incident.
5. Undoubtedly, a prosecutrix is not an accomplice and conviction can be
based on her sole testimony if the same inspires confidence. However, in the
present case the testimony of the prosecutrix is full of contradictions and is
not corroborated by other evidence on record. The prosecutrix has stated that
the Appellant threatened her at the point of knife and made her sit forcibly in
the TSR. She further stated that he confined her in a vacant room at
Sultanpuri, and when she made noise, the Appellant made her to smell
something as a result of which she became unconscious. She further states
that the Appellant raped her contrary to her wishes every night and when she
raised noise, he would drown her noise in the stereo which he played on a
high pitch at the time of committing rape. The version of the prosecutrix does
not inspire confidence. The prosecutrix had also implicated Kamlesh, Hari
Chand, Bal Chand along with the Appellant. The learned trial court has
acquitted them. According to the prosecutrix she was confined in the said
room till 10th September, 1992 and on 10th September, 1992 in the morning
the accused persons performed the marriage ceremony of the prosecutrix with
the Appellant forcibly. One pandit was called for this purpose. According to
her, a doctor was also called who stated that she would be taken to the court
where the marriage would be registered. While they were going in the TSR,
on reaching Malkaganj red light she saw her mother and uncle present there
and on seeing them she rushed towards them. The prosecutrix admits her
signature on the marriage certificate. There is no explanation as to how she
agreed to the signing of the marriage certificate. Though admission of
signature on the document is not an admission of the contents of the
document, but in the present case the photographs which have been admitted
by the prosecutrix and the evidence of the defence witnesses including her
own relations clearly show that she married the Appellant willingly. In this
regard testimony of Bal Chand DW2 her cousin brother and Anu Devi DW2
her aunt is relevant. They both attended the marriage in the temple at Mandir
Marg. Though the prosecutrix states that the marriage was performed at the
house where she was confined on the 10th however, as per the defence and
other evidence on record it is evident that the same was performed in a
temple. Bal Chand DW2 states that he performed the kanyadan and identifies
his presence in the photographs. DW4 Anu Devi has also stated that both the
prosecutrix and Appellant knew each other and were in love with each other,
however, her sister in law that is her jethani, who is the mother of the
prosecutrix did not like the Appellant and thus was opposed to the marriage.
In her cross examination she has stated that the marriage was performed at
Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Maha Sabha Mandir as parents of the prosecutrix were
not agreeable to the marriage. Testimony of DW3 Madan Gopal Dubey is
also relevant who is the purohit of the mandir at Mandir Marg. According to
him when the marriage took place in his mandir, he issued a certificate to this
effect. The marriage was also witnessed by her other cousin brother Mohan
Chand DW1 who is the brother of Bal Chand DW2 who also supports the
defence version. The prosecution could not elicit anything in their cross
examinations. I find the testimony of the defence witnesses creditworthy as
the same is duly corroborated by contemporaneous documentary evidence on
record especially the photographs. Further, the prosecutrix herself gave her
statement in the MLC to the doctor who is an independent witness that she
was willfully living with a man since 29 th August, 1992. In view of this
overwhelming evidence, the consent of the prosecutrix is evident. I find force
in the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the prosecutrix
was a major at the time of incident and she willfully married the Appellant by
eloping from the house as her mother was not agreeable to this marriage, but
when she joined her family she leveled allegations of abduction and rape
against the Appellant.
6. In view of the findings above, the Appellant is entitled to be acquitted
of the charges under Sections 366/376 IPC. Accordingly, the appeal is
allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The
bail bond and the surety bond are discharged.
(MUKTA GUPTA) JUDGE
JANUARY 7th, 2011/mm
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