Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 926 Del
Judgement Date : 17 February, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: February 17,2011
+ CRL.M.C. 754/2009 & CRL.M.A.2801/2009
SANGEETA ARORA ....PETITIONER
Through: Mr. Vikas Arora, Advocate
Versus
C.B.I & ANR. ....RESPONDENTS
Through: Mr. Anindya Malhotra, Advocate with Ms.
Deepti Gulati, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE
1. Whether Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in Digest ?
AJIT BHARIHOKE, J.(ORAL)
1. This is a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of
case R.C.No. 1/2001-SIU-VIII, under Sections 420/468/471 IPC and
the subsequent proceedings pending in the court of Special Judge,
CBI under Sections 420/468/471/120B IPC on the ground that since
the registration of the case, the petitioner has already settled the
loan account with the bank concerned and paid off the entire
amount.
Crl.M.C. 754/2009 Page 1 of 9
2. It is submitted by Sh. Vikas Arora, Advocate for the petitioner
that the petitioner Sangeeta Arora is a divorcee, mother of two
children and medically unfit. He states that though the petitioner
Sangeeta Arora has been charged for criminal conspiracy for
committing offence punishable under Sections 420/468/471 IPC, she
has no role to play in the conspiracy. In fact, she is an innocent
business lady, who was in need of loan and she was told by the
other co-accused persons that they would look after the loan
application and get the loan sanctioned. She told them that she had
no security to furnish for the loan and whatever documentation was
done, it was done by the other co-accused persons in connivance
with the Bank Manager. Learned counsel submits that since
Sangeeta Arora has arrived at a settlement with the bank and paid
off the loan along with interest, no purpose shall be served by
prosecuting her, as such, he requests for quashing of FIR and the
proceedings qua her. In support of his contention, learned counsel
has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of
Nikhil Merchant Vs. CBI and Anr., (2008) 9 SCC 67.
3. Learned Sh. Anindya Malhotra, Advocate for CBI, on the
contrary, has opposed the prayer. He submits that this is a case in
which the petitioner, in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy with the
co-accused persons including the Bank Manager, obtained sanction
of loan worth ` 35 lakhs on the basis of the security of forged title
Crl.M.C. 754/2009 Page 2 of 9
deeds. Learned counsel for the CBI submits that although the
charge under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d), P.C. Act has
been framed against the bank official only, the petitioner is also a
party to the aforesaid offence, being the conspirator. He further
submits that as per the evidence collected during investigation, the
petitioner not only signed the loan application, she accompanied the
guarantor, who was an imposter and introduced him as her relative.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is the main
beneficiary of entire fraud as such her request for quashing of FIR
against her is not justified.
4. I have considered the rival contentions and perused the
material on record. On perusal of the record, it transpires that on
the basis of the charge sheet filed by the CBI, learned Special Judge
has charged the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections
420, 468 & 471 read with Section 120B IPC and her co-accused Sh.
G.R.Meena, Bank Manager has been charged for the offence
punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. On bare reading of the charge sheet,
it is apparent that the petitioner actively indulged in falsification of
documents and impersonation by the guarantor and on the basis of
those forged documents, in connivance with Sh. G.R.Meena,
Manager, Nehru Place Branch of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur,
Crl.M.C. 754/2009 Page 3 of 9
obtained sanction of loan worth ` 35 lakhs and against that loan, `
29,56,164/- was withdrawn.
5. The short point which arises for consideration in this matter is
whether the petitioner is entitled to quashing of FIR merely for the
reason that she has entered into a settlement with the bank and
cleared the loan account?
6. On reading of the judgment in Nikhil Merchant (supra), it is
evident that the aforesaid judgment proceeds on the basis of an
agreement entered into between the financial institution and the
appellant in that case of which Clause 11 of the consent term reads
as under:
"Clause 11: Agreed that save as aforesaid neither party has any
claim against the other and parties do hereby withdraw all the
allegations and counter allegations made against each other."
7. The relevant observations made in aforesaid case are
reproduced thus:
"30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and
the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise
arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been
cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim
against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that
certain documents were alleged to have been created by the
appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the
limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved
herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal
facets. The question which is required to be answered in this
case is whether the power which independently lies with this
Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the
compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
Crl.M.C. 754/2009 Page 4 of 9
31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and
keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi case2
and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the
Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed
by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where
technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the
quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the
continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at
between the parties would be a futile exercise."
8. On perusal of the aforesaid observations, it is apparent that in
Nikhil Merchant's case, criminal proceedings were quashed as
parties had settled the matter in dispute in the light of Clause 11 of
the consent terms.
9. The facts of this case are however different. In the instant
case, the loan account was settled in terms of the compromise offer,
which is reproduced thus:
"COMPROMISE OFFER
(WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE CASE PENDING WITH CBI)
With reference to our letter dated 13.8.04, we certify that you
have deposited Rs. 250414/- (which includes principle of Rs.
227500.00 and interest of Rs. 22914.00), the amount agreed
under One Time Settlement (OTS), leaving no dues towards
Bank in the account in terms of OTS.
Please note that no security will be released till finalisation of
the case with the CBI".
10. On reading of the aforesaid compromise offer, it is evident that
the offer starts with a reservation that settlement offer is without
prejudice to the criminal case pending with CBI. Thus, it is clear that
the complainant bank had never consented to compromise the
Crl.M.C. 754/2009 Page 5 of 9
criminal proceedings or help the petitioner in getting the FIR
quashed.
11. Otherwise also, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nikhil
Merchant's case was considered and discussed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Rumi Dhar Vs. State of West Bengal., JT
2009 (5) SC 321, wherein in the peculiar facts of that case, it was
observed thus:
17. Appellant is said to have taken part in conspiracy in
defrauding the bank. Serious charges of falsification of accounts
and forgery of records have also been alleged. Although no
charge against the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption
Act has been framed, indisputably, the officers of the bank are
facing the said charges.
18. It is now a well settled principle of law that in a given case, a
civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding can proceed
simultaneously. Bank is entitled to recover the amount of loan
given to the debtor. If in connection with obtaining the said loan,
criminal offences have been committed by the persons accused
thereof including the officers of the bank, criminal proceedings
would also indisputably be maintainable. When a settlement is
arrived at by and between the creditor and the debtor, the
offence committed as such does not come to an end. The
judgment of a tribunal in a civil proceeding and that too when it
is rendered on the basis of settlement entered into by and
between the parties, would not be of much relevance in a
criminal proceeding having regard to the provisions contained in
Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act.
...............
...................
22. .....Our attention has also been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr., (2008) 9 SCC 677 , wherein this Court refused to refer the matter to a larger Bench, stating:
30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
12. In the matter of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. A.
Ravishankar Prasad & Others, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1063, Supreme
Court, inter alia, observed thus:
36. In a recently delivered judgment of this Court in Rumi Dhar v. State of W.B. this Court approved the observations of the Special Judge. The observations of the Special Judge are set out as under:
"19. The learned Special Judge in his order dated 16-12-2006 rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant herein, stating:
„I have gone through the record citation and considered the circumstances. It is true that the accused has put a good gesture by paying off the dues of the Bank but I am at one with the learned Public Prosecutor that this payment cannot exonerate the accused from a prima facie charge. If I allow this, then I may have to swallow in a case of bribery that the accused has paid back the amount to the sufferer the amount received as bribe.
It is a question of trial whether there was any criminal intention on the part of this lady accused in this crime. The criminal intention is to be inferred from the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. Simply because the money has been returned, I cannot shut the mouth of the prosecution from adducing evidence against this accused. Thus, I do not like to pass any order in favour of the accused. The prayer for discharge of Accused 7, Rumi Dhar stands rejected. Let the case proceed. Fix 7-2-2007 for consideration of charge. The sureties must produce all the accused persons on that date.‟ "
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46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that mere repayment of loan under a settlement cannot exempt the accused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this case."
13. In the instant case, there is, prima facie, evidence on record
that the petitioner was a party to conspiracy to cheat the bank in
connivance with the bank Manager and she obtained sanction for
loan of `35 lakhs on the strength of forged and false title deeds
produced as security and that she introduced an imposter who stood
guarantee for loan, as her relative. Prima facie, she is the main
person who has benefited from the sanction of loan. Therefore,
merely because she has settled the loan amount and repaid the
money, she cannot be absolved of her criminal act without
prosecution by quashing the FIR. It may be noted that if the
fraudsters and forgers are allowed to go scot free by quashing of FIR
only because of settlement with the complainant, it would send a
negative signal to the society and encourage people to indulge in
such unlawful practices. Thus, I do not find merit in request for the
quashing of FIR on the strength of the settlement arrived at between
the parties, particularly when the compromise offer itself is without
prejudice to the criminal proceedings initiated by the CBI.
14. Petition is accordingly dismissed.
15. Observations made in this order are based upon prima facie
view of the material on record and they shall not be treated as
comments on merit of the case.
(AJIT BHARIHOKE) JUDGE FEBRUARY 17, 2011 akb/pst
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