Vrinda Gaur & Ors. vs Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha ...
2011 Latest Caselaw 6130 Del

*         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+            W.P.(C) 8138/2011 and CM 18335/2011

                                          Decided on: 14th December, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF
VRINDA GAUR & ORS.                                    ..... Petitioners
                         Through: Ms. Rekha Palli, Advocate with
                         Ms. Punam Singh, Advocates

                    versus

GURU GOBIND SINGH INDRAPRASTHA UNIVERSITY & ORS.
                                                ..... Respondents
                   Through: Mr. Mukul Talwar, Advocate for R-1.
                   Mr. T.K. Joseph, Advocate for R-4.

CORAM
HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI

HIMA KOHLI, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition is filed by the petitioners seeking inter alia for

directions to respondent No.1/University to not cancel the provisional

admission granted to them by the respondent No.3/Institution in the

BAMS Programme. It is further prayed that directions be issued to

respondent No.1/University for relaxation of the eligibility criteria for

admission to the aforesaid course so that petitioners may take admission

in the respondent No.3/Institution.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners sat for the

Central Entrance Test (CET) conducted by the respondent No.1/University

for admissions to the BAMS course in respondent No.3/college on

14.5.2011. The result for the said examination was declared on

24.5.2011, by which date the results of the Class XII Board exams of the

petitioners had already been declared on 23.5.2011. Admittedly,

petitioner no.1, petitioner no.2 and petitioner no.3 had obtained 59.3%,

57.6% and 59.33% respectively as the aggregate marks in the subjects

of Physics, Chemistry and Biology in Class XIIth examinations, and Ranks

No. 407, 681 and 736 respectively as ranks in the Common Entrance

Test.

3. The first counseling for the BAMS course was conducted by

the respondent No.3/Institution on 6.6.2011, and thereafter a second

counseling was conducted to fill up seats left vacant. As there were still

seats available even after both the counsellings were completed,

respondent No./Institution decided to conduct a third round of counseling

on 16.10.2011, for which the petitioners were invited through call letters

dated 3.10.2011. The petitioners duly declared in their verification forms,

the aggregate percentage obtained by them in the subjects of Physics,

Chemistry and Biology in the Class XII examination and filed the same

with the respondent No.3/Institution.

4. On appearing before the Institution for the third round of

counseling, the petitioners were informed that since the aggregate

percentages obtained by them fell marginally short of the percentage

prescribed by respondent No.1/University in its Admissions Brochure, as

the eligibility criteria for the said course, was 60%, they would have to

send applications to respondent No.1/University to seek relaxation in the

eligibility criteria. The petitioners duly forwarded their applications dated

14.10.2011 and 18.10.2011 to respondent No.1/University requesting

relaxation of the eligibility criteria. Their request was further supported by

respondent No.3/Institution vide a representation dated 18.10.2011 sent

by it to respondent No.1/University seeking a one-time relaxation in the

eligibility criteria. It is the case of the petitioners that since no response

was received to the said representation from respondent No.1/University,

respondent No.3/Institution, was under the impression that its request

was granted, and as a result, it gave provisional admission to them, by

accepting the fee from them and allowing them to attend classes by

31.10.2011. However, the petitioners recently found out that respondent

No1/University had not yet granted its concurrence to the provisional

admission granted to them, and under the apprehension that their

admissions may be cancelled, they have approached this court by filing

the present writ petition.

5. On the last date of hearing i.e. on 7.12.2011, counsel for the

respondent No.1/University handed over a copy of a letter dated

5.12.2011 sent by respondent No.1/University to respondent

No.3/Institution denying relaxation of the eligibility criteria as sought by

the petitioners, on the ground that it would adversely prejudice the other

candidates who were desirous of taking admission to the said Institution,

but refrained from doing so as they did not meet the minimum criteria. It

was further stated that the requirement of the minimum aggregate

percentage for the academic year 2012-13 may be lowered from 60% to

50%, if so desired by the Institute.

6. At the very outset, counsel appearing for respondent

No.1/University disputes the maintainability of the present proceedings,

on the ground that the petitioners herein have neither challenged the

vires of the relevant provision in the Admission Brochure laying down the

minimum eligibility criteria, nor have they questioned the legality or

validity of the letter dated 5.12.2011, denying their request for relaxation

of the eligibility criteria. It is his submission that the petitioners have,

instead sought a positive mandamus from the Court to direct the

respondent No.1/Institute to lower the aforesaid criteria, which is not

permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, he

submits that the decision as regards the admission criteria rests with the

University which is an expert body and this Court cannot interfere with

the same unless and until some perversity or illegality is demonstrated by

the petitioners. To support his submission, he places reliance on a recent

decision of a Division Bench of this Court dated 2.12.2011 in WP(C) No.

7610/2011 entitled "Siddharth Kaul & Ors. v. Guru Gobind Singh

Indraprastha University".

7. Counsel for the petitioner concedes that the petitioners have

no quarrel with the provisions of the Admission Brochure laying down the

minimum criteria, and no challenge has been laid to the same, either in

the averments or the prayer clause of the petition. She, however, submits

that the relief sought for may be granted to the petitioners as an

exceptional case and in the special facts and circumstances of the case.

She submits that the ground taken by respondent No.1/University in its

rejection order dated 5.12.2011 is unacceptable, as no students would be

prejudiced if the petitioners are admitted to the Institute inasmuch as the

students were called for counseling on the basis of their ranks and not on

the basis of the aggregate percentage, hence any candidate, who at the

time of the counseling fell short of the requisite aggregate percentage,

would similarly have been granted provisional admission, as granted to

the petitioners. She further submits that the petitioners have already

been granted provisional admission and have even started attending the

classes, therefore cancelling their admission at this stage would have an

adverse impact on their academic future and besides, precious seats in

the respondent No.3/Institute would go abegging. It is lastly contended

that as the petitioners are falling short of the required percentage by only

a few points, if rounding off of their percentages is permitted, then they

would satisfy the minimum criteria. In support the said submission,

learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of a coordinate

bench of this court dated 23.11.2010 in WP(C) No. 12475/2009,

entitled "Aditya N. Prasad v. The University of Delhi & Ors.", to claim that

in the said case, concession of rounding off has been permitted. She

urges that the Court must keep in mind that respondent No.3/Institute

itself has no objection to the lowering of the minimum eligibility criteria

and as respondent No.1/University has also accepted the request of the

Institute to lower the eligibility criteria to 50% of aggregate marks for the

academic year 2012-13, the same would clearly provide that there would

be no dilution in the standards of education of the Institute if the

petitioners are permitted admission at a lower percentage.

8. The Court has heard the counsels for the parties and has

perused the judgments relied upon by them. First and foremost, the fact

that provisional admission had been granted to them cannot be the basis

for the petitioners to canvas that they are entitled to claim relaxation of

the eligibility criteria for their admission to the course in question for the

reason that being granted provisional admission to an Institute, does not

in itself create a vested right in the petitioners to claim admission to the

Institute. It cannot be overlooked that at the time of taking admission and

depositing their fee, the petitioners were well aware of the fact that their

admission was subject to approval by the competent authority. Therefore

they took a calculated risk in taking provisional admission to the said

Institute. Furthermore, a plea of the seats going abegging can also not be

taken, as the petitioners as well as respondent No.3/Institute were aware

of the fact that the petitioners' admission was provisional, and respondent

No.3/Institute had the option to conduct another round of counseling and

admit students who could meet the eligibility criteria. In not having done

so, it was the choice of the Institute to let its seats remain vacant.

Furthermore, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Visveswaraiah

Technological University vs. Krishnendu Halder reported as (2011) 4 SCC

606, the object of prescribing eligibility criteria is to ensure maintenance

of excellence in standards of education and not to fill up all the seats.

Reducing the standards to fill the seats was held to be a dangerous trend

which would lead to destruction of the quality of education. A warning

was sounded of the creeping commercialization of education and it was

reiterated that determination of such standards being part of an academic

policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review.

9. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners that if the Court

permits lowering of minimum eligibility criteria, no student would be

prejudiced, appears attractive at first blush but when examined closely is

untenable, as the said argument does not take into consideration those

students who fell within the ranks and were called for counseling by

respondent No.3/Institute but stayed away because they did not meet the

minimum eligibility standards laid down by respondent No.1/University,

and who are not before the Court and would be adversely affected if such

a plea of the petitioners is accepted. Therefore, the ground taken by the

respondent No.1/University in its letter dated 5.12.2011, denying

relaxation of the eligibility criteria on the ground that it would prejudice

the other students, is found to be a reasonable and valid ground.

10. Coming to the argument of the counsel for the petitioner

regarding the rounding off of the aggregate percentage obtained by the

petitioners, it has to be noted that the Admission Brochure of the

respondent No.1/University very categorically states in Clause 5.4, part C

that no rounding-off of aggregate percentage would be permitted. In the

face of a specific prohibition in that regard, the reliance of the petitioner

on the decision in the case of Aditya N. Prasad v. University of Delhi &

Ors. (Supra) is found to be misplaced, inasmuch as the said decision is

distinguishable on its own facts. In the said decision, there had been

some irregularities in the internal assessment of the petitioner therein,

because of which he had fallen short of the minimum eligibility criteria.

Based on the correction of the said irregularities, making the petitioner

therein eligible, the Single Judge had upheld his admission, and had

permitted rounding off of his marks. The said decision would have no

application to the facts of the case in hand.

11. Lastly, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that

respondent No.3/Institute had no objection to the lowering of the criteria

and even respondent No.1/University had permitted the same for the next

academic year, is also of no avail to the petitioners. It is settled law that

policy decisions regarding the admissions in affiliated Institutes lies in the

domain of the University in question. The decision-making power of the

University cannot be interfered with under judicial review unless the

petitioner is able to show some patent malafides on the part of the

University, or point out instances of discrimination, or can make out a

case that the criteria laid down is so perverse that it cannot be sustained.

In the case of Siddhartha Kaul & Ors. v. GGSIU (Supra), the Division

Bench has categorically held that merely because certain conditions

imposed are inconvenient to some students, they cannot be said to

arbitrary. In the said decision, notice was also taken of a decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Visveswaraiah Technological University v.

Krishnendu Haldar reported as (2011) 4 SCC 606, wherein it had been

held that the object of prescribing minimum standards is to ensure

maintenance of excellence in standards of education and not to fill up

seats, and lowering of such standards would result in destruction of the

quality of education. In the present case, while the Court can sympathize

with the predicament of the petitioners, it cannot help but observe that

they have not been able to point out any such arbitrariness, illegality or

perversity in the criteria laid down by respondent No.1/University for

interference in judicial review. The petitioners are seeking relief purely on

the grounds of equity, which ought not to be exercised in their favour,

given the facts of the case. The powers of judicial review of this court

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are well-defined, and a

petition filed purely on the grounds of equity ought not to be ordinarily

entertained, especially in the absence of any challenge laid in the petition

to the vires of the relevant provisions of the applicable Rules.

12. Even though arguments on merits advanced on behalf of the

petitioners have been dealt with in detail and turned down, this Court is

inclined to accept the initial submission made by the counsel for

respondent No.1/University that the present petition is not maintainable

as the petitioners herein have neither challenged the vires of the relevant

provision in the Admission Brochure laying down the minimum eligibility

criteria, nor have they questioned the legality or validity of the letter

dated 5.12.2011, denying their request for relaxation of the eligibility

criteria.

13. In the light of the abovementioned facts and circumstances of the

case, the present petition is dismissed as being devoid of merits,

alongwith the pending application.

                                                      (HIMA KOHLI)
DECEMBER 14, 2011                                         JUDGE
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