Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 3918 Del
Judgement Date : 12 August, 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#7
W. P. (C) 6648/2000
SHASHI BHUSHAN SHARMA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shankar Raju with Mr. Amit
Anand, Advocates.
Versus
M/S INDIAN SEWING MACHINES CO. ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sanjay Kumar
Shandilya, Advocate.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? No
ORDER
12.08.2011
CM APPL Nos. 9365/2002 & 9366/2002
1. Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned Senior counsel appearing for the
Respondent states that costs in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- was tendered by
way of cheque to the workman through counsel in January 2011 but was
not accepted. It was later sent by post but returned undelivered. It is
directed that the said sum be given to the Petitioner by way of a demand
draft on or before 23rd August 2011.
2. The applications are disposed of.
Review Petition No. 123 of 2002
3. Learned counsel for the parties state that this review petition does not
survive in view of the subsequent developments.
4. The review application is disposed of.
W. P. (C) 6648/2000 & CM APPL No. 13567/2002
5. The challenge in this writ petition is to an Award dated 6 th March 2000
passed by the Labour Court in I.D. No. 75 of 1986 holding that the
inquiry held by the Respondent management, M/s Indian Sewing
Machine Co. Ltd. („ISMCL‟), preceding the dismissal of the Petitioner
from service was just and fair. A further prayer is for a direction to
Respondent management to reinstate the Petitioner in service with effect
from 30th March 1985.
6. The Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Ware House Keeper in
Respondent No. 2 ISMCL with effect from 22nd March 1979. He was
promoted as Ware House Keeper with effect from 20th May 1982.
7. On 30th January 1985, the management issued to the Petitioner a
chargesheet listing out six items of charge as under:-
"1. You demanded and collected a sum of
Rs. 150/- from Mr. Gurwant Singh Kathuria, Agent of M/s Kanpur Delhi Goods Transport Co. (P) Ltd., Delhi, in respect of lorry loads booked to Kanpur under G. R. Nos. 422489 and 163465 (copies enclosed).
2. You demanded and collected a sum of Rs. 360/- from the said Mr. Gurwant Singh Kathuria in respect of 2 lorry loads booked to Madras/Cochin under L. R. Nos. 259782 and 259783 both dated 17.8.84 (copies enclosed), of Patel Roadways, Delhi.
3. You demanded and collected a sum of Rs. 45/- from the said Mr. Gurwant Singh Kathuria against G. R. 222212 dated 18.884 (copy enclosed) of M/s Kanpur Delhi Goods Transport Co. (P) Ltd.
4. You demanded and collected moneys from Mr. Suresh Dewan C & F Agent as under:
(i) Rs. 238/- on 3.9.84 in respect of a
consignment of accessory boxes carried by
him to Ludhiana.
(ii) You demanded money from Mr. Suresh
Dewan for allotting Accessories Box-
Assembly contract, when there was
proposal from Purchase & Distribution
Department, Bombay.
5. Under Invoice No. 1141 dated 15.9.84,
(copy enclosed), raised on M/s. R. K. Enterprises, Delhi, only 18 cartons, i.e., 2592 oil bottles (85ml each) were to be supplied whereas, you actually supplied or caused to be supplied 24 cartons i.e., 3456 oil bottles (85ml each) thus cheating the Company to the extent of excess oil bottles and appropriating the proceeds thereof.
6. Under invoice No. 983 dated 10.8.84 (copy enclosed) raised on M/s. Khanna Traders, Sadar Bazar, Delhi, only 12 cartons i.e. 1728 oil bottles (85ml each) were to be supplied whereas you actually supplied to the party 36 cartons, i.e. 5184 oil bottles (85ml each), thus cheating the company to the extent of the excess oil bottles and appropriating the proceeds thereof.
The surplus oil and oil bottles were generated by you by deliberately causing the oil bottles, particularly the ones supplied free with accessory boxes, under-filled and reporting short receipts of empty oil bottles and procuring supplies against such short receipts.
In respect of such supplies, however, you never used to raise regular invoices on the dealer or dealers concerned while effecting supplies but used to circumvent this requirement by calling the dealer in person to the warehouse and obtaining his acknowledgement."
8. The Petitioner was asked to show cause as to why an inquiry should
not be held against him for:
(i) dishonesty in connection with the business of the company.
(ii) commission of acts subversive of discipline.
9. The Inquiry Officer („IO‟), after due notice to the Petitioner, held
proceedings on 21st February 1985. The report of the IO records, inter
alia, that though the Petitioner stated that he had submitted an
explanation to the chargesheet, when asked by the IO whether he would
like to submit a copy to the IO, he replied in the negative. The
management examined four witnesses. The report of the IO records that
the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine all the four
witnesses. However, the Petitioner did not examine them. The Petitioner
confirmed having received the chargesheet and having understood its
contents. He reiterated that he had submitted an explanation but
answered in the negative when asked whether he would like to submit a
copy thereof. The management however, informed the IO that no such
explanation had been received from the Petitioner.
10. The report dated 8th March 1985 of the IO discussed each item of
charge and the evidence presented before the IO in support of each
charge, in great detail. The IO concluded that while charges at Serial
Nos. 1, 5 & 6 were proved, the charges at Serial Nos. 2, 3, & 4 were not
proved. On the basis of the report of the IO, the managing director of
ISMCL on 26th March 1985 dismissed the Petitioner from service.
11. The resultant dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour
Court in ID No. 75 of 1986 which held the inquiry, held prior to the
dismissal of the Petitioner, to be fair and proper. On the said issue, the
Labour Court examined the evidence in great detail. It was held that the
management had given 15 days‟ time to arrange for a co-worker to
represent him and also witnesses in its defence in the inquiry which was
held on 15th February 1985. The inquiry proceedings were not conducted
on that date but postponed to 21st February 1985. In his cross-
examination, the Petitioner admitted that he had signed the inquiry
proceedings and received a copy of the same. The Petitioner had at no
point protested to the IO or the management about the inquiry being
conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice or in an improper or
unfair way. The Labour Court held that the Petitioner was fully
conversant with the charges and the material against him and had cross-
examined the witnesses produced by the management at length. The IO
held the charges at Serial Nos. 1, 2 and 4(i) & (ii) to be proved. The
remaining charges were held not to be proved, by giving the benefit of
doubt to the workman. The fact that the inquiry was concluded in one
day was held not to have caused any prejudice to the Petitioner. The non-
examination of Mr. Kartar Singh was held not to have vitiated the
inquiry. It was, therefore, held by the Labour Court that the inquiry was
fair and proper.
12. Mr. Shankar Raju, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
reiterated that the Petitioner was not given an effective opportunity to
defend himself against the charges. In particular, he was not permitted to
file a statement of defence or lead evidence.
13. However, this Court finds on a perusal of the record that the Petitioner
in fact declined to provide the IO with a copy of the defence statement
and also declined to lead evidence apart from examining himself.
14. It was next submitted that sufficient time was not given to the
Petitioner to prepare for the cross-examination of the management
witnesses since the list was not given to him in advance. Moreover, the
entire cross-examination of the witnesses was concluded on one single
day. Therefore, an effective opportunity of cross-examining the
management witnesses was not given.
15. There is no merit in the above contention as well. In his cross-
examination in the Labour Court, the Petitioner admitted that he had
received copies of the proceedings and in fact had cross-examined each of
the management witnesses. He had at no point protested to the IO about
the procedure adopted. It appears that at that stage, the Petitioner did not
have any grievance.
16. In any event, even assuming that the Petitioner did not get the
opportunity to lead evidence, he could have examined witnesses in the
Labour Court in support of his claim or at least filed an application before
the Labour Court asking it to summon some of the witnesses including
Mr. Kartar Singh. The Petitioner did not do so and therefore, missed
another opportunity of producing evidence before the Labour Court to
substantiate his claim. In the circumstances, this Court is unable to
accept the submission made on behalf of the Petitioner that great
prejudice was caused to the Petitioner on account of the entire inquiry
having been concluded on one single day.
17. The last point urged by Mr. Shankar Raju was based on the decision
of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B.
Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727. In particular, he relied upon the
observations in para 30(iv) in which it was held that the right to make
representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded
in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence
against the charges and it is a breach of principles of natural justice to
deny the said right. Further, it was observed that this rule should apply to
employees in all establishments "whether Government or non-
Government, public or private".
18. In the present case, prior to the impugned order dismissing the
Petitioner from service, he was not furnished with a copy of the inquiry
report. The second grievance is that the order of dismissal refers to the
past record of the Petitioner having been taken into account by the
management. It is submitted that this past record could not be used to
prove the charges against the Petitioner and therefore, the process of
awarding the punishment of dismissal was unfair. Lastly, it is submitted
that in the chargesheet itself, it was stated that the Petitioner if found
guilty of the said charges would be dismissed from service. It is
accordingly submitted that the management had already made up its mind
about the punishment even before the inquiry commenced and, therefore,
the inquiry proceedings were an empty formality.
19. As regards the submission concerning non-furnishing of the inquiry
report to the Petitioner, the consequences would be that the proceedings
will have to be relegated to the stage at which they were prior to the
issuance of the order of dismissal. Then again all that would be done is
that the management would issue to the Petitioner a show cause notice on
the penalty imposed asking him to make his representation against the
inquiry report. Considering the passage of time, it does not appear to be
expedient to relegate the matter to the disciplinary authority of the
management at this stage. If the Labour Court could exercise its powers
under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 („ID Act‟) and
interfere with the quantum of punishment, upon finding it to be shocking
to the judicial conscience, then this Court too can determine if the
punishment awarded to the Petitioner was appropriate.
20. The Petitioner has been unable to outline the circumstances that
would justify the award of a lesser punishment to the Petitioner. This is
particularly true in the light of the charges which have now been held to
be proved against the Petitioner. Charges at Serial Nos. 1, 5 & 6 touch
upon the issue of dishonesty. This Court is unable to find any perversity
in the findings of the IO as regards these charges. In any event,
considering that the Petitioner has been held guilty in three of the six
charges which substantiate the management‟s plea that he acted
dishonestly, the punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be
disproportionate. If the ultimate punishment awarded to the Petitioner
does not call for interference, no purpose would be served relegating the
entire matter to the management for a fresh determination as to the
quantum of punishment.
21. For all the above reasons, this Court finds no ground having been
made out for interference with the impugned Award of the Labour Court.
22. The writ petition and the pending application are dismissed.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
AUGUST 12, 2011 ha
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