Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2295 Del
Judgement Date : 29 April, 2011
REPORTABLE
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
WP (C) No.4330/2010
Date of Decision: April 29, 2011
SHASHI KOHLI ..... Petitioner
through Ms. Tamali Wad, Advocate with
Ms. Indrani Ghosh, Advocate
versus
DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ANR ..... Respondents
through Mr. Anjum Javed, Advocate with
Mr. Nirbhay Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Advocate with
Mr. Nitin Sharma, Mr. Ankur Aggarwal,
Ms. Suman Rani & Mr. Sagar, Advocates
for respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MISS JUSTICE REKHA SHARMA
1. Whether the reporters of local papers may be allowed to see
the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the „Digest‟? Yes
REKHA SHARMA, J.
The petitioner was a Chemistry teacher in Delhi Public School.
She attained the age of 60 years on July 31, 2010. It is not disputed
that her age of retirement was 60 years. Her grievance is that a
Notification dated January 29, 2007 was issued by the Government
of National Capital Territory of Delhi, Directorate of Education (in
short, referred to as "GNCTD") allowing re-employment to all
retiring teachers upto PGT level till they attain the age of 62 years
and that despite the Notification, she has not been granted the
benefit of re-employment without any cogent reason.
Before I proceed further, let me reproduce the Notification. It
runs as under:-
"GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI, DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION, OLD SECRETARIAT, DELHI.
No.F.30-3(28)/Co-Ord/2006/686-753
Dated: 29th January, 2007
NOTIFICATION
In pursuance to Cabinet Decision No.113, dt. 4.9.2006 conveyed vide letter No.F.3/3/2004-GAD/CN/ 20491-502, dt. 8.9.2006, the Lieutenant Governor, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi is pleased to allow automatic re-employment of all retiring teachers upto PGT level, subject to fitness and vigilance clearance, till they attain the age of 62 years or till clearance from Government of India for extending retirement age is received, whichever is earlier. The terms and conditions of re-employment are being notified separately.
By order and in the name of The Lt. Governor of the National Capital Territory of Delhi
Sd/-
(MADHUP VYAS) Joint Secretary (Education)"
In furtherance to the Notification dated January 29, 2007, the
GNCTD issued another Notification dated February 28, 2007 laying
down instructions/guidelines for re-employment. The following
paragraph of this Notification is relevant.
"x x x x x
1. The retiring teachers of the Directorate of Education, GNCT of Delhi, shall be eligible for consideration for re-employment against clear vacancy upto his/her attaining the age of 62 years. The re-employment will be subject to fitness and vigilance clearance of the retiring teachers, i.e. the pensioner. For physical fitness of retiring teacher, a certificate from authorized medical practitioner is required to be submitted to the Head of School, where the retiring teacher has last served. The professional fitness is required to be assessed by DDE of the concerned District after considering work and conduct report, vigilance clearance and medical certificate submitted by the pensioner. The DDE concerned will ensure that the teachers, who are free from vigilance angle, are only re-employed and individual teacher should not be made to run around to get the vigilance clearance..."
While the petitioner has relied upon the aforesaid Notification
of January 29, 2007, respondent No.2, namely, the Managing
Committee of the School has taken the stand that the Notification so
relied upon by her does not apply to private unaided Schools and
that as respondent No.2 is also a private unaided School, it is not
covered by the Notification. It may be noted that respondent No.1,
namely, Director of Education in its counter-affidavit to the
writ-petition has endorsed the said stand of respondent No.2. It
says that the Notification dated January 29, 2007 regarding
re-employment is meant for teachers upto PGT level in Government
and Government aided Schools and is not applicable to unaided
Public Schools. It further says that the re-employment is subject to
conditions as specified in the Notification, like, medical fitness and
performance before the retirement and that the competent
authority in the case of Public Schools is the Managing Committee
which has to take final decision in the matter of re-employment.
It is not that respondent No.2 did not consider the case of the
petitioner for re-employment up to the age of 62 years, but it was
done not on the basis of the Notification dated January 29, 2007 but
on the basis of a decision of the Working Committee of the Delhi
Public School Society taken in its meeting held on January 15, 2007
whereby it was decided that all teachers will remain in employment
upto the age of 62 years unless found unsuitable on any ground by
a Committee consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Principal of
the School. The extracts of the Minutes of the meeting of the
Working Committee relevant for our purpose are as under:-
"x x x x x x
i) All teachers will remain in employment upto the
age of 62 years unless found unsuitable on any ground by a committee consisting of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Principal of the School.
ii) In case of Principals, Vice Principals,
Headmistresses/Headmasters the committee
consisting of Chairman DPSS and Chairman of the concerned School shall take a decision.
iii) Principal of the School would put up all the cases of said employees about to attain the age of 60 years, well in time, for decision by the appropriate committee.
iv) Provisions of the Delhi Education Act and Rules would be kept in view while deciding whether the 2 years beyond 60 years of age are to be by way of
extension or reemployment and whether it can be done without seeking any approval."
It is not disputed that a Committee comprising of Mr. Ashok
Chandra, Chairman, DPSS, Mr. V.R.Vaish, Chairman, M.C.,
Mr. Pramod Grover, Vice-Chairman and Mr. M.I.Hussain,
Principal-cum-Manager was constituted and the said Committee
examined the relevant records of service including the
Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of last 5 years of all eligible
candidates including the petitioner but found the petitioner unfit for
re-employment.
Undoubtedly, and I say so, because it appears to be so
apparent from the Notification of GNCTD dated
January 29, 2007 read along with the Notification dated
February 28, 2007 on the one hand, and the Minutes of the meeting
relied upon by the School on the other, that the grant of extension is
not a matter of right. In so far as the Notification of GNCTD is
concerned, though it does say that the Lieutenant Governor is
pleased to allow automatic re-employment of all retiring teachers
upto PGT level, but it also goes on to say that such re-employment
is subject to fitness and vigilance clearance. And what will
constitute fitness has been clarified in the subsequent Notification of
February 28, 2007. As per the said Notification, fitness does not
mean physical fitness alone, but it also includes professional fitness
which is required to be assessed by DDE of the concerned District
after considering work and conduct report. As regards the decision
of the Working Committee of the School that its teachers will remain
in employment upto the age of 62 years, the same will also come
into effect if the teachers are not found unsuitable on any ground by
the Committee. Hence, irrespective of whether it is the Notification
of the GNCTD, or the decision of the Working Committee of the
School, in either case, what needs to be examined is whether a
teacher is fit, or to put it differently, not suitable for re-employment
on any ground. The only right that the petitioner can claim is the
right to be considered for extension. Nothing less, nothing more.
And as borne out from the record, she was considered and found to
be not fit for grant of extension.
It will not be out of place to refer to two judgments of the
Division Bench of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for
respondent No.2 wherein it has been held that the only right that an
employee has in the matter of re-employment is the right to be
considered and the Courts ordinarily will not interfere in the decision
of the authority empowered to take such a decision.
In the first judgment titled Prof. P.S.Verma versus Jamia Millia
Islamia University & others, reported in 1996 III AD (Delhi) 33, the
petitioner was a Professor in Jamia Millia Islamia University. He
retired at the age of 60 on attaining the age of superannuation.
Upon his retirement, he sought re-employment relying upon
Regulation XXXVII of the University which provided that the
Executive Council, on recommendation of Vice Chancellor, may in
the interest of University, re-employ a teacher for such period as it
may deem fit but not beyond the age of 65 years. The petitioner‟s
request for re-employment was forwarded by the Head of the
Department, namely, the Dean to the Vice Chancellor without
making any comments of his own. However, subsequently the
comments of the Dean were called for and in his comments, he
stated that the petitioner‟s bio-data did not show any substantial
contribution in respect of the research work, which is expected from
a person of his status and as such, he did not recommend his case
for re-employment. His case was also referred to the
Advisory Committee, but the Advisory Committee also in its
recommendation to the Executive Committee felt that it was not in
the larger interest of the institution to grant him re-employment.
The petitioner challenged the non-grant of extension to him,
amongst others, on the ground, that two teachers after
superannuation were re-employed without any recommendation of
the Head of the Department, on the mere forwarding of their
applications. The Division Bench of this Court dismissed the
writ-petition and held as under:-
"5. Having considered the respective stand of the parties, their submissions and the relevant Ordinance XXXVII-A, we are of the view that there is no legal right vested in a teacher of the respondent-University for being re-employed beyond the age of superannuation. The only right, if any, which can be said to be available to a teacher on superannuation would be of being considered for re-employment and in case recommendation is made for re-employment, he may be re-employed by the Executive Council. In a case where no recommendation for re-employment is made, the matter has to be referred to the Advisory Committee. In the case of the petitioner there was no positive recommendation for re-employment and no fault can be found in respondents‟ action in forwarding his case to the Advisory Committee, which also has now given its advice for not re-employing the petitioner. The mere fact that in the past two teachers, after superannuation were re-employed, assuming, without any recommendation of the Head of the Department, on the mere forwarding of their applications, the same cannot amount to conferring a right in petitioner‟s favour and this act cannot be taken as an act of discrimination thereby giving right in petitioner‟s favour for being re-employed as a matter of course when petitioner‟s case was duly considered and not recommended and approved by the Advisory Committee."
The second case titled Dr. V.K.Agrawal versus University of
Delhi and others, reported in (2005) Delhi Law Times 468 (DB) was
an appeal from a decision of a learned Single Judge dismissing the
plea of the appellant who was a Lecturer in Moti Lal Nehru College
for re-employment after he had attained the age of superannuation.
His case for re-employment was recommended by the Principal of
the college and was also recommended by the Governing Body of
the college. However, the Vice Chancellor on receiving the
recommendation sent it to the Advisory Committee which consisted
of experts and the Advisory Committee after examining the
same on various aspects declined to recommend the appellant for
re-employment. The appellant contended before the Division Bench
that once the Governing Body had recommended its case, the Vice
Chancellor was only required to give his formal assent. Dismissing
the plea of the appellant, the Division Bench held that, " it is not for
this Court to say whether a teacher is a distinguished teacher or not.
This Court does not consist of experts in the subject concerned, and
the Court must ordinarily defer to the opinion of the experts. The
advisory committee consists of experts, who considered the case of
the appellant and did not recommend grant of re-employment to
him. We cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the advisory
committee, which was accepted by the Vice-Chancellor."
Coming back to the case of the petitioner, I find, that she does
not say that the Committee was not validly constituted. Of-course,
she does say that she was a party to complaints made against the
Principal of the School, namely, Shri M.I.Hussain to the National
Commission for Women for harassing the teachers of the school and
on those complaints, the Principal was indicted by the Commission.
It is, thus, contended that the Principal was inimically disposed
towards the petitioner and because of his animus against her, he
might have misrepresented the facts before the Screening
Committee resulting in her unfair assessment. I feel, that the mere
fact that she along with some others had made complaints against
the Principal, would not be sufficient to discard the finding of the
Committee. The Principal was not the sole member of the
Committee. It also comprised of the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman and no bias is alleged against them. The Committee
records that it examined the relevant records of service including
the Annual Confidential Reports of last 5 years of all eligible
candidates including the petitioner. It is not the case of the
petitioner that such record was not looked into. She does say that
some ACRs were taken into consideration, which did not paint her in
rosy colours and which were also not communicated to her, but that
is another argument which I shall deal with a little later. The report
of the Committee cannot be rubbished on the sole ground that the
petitioner had filed a complaint against the Principal. However, in
fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner, let me refer to a
judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by her rendered in the
case of Rattan Lal Sharma versus Managing Committee, Dr. Hari
Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and others , reported
in (1993) 4 Supreme Court Cases 10.
In the aforesaid case, the Principal of a Higher Secondary
School was suspended and a charge-sheet was issued to him. One
of the charges was that a sum of ` 129.37 on account of
amalgamated fund given to the appellant by the teacher incharge of
the amalgamated fund, was reported to have been used by him and
was unaccounted for. The school authorities appointed an inquiry
committee of three members including the teacher incharge of the
amalgamated fund. The said teacher not only acted as a member of
the Inquiry Committee but also appeared as a witness in support of
the charge. A learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the
inquiry proceeding was vitiated by bias and hence not sustainable.
The Division Bench in appeal reversed the decision of the Single
Judge. The Apex Court agreed with the Single Bench and held that
in the facts of the case, there was not only a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the appellant about the bias of one of
the members of the inquiry committee but such apprehension
became real when the member appeared as a witness against the
employee to prove the charge and thereafter proceeded with the
inquiry proceedings as a member of the inquiry committee to
uphold the correctness of his deposition as a judge. The Apex Court
further held that the said member of the inquiry committee was
interested in establishing the charge and from the charge itself, it
was apparent that he had a pre-disposition to decide against the
appellant.
The aforementioned case cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, the bias of the
member of the Committee was very pronounced. He not only acted
as a member of the inquiry committee but also deposed against the
employee in support of the very charge on which, the inquiry
committee was required to give its finding of „proved‟ or „not
proved‟. The facts of the present case are entirely different. Here
there was a mere apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that
the Principal on account of her having made complaints against him
was biased against her. There was no further allegation against
him. Hence, the petitioner can derive no assistance from the
aforementioned case.
This brings me to the question, whether the Committee could
take into consideration such ACRs of the petitioner which were
adverse and were not communicated to her while she was in
service?
The petitioner contends that notwithstanding the adverse
ACRs which were never communicated to her, she was granted
financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme dated August 09, 1999.
She further contends that the denial of the benefit of
re-employment to her on the basis of the very same ACRs is
arbitrary, malafide, biased and hence illegal. On the other hand,
respondent No.2 in paragraph-5 of its counter-affidavit has
reproduced the entries made in the ACRs of the petitioner between
the years 2002-03 to 2008-09. Those entries certainly do not
project the petitioner in good hues. The very first entry of 2002-03
shows that her increment was stopped for a period of one year
w.e.f. July 01, 2003. The ACR of 2003-04 reflects that she was
adjudged to be a teacher with very poor communication skill and
poor knowledge of chemistry and that she could not satisfy the
students of 10+2 level. Hence it was recommended that she should
not be given Class-XI to teach. The ACRs of the years 2004-05 till
2008-09 indicate that she was not following the norms of teaching;
she was not dynamic; she was not keeping herself updated with the
development of the subject; and, there were complaints received
against her from the students/teachers and parents.
Besides the ACRs, respondent No.2 by way of Annexure-B to
the writ-petition filed a bunch of communications addressed to the
petitioner by the Principal or on his behalf which ranged from as
distant a time as January 05, 1979 and were as recent as
July 14, 2009. I do not propose to refer to the contents of each of
such communication. However, the fact remains that some of them
pertain to the conduct of the petitioner with regard to her improper
style of teaching, her not reporting for Monday Test Duty at times,
her refusal to accept the ACRs under her signatures and her not
attending to morning assembly sessions, etc.
It is well settled that every adverse entry in a confidential
report of an employee has to be communicated to him, for it is likely
to mar his chances of promotion or other benefits. Here, in the
present case, it is the petitioner‟s own case that inspite of adverse
entries which were not communicated to her, she was given the
benefit of financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme and was not
put to any disadvantage while she was in service. The question is,
whether once she has ceased to be in the service of the respondent
on attaining the age of 60 years, those ACRs even though not
communicated to her could be looked into for determining, whether
she deserved to be re-employed up to the age of 62 years. I feel
that for the purpose of re-employment, the Committee was required
to take an over-all view of conduct of the petitioner as a teacher in
terms of fitness and, therefore, the ACRs, whether adverse or
favourable, could be looked into. In any case, the Committee not
only examined the ACRs of the last 5 years of the petitioner, but
also her other record which, as noticed above, was far from
commendatory. It is true that the school did not take any
disciplinary action against the petitioner on the basis of the adverse
ACRs while she was in service, but if the school overlooked and
ignored her such record and yet granted her financial upgradation
and other benefits, must it also grant her re-employment? I feel,
the answer is in the negative. At the cost of repetition, it may be
stated that the petitioner has no right to re-employment. She only
has a right to be considered and the school has a right to deny her
re-employment, if after considering her over-all performance as a
teacher, it finds that she is not fit for re-employment.
For the reasons delineated above, I find myself one with
respondent No.2, and hold, that the action taken by it in not
granting re-employment to the petitioner suffers from no illegality.
The writ-petition has no merit. The same is dismissed.
REKHA SHARMA, J.
APRIL 29, 2011 ka
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