Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 4728 Del
Judgement Date : 7 October, 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W.P.(C) 9355/2009 & CM No. 7144/2009
UNION OF INDIA ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms. Maneesha Dhir with
Ms. Preeti Dalal, Advocate.
versus
R.S. KHAN ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Nandan K. Jha, Advocate.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the order? No
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the order should be reported Yes
in Digest?
ORDER
07.10.2010
1. This petition is directed against the order dated 8th May 2009 of the
Central Information Commission („CIC‟) allowing the appeal of the
Respondent and directing the Central Public Information Officer
(„CPIO‟) in the office of the Controller General of Defence Accounts
(„CGDA‟) to provide to the Respondent within 10 working days the
information sought by her.
2. On 5th December 2008, the Petitioner applied to the CPIO in the
CGDA seeking information in respect of 8 matters arising from the
disciplinary proceedings conducted against her for a major penalty,
which had recently been concluded. The Respondent had been awarded
the penalty of „censure‟ in those disciplinary proceedings. By an order
dated 7th January 2009, the CGDA rejected the request stating that the
information cannot be provided as it attracted Sections 8(i)(e), 8(i)(g)
and 8(i)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 („RTI‟ Act, 2005).
Inter alia, it was observed as under:
"Notings in case of a disciplinary proceeding contain the views and opinions of the various authorities which are fiduciary in nature and the views and opinions, if made open, might antagonize the charged officer. It may also lead to the danger of the lift of the officials who have made those remarks. Further the disciplinary proceedings are conducted in an objective and fair manner with the involvement of lot of agencies which include CGDA, Ministry of Defence (Finance), and DoPT. Further disclosing entire set of notings which includes the personal information/opinion of the officials at various stages does not have any relationship with any public activity or interest."
3. The Appellate Authority concurred with the view of the CPIO and
dismissed the Respondent‟s appeal on 4th March 2009. Thereafter, the
Respondent preferred an appeal to the CIC.
4. The CIC observed that the expression „fiduciary relationship‟ in
Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, 2005 could not apply to the relationship
between a government and its own employees. It did not cover notings
in a public document. Likewise, the reference to Section 8(1)(g) of the
RTI Act was also held to be misplaced. It was held that notings made
on files as part of discharge of official functions was a public activity.
The CIC disagreed with the view expressed by the CPIO and the
Appellate Authority that the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against
the Petitioner that the notings and the files during the disciplinary
proceedings did not have any relationship with public activity or public
interest.
5. Ms. Maneesha Dhir, learned counsel for the Petitioner reiterated the
submissions made before the CIC and supported the order of the CPIO
and the Appellate Authority. She again referred to Section 8(1)(e),
8(1)(g) and 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 and submitted that the
information sought was covered under each of these provisions and was
therefore exempt from disclosure. It was submitted that notings on files
do not fall within the definition of information under Section 2(f) RTI
Act, 2005. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in
State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar (1987) 3 SCC 34, Sethi Auto
Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority 2009 (1) SCC 180,
Khanapuram Gandaiah v. Administrative Officer (2010) 2 SCC 1 and
Union of India v. Central Information Commission 2009 (165) DLT
559.
6. As regards the first point urged, this Court is unable to accept the
submission made on behalf of the Union of India that file notings,
which are in the form of the views and comments expressed by the
various officials dealing with the files, are not included within the
definition of „information‟ under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, 2005.
Section 2(f) reads as under:
"(f) "information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public
authority under any other law for the time being in force;"
7. It is clear that legislative intent is to give a wide interpretation to the
term „information‟ under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, 2005. This is
evident from the inclusion of "records, documents, memos, e-mails,
opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders" within the broad
definition of "information".
8. The submission made by learned counsel for the Petitioner also
stands contradicted by an office memorandum dated 28th June 2009
issued by the Department of Personnel & Training („DoPT‟) to the
following effect:
"OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject : Disclosure of „file noting‟ under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
***
The undersigned is directed to say that various Ministries/Departments etc. have been seeking clarification about disclosure of file noting under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It is hereby clarified that file noting can be disclosed except file noting containing information exempt from disclosure under section 8 of the Act.
2. It may be brought to the notice of all concerned."
9. Unless file notings are specifically excluded from the definition of
Section 2(f), there is no warrant for proposition that the word
„information‟ under Section 2(f) does not include file notings.
10. The next submission to be dealt with is that information contained
in the files in the form of file notings made by the different officials
dealing with the files during the course of disciplinary proceedings
against the Petitioner were available to the Union of India in a
„fiduciary relationship‟ within the meaning of Section 8(1)(e) of the
RTI Act. This Court concurs with the view expressed by the CIC that in
the context of a government servant performing official functions and
making notes on a file about the performance or conduct of another
officer, such noting cannot be said to be given to the government
pursuant to a `fiduciary relationship‟ with the government within the
meaning of Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, 2005. Section 8(1)(e) is, at
best, a ground to deny information to a third party on the ground that
the information sought concerns a government servant, which
information is available with the government pursuant to a fiduciary
relationship, that such person, has with the government, as an
employee.
11. To illustrate, it will be no ground for the Union of India to deny to
an employee, against whom the disciplinary proceedings are held, to
withhold the information available in the Government files about such
employee on the ground that such information has been given to it by
some other government official who made the noting in a fiduciary
relationship. This can be a ground only to deny disclosure to a third
party who may be seeking information about the Petitioner in relation to
the disciplinary proceedings held against her. The Union of India, can
possibly argue that in view of the fiduciary relationship between the
Petitioner and the Union of India it is not obligatory for the Union of
India to disclose the information about her to a third party. This again is
not a blanket immunity against disclosure. In terms of Section 8(1)(e)
RTI Act, the Union of India will have to demonstrate that there is no
larger public interest which warrants disclosure of such information.
The need for the official facing disciplinary inquiry to have to be
provided with all the material against such official has been explained
in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India
v. L.K. Puri 151 DLT 2008, as under:
"The principle of law, on the conjoint reading of the two judgments, as aforesaid, would be that in case there is such material, whether in the form of comments/findings/ advise of UPSC/CVC or other material on which the disciplinary authority acts upon, it is necessary to supply the same to the charge sheeted officer before relying thereupon any imposing the punishment, major or minor, in as much as cardinal principle of law is that one cannot cat on material which is neither supplied nor shown to the delinquent official. Otherwise, such advice of UPSC can be furnished to the Government servant along with the copy of the penalty order as well as per Rule 32 of the CCS(CCA) Rules."
12. In Dev Dutt v. Union of India (2008) 8 SCC 725, the Supreme
Court mandated communication of not only all entries in ACR but even
whether the entry of a grade in an ACR, in comparison to the previous
years‟ entry resulted in the lowering of the grade. A reference may be
made to paras 39 and 45 of the said judgment which read as under:
"39. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in
public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation. This in our opinion is the correct legal position even though there may be no Rule/G.O. requiring communication of the entry, or even if there is a Rule/G.O. prohibiting it, because the principle of non-arbitrariness in State action as envisaged by Article 14 of the Constitution in our opinion requires such communication. Article 14 will override all rules or government orders." .......
45. In our opinion, non-communication of entries in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the military), certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for promotion or get other benefits (as already discussed above). Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution."
13. The decision in State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar was rendered at
a time when no RTI Act existed. The understanding of `privileged‟
information in 1987 will have to give way to the legislative intent
manifest in the RTI Act, enacted eighteen years later. The decision in
Sethi Auto Services was again not in the context of the RTI Act. It
concerned the termination of a petrol pump dealership. In Khanapuram
Gandaiah, the Petitioner was seeking to know from a Judicial Officer
as to why he decided an appeal "dishonestly". The said decision is
plainly distinguishable on facts.
14. In the considered view of this Court, the Union of India cannot rely
upon Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, 2005 to deny information to the
Petitioner in the present case.
15. It may be further added that the Respondent has already retired on
31st October 2009. Further, even the censure awarded to the Petitioner
has been quashed by this Court by an order dated 9th August 2010 in
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12462 of 2009. The Respondent has also
placed on record a copy of the order passed by the CGDA treating the
suspension period as duty period, and directing the release of full pay
and allowances to the Respondent for the said period.
16. In light of the above developments, this Court finds no merits in any
of the apprehensions expressed by the CPIO in the order rejecting the
Respondent‟s application with reference to either Section 8(1)(g) of the
RTI Act 2005.The disclosure of information sought by the Petitioner
can hardly endanger the life or physical safety of any person. There
must be some basis to invoke these provisions. It cannot be a mere
apprehension.
17. As regards Section 8(1)(j), there is no question that notings made in
the files by government servants in discharge of their official functions
is definitely a public activity and concerns the larger public interest. In
the present case, Section 8(1)(j) was wrongly invoked by the CPIO and
by the Appellate Authority to deny information to the Respondent.
18. This Court finds that no error has been committed by the CIC in
passing the impugned order. Consequently, the writ petition is
dismissed with costs of `5,000/-, which will be paid by the Petitioner to
the Respondent, within a period of four weeks. Interim order dated 27th
May 2009 stands vacated. Application also stands dismissed
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
OCTOBER 07, 2010 ak
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