Delhi High Court
Air Force Senior Secondary School vs Ms. Preeti Tomar & Anr on 30 November, 2010
Author: Rekha Sharma
UNREPORTABLE
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
WP (C) No.8020/2010
Date of Decision: November 30, 2010
AIR FORCE SENIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL ...... Petitioner
through Mr. A.K.Bhardwaj, Advocate
versus
MS. PREETI TOMAR & ANR ..... Respondents
through Mr. R.K.Saini, Advocate with
Mr. Sitab Ali Chaudhary, Advocate for
respondent No.1.
Ms. Purnima Maheshwari, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MISS JUSTICE REKHA SHARMA
1. Whether the reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? No
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the „Digest‟? No
REKHA SHARMA, J. (ORAL)
Caveat No.270/2010
The caveator has been heard.
The caveat is discharged.
WP(C) No.8020/2010
Admittedly, the petitioner vide order dated April 01, 2008
appointed respondent No.1 as PGT (Biology) initially on probation for a
period of one year from the date of her joining. Admittedly again, after
the expiry of the period of one year, neither her probation period was
extended nor was she confirmed on the post. However, she continued
to work on the post till April 30, 2009, on which date she was served
with a termination order stating that her services were no longer
required as the experience certificate produced by her at the time of
interview was found to be forged after verification.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, respondent No.1
preferred an appeal to the Delhi School Tribunal under Section 8(3) of
the Delhi School Education Act, 1973. The Tribunal vide order dated
July 30, 2010 has held in favour of respondent No.1 observing that, " by
stating that the Appellant produced „forged certificate‟, the employer
made the letter stigmatic. Obviously such an order could not be
passed without holding a departmental inquiry. " The Tribunal, thus,
has further held that the services of respondent No.1 were terminated
illegally, arbitrarily and for no fault of hers. Consequently, a direction
has been issued to the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.1 into
service along with full back-wages.
The present writ-petition has been filed by the petitioner against
the aforesaid order of the Tribunal.
The question which arises in the present writ-petition had arisen
before me in an earlier writ-petition in the case of "Air Force Senior
Secondary School versus Mrs. Promila Kumar & Another" being WP(C)
No.6662/2010. The facts of that case were similar to the facts of the
present case, as in that case also the termination letter was similarly
worded. While disposing of that writ-petition on November 11, 2010,
I held as under:-
"Undoubtedly, the aforesaid order is not a
simplicitor order of termination. It accuses
respondent No.1 of having produced a forged
experience certificate. Hence, it carries a taint
with it. It is true that no inquiry is required to
be held before terminating the services of an
employee on probation but such an employee
can also not be visited with an order which is
stigmatic. Since respondent No.1 continued to
be on probation in the absence of an order
confirming her on the post, the petitioner could
easily do away with her services by merely
stating that the same were no longer required,
but the use of additional words in her
termination letter that "her services were
being terminated because of her having
produced a forged experience certificate" do
carry a stigma and it is these words which
make the termination letter bad in law. Even
the Division Bench while reversing the order of
the learned Single Judge in the case of Veena
Sharma (supra) has held that, "As we have not
concurred with the finding that the employee
was a confirmed employee, the conclusion
arrived at as an inevitable corollary relating to
the violation of the doctrine of natural justice is
also set aside, for there is no stigma attached
to the order of termination." The words "for
there is no stigma attached to the order of
termination" used by the Division Bench are
significant. They imply that if the order of
termination carries stigma, then the
termination can be held to be bad."
It is not disputed either by the learned counsel for the petitioner
or by the learned counsels for respondents No.1 & 2 that the present
case is fully covered by the aforesaid judgment of this Court.
Accordingly, I set-aside the order of termination dated April 30, 2009.
The writ-petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to take
appropriate action against respondent No.1 as per law, if so advised.
REKHA SHARMA, J.
NOVEMBER 30, 2010
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