Oriental Bank Of Commerce vs Shri Ram Prakash Sehrawat
2010 Latest Caselaw 5170 Del

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                RFA No. 632/2004


                         Judgment delivered on: 12.11.2010

Oriental Bank of Commerce                ..... Appellant
                   Through: Mr.Mahesh K.Chaudhary, Adv.

                      Versus

Shri Ram Prakash Sehrawat          ..... Respondent

Through: Mr.Pawan Upadhyay, Mr.Saurab Mehra and Mr.Anish Kumar Maggo, Advocates

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR,

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes

KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. Oral:

1. By this appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 the appellant seeks to set aside the judgment

and decree dated 29.07.2004 passed by the Court of the

learned ADJ, Delhi whereby the suit was decreed in favour of

the respondent and against the appellant.

2. Brief conspectus of facts relevant for deciding the

present appeal is that the respondent had leased his property

bearing Khasra No. 754(1-4:1/2), Mahipalpur, New Delhi to

the appellant bank vide lease dated 26.12.1990 for a period of

five years renewable thereafter. That the lease came to an

end on 26.12.2000 whereafter no fresh lease was executed

between the parties but deliberations were going on between

them to execute a fresh lease deed and through various

letters exchanged between the appellant and the respondent

various terms and conditions of the lease were being

discussed. The main difference which arose was with regard

to the date of execution of the fresh lease and the duration of

the lease period. During these negotiations, the appellant

bank continued in occupation of the leased premises and was

paying rent at the old rate which was not acceptable to the

respondent. Hence, consequently the respondent filed a suit

for recovery which vide judgment dated 29.7.2004 was

decreed in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.

Feeling aggrieved with the same, the appellant has preferred

the present appeal.

3. Mr.Mahesk K.Chaudhary, counsel appearing for the

appellant submits that the earlier lease deed executed

between the parties came to an end on 26.12.2000 and

thereafter no fresh lease deed was executed between the

parties. Counsel submits that the appellant was not liable to

pay the revised rent as has been claimed by the respondent,

once no fresh lease deed was executed between the parties.

Counsel further submits that simply an offer was made by the

appellant vide its letter dated 15.03.2003 to revise the rate of

rent @ Rs.15/- sq. ft. for ground floor and Rs.9/- sq. ft. for

basement, but the said revision was subject to further

condition that the lease would be revised for a period of nine

years and the same would be effective from the date of

execution of the lease deed. The contention of counsel for the

appellant is that once the lease deed was not renewed by the

respondent in terms of the said offer made by the appellant,

therefore, the respondent could not have claimed the revised

rent in terms of the said offer in the absence of execution of a

fresh lease deed. Counsel for the appellant further submits

that the respondent failed to give any break up or details of

the amount claimed by him in the plaint and in the absence of

any such details, the learned trial court fell in grave error in

accepting the case of the respondent/plaintiff without there

being any specific details of the claim. Counsel for the

appellant further submits that the appellant was constrained

to hand over the possession of the tenanted premises on

09.03.2005 after the appellant was put to great harassment

by the respondent as otherwise the appellant would not have

vacated the premises at least before the expiry of nine years

period, had the conditions laid down by the appellant in the

letter were accepted by the respondent. Counsel for the

appellant also submits that the appellant in its letter dated

10.5.03 reiterated its request for extension of the lease for a

period of nine years but the same was not agreed to by the

respondent and, therefore, the appellant was under no

obligation to pay the revised rate of rent merely based on the

offer letter dated 15.3.2003.

4. Refuting the said submissions of the counsel for the

appellant, counsel for the respondent submits that the

respondent never claimed eviction of the appellant from the

tenanted premises and the respondent was forced to file a

recovery suit against the appellant when despite various

requests made by the respondent, the appellant failed to pay

the enhanced rent. Counsel further submits that the earlier

lease came to an end on 26.12.2000 and thereafter the

appellant was required to pay the rent at the revised rate and

the said revision in rent was agreed to by the appellant itself

through its letters dated 15.03.2003 and 10.05.2003. Counsel

thus submits that the appellant cannot take a somersault and

resile from the stand as taken by it through its letters dated

15.03.2003 and 10.05.2003. Counsel also submits that the

respondent has been insisting the appellant to execute a fresh

lease deed but the appellant deliberately did not come

forward to execute the same and, therefore, it was the

appellant alone who was responsible for not coming forward

to execute a fresh lease deed and now it cannot take

advantage of the same for denying payment of rent at the

revised rate. Counsel thus states that no fault can be found

with the findings of the learned trial court which are based on

the admissions of the appellant itself, so far the revision in

rent is concerned.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at

considerable length and gone through the records.

6. It is quite intriguing and distressing to find that the

Scheduled Bank, like the appellant is engaging itself in

fighting a legal battle on the trivial ground of disputing its

liability to pay the rent at the revised rate. It is not expected

of the State instrumentalities, Govt. Undertakings or any

Govt. Corporation or the Scheduled Banks to take a stand in a

court of law like an unscrupulous litigant. The appellant bank

has not denied the fact that in principle they had taken a

decision to revise the rent from Rs.4/- to Rs.15/- sq.ft. for

ground floor and from Rs.3/- to Rs.9/- sq. ft. for the basement

floor forming part of the tenanted premises falling in Khasra

No.754 (1-4:1/2) situated in Mahipalpur, New Delhi and once

having agreed to the same, where the question not to pay the

said revised rent could arise. The appellant was inducted as a

tenant by the respondent-plaintiff under an unregistered lease

agreement dated 07.02.1991 initially for a period of five years

effective from 26.12.1990 with an option for renewal of the

same for a further period of five years with 15% increase in

the rent. The lease with further renewal of five years came to

an end on 26.12.2000 and thereafter no fresh lease deed was

executed between the parties. The respondent-landlord vide

letter dated 27.12.2000 (Ex. PW 1/C1) and thereafter letter

dated 30.5.2003 (Ex. PW 1/F), time and again reminded the

appellant/bank for the renewal of the lease deed on the

increased rent as per the market price. Through the letter

dated 1.1.2001 (proved on record as Ex. PW 1/G-2), the

respondent also informed the appellant that he shall not

accept the rent at a lesser rate and not to deposit the rent

amount in his account at the old rate. This letter clearly

shows that deliberations between the parties were in progress

for the renewal of the lease. The letters dated 15.03.2003 and

10.5.2003 were in response to and in furtherance of such

deliberations and requests made by the respondent for the

renewal of the lease. In the letter dated 15.3.2003 and in the

subsequent letter dated 10.5.2003, the appellant/bank has

clearly agreed to enhance the rent from Rs.4/- sq. ft. to

Rs.15/- sq.ft. for ground floor and from Rs.3/- sq. ft. to Rs.9/-

sq. ft for the basement floor. The appellant/bank in the said

letter has also agreed to clear the arrears of the revised rent

from 26.12.2000. The appellant/bank thus had clearly shown

its willingness to extend the lease on the terms and conditions

contained in the said letters. However, the respondent on the

other hand was agreeable to extend the lease not from the

date of the execution of fresh lease deed but from the date of

expiry of the previous lease agreement. The respondent vide

its letter dated 30.5.2003 was also not agreeable to extend

the lease for a period of nine years, but for two renewals of

three years each. This disagreement between the appellant

and the respondent was therefore with regard to the duration

of the lease period and also date of commencement of fresh

lease deed. So far other terms and conditions proposed by the

appellant/bank are concerned, they were duly accepted by the

respondent without any demur. The respondent has also

proved on record various letters written by him so as to call

upon the appellant/bank to execute the lease deed but without

any response from the side of the appellant/bank.

7. It is not in dispute that the appellant/bank kept on

occupying the tenanted premises as a tenant even in the

absence of execution of a fresh lease deed and had vacated

the premises only on 09.03.2005, much after the filing of the

said suit by the respondent and even after the passing of the

impugned judgment and decree. It is also not in dispute that

the respondent did not seek eviction of the appellant/bank

from the tenanted premises and was only concerned with the

payment of rent at the revised rate. It is also not in dispute

that the earlier lease period came to an end on 26.12.2000

and no further lease deed was executed between the parties.

The learned trial court has rightly observed that the tenancy

of the appellant/bank was a monthly tenancy as the earlier

lease deed was not registered as per the requirement of

Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 read with

Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

8. The precise question to be answered by this Court,

keeping in view the grievance raised by the appellant/bank,

is:

"Whether in the absence of execution of a fresh lease deed the appellant bank can still be held liable to pay the rent at the revised rate?"

So far the rate of rent is concerned, the appellant has

not disputed the fact that it has accepted the revised rate of

rent i.e. Rs.15/- sq. ft. for ground floor and Rs.9/- sq. ft for

basement floor. The case put forth by the appellant bank is

that the said revision is inter linked with the duration of the

lease deed and also lease period to become effective from the

date of its execution. It is quite clear from the letter dated

30.5.2003 sent by the respondent that he never agreed for the

duration of nine years lease effective from the date of

execution of the fresh lease deed and was insisting for the

duration of the lease for six years to become effective from

the date of expiry of the previous lease. The appellant bank

has failed to prove on record any document to show that the

appellant bank volunteered to hand over the possession of the

tenanted premises once they were not prepared to agree to

the terms and conditions proposed by the respondent. Hence

it is clear that the appellant bank was as reluctant to execute

the lease deed as it was to pay the revised rate of rent.

9. In the background of these facts, the trial court has

rightly based its findings on the admission of the appellant in

the said letter dated 15.3.2003 wherein it had clearly

admitted its liability to pay the revised rate of rent w.e.f

26.12.2000. It would be useful to reproduce the said findings

of the trial court here:

"Now the question which arises for consideration is at what rate the plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent. As discussed above, I have already held that vide letter mark B the Chief Manager of the defendant bank had himself unequivocally admitted in this letter that with reference to the discussions held with the

plaintiff, the bank was willing to extend the lease on the terms and conditions that rent for the ground floor would be @ 15 per sq. ft. and Rs.9 per sq. ft. of the basement. Thus, the admission of the rate of rent comes out from the horse's mouth and it is well settled principle of law that admission is the best proof and this rate of rent is also claimed by the plaintiff in the present suit. Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent at the rate mentioned above. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant."

10. It is manifest from the letters proved on record that

there was a divergence of opinion of the parties on the

duration of the fresh lease deed and its date of operation. It

cannot be lost sight of the fact that the lease expired on

26.12.2000 and the bank vacated the leased property only on

9.3.2005. If the terms and conditions set forth by the

respondent were not agreeable to the appellant bank, it

should have vacated the said premises immediately after the

deliberations between the parties came to be a no-go. The

contention of the appellant that the respondent did not file an

eviction suit but only a recovery suit ironically leans in favour

of the respondent to demonstrate that he had no problem in

further leasing out the premises to the Bank had it agreed to

his terms and conditions. When an ordinary citizen leases out

his property to a Bank or a Company as opposed to a private

individual, it is with the view that these organized institutions

are hassle free to deal with. It is a common perception that

the Banks are reliable establishments which do not harass the

lessor for trivial and inconsequential issues. But in the event

of the circumstances like that of the case at hand, this court is

constrained to observe that the Scheduled Bank like the

appellant has embroiled itself in frivolous litigation on trivial

issues leading to vexatious and galling litigation resulting in

waste of judicial time. It is rather expected of a Bank, like the

appellant, not to compel the lessor to chase it for payment of

his dues and then hassle him to approach the court of law.

This attitude of the bank is certainly deprecated by the court

and it is expected of the bank to conduct its dealings more

responsibly in future.

11. In the light of the above, I do not find any

perversity and illegality in the findings arrived at by the

learned trial court. There is no merit in the present appeal

and the same is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree

dated 29.07.2004 passed by the learned trial court is

accordingly upheld.

November 12, 2010             KAILASH GAMBHIR, J
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