Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 2794 Del
Judgement Date : 26 May, 2010
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 15.05.2010
Judgment Delivered on: 26.05.2010
+ W.P(C) No.4876/2007 & CM No.6943, 11867, 11868/2009
& 1178/2010
The Central Secretariat Stenographers Service Association & Ors.
... Petitioners
- versus -
The Central Secretariat Service, Direct Recruit Assistants
Association & Ors. .... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners : Mr Ajit Kumar Sinha, Sr. Adv with Mr R.
Balasubramanian, Mr Ashwqarya Sinha and Mr Rohit
Tripathy, Advocates
For the Respondent : Mr Sudhir Nandrajot, Sr. Adv. with Mr. A.K. Behera
and Mr A.K. Bhardwaj, Advs.
For the Intervenrs : Gr Capt. Karant Singh Bhati Advocate
For the Interveners : Mr Padam Kumar S., Advocate
/Petitioners in
CM 9321/2009
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes
V.K. JAIN, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order of the
Central Administrative Tribunal dated 25.05.2007 in
O.A.No.145/2006 read with O.A. No.669/2006, whereby the
Tribunal declined to recall/modify its order dated 11.11.2005
passed in OA No.1435/2005, quashing para 4 of the Central
Secretariat Service Section Officers Grade/Stenographers
Grade B (Limited Departmental Competitive Examination)
Regulations, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations)
whereby the members of the Central Secretariat Stenographer
Services were eligible to sit in the Limited Departmental
Competitive Examination (LDCE) for the post of Section
Officers.
2. The Central Secretariat Stenographers' Service
(hereinafter referred to as CSSS) is one of the three Central
Secretariat Services, the other two being Central Secretariat
Service (CSS) and the Central Secretariat Clerical Service. Rule
13 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules 1962 (hereinafter
referred to as "the Rules") framed under the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution of India, to the extent it is relevant
reads as under:-
"13. Recruitment to the Section Officers' and the Assistants' Grade- (1) Section Officers Grade - Twenty per cent of the regular vacancies in the Section Officers' Grade in any cadre shall be filled by direct recruitment on the basis of the result of a competitive examination held by the Commission for this purpose, from time to time. The remaining vacancies shall be filled by appointment of persons included in the Select List for
the Section Officers' Grade. Such appointments shall be made in the order of seniority in the Select List except when for reasons to be recorded in writing, a person is not considered fit for such appointment on his turn.
Rule 23 of the aforesaid Rule reads as under:-
23.Regulations.- The Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance and Pensions may make regulations, not inconsistent with these rules, to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient, for the purpose of giving effect to these rules."
3. Regulation 4 of Central Secretariat Service Section
Officers' Grade/Stenographers' Grade „B‟ (Limited
Departmental Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1964
reads as under:-
Conditions of Eligibility- Any permanent or temporary officer of the Assistants' Grade of the Central Secretariat Service or of Grade C of the Central Secretariat Stenographers' Service who, on the crucial date, satisfies following conditions, shall be eligible to appear at the examination."
4. In the LDCE held in the year 1975, for preparation of
a list of candidates qualified to be appointed to the grade of
Section Officers in the Central Secretariat Service,
Stenographers belonging to grade-II of the CSSS were allowed
to compete along with the Assistants. This was challenged by
some Assistants by filing CWP No.1122/1975 before this
Court. The challenge was based on two counts. The first
ground taken by the petitioners before this Court was that the
scheme of the Rules and the fourth schedule thereof was such
that only the Assistants were meant to compete at the LDCE.
Their contention was that the Regulations, to the extent they
enabled the Stenographers to compete in the Examination,
along with the Assistants, were ultra vires the Rules. The
second plea taken by the petitioners was that if the
Regulations were not ultra vires, then the Rules themselves
were unconstitutional being contrary to Article 14, 16 and 309
of the Constitution.
5. A Division Bench of this Court was of the view that
the question whether Assistants alone should be allowed to
compete at the Examination was entirely administrative, there
being no law involved in it. It was noted that the regulations
were framed by the same department which had framed the
Rules. This Court found it difficult to accept that the
department which allowed the Stenographers to compete at the
examination, they did not know its own mind reflected in the
language of the Rules. This Court rejected the contention that
the word 'persons' in the Rules must be construed to mean
only the Assistants and no other person. It was observed by
this Court that had the intention been to confine entry to the
LDCE only to the Assistants, the word 'Assistants' would
have been used in place of the words 'persons'. The only
inference found possible by this Court, therefore, was that the
entry was not intended to be confined to the Assistants but
was meant to allow other departmental candidates also to
appear in the Examination. Thus, challenge to the validity of
the Regulations was not accepted by this Court.
6. As regards Constitutional validity of the Rules, one of
the contentions of the petitioners before this Court was that
the Assistants were doing work which was more akin to the
work of Section Officers, while the Stenographers were doing
totally different work. It was also contended that the
Assistants needed to be graduates whereas Stenographers
could be only matriculates and, therefore, the
'unequals'were being treated as 'equals' for the purpose
of appearing at the Departmental Competitive Examination
thereby violating Article 16 read with Article 14 of the
Constitution. The contention was, however, rejected by this
Court which did not find the Stenographers Grade-II in any
way inferior to the Assistants for the reasons that both of them
have enjoyed the same scales of pay and many of the
Assistants were promotees from the Grades of clerks for which
the qualification required was only matriculation. It was also
noted that an expert body like the Third Pay Commission had
recommended that the Stenographers should be allowed to
compete at the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination
and the Union Public Services Commission had also agreed to
the proposal. It was further noted that the Government had
taken into consideration the stagnation suffered by the
Stenographers before allowing them to appear at the LDCE. It
was also observed by this Court that the work done by the
Stenographers as Personal Assistants to the Officers was of a
higher kind then the work done by the Assistants. This Court
was of the view that since only a person who passes the LDCE
is allowed to become a Section Officer, the test being common
for both the Assistants and the Stenographers, both stand on
an equal footing after passing the test and any difference in
their qualifications and experience prior to the passing of test
then becomes immaterial. It was held that Article 16 & 14
were not violated. This Court took note of the fact that in the
year 1970 a new avenue of the promotion was opened to the
Stenographers in their own service and their eligibility at the
LDCE was discontinued, but, on second thoughts, the
Government decided, in the year 1973, to allow them to appear
at the examination in view of the recommendations of the Third
Pay Commission. This Court found nothing wrong with the
decision taken by the Government and dismissed the writ
petition. The rules having been upheld, were operated and
followed ever since for almost 30 years.
7. Issue was however sought to be revived by the
Respondent No.1, Central Secretariat Service Direct Recruits
Assistants Association and some Assistants, who filed
O.A.No.1435/2005 before the Central Administrative Tribunal
challenging Regulation 4 of the Regulations and also sought a
declaration that Grade 'C' Stenographers of CSSS were not
eligible for appearing in the aforesaid examination. The basic
grievance of the petitioners before the Tribunal was that
Regulation 4 of Regulations 1962 travelled beyond the Rules
and the Regulation being a subordinate regulation made under
the 1962 Rules cannot travel beyond the parent Rules. It was
contended before the Tribunal that the Rules did not provide
for entry of Grade 'C'Stenographers into Section Officers
Grades of CSS and they had been made eligible to sit in the
examination, in contravention of the Rules.
Neither the petitioner, i.e., the Central Secretariat
Stenographers Service Association, nor any Grade „C‟
Stenographer was impleaded as a party to this OA. It was
contended before the Tribunal that the Rules, which were
framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, did
not either explicitly or implicitly made Stenographers of Grade
„C‟ eligible or feeder category for promotion to Assistant grade
and, therefore, the Regulations, framed under the aforesaid
Rules, could not make them eligible and feeder grade since the
Regulations, which are in the nature of administrative
guidelines, cannot supplement the rules.
8. The material question, which the Tribunal considered
in that OA, was as to whether para 4 of the Regulations,
making Grade „C‟ Stenographers eligible for LDCE was valid
and legal or not. It was observed by the Tribunal that power to
frame Rules will not include the power to lay down the
conditions of eligibility and making a cadre, which is alien and
outside the normal channel and promotion, eligible for the
grade of Sections Officers in the CSS. It was observed that the
Grade „C‟ Stenographers were eligible for promotion to the next
higher Grade in their own channel of stenography. It was
observed that the Parliamentary Standing Committee of
Ministry of Home Affairs in its Eighty-Third Report had
observed that the channels of promotion of CSS Assistants and
Grade „C‟ Stenographers being different from each other, only
CSS Assistants should be allowed to compete in the LDCE for
CSS Sections Officers, but, the Government had diluted the
recommendations made by the Committee by deciding that
only those stenographers, who are graduate would be allowed
to participate in the LDCE for the Sections Officers Grade of
CSS. The Tribunal was of the view that CSS Rules envisage
selection for appointment to Sections Officers and Assistants
from the categories of officials prescribed in Rule 13 and it
could not admit of any doubt so that the Department could
make the Stenographers eligible for selection and appointment
to Sections Officers‟ Grade. The Tribunal was of the view that
the Assistants and Stenographers belonged to two different
classes and groups and they being unequal in important
matters, such as nature of posts, duties and responsibilities to
be decided by them in such posts, were not comparable. The
Tribunal took the view that the Government, while framing
1964 Regulations, had enlarged the scope of the Rules, which
was beyond its competence and jurisdiction since executive
instructions could not override any provision of Rules. Para 4
of the Regulations was, therefore, held to be ultra vires and
inconsistent to Rule 13, read with para 2 under the Fourth
Schedule of the Rules. The aforesaid para was accordingly
quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits.
9. A number of writ petitions were filed before this Court
against the order dated 11th November, 2005, passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. It was noted by this Court
that the directions issued by the Tribunal had adversely
affected the petitioners by taking away their rights under para
4 of the Regulations. It was also noted that the Tribunal had
rejected the preliminary objection raised by the Union of India
that the petition was not maintainable, without impleading the
association of Stenographers. The petitioners before this Court
pointed out that the decision, rendered by the Tribunal on
11th November, 2005 was contrary to and inconsistent with
the decision of this Court in W.P.No.1122/1975 decided on
05th November, 1976 and the decision of the Tribunal in OA
No.1091/2005 decided on 26th July, 2005. A preliminary
objection was taken by the private respondents regarding
maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that the
petitioners were not parties to the OA filed before the Tribunal.
In view of this, the petitioners were permitted to withdraw the
writ petition with liberty to file a fresh petition before the
Tribunal under Section 19 of Central Administrative Tribunal
Act and were also permitted to raise all those issues which they
had raised in the writ petitions. It was directed by this Court
that if and when such pleas are raised before the Tribunal, the
same shall be considered by it in accordance with law and if it
is found that the decision of this Court and the decision of the
Tribunal governed the case of the parties, orders shall be
passed by the Tribunal in accordance with law. It was also
directed that if the Tribunal finds that the order passed by it
on 11th November, 2005 was contrary to the aforesaid
decisions, the matter shall be referred by it to the Larger
Bench, wherein all the pleas, arising out of the disputes
between the parties, shall be urged and decided by the
Tribunal.
10. OA No.145/2006 and 669/2006 were accordingly
filed by Stenographers, seeking review and recall of the order
dated 11th November, 2005.
11. It was contended before the Tribunal that the
judgment of this Court in CWP 1122/1995 titled as „Joginder
Lal Sawhney & Ors. vs. Union of India‟ was rendered in a
different factual situation relating to service condition of
Stenographers in CSS, which was not a valid precedent after
passage of such a long time, particularly when there had been
sea-change in the service conditions, namely promotional
avenues, besides grant of financial up-gradation under ACP
scheme and host of other aspects. It was further contended
that career prospects and promotional avenues in CSSS had
tremendously improved since 1975, the chances of stagnation
in that service had been reduced and, therefore, the delegated
legislation, even if valid in the year 1975-76, was not valid
anymore.
12. The Tribunal noted that the Fifth Central Pay
Commission had observed that the Stenographers in the
Secretariat were at a more advantageous position as far as time
taken for promotion from one grade to another was concerned
when compared to their counterparts in subordinate offices
and almost at the same position with other comparable service
in the Secretariat and had taken a view that the promotional
opportunities for a particular service could not be improved at
the expense of another service. It was also noted that the
applicants could have promotion in their normal channel of
promotion since Stenographer Grade III could be promoted to
Stenographer Grade II and Grade I and could reach up to the
level of Senior Principal Private Secretaries, who were
equivalent to Deputy Secretaries. It was observed by the
Tribunal that in the current era of globalization when the
entire philosophy of society, on the economic front, is
undergoing drastic changes and much emphasis is laid on in
the concerned field, Stenographers certainly should
concentrate only on their own line and channel and not outside
their normal field. The Tribunal also took note of the
recommendations made by the Standing Committee of
Parliament in its Eighty-Third Report, recommending therein
that only Assistant should be allowed to appear in LDCE for
Sections Officers. Considering that CSS enjoys promotional
avenues and channel of promotion in their own line, which
were not available to them three decades ago, the Tribunal saw
no justification in their being allowed to encroach upon
another distinct line and cadre of Assistants. The Tribunal,
therefore, held that the judgment of this Court in the case of
Joginder Lal Sawhney (supra) was not a valid precedent after
passage of almost three decades. The Tribunal accordingly
found no justification to recall/review its order dated 11th
November, 2008 passed in OA No.1435/2005. However, on
equitable considerations, the Tribunal directed that
Stenographers, who had appeared in the examination for the
post of Section Officer till the year 2005 and had successfully
cleared that examination, needed to be protected and should
not be disturbed.
13. The order dated 25.05.2007 has been challenged
before us primarily on the ground that it is contrary to the
decision of this Court in the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney
(supra) as well as its decision dated 06.01.2006 in W.P.(C)
No.3891-94/2005. The grievance of the petitioners is that the
Tribunal being subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court has
not maintained the judicial discipline. The contention of the
petitioners is that it was not open to the Tribunal to hold that
the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court was not a
valid precedent.
14. In its counter-affidavit, respondent No.6 Union of
India has stated that the order of the Tribunal was examined
by the department and it was decided to accept and implement
the same from 2005 onwards.
15. The private respondents have submitted that the
promotional prospects in the CSS and the promotional
prospects in the Central Secretariat Stenographers' Service
now stand on a totally different footing than it was thirty years
ago. It is further stated that there is acute stagnation in
Central Secretariat Service whereas enough opportunity of
promotion is available in CSSS, within their own cadre and
considering these factors along with other relevant factors, the
Tribunal was right in holding against lateral entry of
Stenographers to CSS at the level of Section Officers.
16. In the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra) the
petitioners before this Court, all of whom were Assistants in
Central Secretariat Service had challenged the vires not only of
the Rules but also of the Regulations. The Tribunal vide
impugned order dated 25.5.2007 has not gone into
constitutional validity of the Rules but has held the
Regulations to be ultra vires. In the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra), the validity of the Regulations was challenged
primarily on the ground that they were ultra vires the rules
which envisage only the Assistants to compete at the LDCE.
This court rejected the challenge, holding that the question as
to whether the Assistants alone should be allowed to compete
at the examination was an administrative decision, and no
question of law was involved in it. This Court specifically
rejected the contention that the expression "persons" must be
considered in the context of the scheme of rules, to mean only
the "Assistants". The Tribunal, therefore, while quashing para
4 of the Regulations of 1964 passed an order which is
diametrically opposite to the decision of this Court dated
6.1.2006 in the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra).
17. The following justifications were given by the Tribunal
for taking a view contrary to the decision of this Court in the
case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra):
1. In the current era of globalization where much emphasis is laid on specialization in the concerned filed Stenographers should concentrate only on their own line of channel and not outside their normal field.
2. The Government of India had taken a policy decision to discontinue the lateral entry of Central Secretariat Services at the level of Under Secretary.
3. The stagnation in CSS was alarming. The Assistants have to wait for more than 15 years to get promotion to the post of Section Officer.
4. Parliament Standing Committee in its 83 Report had taken a view that rd
only Assistants should be allowed to appear in LDCE for the posts of Section Officers.
18. In our view, none of the reasons given by the Tribunal
justified taking a view contrary to the decision of this Court, in
challenge to the very same Regulations which have now been
struck down by the Tribunal. Justifying its view that the
decision of this Court in the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra) was not a valid precedent after 30 years, the
Tribunal has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in
State of Punjab & Another Vs. Devans Modern Breweries
Limited & Another : (2004) 11 SCC 26. While delivering a
dissenting judgment, Hon‟ble Mr.Justice S.B.Sinha, in the case
of Devans Modern Breweries(supra), referred to the principle
„cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex' as explained in Dias
Jurisprudence, 5th Edition pp. 147-147, which reads as under:
".... It is not easy to detect when such situations occur, for as long as the traditional theory prevails that judges never make law, but only declare it, two situations need to be carefully distinguished. One is where a case is rejected as being no longer law on the ground that it is now thought never to have represented the law; the other is where a case, which is acknowledged to have been the law at the time, has ceased to have that character owing to altered circumstances."
It was observed that changes are bound to occur in
an evolving society and the judiciary must keep abreast of
these changes in order that the law is considered to be good
law.
19. In our view, the observations made by Hon‟ble
Mr.Justice S.B.Sinha, while delivering dissenting judgment in
the case of Devan Modern Breweries(supra), do not justify the
view taken by the Tribunal while passing the impugned order
dated 25.5.2007. We are unable to accept the contention that
the change in factual situation between the date on which
judgment was rendered by this Court in the case of Joginder
Lal Sawhney(supra) and 11 th November, 2005, when para 4 of
the Regulations was struck down by the Tribunal, had taken
away the binding effect of the judgment of this Court in the
case of Joginder Lal Sawhney (supra). A perusal of the
decision of this Court would show that while upholding the
vires of the Regulations this Court took the view that the
question whether Assistants alone should be allowed to
compete in the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination
was entirely administrative, there being no law involved in it.
The stagnation in the cadre of Stenographers at that time was
not at all the reason for this Court upholding vires of the
Regulations. This Court was not convinced that the
Department which had framed the Rules as well as the
Regulations did not know its own mind as reflected in the
language used in the Rules. Stagnation amongst
Stenographers was taken into consideration by this Court only
while considering whether the Rules were ultra vires the
Constitution of India.
As noted earlier, the Tribunal has struck down para 4
of the Regulations and has not gone into the vires of the Rules.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision of this Court in
the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra) had lost its binding
effect, as a precedent, on account of increase in the
promotional avenues available to the Stenographers or on
account of stagnation in the cadre of Assistants having
increased in the meanwhile. It is for the Government, to
decide, after taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, including the Report of Commissions/
Committees which examined this issue and take a view as to
whether there was so much change in the factual situation as
would warrant any amendment to the Regulations, which
permitted the Stenographers to compete at the LDCE. Unless
the Rules framed by the Government under the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution are shown to be ultra vires the
constitution or the Regulations framed by the Government in
furtherance of the Rules are shown to be ultra vires the Rules,
it will not be appropriate for the Court to quash or set them
aside. The Tribunal noted that the Government of India had
taken a policy decision to discontinue the lateral entry of
Central Secretariat Stenographer Services Officers into Central
Secretariat Services at the level of Under Secretary, but failed
to notice that no such decision was taken by it with respect to
the lateral entry of Stenographers, by permitting them to
appear in the LDCE for the posts of Section Officers. The
Tribunal also failed to take note of the fact that the Committee
on Cadre Restructuring of CSS, which submitted its report in
February, 2002 recommending that the lateral entry of CSS
Officers into CSS at the level of Under Secretary of CSS be
discontinued, had also recommended that those Stenographers
who were graduates should continue to participate in the
LDCE for Section Officers grade of CSS and accepting that
recommendation, the Government decided to permit only the
graduate Stenographers to participate in the LDCE. No
recommendation was made by the Committee on Cadre
Restructuring of CSS to altogether discontinue the
participation of Stenographers Grade „C‟ in the LDCE for the
Section Officers Grade of CSS. The Tribunal noted that the
Parliament Standing Committee in its 83 rd Report, submitted
on 19th December, 2001, had recommended that only CSS
Assistants should be allowed to appear in LDCE for Section
Officers, but failed to note that the Government even after
receipt of the aforesaid Report chose not to exclude the
Stenographers altogether from participation in LDCE for the
Section Officers Grade of CSS and decided to exclude only
those Stenographers who were not graduates. Therefore, in
our view, there was no justification for the Tribunal to take a
view contrary to the view taken by this Court in the case of
Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra), which was binding upon the
Tribunal.
20. It was contended by Shri Sudhir Nandrajog, learned
senior counsel for the private respondents that the judgment of
this Court in the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney (supra) is per
incuriam, as the attention of this Court in that case was not
drawn to the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules. The decision of
this Court in the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra), in our
view, cannot be said to be per incuriam, merely because it does
not refer to the provisions of Rule 10 of CSS Rules, 1962. Rule
10, to the extent it is relevant, provides that every duty post in
a cadre shall unless declared to be excluded from the cadre
and/or held in abeyance for any reasons, be held by a cadre of
the officers of an appropriate grade. The contention of the
private respondents is that Rule 10 mandates that all the duty
posts of Central Secretariat Service shall be held by cadre
officers of that service alone. We are unable to accept the
contention of the private respondents. The proviso to Rule 10
itself provides that the officers of Grade A of the corresponding
cadre of Central Secretariat Stenographers Service who have
rendered not less than two years service in that grade may be
posted to duty posts in the Section Officers grade. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the scheme of the Rules totally excludes
manning of the posts of Section Officers by any person other
than a member of Central Secretariat Service. The argument
that the scheme of the rules does not envisage participation by
an outsider in the LDCE for the post of Stenographer was
rejected by this Court in the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra) holding as under:
"It was argued by Mrs.Shyamla Pappu that the word "persons" must be construed in the context of the scheme of the Rules to mean only "Assistants" and no other persons. The reasons in support of the argument are that the Central Secretariat Service which contains the Grade of Section Officers also contains the Assistants but does not take in the Stenographers who have a separate service of their own. But this cannot
necessarily mean that the posts of Section Officers are to be filled up only by Assistants. Even the Rules as originally framed contemplated Stenographers filling up the posts of Section Officers.
For instance, rule 12(2) allows Stenographers with certain experience and who have acted as Section Officers for two years to be included in the Select List for Grade I of the service. This means that for two years Stenographers were allowed to act as Section Officers with a view to promotion to a Grade above the grade of Section Officers. This Grade I is also in the Central Sectt. Service. The assumption made on behalf of the petitioners that persons outside this Service are not to come into the Service to occupy any Grade in the Service is, therefore, not partly by recruiting Stenographers, there is no a priori reason why the Grade of Section Officers cannot be filed up partly by Stenographers."
We, therefore, are unable to accept the contention of
learned senior counsel for the private respondents, that the
judgment of this Court in the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra) was per incuriam.
21. It was contended by the learned senior counsel for the
private respondents that with effect from 1.11.1985 the
jurisdiction of the High Court was divested in service matters
and came to be vested in Central Administrative Tribunal and,
therefore in view of the change in the factual scenario in last
30 years, it was permissible for the Tribunal to take a view
contrary to the view taken by this Court in the case of Joginder
Lal Sawhney(supra). We are unable to accept the contention.
In our view, the judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this
Court upholding the vires of the CSS Rules, 1962 and the
Regulations was binding upon the Tribunal. As noted earlier,
the decision of this court upholding the vires of the Regulations
was not based upon the stagnation prevalent in cadre of
stenographers at that time but was based upon the view taken
by this Court that the decision taken by the Government in
this regard was an administrative decision, and no law was
involved in it, and the Court rejecting the contention that while
framing Regulations the Government did not appreciate the
true import of CSS Rules, 1962. In our view, merely because
the Tribunal had the power to adjudicate upon the vires of the
Rules, it cannot be said to be Coordinate-Bench of the High
Court, to the extent that the decision of the High Court, on the
validity of the very same Regulations, which are under
challenge before it, will not be binding on it, despite the fact
that all the decisions of the Tribunal, including the decisions of
the validity or otherwise of a Rule/Regulation are subject to
writ jurisdiction of this Court. We may note here that the
decision of Supreme Court in L Chandar Kumar Vs. Union of
India (1997) 3 SCC 261 holding therein that the Tribunal had
the power to adjudicate upon the vires of any statutory
provisions such decision will be subject to High Court‟s writ
jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before
a Division Bench of the concerned High Court, had been
delivered much before the impugned order was passed by the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, therefore, was very much aware of the
binding nature of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench
of this Court. Even otherwise, the law declared by the
jurisdictional High Court is binding on all the Tribunals,
including the Benches of CAT functioning in its local
jurisdiction. We, therefore, are of the view that though the
Tribunal was competent to examine the vires of the
Regulations, it could not, while doing so, have taken a view
contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court
in the case of Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra). Even a
Coordinate-Bench of this Court is bound by the judgment
rendered by this Court in the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra) and if it for some reasons does not agree with
the view taken in that case, the only course of action available
to it is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. As far as the
Tribunal is concerned, it was in any case bound by that
judgment.
22. The Supreme Court in M.A.Murthy Vs. State of
Karnataka : (2003) 7 SCC 517, inter alia, observed as below:
"The doctrine of binding precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of transactions forming part of the daily affairs."
It was further observed that, as noted in Pradip
Chandra Parija Vs. Pramod Chandra Patnaik : (2002) 1 SCC
1, judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow
the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench and that if it does
not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another
Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger Bench. It
was further noted that, as noted in Kalyani Stores Vs. State
of Orissa : AIR 1966 SC 1686 and Krishan Kumar Narula Vs.
State of J & K : AIR 1967 SC 1368, no decision can be arrived
at contrary to or in consistent with the law laid down by the
coordinate Bench.
In Vijay Laxmi Sadhu (Dr.) Vs. Jagdish : (2001) 2
SCC 247, Supreme Court, inter alia, held as under:
"...... It is well settled that if a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction whether, on the basis of „different arguments‟ or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs."
In State of Bihar Vs. Kalika Kuer : (2003) 5 SCC
448, Supreme Court, inter alia, held as under:
"The earlier judgment may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two days - either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on merits."
23. It was also contended by the learned senior counsel
for the private respondents that since the Government, which
is the Rule making authority has decided to accept the decision
of the Tribunal from 2005 onwards, as stated in para 5 of the
affidavit filed by the Union of India, it amounts to amendment
of Regulations and the Rules by implication. It was also
pointed out that since the Regulation was struck down by the
Tribunal on 11th November 2005, there was no occasion for the
Government to amend the Regulations thereafter, taking the
changed factual situation into consideration. We are unable to
agree with the learned senior counsel for two reasons. Firstly,
despite receipt of Reports referred in the order of the Tribunal,
the Government did not make any amendment in the Rules or
Regulations before till the Regulation itself was struck down by
the Tribunal on 11th November, 2005. Nothing prevented the
Government from carrying out appropriate amendment in the
Rules/Regulations if it was satisfied that considering the
removal/reduction of stagnation amongst Stenographers,
coupled with increase in stagnation amongst Assistants, lateral
entry of Stenographers in the cadre of Section Officers in
Central Secretariat Service was not justified anymore. The
Government, however, did not take resort to any such
amendment. Even while issuing the order dated 27.7.2005
after considering the Report of the Committee on Cadre
Restructuring of CSS, the Government allowed graduate
Stenographers to continue to participate in LDCE for the
Section Officers Grade of CSS. Even in its counter-affidavit
filed before the Tribunal in OA No.1435 of 2005 the
Government took the stand that the provision of lateral entry of
Stenographers Grade „C‟ in Section Officers Grade through
LDCE was in accordance with the Rules. Hence, the decision
taken by the Government after 11th November, 2005, to accept
the decision of the Tribunal, in our view, does not amount to
amendment of Rules or Regulations. Secondly, despite order of
the Tribunal dated 11th November, 2005, having been
challenged firstly before this Court in CWP 23891-94/2005
and then by filing OA No.145/2006 and 696/2006, before the
Tribunal, no effort was made by the Court to amend the very
Rules, under which the Regulations were framed by it, so as to
give a legal effect to the decision taken by it. Had that been
done by the Government, OA No.145/2006 and 696/2006
would probably have become infructous. Moreover, had the
Rules been amended by the Government, the Stenographers
would have been entitled to challenge the amendment before
an appropriate forum. We, therefore, find no merit in this
submission.
24. It was also requested by the learned senior counsel
for the private respondents that if this Court is in disagreement
with the view taken by the Tribunal, the matter may be
referred to a larger Bench. We find no good ground to refer the
matter to a larger Bench since we find no good reason to differ
with the view taken by this Court in the case of Joginder Lal
Sawhney(supra), to the effect that the question as to whether
the Stenographers should be allowed lateral entry in the cadre
of Section Officers in CSS or not was an administrative
decision. We, therefore, are of the view that it is for the
Government to consider the rival claims made by the members
of both the services, in the backdrop of other relevant facts and
circumstances, including the stagnation, if any, still persisting
amongst the Stenographers, the extent of stagnation amongst
the Assistants, availability of ACP Scheme to both the cadres
and their respective aspirations and take an appropriate
decision in the matter. But, as far as the impugned orders
passed by the Tribunal are concerned, we are of the view that
these being contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of
Joginder Lal Sawhney(supra) cannot be allowed to stand.
25. Another reason why the impugned order dated
25.5.2007 needs to be set aside is that a Division Bench of this
Court, while deciding WP.(C) 23891-94/2005 on 2.4.2006
specifically directed that if it was found by the Tribunal that
the order passed by it on 11th November, 2005 was against and
contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of Joginder
Lal Sawhney(supra) as also its own decision in
OA.No.1091/2004 Kailash Chander & Others Vs. Union of
India & Another decided on 26.7.2005, the mater shall be
referred by the Tribunal to the larger Bench, wherein all the
pleas arising out of the disputes between the parties shall be
urged and decided by the Tribunal. Despite this specific
direction, the Division Bench of the Tribunal which considered
the applications for recall/review of the order dated 11 th
November 2005, did not refer the matter to a larger Bench.
The impugned order passed by the Tribunal, therefore, need to
be set aside.
26. The learned senior counsel, appearing for the private
respondents, has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court
in Satyawati Sharma(Dead) by LRs. Vs. Union of India &
Others : (2008) 5 SCC 287, where it was observed that the
legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the
time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to
change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and
violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of
such a legislation may have been upheld at a given point of
time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the
same if it is found that the rationale of classification has
become non-existent.
He has next referred to Malpe Vishwanath Acharya
& Others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another : (1998) 2 SCC
1, where the Supreme Court observed that a statute which,
when it enacted was justified, may, with the passage of time
become arbitrary and unreasonable, with the change in
circumstances. He has also referred to Motor General
Traders & Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others :
(1984) 1 SCC 222, where it was observed that once a non
discriminatory piece of legislation may in the course of time
become discriminatory and be exposed to successful challenge
on the ground that it is violative of the Article 14 of the
Constitution. None of these judgments is a authority for the
proposition that a Division Bench of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, while considering the vires of a Regulations, could
have struck it down when a Division Bench of the jurisdictional
High Court had upheld the vires of the very same Regulation
and another Division Bench of the Court had specifically
directed that if the Tribunal found that its earlier order dated
11th November, 2005 was against and contrary to that decision
and its own earlier decision on the same subject matter, the
matter shall be referred by the Tribunal to its larger Bench for
decision.
27. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs,
the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated
25.5.2007 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA
No.145/06 read with 669/06 as also its earlier order dated
11.11.2005 passed in OA No.1435/05 are hereby set aside.
We, however, make it clear that the order passed by us in this
petition will not come in the way of the Government making
such amendment, if any, as it may deem appropriate to make,
in CSS Rules, 1962 and/or in Central Secretariat Services
Section Officers Grade/Stenographers Grade „B‟ (Limited
Departmental Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1964.
The writ petition and CMs stand disposed of. There shall be no
order as to costs.
(V.K. JAIN) JUDGE
(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE MAY 26, 2010 sn/bg/rs
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!