The New India Assurance Company ... vs Rohinee Michigan & Ors.
2010 Latest Caselaw 2479 Del

*               IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

           F.A.O. No.508 of 2003 & C.M. Appl. Nos.1047 of 2003, 1049 of 2003

%                                                                                10.05.2010

       THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD.                  ...Appellant
                           Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Advocate.
                               Versus
       ROHINEE MICHIGAN & ORS.                               ...Respondents
                           Through: Mr. A. Kumar, Advocate for R-1 to 5.

                                                               Reserved on: 5th April, 2010
                                                            Pronounced on: 10th May, 2010
       JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

1.     Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2.     To be referred to the reporter or not?
3.     Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?

                                    JUDGMENT

C.M. Appl. No.1049 of 2003

This is application for condonation of delay of 32 days in filing the present appeal.

In view of the submissions made therein, the application is allowed and the delay

in filing this appeal is hereby condoned.

The application stands disposed of.

F.A.O. No.508 of 2003

1. The present appeal has been preferred by the insurance company on the grounds

that the Tribunal failed to take into consideration the fact that the accident took place due

to rash and negligent driving of the Jeep by its driver and that the Tribunal erred in

making insurance company liable to pay compensation in respect to the death of the

deceased. The Tribunal failed to understand the ratio of Kaushnuma Begum & Others vs.

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1(2001) SLT 300 and failed to take into consideration

the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Minu B. Mehta & Others vs. Bal Krishna

Ramchandra Nayan, 1977 ACJ 118.

2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal are that on

15th October, 1998 Tata Sumo Jeep bearing number UP-14H-7092 insured by the

appellant, being driven by the driver met with an accident. There are two versions of the

accident, one version given by the occupants of the jeep that when the jeep reached little

ahead of Badhkot, the road was found relatively free from traffic and the driver started

speeding the vehicle. He did not lower the speed despite repeated requests of occupants

and drove the vehicle rashly, negligently and recklessly and lost the control of the jeep.

The jeep fell into the deep gorge on the side of the road as a result of which the occupants

received injuries. The other version given by the driver side that is on that day it was

raining while on the way to Navgaon (Uttrakashi) and all of a sudden a dog came on the

road. In order to save the dog, the driver swerved the vehicle on one side and in that

process the driver lost control of the vehicle as a result of which, the vehicle fell into the

gorge on the side of the road.

3. The learned Tribunal after considering the evidence of two versions came to

conclusion that driver side version was more probable. However, the Tribunal observed

that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in the present case. The Tribunal

also observed that in view of Kaushnuma Begum's case (supra), the rashness or negligent

of the driver had lost importance.

4. I consider Tribunal went wrong in observing that in view of Kaushnuma Begum's

case (supra), the issue of rashness or negligence of driver has lost importance. If the

claim of the claimant had been under Section 163A of the Act, the issue of rashness or

negligence would not have been there before the court. The case of Kaushnuma Begum is

one under Section 163A of the Act where involvement of the vehicle was sufficient to get

an order of compensation without proof of negligence. Thus, the principles laid down in

that decision cannot have any application to a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act.

5. I consider that the Tribunal wrongly came to the conclusion that since vehicle was

moving at a speed of 25-30 kilometers per hour at the time of accident, there was no

question of vehicle being driven in a rash and negligent manner by the driver and the

accident took place since the driver had to swerve the vehicle at one side of the road as a

dog had come in front of the vehicle all of a sudden. It was the claim of the driver and it

had also come in evidence of PW-3 that at the time of accident, it was raining and track

was full of pine leaves and the road had become slippery as malba was falling down on

the road from mountain in the shape of small landslides. When such was the weather and

the track on which vehicle being driven was hilly area; on one side was mountain and on

other side was deep gorge, every driver drives very slowly may be at the speed of 10

kilometers per hour, so that if he had to apply the brakes, the vehicle stops immediately.

The very fact that on seeing a dog the driver instead of applying brakes swerved the

vehicle towards edge of the road with the result that vehicle fell into the gorge would

show that the driver was driving in a gross negligent manner and his speed was much

more than what was required in the weather of rainy season when road was full of pine

leaves and mud. The speed of 20 or 25 kilometers on hilly tracks is the normal speed of

vehicles when weather is clear and there is no rain and the road has no pine leaves or

mud. A speed of 25-30 kilometers in hilly area during rainy season, when the road is full

of pine leaves and land slide mud, has to be considered as a dangerous speed. The

Tribunal seems to be oblivious of the conditions of driving on hilly roads and that seems

to be the reason that it made observation that it was not the negligence of driver. Even

otherwise for saving life for a dog, you cannot throw your vehicle full of passengers into

a gorge, that itself is a negligent driving. When your vehicle is full of passengers, you

cannot risk of swerving the vehicle to one side of the road more so when it is raining and

road is narrow and slippery. The only option available with the driver was to apply the

brake and bring the vehicle stationary but it seems that speed of the vehicle was such that

application of brakes would have also resulted into toppling the vehicle and that is how

the driver tried to save the dog by swerving the vehicle thereby endangering the life of the

occupants. Thus, it is clear that the accident took place due to negligence of the driver.

6. In the case of Basthi Kashim Saheb v. Mysore State Road Transport Corporation;

1991 ACJ 380, a bus driven at a fast speed while crossing a bullock cart left stationary on

the left flank of the road went on to the kacha flank of the right side and its wheel sank in

the soil and the vehicle toppled on its right side causing injuries to its passengers. In such

circumstances, the Apex Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the ground that

the driver should have been aware of the fact that in the rainy season when it was actually

raining, the unmetalled portion of the road used to be rendered slushy and muddy and as

such, he should be held negligent for bringing the bus with fast speed to that portion of

the road.

7. I, therefore, consider that Kaushnuma Begum's case (supra) was wrongly applied

by the Tribunal. It is a case where the driver was negligent and the principles of res ipsa

loquitur would be squarely applicable and for the negligent driving of the driver, the

owner would be liable and since the risk of the owner was insured, the insurance

company would be liable to pay the award amount.

8. I find no force in the appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed.

MAY 10, 2010                                             SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J.
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