Ram Sahai Meena (Sub Inspector) vs Union Of India And Another
2010 Latest Caselaw 1516 Del

*                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                             WP(C) No.13941/2009


%                          Date of Decision: 18.03.2010


Ram Sahai Meena (Sub Inspector)                .... Petitioner
                 Through Mr. Arun Bhardwaj and Ms. Archana
                          Gaur, Advocates


                                   Versus


Union of India and Another                           .... Respondent
                   Through Ms. Jyoti Singh and Mr. Ankur Chhibber,
                           Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG

1.      Whether reporters of Local papers may be          YES
        allowed to see the judgment?
2.      To be referred to the reporter or not?            NO
3.      Whether the judgment should be reported           NO
        in the Digest?



ANIL KUMAR, J.

*

The petitioner has challenged the order dated 6th August, 2008

passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

Delhi in OA No.2139 of 2007 titled Ram Sahai Meena v. Union of India

and anr. dismissing the original application filed against the order

dated 14th June, 2007 passed by Joint Commissioner of Police as

appellate authority dismissing the appeal of the petitioner being barred

by time.

A regular departmental inquiry was ordered against the petitioner

on 1st July, 2002 on the allegation that while posted at Police Station:

O.I. Area, he arrested one Kailash Chand. The son of Shri Kailash

Chand, namely, Shri Dinesh Chand was contacted and an amount of

Rs.1.00 lakh was demanded as bribed in lieu to spare Shri Kailash

Chand. The conversation of the petitioner, Ram Sahai, and the

complainant, Dinesh Chand, was recorded by the CBI which indicated

and reflected that the petitioner did not refuse the offer and the

petitioner rather gave the telephone number to the complainant for

making further contact and to arrange a telephonic conversation

between him and Shri Kailash Chand, father of the complainant.

The inquiry officer recommended the discharge of petitioner,

however, the disciplinary authority issued a disagreement note and

after consideration the representation made by the petitioner against

the disagreement note, passed the punishment order dated 14th

November, 2005.

The petitioner challenged the punishment order dated 14th

November, 2005 by filing an appeal before the appellate authority. The

appeal was not filed within time. It appears that the appeal was filed

because on account of penalty of censure, the petitioner was not given

promotion which was allegedly due to him in June 2006. Since the

appeal was belated and no cogent and sufficient reason was disclosed

by the petitioner, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal being

barred by time.

Aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority dismissing the

appeal being barred by time, the petitioner preferred the original

application before the Tribunal contending inter alia that it was not

proper for the appellate authority to dismiss the appeal merely on the

ground that the same was barred by time without considering the other

pleas raised by the petitioner.

The Tribunal while dismissing the original application resorted to

Rule 24(3) of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1980

contemplating limitation for filing the appeal as 30 days from the date

of the receipt of the order. The Tribunal has held that since the

petitioner belongs to a disciplined force, he is expected to know about

his rights and a sympathetic view cannot be taken especially as no

cogent and sufficient reason has been disclosed.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the

appeal was filed after the gap of about 11 months and 19 days after

expiry of 30 days prescribed under Rule 24 (3) of Delhi Police

(Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1980. Learned counsel for the

petitioner is also unable to show any reason or ground raised by the

appellant to explain to delay in filing the appeal except that he was

disturbed due to family problems. A bald allegation that the petitioner

was disturbed due to family problems without specifying anything

further does not constitute sufficient reason for condonation of delay in

filing the appeal. If the petitioner failed to disclose any reason for

condonation of delay, the order of the appellate authority to dismiss the

appeal cannot be held to be contrary to any rule or law established for

condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Merely filing an appeal with a

bald averment that the petitioner was disturbed on account of family

problems would not entitle him for condoation of delay and

consequently even dismissal of the original application by the Tribunal

sustaining the order of appellate authority cannot be faulted in the facts

and circumstances.

Considering also the facts of the case, this Court is not inclined to

exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

This cannot be disputed that for issuing a writ for any other purpose

under article 226 of the Constitution of India, it has always been in the

discretion of the High Court to interfere or not, depending upon the

facts and circumstances of each case. It is not necessary for the High

Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to interfere in every case where

there is violation of fundamental or statutory rights. Reference in this

connection can be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Durga

Pershad Vs The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC

769, holding that even where there is an allegation of breach of

fundamental right, the grant of relief is discretionary and such

discretion has to be exercised judiciary reasonably. Constitution Bench

of the Supreme Court in The Moon Mills Ltd. vs M.R.Meher, AIR 1967

SC 1450 had held that writ is legally a matter of sound discretion and

would not be issued if there be such negligence or omission on the part

of the applicant to assert his right as taken on conjunction with the

lapse of time and other circumstances. In Shangrila Food Products Ltd.

Vs Life Insurance Corporation of India (1996) 5 SCC 54, the Supreme

Court had held that " the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India can take cognizance of the entire

facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give

the parties complete and substantial justice. The jurisdiction of the

High Court, being extra ordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in

mind the principle of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote

honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a

party, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can

take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party

to shed the unfair game before granting relief.

The order of the Tribunal impugned before us does not suffer

from any such illegality or irregularity which shall entail any

interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article

226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is without any merit

and it is, therefore, dismissed.

ANIL KUMAR, J.

MARCH 18, 2010                                MOOL CHAND GARG, J.
'Dev'