Delhi High Court
Delhi Development Authority vs Gaurav Kukreja on 15 July, 2010
Author: Manmohan
59
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 466/2010
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. P.K. Mittal, Advocate.
versus
GAURAV KUKREJA ..... Respondent
Through: None.
% Date of Decision: 15th July, 2010
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
MANMOHAN, J (Oral)
CM APPL. 12121/2010
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Accordingly, application stands disposed of.
CM APPL. 12120/2010
This is an application for condonation of delay of 41 days in
filing the appeal.
For the reasons stated in the application, delay of 41 days in
filing the appeal is condoned.
Accordingly, application stands disposed of.
LPA 466/2010 & CM 12119/2010
1. The present Letters Patent appeal has been filed by the Delhi
Development Authority challenging the judgment dated 06th January,
2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 7608/2009.
2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the present case are that Plot
No. N-73, Panchsheel Cooperative House Building Society Limited
was sub-leased by Delhi Development Authority in the name of Sh. Jan
Talwar. On 12th June, 1986, Sh. Jan Talwar executed General Power of
Attorney in favour of respondent's father and an agreement to sell in
favour of respondent's mother.
3. In the year, 1989, a Civil Suit being CS(OS) 2777/1989 was filed
for Specific Performance of the aforesaid agreement to sell by the
respondent and his father against Sh. Jan Talwar and respondent's
mother. The aforesaid suit was decreed on a compromise application.
4. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has
observed as under:-
"11. In the Suit for specific performance filed by the
petitioner as well as the father Sh. Jan Talwar was arrayed
as defendant no.1and Mrs. Raymen Kukreja, mother of the
petitioner, was arrayed as defendant no.2. As per the
judgment of this Court dated 30.03.2001, defendant no.1
Sh. Jan Talwar stopped appearing in the matter and on
18.07.1991 he was proceeded ex parte. Defendant no.2,
mother of the petitioner, did not contest the suit and on the
basis of an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C.
suit was decreed. As per the judgment, defendant no.2 that
is the mother of the petitioner in whose favour Agreement
to Sell was executed by Sh. Jan Talwar had no objection if
the sale deed was executed in favour of the petitioner
herein. Similar, no objection was also granted by plaintiff
no.2 that is the father of the petitioner, the General Power
of Attorney holder of Sh. Jan Talwar. The effect of this
statement would be that the mother of the petitioner in
whose favour the agreement to sell was executed by Sh.
Jan Talwar as well as the father of the petitioner in whose
favour a General Power of Attorney was executed, both
had no objection to the execution of the sale deed in favour
of the petitioner herein. A decree for specific performance
has been passed in favour of the petitioner herein. Based
on the decree passed by the Delhi High Court the case of
the petitioner is on a higher footing than any General
Power of Attorney holder as per Clause 13 (a) of the
conversion policy. The decree passed by the High Court
would also show that there is no dispute between Sh. Jan
Talwar and the mother and father of the petitioner as well
as the petitioner and his parents. Thus, in view of the
decree passed, the aim and object of the policy for
conversion as well as the condition of Clause 13(a) would
stand satisfied. Taking into consideration that
correspondence between the petitioner and DDA has been
exchanged at the given address, supporting affidavit to the
writ petition also shows the address of the petitioner to be
N-73, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi, condition (b) of
Clause 13 also stands satisfied. In view of the decree
passed, sub-clause (c) of Clause 13 would not be
applicable to the facts of this case.
12. Petitioner has filed copies of the Registered
Agreement to Sell dated 10.06.1986 as well as registered
General Power of Attorney dated 10.06.1986 executed by
the original owner in favour of the parents of the
petitioner. Petitioner is not a stranger to the transaction
being the son of the purchasers and had filed a suit for
specific performance, which has been decreed in his
favour. Accordingly, present petition is allowed. DDA is
directed to consider the application of the petitioner for
conversion of property bearing No. N-73, Panchsheel
Enclave, New Delhi, from lease hold to free hold within a
period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this
order."
5. Mr. P.K. Mittal, learned counsel for appellant submitted that
learned Single Judge had failed to appreciate that the respondent did not
have clear title to the property in question as no sale deed was ever
executed in respondent's favour. He pointed out that there was a
revenue loss to the Government inasmuch as neither the sale deed was
registered on payment of stamp duty nor unearned increase was paid to
the Delhi Development Authority.
6. Admittedly, under the scheme for conversion floated by Delhi
Development Authority, it was not mandatory for an applicant to be the
owner of a property by virtue of a registered sale deed. Even a power
of attorney holder could apply for conversion of property from lease
hold to free hold. Moreover, there is no time limit within which an
applicant has to get his Court decree executed. In the present case,
respondent could certainly be taken to be a power of attorney holder
and thus fully entitled to apply for conversion.
7. In our opinion, if the appellant has come up with the beneficial
scheme which does not require an applicant to be an owner of the
property by way of a registered sale deed, Delhi Development
Authority cannot insist that respondent should first pay stamp duty and
unearned increase before applying for conversion. Accordingly, the
present appeal and application being devoid of merit are dismissed in
limine but with no order as to costs.
MANMOHAN, J
CHIEF JUSTICE
JULY 15, 2010
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