Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 81 Del
Judgement Date : 11 January, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl.M.C. No. 458/2009
Date or Order: 11th January 2010
# SARABJEET & ORS. ..... Petitioners
! Through: Mr. Rajat Wadhwa, Adv.
versus
$ STATE ..... Respondent
^ Through: Mr. Pawan Bahl, APP.
* CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? Yes
: V.K. JAIN, J. (Oral)
1. This is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for quashing the order dated 19th January 2007,
whereby cognizance was taken and subsequent order dated 24 th
July 2007 whereby notice envisaged under Section 251 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure was given to the petitioner for the
offence punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of IPC read with
Section 34 thereof.
2. A perusal of the order dated 24th July 2007 would show that
the learned Metropolitan Magistrate passed a speaking order
stating therein that prima facie case is made out for the offence
under Sections 323/325/34 of IPC. Thus, the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate prima facie took the view that not only
the offence under Section 323 but also offence under Section
325 of the IPC was made out against the petitioner. Despite
that, he chose to frame a notice under Section 251 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, instead of framing charge against him.
3. The offence under Section 325 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, being punishable with imprisonment upto 7 years
and fine, is a Warrant Trial Case, though the offence under
Section 323 is a Summons Trial Case. The procedure for trial of
Warrant Cases, by Magistrate, has been prescribed in Chapter
XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 238 of the Code
provides that when, in any Warrant Case, instituted on a police
report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at
the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate shall satisfy
himself that he has complied with the provisions of Section 207,
which requires copies of documents, statements, charge sheet,
etc. to be supplied to the accused. Section 239 of the Code
provides that if on considering the police report and the
document sent with it under Section 173 of the Code, and
examining the accused, if the Magistrate thinks necessary, and
after giving opportunity of hearing to the prosecution as well as
to the accused the Magistrate considers the charge against the
accused to be groundless, he shall discharge him, after
recording his reasons for discharging him. If, however, the
Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence triable under
Chapter XIX, he shall accordingly frame charge against the
accused. Thus, in a Warrant Trial Case it is mandatory for the
learned Magistrate to hear not only the prosecution, but also the
accused before he decides whether to discharge or to charge
him.
4. On the other hand, the procedure for trial of Summons
Cases, which has been prescribed in Chapter XX of the Code
provides, in Section 251, that when the accused appears or is
brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of
which he is accused shall be stated to him and shall be asked if
he pleads guilty or has any defence to make and it is not
necessary to frame a formal charge. Unlike Section 239 of the
Code, Chapter XX does not envisage discharge of the accused at
this stage. Therefore, if a Warrant Case is tried on a Summon
Case, the accused would be deprived of an opportunity to seek
discharge under Section 239 of the Code on the ground that
there are no reasonable grounds to charge him for the offence
complained of.
5. Section 259 of the Code provides that when in the course
of the trial of a Summons Case relating to an offence punishable
with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, it appears
to the Magistrate that in the interests of justice, the offence
should be tried in accordance with the procedure for the trial of
Warrant Cases, he may proceed to rehear the case in the
manner prescribed for trial of Warrant Cases. Thus, it is
permissible for the Magistrate to try an accused in a Summons
Case in accordance with the procedure prescribed for trial of
Warrant Cases, but there is no provision in the Code for trying a
Warrant Case as a Summons Case.
6. In Pulukuri Kotayya vs. Emperor, AIR (34) 1947 Privy
Council 67, the Privy Council, inter alia, observed as under:-
"When a trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code, as in 28 IA 2575, the trial is bad, and no
question of curing an irregularity arises; but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct, the irregularity can be cured under S.537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one or more of the very comprehensive provisions of the Code. The distinction drawn in many of the cases in India between an illegality and an irregularity is one of degree rather than of kind. This view finds support in the decision of their Lordships' Board in 5 Rang 536, where failure to comply with S. 360, Criminal P.C., was held to be cured by Ss. 535 and 537."
7. In Public Prosecutor (AP) vs. Vaijnath & Anr. , 1971
Crl. L.J. 205, Andhra Pradesh High Court held that when a
Warrant Case is tried as a Summon Case it amounts to an
illegality and not an irregularity curable under section 537 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1898. In Dilip Kulkarni and ors. vs.
Bahadurmal Chowdary and Sons and Anr., 2005(2) ALD (Cri)
171, Andhra Pradesh High Court, inter alia, held as under:-
"Thus, it is obvious that the Code enables the Judicial Magistrate of First Class to convert a summary case either into a summons case and a summons case into a warrant case, but not vice versa. The only requirement for such conversion is that in the course of trial it should appear to the Court in the interests of justice that such conversion is needed. But if the
Magistrate conducts trial in a warrant case adopting summons procedure or a summons case by following the summary procedure, the trial is certainly vitiated."
8. Though the learned Magistrate has applied his mind to the
merit of the allegations made against the petitioner, the fact
remains that even if he had formed an opinion different from the
one taken by him, he was precluded in law from discharging
him, as he chose to adopt to procedure prescribed for the trial of
a Summons Case. There is no good reason for not trying the
petitioner in accordance with the prescribed procedure, when he
has come to this Court, at the earliest opportunity.
9. Since, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate could not have
frame notice under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in a warrant case and could not have adopted the
prescribed procedure for trial of summons case, the impugned
order dated 24th July 2009 and the notice framed against the
petitioner on that date cannot be sustained and are hereby set
aside. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall pass a fresh
order envisaged under Section 239/240 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure after hearing the petitioner and shall then proceed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, depending upon the view taken by him.
The petitioner is directed to appear before the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate on next date of hearing fixed in the trial
court for that purpose.
V.K. JAIN (JUDGE) JANUARY 11, 2010 Ag/RS
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