Prem Kumar vs The State(Delhi Admn.)
2010 Latest Caselaw 509 Del

*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


                     CRL. APPEAL NO. 101 OF 1997


%                        Judgment reserved on: 21st January, 2010
                         Judgment delivered on: 29th January, 2010

PREM KUMAR                                  . . . APPELLANT
                         Through:           Ms. Anu Narula, Advocate/
                                            Amicus Curiae

                                VERSUS


THE STATE (DELHI ADMN.)                     . . .RESPONDENT
                  Through:                  Mr. Sunil Sharma, APP.

CORAM :-

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE

      1.      Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
              may be allowed to see the Judgment?              No
      2.      To be referred to the Reporter or not?           No
      3.      Whether the Judgment should be
             reported in the Digest?                           No

AJIT BHARIHOKE, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment dated

29.11.1996 convicting the appellant in case FIR No.147/89, P.S.

Okhla Industrial Area under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his

wife Sushila and the consequent order on sentence in terms of which

the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

2. Briefly stated, the case of prosecution is that on 19.7.1989,

Ms.Sushila (hereinafter referred to as deceased), resident of House

No.1, Gali No.9, Ratia Marg, Sangam Vihar, New Delhi was admitted

in Safdarjung Hospital by Joginder Singh, Head Constable with burn

injuries. She was examined by Dr.Devansh Sharma, PW18. She is

stated to have herself given the history of her burn injuries to the

doctor that while she was sitting in the house with her child, her

husband Prem Kumar Shukla (appellant) came from outside, poured

kerosene on her and lit her with a match box. The doctor prepared the

MLC Ex.PW8/A wherein he observed that the patient was conscious

and coherent, she was responding to oral command, pulse could not

be palpitated, B.P. could not be recorded, heart rate was 120 per

minute and there were 100% deep burns all over the body. The

doctor also observed that the patient was in shock and the nature of

injury was grievous, caused by fire.

3. The intimation regarding admission of the deceased in the hospital

was conveyed to Police Station Okhla Industrial Area and on the

receipt of said intimation, S.I. Sita Ram, PW20 reached the hospital.

He collected the MLC of the deceased and after seeking permission of

the doctor, who declared the patient fit for statement, S.I. Sita Ram

recorded the statement of Smt.Sushila Ex.PW20/B wherein she stated

that her husband came from outside, quarreled with her and thereafter

set her on fire after pouring kerosene on her. S.I. Sita Ram forwarded

the said statement to the police station along with his endorsement

Ex.PW5/A and on the basis of the said statement, formal FIR

Ex.PW5/B was registered.

4. S.I. Sita Ram visited the spot of occurrence; he prepared the rough

site plan Ex.PW20/C and got the spot photographed from various

angles. The photographs are Exs.PW2/A1 to A3. S.I. Sita Ram

found burnt clothes smelling of kerosene oil, two kerosene oil stoves

with oil in their tanks, a kerosene oil lamp, a plastic can containing

small quantity of kerosene oil and a match box, which were taken into

possession. The deceased died on the same night. Inquest

proceedings were conducted under Section 174 Cr.P.C. The body

was sent for post mortem. I.O. obtained the post mortem report.

During investigation, statement of the father of the deceased PW9

Paras Nath was recorded. A letter Ex.PW9/A stated to have been sent

by the deceased to her father was also seized. We may note that

intimation regarding admission of the deceased in the hospital was

sent to the SDM by the SHO, Inspector Bhag Singh, PW21 requesting

him to visit the hospital and record the dying declaration of the

deceased. SDM Shri N.K. Sharma, PW10, reached at the hospital and

requested the doctor to permit him to record the dying declaration of

the deceased, when he was informed that the deceased had already

expired. On conclusion of investigation, the challan was filed against

the appellant. The appellant was charged for having committed the

offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to which he pleaded not

guilty and claimed trial.

5. Prosecution examined 22 witnesses. We feel that before adverting to

the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to have a

glance at the testimony of some of the important witnesses.

6. PW6, Mohd. Hasan is a neighbour of the deceased. He stated in the

Court that on the relevant night in the month of July at around 11.45

p.m., he was sitting in front of his house along with PW7, Kishan Lal

when he heard the cries of "Bachao Bachao" coming from the house

of the appellant. They immediately rushed to the house and kicked

open the door and saw the deceased burning and struggling to save

herself. They extinguished the fire. Though, as per the case of

prosecution, PW6, Mohd. Hasan and PW7, Kishan Lal had rescued

the deceased after opening the door of the room which was bolted

from outside and they also saw the appellant running away after

bolting the door, he did not support the case of prosecution in that

regard. He was cross-examined by the learned APP, but he denied

the suggestion of learned APP to that effect. PW7, Kishan Lal stated

in the Court that in the month of July at around mid night, he was

sitting in the gali with PW6, Mohd. Hasan when they heard the

shrieks of a woman „Jala Di Jala Di Bachao Bachao‟ coming from the

room of the appellant. On reaching the said room, they noticed the

door bolted from outside. They kicked open the door and found the

deceased afire and running around to save herself. They extinguished

the fire and took her out of the room. In the meanwhile, Police

Control Room van arrived at the spot and they took her to the

hospital. The witness further stated that he accompanied the deceased

to the hospital and in the hospital in their presence, she told that she

had been burnt by her husband Shukla, who ran away after setting her

on fie and closing the door from the outside. He however, denied

having seen the appellant running away or bolting the door from

outside.

7. PW9, Paras Nath, father of the deceased had deposed that the

deceased used to complain to her mother that the appellant was

having illicit relations with one Shukni and that before the death of

Sushila, he had received a registered letter Ex.PW9/A written by the

deceased in her own hand, which letter he handed over to the police

along with the envelope Ex.PW9/B.

8. PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma, who prepared the MLC of the deceased

has deposed about the dying declaration made by the deceased in his

presence. He has stated that when he examined the deceased, the

deceased herself informed that she was sitting in the house with her

child when her husband came from outside, poured kerosene over her

and lit her with the match stick. He has proved the MLC prepared by

him as Ex.PW8/A on which the aforesaid history is recorded in his

handwriting. He also stated that the statement of the deceased

Ex.PW20/B was recorded by the I.O. in his presence, which was

thumb marked by the deceased and he attested the said statement

Ex.PW20/B vide his endorsement Ex.PW18/B.

9. PW20, S.I. Sita Ram is the Investigating Officer. Apart from giving

the details of the investigation carried on by him, he deposed that on

the receipt of information about the incident, he visited Safdarjung

Hospital and collected the MLC of the deceased, then he moved an

application Ex.PW20/A to the doctor seeking permission to record the

statement of the deceased. The doctor declared the patient fit for

statement vide his endorsement Ex.PW18/A and thereafter, in

presence of said Dr.Devansh Sharma, he recorded the statement of

patient Sushila, who appended her thumb impression mark „A‟

thereupon, which was attested by Dr.Devansh Sharma.

10. The appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with a view to

afford him an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing

against him in evidence. The appellant denied the prosecution case

and claimed to be innocent. He came out with the explanation that on

the relevant night, he was at the house of his employer as there was a

party. This explanation appears to be an after-thought as no such

suggestion was given by the appellant to his employer Shwed Kamal,

PW1 in his cross-examination.

11. The learned Trial Court, on consideration of evidence on record and

the statement of the accused, relying upon the dying declarations,

found the appellant guilty of murder of Sushila and convicted him

under Section 302 IPC.

12. The case of the prosecution is based upon the two purported dying

declarations made by the deceased, the first dying declaration being

made in presence of PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma in the form of

history of the burn injuries suffered by the deceased, given by herself.

The second dying declaration is the statement of the deceased

Ex.PW20/B recorded by the Investigating Officer PW20, S.I. Sita

Ram wherein the deceased implicated the appellant for her burn

injuries. Since the success or failure of the appeal would depend

upon the acceptability of the dying declarations, it would be

appropriate to have a look at the law relating the dying declaration.

13. In Khushal Rao V. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22, the Supreme

Court summarized the principles with regard to dying declarations as

under:

"16......(1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other piece of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the

principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties."

14. In the matter of Paniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474, the

Supreme Court has summed up the principles governing dying

declaration as under:

"18. (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.

(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration.

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth.

(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the versions as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon." The same

position has been reiterated in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court including that of Vikas v. State of Maharashtra: I (2008) DMC 692 (SC) = II (2008) CCR 280 (SC) = IV (2008) SLT 95 = (2008) 2 SCC 516."

15. In the matter of Geeta and Anr. vs. State, 163 (2009) Delhi Law

Times 268, a coordinate Bench of this Court after considering the

various pronouncements on the law relating to dying declaration has,

inter alia, observed thus:

"24. The law with regard to dying declarations is quite well settled. It is an established principle that a conviction can be based solely upon a dying declaration. But, before this can be done, the dying declaration must be established to be authentic and correct as well as truthful. Insofar as the authenticity and correctness of the dying declaration is concerned, the prosecution has to establish that the dying declaration in question was, in fact, made by the person who lost his life. Even where it can be established that the statement, which purports to be the dying declaration of the deceased, was in fact made by the deceased, the prosecution has also to establish that the statement was truthful. Of course, it is normally presumed that a dying person in his last moments does not utter any falsehood. But that does not rule out the possibility that in some cases this may not be the position. There may be instances where out of hate or spite a person may falsely implicate his enemy, even in his dying moments. It is also quite possible that the person making the dying declaration is under the influence or control of someone else and out of fear or other reasons, he may make a false statement prior to his death. There is also a possibility that a person, in order to save his honour and the honour of his family, who would survive him, may make statements which are not entirely correct or truthful. There is also a possibility that the person making the dying declaration is under some medication or because of his precarious condition is suffering from hallucinations and, therefore, the statements he makes at that point of time may be far removed from the truth. It is only when all these circumstances are ruled out and the court is of the belief and opinion that what the dying declaration states is truthful, can a conviction be based upon it without seeking corroboration. A dying declaration must always pass the scrutiny by the Court because, after all, it is merely hearsay evidence and it is admissible and relevant only because the person who made the declaration is no longer alive and cannot be produced before Court for testifying. At the same time, the courts need to exercise caution in relying upon dying declarations because the maker of the statement is not before it and nor does the defence have an opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus, while there is no rule of law which suggests that a conviction cannot be based solely upon a dying declaration, the courts, as a rule of prudence, look for other corroborative material. If the dying declaration is of such a stellar and unimpeachable quality that it fully inspires confidence of the Court, there is nothing to prevent the Court from relying solely on such a dying declaration and on basing a conviction thereupon. But, the emphasis must be on the quality of the dying declaration. If the dying declaration is suspicious or suffers from some infirmity, then it should not be acted upon without any corroborative evidence."

16. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Trial

Judge has erred in relying upon the purported dying declarations of

the deceased made in presence of PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma and

PW20, SI Sita Ram respectively, without taking into consideration

the accompanying facts and circumstances as also the physical and

mental state of the deceased, which rules out the possibility of her

being in a fit condition to make a coherent dying declaration.

Learned counsel submitted that the learned Trial Judge has totally

ignored the testimony of PW6, Mohd. Hasan and PW7, Kishan Lal,

who stated that when they reached at the room of the appellant they

had to kick open the door, which implies that the door was bolted

from inside and raises a strong possibility of the deceased having

committed suicide and casts a doubt on the authenticity/truthfulness

of the dying declarations. She further submitted that as per the

testimony of PW18 and the MLC Ex.PW8/A, the deceased had

suffered 100% deep burns all over her body and on examination, her

pulse could not be palpitated, blood pressure could not be recorded,

heart rate was as fast as 120/min. and she was in shock. Learned

counsel submitted that given the aforesaid medical condition, it is

highly improbable that the patient was even able to speak, what to say

about her physical/mental condition, to give a coherent declaration

regarding the cause of her injuries, particularly when as per the

inquest report, she was a person of weak constitution. Regarding the

second dying declaration Ex.PW20/B, learned counsel submitted that

before placing reliance upon the said dying declaration, the trial Court

did not take into consideration that by that time, the patient must have

been administered pain relieving medicines to reduce her trauma and

pain and those medicines generally have an impact on the mental

capacity of a person and sometimes the patient, on administration of

such drugs, goes into stupor. As such, the reliability of the dying

declaration Ex.PW20/B itself is suspect. Learned counsel also

submitted that Ex.PW9/A is the letter purported to have been posted

by the deceased to her father few days before her death. She

submitted that a reading of said letter Ex.PW3/A would show that the

deceased was fed up with the ill treatment by her husband and

therefore, she had requested her father to come and take her from her

matrimonial home and she was even nursing the thought of

committing suicide. From this circumstance, she has urged us to infer

that a possibility of the appellant having committed suicide and

falsely implicated the appellant to take revenge on him cannot be

ruled out. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no mention

of the advised line of treatment in the MLC of the deceased, which

suggests callousness on the part of Dr.Devansh Sharma and has

caused prejudice to the appellant because such details would have

enabled the Court to form an informed opinion as to whether the

deceased actually was in a fit physical/mental state to give a coherent

dying declaration.

17. Learned counsel further submitted that though as per the case of the

prosecution, two kerosene oil stoves, a plastic can containing little

quantity of kerosene and a match box containing match sticks were

seized by the police from the spot, the Investigating Officer did not

take pains to lift chance finger prints from the recovered articles,

particularly the plastic can, which could have been helpful in coming

to the conclusion whether it was a case of a homicide or suicide.

Learned counsel submitted that this lapse on the part of the

Investigating Officer has resulted in a grave prejudice to the defence

and deprived the accused of an opportunity to prove his innocence.

Thus, in the nutshell, learned counsel has submitted that the dying

declarations Ex.PW8/A and Ex.PW20/B are not reliable and has

urged us to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused.

18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has argued in support

of the impugned judgment. He has submitted that the learned Trial

Judge has rightly relied upon the dying declarations of the deceased.

He has submitted that the first dying declaration was made in

presence of PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma when he examined the

deceased in the casualty of the hospital and at that time there was no

possibility of the deceased being under the influence of drugs as by

that time her treatment had not started and even if some life saving

drug was administered to her immediately on arrival of the hospital, it

could not have had any effect on the mental state of the deceased

within such a short duration. He also submitted that Dr.Devansh

Sharma is an independent witness who had no connection whatsoever

with the appellant or the deceased, therefore, there is no reason to

suspect that he would have made a false record of the dying

declaration of the deceased. Learned counsel further submitted that

on perusal of the record it transpires that the deceased reached at the

hospital at 12.30 a.m. and her statement Ex.PW20/B, as per the rukka,

was recorded sometime before 1.30 a.m. which was also attested by

Dr.Devansh Sharma at 1.30 a.m. The said statement Ex.PW20/B is

consistent with the dying declaration made by the deceased in

presence of PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma, therefore, there is no reason

even to suspect the correctness and authenticity of Ex.PW20/B.

Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the submission of

the counsel for the appellant that the mental state of the deceased

might have been impaired due to administration of drugs in the course

of her treatment is in the nature of surmises and conjectures and once

the treating doctor had declared the patient fit for statement there is

no need to enter into such speculations and create a boggy of

suspicion around the dying declarations Ex.PW20/B as well as

Ex.PW8/A. Regarding the letter Ex.PW9/A, learned prosecutor has

submitted that a complete reading of that letter would show that the

deceased had only detailed her plight to her father and requested him

to come and take her from her matrimonial home and the tone and

tenor of the letter does not suggest that the deceased was nursing any

thought to commit suicide. It is also submitted by learned prosecutor

that failure of the Investigating Officer to lift the chance prints is only

a lapse in investigation but it cannot be taken as a circumstance to

reject the two consistent dying declarations of the deceased, the

authenticity and correctness of which is beyond doubt.

19. On consideration of rival contentions of the parties, it is apparent that

the real issue for determination in this case is whether it is a case of

homicide or the suicide.

20. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the theory of suicide

has referred to the testimony of PW6 and PW7, who in their

respective testimonies have stated that on hearing the shrieks of

„Bachao Bachao‟, they reached at the room of the appellant/deceased

and kicked open the door and found the deceased in flames. Both of

them denied having seen the appellant running away from the spot

after bolting the room from outside. From the aforesaid evidence,

learned counsel has urged us to infer the fact that the door has to be

kicked open is an indication that it was closed from inside and since

deceased alone was found in the room, it has to be a case of suicide.

We do not find any merit in this contention, firstly, because both the

above witnesses have turned hostile and resiled from their earlier

statements, therefore, a possibility cannot be ruled out that they have

been won over by the appellant. Further, on perusal of the testimony

of PW7 Kishan Lal, in his examination-in-chief, he is categoric that

on reaching the room in question he saw the door of said room closed

and bolted from outside. Even in the cross-examination, PW7 has

stated that they pushed the door twice and it opened and they had not

used force for opening the door. From the aforesaid version of PW7,

it appears that the door of the room of the deceased was bolted from

outside, which fact gives credence to the dying declarations of the

deceased Ex.PW8/A and Ex.PW20/B, wherein she had stated that she

was set on fire after pouring kerosene on her by her husband. The

second limb of the argument of the appellant in support of the theory

of suicide is that as per the case of the prosecution, the appellant was

having an extra-marital affair and was ill treating the deceased.

Therefore, a possibility cannot be ruled out that because of that reason

the deceased was depressed and in the fit of depression, she

committed suicide. To support this argument, learned counsel for the

appellant has referred to the letter Ex.PW9/A purportedly written by

the deceased to her father wherein she had narrated about the affair of

her husband and the ill treatment meted out to her and her child and

requested her father to take her away lest she may take some extreme

step. We have carefully perused the letter Ex.PW9/A written in Hindi

script and overall reading of the letter does not suggest that the

deceased was nursing any thought of committing suicide. On the

other hand, the letter reflects the anxiety of the deceased to get away

from the house of her husband as she suggested to her father that if he

was short of cash, he could take money from mother of one Puchu,

with whom some money of the deceased was lying. A passing

reference in the letter about the advice given by the neighbours and a

mention of the fact that she had accepted said advice, otherwise she

would have died, cannot be taken as a circumstance to infer that the

deceased was either depressed or she was nursing a thought of

committing suicide. Instead, the letter clearly shows the anxiety of the

deceased to get away from the house of the appellant. Thus, in our

considered view, the theory of suicide is ruled out.

21. Learned counsel has drawn our attention to the MLC of the deceased

Ex.PW8/A and the testimony of PW18, Dr.Devansh Sharma to show

that the patient, on her first examination in the casualty of GTB

Hospital, was found in the state of shock, her pulse could not be

palpitated, B.P. could not be recorded, heart rate was 120/min. and

there were 100% deep burns all over her body. Learned counsel has

submitted that in view of the above referred physical condition of the

deceased recorded in the MLC, it is highly improbable that she could

have been in a position to speak or to make a coherent dying

declaration.

22. We do not find any merit in this contention. No doubt as per the

above said observations recorded in the dying declaration, the

condition of the deceased was vicarious but this by itself cannot be

taken as a reason to conclude that the deceased was not in a position

to speak or she could not have been in a fit physical or mental state to

give a coherent declaration. One cannot generalize whether or not a

person would be able to speak and make a dying declaration with

100% deep burns and failing pulse and heart beat. The response of

different patients with similar injuries can always vary and it would

depend upon the physical constitution, power of endurance and will

power of the patient. The fact that Dr.Devansh Sharma, PW18, who

is an independent person and who had no axe to grind with the

appellant has categorically stated that the deceased was conscious and

coherent and that he recorded the history of the injuries on the basis

of information given by patient herself is sufficient assurance that the

deceased, at the relevant time was in fit state of mind when she made

the dying declaration in presence of Dr.Devansh Sharma. We may

note that the deceased was taken to the hospital by the PCR van and

the appellant had not accompanied her. Despite of that in the MLC,

Dr.Devansh Sharma has observed that patient herself informed that

she was sitting in the house with her child when her husband Prem

Kumar Shukla came from outside, poured kerosene on her and lit her

with a match stick. Dr.Devansh Sharma obviously could not have

recorded the name of the husband of the deceased unless the dying

declaration was made by the deceased herself. Further PW20, SI Sita

Ram has also categorically deposed about the dying declaration

Ex.PW20/B made by the deceased wherein she stated that her

husband i.e. the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on

fire and thereafter fled away. Even said dying declaration has been

attested by Dr.Devansh Sharma which is sufficient assurance that it

cannot be a fabricated document. Otherwise also PW20, SI Sita Ram

is a public servant and there is nothing on record to suggest that there

was any reason for him to falsely implicate the deceased. Further, we

find no inconsistency in the two dying declarations made by the

deceased. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Trial Judge

has rightly relied upon the above referred dying declarations. We

may note at this juncture that even before recording the dying

declaration Ex.PW20/B, S.I. Sita Ram had moved an application

Ex.PW20/A to obtain permission from the doctor for recording her

statement and on the said application Ex.PW20/A, Dr.Devansh

Sharma had appended his endorsement that the patient is fit for

statement. This circumstance rules out any possibility of speculation

about the physical and mental state of the deceased.

23. Another submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is that

the investigation of this case has not been conducted fairly inasmuch

as that the investigating officers did not try to lift chance prints from

the kerosene stoves and the plastic can recovered from the spot of

occurrence, which chance prints could have given a clinching

evidence as to whether it is a case of suicide or homicide. The

infirmity pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant of course is

a lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer. It would have been

better if he had tried to lift the chance prints from the articles seized at

the spot, however, his failure to do so is not such a lapse which may

be taken as a circumstance to reject two consistent dying declarations

made by the deceased, particularly when the possibility of suicide is

ruled out by the testimony of PW7 who stated that the door of the

room in which the occurrence took place was bolted from outside.

The version of PW7 suggests that someone, after setting the deceased

on fire had bolted the door from outside and that someone obviously

is the appellant who is named as a culprit by the deceased in her

dying declarations.

24. In view of the discussion above, we are of the considered view that

the learned trial Judge has rightly convicted the appellant on the basis

of the two consistent dying declarations Ex.PW8/A and Ex.PW20/B

made by the deceased, one in presence of PW18 and the other in

presence of PW20. Thus, we conclude that the appeal is without any

merit and is accordingly dismissed.

25. The appellant is on bail. His bail bond and surety bond stand

cancelled. Appellant be taken into custody to undergo the remaining

sentence.

AJIT BHARIHOKE, J.

A.K. SIKRI, J.

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