Delhi High Court
Smt.Har Devi And Others vs State Of Delhi on 15 January, 2010
Author: G. S. Sistani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Judgment delivered on January 15, 2010
CRL. A. No.76/2001
# Smt. Har Devi and Ors. ..... Appellants
Through : Mr. Anupam S. Sharma, Adv.
Versus
State of Delhi .... Respondent
Through : Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, Adv.
CRL. A. No.87/2001
# Ravinder Rana ..... Appellant
Through : Mr. Anupam S. Sharma, Adv.
Versus
State of Delhi .... Respondent
Through : Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest? YES
G.S. SISTANI, J.
1. Both the appeals have been filed under section 374 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the Judgment dated 30.01.2001 and
Order on Sentence dated 31.01.2001, passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Delhi in Session's case No. 22/1999, FIR No. 444/97,
sections 498-A/304-B/34, Police Station Rohini of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as, the ―IPC‖). Both the appeals were
heard together and are accordingly, being disposed of by this common
judgment.
2. Vide Order on Sentence dated 31.01.2001 passed by the trial court,
Ravinder Rana (appellant in CRL. A. No.87/2001) was sentenced to
seven years R.I. under section 304-B IPC. Har Devi, Kuldeep Singh and
Jagjeet Singh (appellants in CRL. A. No.76/2001) as well as Ravinder
Rana were sentenced to two years of imprisonment under section 498-A
IPC. A fine of Rs.1,000/- was also imposed upon each of them. In case of
default in the payment of fine, appellants were directed to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of one month. In case of Ravinder
Rana, the sentence was directed to run concurrently.
3. Brief facts of the case as noticed by the learned Sessions Judge are that
Smt. Suman was married to Sh. Ravinder Rana on 08.07.1992. On
13/14.08.1997, Smt. Suman was found hanging with a ceiling fan and
chunni was tied around her neck. When Sh. Hukam Chand Verma,
(father of Smt. Suman) reached her house and found her to be dead, he
dialed number 100 and informed the police officials. On such
information, police arrived at the spot. Investigation was conducted and
challan was filed against four persons namely Ravinder Rana (husband
of Suman), Har Devi (mother-in-law), Jagjit Singh and Kuldeep Singh
(brothers-in-law of Suman). Post-trial, all the four appellants were
convicted by the learned trial court.
4. In support of its case, prosecution examined fourteen (14) witnesses.
Statement of all the four appellants was recorded under section 313,
Cr.P.C wherein they denied the allegations leveled against them.
Appellant, Ravinder Rana also got himself examined as a defence
witness. It would be appropriate to analyse the evidence of the material
witnesses.
5. Sh. Anupam Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants while impugning
the judgment and order on conviction passed against the appellants
submits that the judgment passed by the learned trial court is based on
surmises and conjectures and that the trial court has failed to
appreciate the facts of the case in light of the settled position of law.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the case of the
prosecution cannot be believed in asmuchas, there was gross delay in
lodging of the FIR (Ex. PW-7/B). He submits that it is the case of the
prosecution that Hukum Chand Verma (PW-1) reached the spot at
around 7:15 am and it was after about 15-20 minutes that the police
arrived at the spot. Learned counsel submits that however, the
statement of PW-1 was not recorded at that time and it was only after
the post-mortem of the deceased, that the statement of PW-1 was
recorded. It is submitted by learned counsel that it is the case of the
prosecution that statement of PW1 was recorded at 1:00 p.m. and the
FIR (Ex. PW-7/B) was registered at 4:30 p.m. Counsel submits that
however no justifiable reason has been given for the delay of three and
half hours in recording the FIR or statement and if in case the statement
was recorded at 1:00 p.m., there was no reason to delay lodging of FIR.
Further the corresponding entry i.e. DD no. 8A, vide which the FIR was
registered, has not been proved nor any evidence has been produced by
the prosecution regarding sending of the copy of FIR to senior officers
including the concerned Magistrate.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in order to establish its
case, the prosecution has examined Sh. Hukum Chand Verma (PW-1),
Smt. Kamlesh (PW-2), Sh. Shamsher Singh (PW-3) and Smt. Chander
Kala (PW-4). However, they cannot be believed in view of the fact that a
note (Ex. PW1/DA) written and signed by the deceased was found
wherein it was clearly stated that ―nobody is responsible for my death‖.
The said note was opined by the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) to be
in the handwriting of Suman (deceased) vide report Ex. PW14/A.
Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the trial Court has
convicted appellant, Ravinder Rana under section 304-B, IPC as well as
498-A, IPC. He submits that to bring a case within the fold of section
304-B IPC, the prosecution has to prove the following ingredients:
i. that the death of a woman was caused by burn or bodily
injury or otherwise than under natural circumstances.
ii. that the death has taken place within 7 years of her
marriage.
iii. that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband in
connection with any demand of dowry.
iv. that the said cruelty and demand of dowry was meted
out to her, soon before her death.
8. Learned counsel contends that, had the appellants tortured, harassed or
maltreated the deceased, she would not have exonerated them and
would have definitely mentioned the torture meted (if any) out to her, in
the suicide note. Learned counsel submits that the deceased (Suman)
had further mentioned in her suicide note that a loan of Rs.3,00,000/-
(Rs. three lacs only) taken from her father as well as the jewellery, be
returned to her father. Learned counsel submits that by no stretch of
imagination, can a loan be equated with a demand of dowry. It is
submitted by him that even if it is assumed that some money was taken
by Ravinder Rana from his in-laws, so as to purchase a property, such a
loan cannot be said to be covered under the provisions of section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel
relies upon the case of Baskar Ramappa Madan & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka reported at 2009 (3) JCC 1622 (SC) and Satbir Singh Vs.
State of Punjab reported at 2004 (2) JCC 274 (SC).
9. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the case of the
prosecution with regard to demand of a car is baseless and without any
foundation. The letters written by Suman dated 20.09.1993 (Ex.
PW1/C); dated 10.01.1994 (Ex. PW1/D) and her reply to the Deputy
Commissioner of Police (DCP) dated 05.04.1994 (Ex. PW1/F) do not
mention anything regarding the demand of a car, as alleged by the
prosecution. It is submitted that the story of the demand of car was
cooked up by the prosecution witnesses only with an ulterior motive to
falsely implicate the appellants. Learned counsel submits that no
complaint whatsoever, has ever been made by the deceased regarding
any harassment or torture meted out to her by the in-laws, either to the
police or any other authority.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants further contends that the statements
of prosecution witnesses namely, Kamlesh (PW2) and Shamsher Singh
(PW3) were recorded on 19.08.1997, which is after a delay of 5 days.
The statement of Chander Kala (PW4) was recorded after a delay of 32
days, although these witnesses met the police at the spot on the day of
the incident and also the SDM at the mortuary. Learned counsel submits
that the recording of the statements of prosecution witnesses was
deliberately delayed so as to give time to the prosecution to fabricate a
false case against the appellants. He submits that the prosecution
witnesses are totally unreliable in view of the fact that their statement
was recorded after undue and un-explained delay of days together.
Learned counsel submits that since PW-2 and PW-4 had nothing against
appellant Ravinder Rana, thus did not give any statement immediately
after the incident and any statement made subsequently is nothing but
a result of fabrication and due deliberations. It is submitted by the
counsel that the statement of PW4 was only recorded after his bail
application had been heard on 10.09.1999 and apparently the same was
done so as to fill the lacunae in the case of the prosecution.
11. Learned counsel for appellant, Ravinder Rana submits that there are
material discrepancies as well as improvements in the evidence led by
prosecution witnesses and which go to the root of the matter. Learned
counsel points out that Smt. Kamlesh (PW2) and Smt. Chander Kala
(PW4) have deposed before the Court that they became unconscious at
the house of the deceased and did not go to the mortuary. However,
Bhag Singh, SI (PW10) and Phulwari Singh, SI (PW12) have categorically
stated that the mother, brother as well as the sisters of the deceased
also accompanied the dead body to the mortuary. Even as per the brief
facts (Ex. PW8/DA) recorded by the SDM at the mortuary, it is clearly
established that parents of the deceased were present. Learned counsel
also points out that Shamsher Singh (PW3) in his statement before the
SDM had said nothing about the demand of dowry or car and in his
evidence before the Court he stated that SDM had asked him to restrict
himself to the incident of 14.08.1997, which fact was categorically
denied by Sh. Vinay Bhushan, SDM (PW8). Even otherwise it does not
seem probable that the SDM would restrict the statement of PW-3.
Learned counsel submits that the allegations of the prosecution
witnesses that on the next date of marriage, Suman disclosed that a car
was demanded and that she was taunted by her in-laws is apparently
not true as neither this fact was mentioned in the FIR nor in the
statement of any other witness. All the witnesses were confronted with
the said contradiction. Further while PW-1 stated that this fact was told
to him by Suman herself, PW-2 stated that Suman had instructed them
not to disclose this fact to their father (PW-1). Furthermore, none of the
prosecution witnesses have alleged that there was any demand of
dowry at the time of marriage. The next allegation of PW-1 and PW-2
that after a few days, Suman came to her parental house as she had
been harassed and beaten by the appellants, was not only confronted to
the witnesses but PW-3 and PW-4 have not alleged any such incident
against the appellants.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that when Suman
had left the matrimonial home on two different occasions, it was
Ravinder Rana who had filed applications (Ex. DW4/A dated 06.10.1993
and Ex. DW4/F dated 01.03.1994) before the DCP, seeking her return to
the matrimonial home. He submits that infact, on 17.09.1993, Ravinder
Rana had been transferred to Vijaywada and Suman was taken away by
PW1 on 26.09.1993 only to pressurize Ravinder Rana to live in AzadPur
and to not go to Vijaywada. It was done at a time when the mother of
Ravinder Rana was admitted in hospital for operation on 11.09.1993. It
is argued that to pressurize Ravinder Rana further, PW1, admittedly got
Suman transferred to a school in Ashok Vihar and it was only after
Ravinder Rana had resigned from his job of Executive Officer in the
‗Food and Vegetable Project', Mother Dairy and he started living
separately from his parents, did Suman rejoin his company. Ravinder
Rana as DW-4 has also proved the order (EX. DW-4/B) dated 17.09.1993
regarding his transfer to VIjaywada, his resignation letter (Ex. DW-4/D)
and acceptance thereof. Ravinder Rana had thereafter filed application,
Ex. DW4/A dated 06.10.1993 to the DCP and upon his advice Suman
returned to the matrimonial home on 18.10.1993. Learned counsel for
the appellants submits that in fact PW1 and PW2 denied any knowledge
regarding the transfer or resignation by Ravinder Rana or that his
mother was admitted in hospital. Sh. Anupam Sharma, counsel submits
that it is very much apparent that the said witnesses were deliberately
hiding these material facts, although the letter (Ex. PW1/C) allegedly
written by Suman, clearly mentions this fact. Learned counsel for the
appellants submits that there is very likelihood that letters Ex. PW1/C
and Ex. PW1/D were infact fabricated subsequently only to create some
evidence which the prosecution witnesses could only in case of need,
and the same is evident from the fact that the friend to whom letter Ex.
PW1/C was addressed by Suman, was not listed as a prosecution
witness nor any verification of the genuineness of the seal affixed on
letter, Ex. PW1/D was carried out. Learned counsel submits that if these
letters were actually sent on the dates alleged, then there was no
reason why their reference was not given at the time when Suman gave
her reply (Ex. PW-1/f) dated 05.04.1994 to the application (Ex. PW-1/f) of
Ravinder Rana to DCP, Ashok Vihar. Learned counsel for the appellants
further submits that even if the letters examined by prosecution and
allegedly written by deceased are admitted at their face value, the same
do not advance the cause of the prosecution in asmuchas, the
allegations levelled therein, do no make out a case against appellant,
Ravinder Rana under section 498A, IPC. Even otherwise, the allegations
were deemed to have been condoned by Suman when she joined the
matrimonial home post conciliation.
13. It is next submitted that Suman had left her matrimonial home for the
second time on 11.02.1994 along with her father as appellant, Ravinder
Rana had not shifted to Azad Pur. However, it is PW1's own version that
Ravinder Rana had brought Suman back to the matrimonial home.
Ravinder Rana had also moved an application (Ex. DW-4/F) to DCP on
01.03.1994 and he had stated the actual reason as to why Suman had
left the matrimonial home. The prosecution did not suggest to Ravinder
Rana (DW4) that the averments made in Ex. PW1/E or Ex. PW4/F were
wrong. Learned counsel for the appellants has also relied upon reply
(Ex. PW1/F) dated 05.04.1994 filed by Suman, to the application of
Ravinder Rana, and submits that it is nowhere stated that any car was
ever demanded by the appellants or she was harassed in regard to the
same. Learned counsel submits that the said reply clearly brings out
that Suman was never harassed by her in-laws. Learned counsel further
points out that it was appellant, Ravinder Rana who had filed an
application (Ex. PW2/DJ) before the Legal Aid Cell for re-conciliation.
Thus it is apparent that Ravinder Rana had tried his best to reconcile the
matrimonial disputes.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the allegation levelled
against appellant, Ravinder Rana that in March 1997, he had requested
PW1 for arranging an accommodation near the school for which the
entire payment of Rs. 3.25 lacs was made by PW1, was false and
appellant, Ravinder Rana (DW4) has proved agreement to sell (Ex.
DW4/H), pertaining to the said property to which PW1 was a witness and
showed that the flat was purchased not for Rs. 3.25 lacs but for Rs. 6.45
lacs. Ravinder Rana also proved documents Ex. PW4/J and Ex. PW4/L
inter alia showing that all the money regarding the said flat was
arranged by Ravinder Rana from his own sources. Learned counsel
submits that prosecution has alleged that on 13.08.1997 (in the morning
of 14.08.1997 Suman was found hanging) at around 8:30 p.m., Suman
had made a telephone call to PW-1 and informed him that she had been
beaten on that day as well and that her in-laws were demanding a car. It
is submitted that it is an unnatural conduct on the part of PW-1, to not
go to the house of his daughter, Suman immediately and to tell her that
he would visit her the next day.
15. Counsel for the appellant submits that in view of the apparent and major
contradictions in the statement of prosecution witnesses, no
presumption can be drawn against appellant, Ravinder Rana under
section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. He submits that the
prosecution has been unable to prove that Suman was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in
connection with any demand of dowry, leave alone that the said cruelty
and demand of dowry was meted out to her, soon before her death.
Learned counsel submits that infact Ravinder Rana has stood up and
narrated true facts before the Court. He has withstood incisive cross-
examination and the prosecution was unable to dent his credibility.
Ravinder Rana as DW-4 has categorically narrated the sequence of
events immediately before the death of Suman, and as per which on
13.08.1997 Ravinder Rana had prepared khichri for Suman which she
vomited and asked Ravinder to sleep in the drawing room. In the
morning, when Ravinder Rana went to wake her up, he found her
hanging with the ceiling fan. Therafter, Ravinder gave a telephonic call
to his in-laws, who reached the spot. Counsel contended that appellant,
Ravinder Rana had tried his level best to make Suman adjust to the
village atmosphere, and photographs Ex. PW-2/D, E, F, G and H with her
husband and other relations are testimony to the fact that she was
happy in her matrimonial home. However, all went in vain due to the
constant interference of her parents. Learned counsel for the appellant
submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of
section 498A, IPC and no case is made out against appellant, Ravinder
Rana under section 498A, IPC much less under section 304B, IPC.
16. Sh. Anupam Sharma, while arguing on behalf of appellants Kuldeep
Singh and Jagjeet Singh (appellants in CRL. A. No.76/2001; appellants
are real brothers of Ravinder Rana, husband of the deceased) submits
that while these two appellants were convicted under section 498A, IPC,
no case is made out against them also. Learned counsel submits that
the learned trial court failed to consider the fact that the deceased was
residing with her husband in a joint family house, which was very large.
He contends that one of the appellants (Sh. Kuldeep Singh) never jointly
resided with the deceased and her husband in asmuchas, he was
residing 15 kilometers away at Rani Bagh. Appellant, Sh. Jagjit Singh,
although was residing in the same house, had a separate kitchen. It is
also submitted that since brothers-in-law were staying separately, no
benefit from the dowry could have been derived by them, they had no
role to play in the day to day affairs of the house and they have thus
been falsely implicated in this matter.
17. While relying upon the arguments advanced for and on behalf of
appellant Ravinder Rana, Sh. Anupam Sharma (counsel) submits that
there are no allegations of any demand of dowry or harassment meted
out to the deceased by the appellants Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet Singh,
in the FIR (Ex. PW-1/A) or the brief facts (Ex. PW8/A) recorded by the
SDM on the date of occurrence of the incident. Counsel points out that
even in the statement (Ex. PW3/A) of Shamsher Singh (PW-3) recorded
after a delay of 5 days and Chander Kala (PW-4; Ex. PW4/A) recorded
after a delay of 32 days, no allegations have been levelled against the
two appellants, Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet Singh.
18. Sh. Anupam Sharma, arguing on behalf of appellants, Kuldeep Singh and
Jagjeet Singh further submits that even in the letters allegedly written
by Suman, dated 20.09.1993 (Ex. PW1/C) and dated 10.01.1994 (Ex.
PW1/D), there are no allegations against the two appellants that they
ever harassed the deceased. No role has been ascribed to them leave
alone any specific incident of harassment having been related to them.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants (Ravinder Rana, Kuldeep Singh and
Jagjeet Singh) further points out that both PW-1 and PW-2 have admitted
in their cross-examination that Suman had received grievous injuries in
an accident in March 1996. A tyre of a truck had passed over her and
she had suffered multiple fractures. Suman received treatment for
accidental injuries till July 1997 and the discharge slip (Ex. PW-1/DZ)
from Hindu Rao Hospital is ample testimony to this fact. Learned
counsel has relied upon a certified copy of a petition filed before MACT
by Suman wherein she had given the correct and true position of the
injuries suffered by her and submits that infact the medical papers (Ex.
PW-2/DZ) pertaining to Suman were deliberately removed and found in
the possession of PW-1. The same was done with an intention to hide
the actual reason for the death of Suman. Learned counsel submits that
PW-1 has himself admitted in his cross-examination that Suman was
suffering from unbearable pain and that she used to have suicidal
thoughts. Learned counsel further points out that even as per the post
mortem report of the deceased, there were no signs of any beating on
her person. Learned counsel submits that Suman had committed
suicide as she was tired of her illness and unbearable pain. In view of
the arguments advanced, learned counsel for the appellants submits
that no case is made out against any of the appellants and that they
have been falsely implicated in this case.
20. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits that the prosecution
has proved its case against the three appellants on all fronts and there
is no anomaly in the judgment rendered by the trial court. Learned
counsel submits that immediately on the next day of the marriage,
Suman had complained that her in-laws were demanding a car and were
taunting her that these days even an LDC brings a car in dowry whereas
Ravinder Rana was an officer. In May, 1993, a daughter was born to
Suman and Ravinder Rana, however, the parents of Suman were not
called to join the celebrations.
21. Learned counsel for the State submits that on 20.3.1993 the deceased
had also addressed a letter to her sister Kamlesh, wherein she had
specifically stated that she was being subjected to constant torture and
harassment by her in-laws and that on 26.9.1993, Suman went back to
the house of her parents because of the repeated demands of a car and
the constant harassment by her in-laws. On 16.10.1993, Ravinder Rana
made a complaint to the Deputy Commissioner of Police and on
18.10.1993 a settlement was arrived at between Ravinder Rana and
Suman whereafter the latter came back to the matrimonial home.
Learned counsel submits that the fact that Suman had left the
matrimonial home at the first instance goes to show that all was not well
within the family and that she was not being treated well by her in-laws.
22. Learned counsel for the State submits that the attitude of her in-laws
towards her was so negative that on 26.10.1993, the father of the
deceased underwent a surgery, however, Suman (deceased) was not
allowed to meet her father during that time while he was in the hospital.
It is submitted by him that on 11.02.1994, Suman once again left her
matrimonial home and rushed to her parents' house wearing bathroom
slippers and ordinary clothes and informed her parents that on
11.02.1994 when she had returned from the school, she was beaten by
her mother-in-law and brother-in-law. Suman also had injury marks on
her person. On seeing the condition of Suman, PW1 asked her to stay in
his home, however, Suman was not allowed by her in-laws to bring her
infant-daughter to the house. In the meantime, on 01.03.1994, Ravinder
Rana approached the DCP and subsequently approached the legal aid
centre. Post conciliation, in March 1995, Suman once again went back to
the house of her in-laws. Learned counsel submits that in the complaint
(Ex. DW4/F) addressed to the DCP, appellant Ravinder Rana had
admitted the incident of 11.02.1994.
23. Learned counsel for the State submits that there was peace for about
four months and thereafter problems once again arose when Ravinder
Rana and his family members started to tease and harass Suman for
dowry. In March 1997, Ravinder Rana got his daughter admitted in a
school in Pitampura and asked PW1 to arrange an accommodation near
the school, whereafter PW1 purchased a house in Vijeta Vihar. He
submits that although it was not mentioned in the statement recorded
before the SDM, that money was paid by PW-1 for purchasing a flat, but
the same stands corroborated vide the suicide note written by the
deceased. Learned counsel for the State submits that the transfer
order of the appellant DW-4/C clearly shows that the appellant did not
join his new post due to the eye operation of his mother and not
because of the problem of his wife, as has been argued by the
appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the statement of the
SDM clearly shows the reason as to why the statement of PW-1 could
not be recorded immediately after the incident, inasmuch as, the SDM
had asked the relatives of the deceased to take the body to the
mortuary. Learned counsel submits that the prosecution witnesses are
reliable and consistent in their deposition against the appellants and
there are no material improvements which go to the root of the matter.
The witnesses have only given explanatory details and not added
anything to the statement made before the SDM. From day one of the
marriage, the appellants have harassed the deceased for dowry and the
same is clearly borne out from the record. The appellants wanted the
deceased to bring a car from her parents and had also compelled her
parents to pay the money for a flat in Vijeta Vihar. Learned counsel
further submits that the arguments of the appellant that the FIR is
insufficient to bring out the case against the appellant does not have
any weight in view of the settled position of law that an FIR is not
supposed to be an encyclopedia containing intricate details about the
incident. It is merely a first hand account, containing brief description of
the incident. Learned counsel for the State submits that this is a crystal
clear case and there is no doubt that appellant, Ravinder Rana had
subjected Suman (deceased) to harassment for and in connection with
dowry, soon before her death and the same is very much apparent from
the fact that on 13.8.1997, at around 8:30 p.m., the deceased had given
a call to her father (PW-1) categorically stating that on that day she had
been beaten by her in-laws on account of the fact that she had been
unable to arrange a car from her father. On hearing this, PW-1 had
asked her daughter to calm down and told her that he would visit her,
the next day. Accordingly, on 14.8.1997, PW-1 reached his daughter's
home early in the morning, only to find her hanging from the ceiling fan
with a duppata tied around her neck. Learned counsel submits that
there is no anomaly in the judgment of conviction passed against
appellant Ravinder Rana, by the learned trial court under section 304-B
IPC and 498-A IPC. He further submits that it is clearly borne out from
the record that the two real brothers of Ravinder Rana had also
subjected Suman to cruelty and harassment and that they have been
justifiably convicted by the trial court under section 498-A, IPC.
24. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, and carefully
gone through the record of the case. In the present case Har Devi,
Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet Singh (appellants in CRL. A. No.76/2001)
were convicted by the trial Court under section 498-A, IPC. Ravinder
Rana (appellant in CRL. A. No.87/2001) was convicted under section
304-B, IPC as well as under section 498-A, IPC. While section 498-A, IPC
deals with cruelty subjected on a woman by her husband or a relative;
section 304-B, IPC read along with 113-B, Evidence Act deals with dowry
death and presumption as to dowry death.
25. Section 498-A of the IPC reads as under:
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting
her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, ―cruelty‖
means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person related
to her to meet such demand.
Section 304-B, reads as follows:
―304-B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
under normal circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry, such death shall be called ‗dowry death', and such
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
death.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, ‗dowry'
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
26. Furthermore the term ‗dowry' has been defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as under:
Definition of "dowry".--In this Act, ―dowry‖ means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by
any other person, to either party to the marriage or to
any other person,
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with
the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or
mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim personal law
(Shariat) applies.
Explanation I.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that any presents made at the time of a marriage to
either party to the marriage in the form of cash, ornaments,
clothes or other articles, shall not be deemed to be dowry
within the meaning of this section, unless they are made as
consideration for the marriage of the said parties.
Explanation II.--The expression ―valuable security‖ has the
same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code
27. The essential ingredients of the offence under section 304-B, IPC
are (i) death of a woman must have been caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii)
such death must have occurred within seven years of marriage;
(iii) soon before the death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or relative of her husband; (iv) such
cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand of
dowry. As and when the aforesaid circumstances are established,
a presumption of dowry death shall be drawn against the accused
under section 113(B) of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:
113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.--When the question
is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a
woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the court shall presume that such person had caused the
dowry death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, ‗dowry death'
shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).
28. In the case of Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi reported at
(2003) 8 SCC 80, it was held that:
"9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and
Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that
soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or
harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a
natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of
―death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances‖. The
expression ―soon before‖ is very relevant where Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service.
The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the
occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case
presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by
the prosecution. ―Soon before‖ is a relative term and it would
depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of
soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any
fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test
both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for
raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
The expression ―soon before her death‖ used in the substantive
Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is
present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has
been indicated and the expression ―soon before‖ is not defined. A
reference to the expression ―soon before‖ used in Section 114
Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a
court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods
―soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods
knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their
possession‖. The determination of the period which can come
within the term ―soon before‖ is left to be determined by the
courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case.
Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ―soon before‖
would normally imply that the interval should not be much
between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in
question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the
death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in
time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental
equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no
consequence.‖
29. What would constitute a period soon before the incident would
depend upon the facts of each case. While there is no one single
definition of the expression 'soon before' and neither can there be
a straight jacket formula nor a test with regard to this expression,
Courts have interpreted this expression keeping in view the
peculiar facts of each case. Thus the first question which arises for
my consideration is whether appellant, Ravinder Rana (husband of
the deceased) ‗demanded dowry' and as to whether he had
subjected the deceased to ‗harassment' in connection with this
demand. The second question which arises is whether ‗soon
before the death', the deceased had been subjected to
harassment in connection with this demand of dowry.
30. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the case of the
prosecution cannot be believed in view of the fact that the FIR was
deliberately delayed by over three hours. He has submitted that the
statement of PW-1 was recorded at around 1:00 p.m. while the FIR was
registered at around 4:30 p.m. It would be apt herein to reproduce
relevant portion of the decision in the case of Ravinder Kumar Vs.
State of Punjab reported at (2001) 7 SCC 690, wherein it was held
that:
13. The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in
lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped
redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most
of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in
furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be
remembered that law has not fixed any time for lodging the
FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Of course a prompt and
immediate lodging of the FIR is the ideal as that would give
the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords
commencement of the investigation without any time lapse.
Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible
concoction of a false version. Barring these two plus points for
a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot
operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be
overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an
unreserved guarantee for the genuineness of the version
incorporated therein.
14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case
was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was
such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR
lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of
the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse
of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon
among urban people also. They might not immediately think of
going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of
adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the
police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is
that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some
appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of
mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police
station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information.
Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give
such information themselves could be so physically impaired
that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous
information about the incident.
15. We are not providing an exhaustive catalogue of
instances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our
effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the
criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground
of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal
corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR
the court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are
not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no
consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging
the FIR.
31. Thus it is settled principle of law that delay in lodging of FIR by
itself cannot be a ground to doubt the case of the prosecution and
it only puts the court on guard to see if the FIR was deliberately
delayed or there is any plausible explanation for the delay.
However, in the facts of this case, I find there to be no delay on
the part of the prosecution in lodging the FIR inasmuch as, it is not
expected that the family of the deceased who lost her young
daughter would have been in a state of mind to give a statement
immediately after the incident. Further it is borne out from the
evidence of SDM (PW-8) that he was unable to reach the spot of
the incident and had asked the body of the deceased to be taken
to the mortuary, where he reached at around 12 noon. Thereafter
at around 1:00 noon, PW-8 recorded the statement of PW-1 (father
of the deceased) in the mortuary, who signed the same at point A
in token of its correctness, and ordered registration of the case
vide his endorsement, Ex. PW-8/A. Thereafter, Inspector Subhash
Tandon, PW-13 received the statement of PW-1, made an
endorsement (Ex. PW-7/A), took rukka to the police station and
got the FIR registered. I find that the prosecution has clearly
explained the time gap of three hours and the lengthy process
involved. I find no merit in the contention of counsel for the
appellants that the FIR was belatedly lodged by the prosecution.
32. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that in
order to establish its case, the prosecution has examined Sh.
Hukum Chand Verma (PW-1), Smt. Kamlesh (PW-2), Sh. Shamsher
Singh (PW-3) and Smt. Chander Kala (PW-4) and the allegation
levelled against the appellants that immediately on the next day
of the marriage, appellants demanded dowry from Suman, in the
form of a car and harassed her for the same, is false and without
any merit. Learned counsel submits that the trial Court has erred
in believing the version of the prosecution. I have carefully gone
through the evidence of PW-1; PW-2; PW-3 and PW-4.
33. PW-1, father of the deceased, has deposed in his examination-in-
chief that on the next day of the marriage of appellant, Ravinder
Rana with his daughter, Suman, his (PW-1's) son Shamsher Singh,
daughters - Kamlesh and Nirjala, went to the house of the in-laws
of Suman so as to bring her back to the parental house, as per the
custom. On seeing them, Suman became sad and when she was
brought to the parental house, Suman informed PW-1 that her
mother-in-law; husband; and the two brothers-in-law were
taunting her that even an LDC brings a car in the marriage,
whereas appellant, Ravinder Rana, was an officer, and a car
should have certainly been given in dowry. Although PW-2, sister
of the deceased has deposed in her examination-in-chief before
the Court that on the next day of the marriage, when Suman was
brought back to the parental house, she had informed about the
demand of a car by her in-laws, however, at the same time I find
that PW-2 had stated that this fact was only told by Suman to her
(i.e. PW-2); PW-3 and their sister, Nirjala. PW-2 further deposed
that she had been instructed by Suman to not tell this fact to their
father, who was a heart patient. The anomaly between the version
of PW-1 and PW-2 is very much apparent as PW-1 has stated that
he was told by Suman herself about the demand for a car. PW-3,
in his examination-in-chief, added another twist and deposed that
on the next day of the marriage of Suman, when she was brought
back to the parental house, Suman had informed them that Har
Devi (mother-in-law of the deceased) had beaten Suman on the
ground that she had not brought the car. Uptill now, no witness
had alleged any beating given to Suman immediately on the next
day of marriage. A careful reading of the statement (Ex. PW3/A)
made by PW-3, Shamsher Singh before the SDM would further
reveal that in Ex. PW3/A, he has stated nothing about any demand
of dowry or car by the appellants. When PW-3 was confronted with
this contradiction in his cross-examination, PW-3 offered an
explanation that the SDM had asked him to restrict specifically to
the incident of 14.08.1997, which however, was categorically
denied by Sh. Vinay Bhushan, SDM (PW-8). PW-4 has stated
nothing insofar as any demand of car is concerned by the
appellants, immediately on the next day of the marriage of Suman
and has only made bald and vague allegations that whenever
Suman used to meet her, she used to complain that appellants
were demanding a car. Thus there is no merit in this contention of
learned counsel that a car was demanded immediately on the
next day of marriage. Even otherwise, any demand for a car
immediately on the next day of the marriage which took place on
08.07.1992 is too remote in time to be said to have a live link with
the death of Suman which occurred on 13/14.08.1997.
34. PW-1 (father of the deceased) has further deposed in his examination-
in-chief that after a few days of the marriage, Suman came to the
parental house, followed by appellant, Ravinder Rana and his mother
and that Suman informed PW-1 that the appellants were beating and
teasing her and that she was being subjected to constant harassment by
them. As per PW-1, he spoke to appellant, Ravinder Rana, and his
mother and asked them to keep his daughter happy. Although, PW-2,
Kamlesh, sister of the deceased, has deposed that after about 10-15
days of the marriage, Suman came to the parental house and informed
PW-2 that she had been beaten by Ravinder Rana, Har Devi, Daljit and
Kuldeep and that Suman used to be dragged in the courtyard by the
appellants and given a beating by holding her from her hair. In my
considered opinion, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 cannot be relied
upon in view of the fact that PW-3, Shamsher Singh (brother of the
deceased) as well as PW-4, Chander Kala (mother of the deceased) have
not even mentioned any such incident. Even otherwise, both PW-1 and
PW-2 were confronted in their cross-examination inasmuch as, they had
not mentioned about any such incident in their statement before the
SDM. In fact, PW-1, has admitted in his cross-examination that he did
not state before the SDM that after a few days Suman had come to his
house complaining that she was being beaten and teased by the
appellants. Thus there are contradictions not only inter-witnesses but
also intra-witnesses.
35. Further, I find that while PW-1 has only mentioned that in May, 1993,
Suman gave birth to a daughter, however, PW-2 went on to accuse that
after the birth of the child, when they had gone to the house of the
appellants, Suman, told them that the appellant, Ravinder Rana, had
beaten her just one week after the delivery of the child on the ground
that she had not yet brought a car. PW-2 further alleged that the
jewellery of Suman had been removed and she found injury marks on
her person. However PW-2, was confronted in her cross-examination
that she had not stated before the SDM regarding these material facts.
Even otherwise, as per PW-2, she had narrated the entire incident to her
mother (PW-4), however, PW-4 has not alleged any such thing. PW-1;
PW-3; and PW-4 have failed to corroborate the evidence of PW-2 on this
account. Thus this portion of the evidence of PW-2 is also unreliable.
36. Learned counsel for appellant has further submitted that no justifiable
reason has been given for the delay in recording the statement of
material witnesses and that PWs have even lied about their presence at
the mortuary. Further I find that Smt. Kamlesh (PW-2) has deposed in
her cross-examination that "I could not visit the mortuary on the death
of Suman, as I became unconscious on hearing the news of her death.
However, my husband had visited the mortuary. It is incorrect that I am
giving false explanation." Similarly, Smt. Chander Kala (PW4) deposed
before the Court ―We reached the house of Suman on the day of death
at about 8:00 a.m. The police had already arrived there. ... I did not go
to the mortuary also. My daughter also did not go to the mortuary. It is
incorrect to suggest that I had gone to the mortuary on the day of
occurrence and met the SDM." However, contrary to these statements,
there is clear cut evidence on record which suggests that they both
were present at the mortuary inasmuch as, Bhag Singh, SI (PW-10) has
categorically stated that the father, mother, brother as well as the
sisters of the deceased accompanied the dead body to the mortuary.
Merely because, Bhag Singh, SI is a police witness, that does not imply
that his version is to be disregarded. Further, no plausible explanation
has been offered by the prosecution as to why the statement of PW-3
was recorded on 19.8.1997 i.e after a delay of five days when in fact he
was present at the mortuary and even identified the dead body before
the SDM vide identification memo, Ex.PW-3/DA. PW-8 (SDM) has
deposed that PW-3 had told him that he would make a statement later
on. The prosecution has also failed to explain the delay of 32 days in
recording the statement of Chander Kala, PW-4,
37. On a careful analysis of the evidence of PWs-1-4, I am of the considered
opinion that the version of these witnesses bristles with discrepancies
and material inconsistencies which go to the root of the matter.
However, it is settled position of law that merely because there are
some inconsistencies in the evidence of a witness, it does not imply that
the entire evidence of such witness be held as otiose. In the case of
Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 4 SCC
494 it was held that:
"19. We are quite aware of the principle that in a country
like India where it is difficult to find a witness who has not
made any embellishment or exaggeration, and therefore, in
such case court would be justified in separating the chaff
from the grain and then act upon the grain.‖
38. In the case of Gurpreet Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported at
(2002) 8 SCC 18, the Apex Court observed as under:
―19. Incidentally, it is now well settled that in the
event of a portion of evidence not being consistent
with the statements given under Section 161 and the
witness stands declared hostile, that does not,
however, mean and imply total rejection of the
evidence. The portion which stands in favour of the
prosecution or the accused may be accepted but the
same shall be subjected to close scrutiny.‖
39. The task of the Court is to sever the truth from the false hood and
separate chaff from the grain, subjecting the evidence to careful
scrutiny, and if the Court finds a portion thereof to be reliable, then the
Court may place reliance on it.
40. PW-1 has deposed in his examination-in-chief that he had produced two
letters (Ex. PW-1/C and Ex. PW-1/D) written by Suman to Kamlesh (PW-
2) and further identified the writing of those letters to be that of her
daughter Suman. PW-1 was cross-examined on this point, however he
was firm in his stand that the letters were indeed written by Suman.
Kamlesh (PW-2), has also affirmed that on 21.09.1993, she had received
a letter, Ex.PW-1/C, dated 20.09.1993 and subsequently another letter,
Ex.PW-1/D dated 10.01.1994, from Suman (deceased). PW-2 also
identified the writing of Suman and stated that the letter had been
written by Suman. In my considered opinion, there is no doubt that
letters (Ex. PW-1/C and Ex. PW-1/D) were written under the hand of
Suman (deceased). I find this portion to be completely severable from
the rest of the evidence given by PWs- 1,2,3 and 4.
41. Letter (Ex.PW-1/C dated 20.9.1993) written by Suman to Kamlesh PW-2,
reads as under:
―DEAR AND RESPECTED SISTER
BAHUT DINO SEY PAREYSHAN THI SAMAJH NAHIAA RAHA THA KYA
KAROON? KISI KO APNI PAREYSHANI KEH BHI NAHI SAKTI THI.
SAMAJH NAHI AATA KAHAN SEY SHURU KAROON - SAPNEY MAIN
BHI NAHI SOCHA THA KI MEREY SAATH YE SAB HOGA. JAB SEY MAI
DIMPI KO GHAR LEYKAR AI HOON TABHI SEY MEREY SAATH YE
SUB CHAL RAHA HAI......... EXCESS MENTAL OR PHYSICAL
TENSION KEY KARAN MAI CHIDCHIDI TO HOHI GAI HOON, US PAR
HAR WAQT IN MAA-BETAI KI TOKATAKI. KOI BHI INKEY YAHAN
APNA ATMSAMAAN LEYKAR NAHI REH SAKTA. MEREY HAR KAAM
MAIN KAMI NIKALNA INKI AADAT BANGAI HAI. ...........................
KEHTEY HAI TERI MAA TUJHEY SIKHATI HAI. SUCH KAHTI HOON IN
JITNEY NANGEY GANDEY AADMI NAHI DEKHEY. INHEY CHAHIYE
THA KOI ROBOT JO BINA APNEY DIMAG KEY INKEY ISHARON PAR
KAAM KARTA. INKI BEYMATLAB KI LAAT KHAATA. MAI TO AISAI
PHAS GAI KI NAA MAI NIKAL SAKTI HOON NA MAI REH SAKTI HOO.
MUJHEY LAGTA HAI KI MUJHEY YAHAN UMRKAID.... RAVI UB DUS-
PANDRAH DIN MAIN VIJAYVADA JANEY WALA HAI SHAYAD SAAL-
DO-SAAL WALHIN RAHEY. DADY MUMMY KO KUCH MAT BATANA
UNHEY DUKH HOGA. JO MEREY NASIB MAI HAI WO MUJHEY TO
BHUGATNA HI HAI. KOSHISH KARUNGI KO APNEY KO MAARKEY
INKEY ANUSAR APNEY AAPKO DHAAL LOON, BAAKI AGEY
BHAGWAN KI MARZI. SOCHA THA OFFICER SEY SHAADI SHADI HO
RAHI HAI SOCIAL STATUS BADHEYGA MAGAR MERA SOCIAL
STATUS EK TEACHER KA BHI NAHI RAHA. .....................‖
42. Letter (Ex. PW-1/D) dated 10.01.1994) addressed to Kamlesh (PW-2),
reads as under:
―WAISE TO LETTER LIKHNE KA KOI UDESHYA (purpose)
NAHI, PAR JAB MAN PAR BOJH BAHUT JYADA BADH JATA
HAI, TO KISI APNE PAR JAHIR KER KE, VO BOHJ HALKA HO
JATA HAI. IN DO TEEN MAHEENO MAI ITNEE BATE IKATHI
HO CHUKI HAI, KI EK-EK BAAT BATAU TO KAI PAGE BHAR
JAYENGE. RAVI AUR ISKEE MAA KI MEAN MENTALITY PER
KAI BAAR HAIRANI HOTI HAI. SOCHTI HUN INME AUR
JANWARO MAI KYA FARK HAI. SCHOOL SE GHAR JATI HUN,
TO PAIR KAMPNE LAG JATE HAIN. ISS AURAT SE AB TO
GHYRNA SEE HO GAI HAI. HAR WAQT YE KUTCH NA KUTCH
BOLTI RAHTI HAI. ITNEE ABUSING LANGUAGE ISTEMAL
KARTI HAI, KI KOI BHI SHARMDAR ADMI, JISNE YE SAB NAHI
DEKHA, MAR JANA PASAND KARE
.................... MERE HAR KAAM ME NUKTA CHINI NIKALNA,
DATNA, DAPTNA CHIRCHARANA USKA (RAVINDER RANA)
SWABHAV BAN GAYA HAI. JO HAMARE GHAR KE GAHNE
THE, WO BHI USNE ALMARI SE NIKALWAKAR TIJORI ME
RAKH DIYE HAIN. JO HAMNE 61 HAZAR BYAZ PAR DIYE THE,
USME SA 20 AUR AB TO WO 25 HAZAR JO DADY NE DIYE
THE, WO NIKALWANE KE LIYA BOL RAHA HAI. AAJ MAIN
AZADPUR JA KAR BANK SE PAISE NIKALWAKAR LAUNGI.
PUCHO TO DHANG SE BATATA BHI NAHI, KI UN PASON KA
KYA KIYA. ...... USKEE MAA ITNE TUCHHI BATE KAHTI HAI KI
SUNI NAHE JATI HAI. SACH PUCHO TO WO HI IN SAB KE LIYE
RESPONSIBLE HAI. WO PAHLE AISA NAHI THA. KAI BAR
SOCHTI HUN, KI ITNA PADH LIKHNE KE BAD BHI, HAR
TARAH KA KAAM MAI KARTI HUN, PHIR BHI USE KISI BAAT
KA SATISFACTION NAHI. PURA DIN KAAM KARNE KE BAAD
BHI WO KUTCH NA KUTCH BOLTA RAHTA HAI. ...... APNE
APKO JAB ITNA NEGLECT PAATI HUN, TO DIL JAL JATA HAI.
PATA NAHI KIS TARAH KI GULAMI WO MUJH SE CHAHTA HAI.
ACHA DIDI KAFI HALKA MAHSOOS KAR RAHI HUN.
‗SUMAN'‖
43. It would be relevant herein to note that in the case of Gurucharan
Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan reported at (2003) 2 SCC 698
Supreme Court laid considerable emphasis on the letters written by the
deceased to her family and friends and observed that, although a
perusal of the oral evidence on record created an impression that the
appellants as well as the husband of the deceased were constantly
taunting deceased for the failure of her father to provide them with a
car despite his prosperity and status, and ultimately this led her to
commit suicide. However, the documentary evidence on record of
contemporaneous nature, some of them written by deceased herself,
gave quite a different picture. The Apex Court further observed that the
letters did indicate that the deceased was unhappy and depressed for
some reason, but they also revealed that so far as the appellants were
concerned, they treated her with love and affection and there was no
complaint in any of the letters against their conduct. There was not even
a whisper in any of the letters written by the deceased or anyone else
about a demand for a car. The Court observed that, these letters were
significant and substantially contemporaneous because they were
written at a time when, according to the prosecution, deceased was
being subjected to harassment and cruelty and was repeatedly taunted
by her husband as well as her father and mother-in-law for the failure of
her father to give a car in dowry. These letters, therefore, threw
considerable light on the circumstances that prevailed during the period
of her stay in her matrimonial home; resulting ultimately in her death.
After analyzing several letters, the Apex Court came to the conclusion
that the letters did not support the case of the prosecution that
deceased was subjected to torture and harassment or was being
constantly taunted for not bringing a car in dowry.
44. Coming back to the facts of this case, I find that as per PW-2, when she
received letter, Ex.PW-1/C dated 20.09.1993, PW-2 along with her
husband immediately went to the house of Suman, only to find that
Suman was so terrified that she was not able to speak properly. Suman
was also not wearing any gold articles at that time and thus as per PW-
2, she gave her own pair of tops (ear) to Suman. Suman was frightened
and asked PW-2 to give a car to her in-laws, else there would be a
danger to her life. PW-2 stated that after coming back to her house, she
informed her mother on telephone about the danger to the life of Suman
and that she should be brought back to their house. However, I find that
PW-4 (mother of the deceased) has not even referred to any such
telephone call and/or alleged any such fact. Thus in my opinion, this
version of PW-2 also falls to the ground. Even otherwise, I find merit in
the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that had Suman
been tortured and/or harassed by the appellant Ravinder Rana or his
family members, on account of or in connection with dowry, she would
have had surely mentioned the same in her letters addressed to PW-2.
Further PW-1 (father of the deceased) deposed in his examination-in-
chief that on 26.09.1993, Suman had come on her own to the parental
house. However, in his statement recorded before the SDM, PW-1 had
stated that on 26.09.1993 he, himself had brought Suman to the
parental house. PW-1 was confronted in his cross-examination, wherein
he stated that it had been wrongly mentioned in his statement before
the SDM that he had gone to bring Suman. Be that as it may, the fact of
the matter is that Suman had left the matrimonial home on 26.09.1993
and which also stands affirmed by the defence taken by the appellants
themselves that after Suman had left the matrimonial home, appellant
Ravinder Rana had filed an application, Ex. DW4/A dated 06.10.1993
before the DCP.
45. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that infact, on
17.09.1993, Ravinder Rana had been transferred to Vijaywada and
Suman was taken away by PW-1 on 26.09.1993 only to pressurize
appellant Ravinder Rana to live in Azadpur and to not go to Vijaywada.
Counsel has also submitted that so as to pressurize appellant, Ravinder
Rana further, PW1, got Suman transferred to a school in Ashok Vihar
and it was only after Ravinder Rana had resigned from his job of
Executive Officer in the ‗Food and Vegetable Project', Mother Dairy and
he started living separately from his parents, did Suman rejoin his
company on 18.10.1993. I have carefully analysed the evidence of PWs
on this aspect and I find that when this question was put to PW-1, he
denied having any knowledge about the transfer of appellant, Ravinder
Rana to Vijaywada in Andhra Pradesh in the year 1993. It is surprising
to note that PW-1 has claimed to have no knowledge about the transfer
of appellant Ravinder Rana when infact, a careful reading of letter (Ex.
PW1/C) written by Suman, clearly mentions this fact, and which was
admittedly, in the possession of PW-1. However, at the same time I
don't find any merit in the contention of counsel for the appellants, that
PW-1 had taken away Suman on 26.09.1993 only to pressurize Ravinder
Rana to live in Azadpur. Rather, letter (Ex. PW1/C) written by Suman
clearly brings out the harassment and apathy to which she was being
subjected to by her husband and mother-in-law, and I have no doubt
lingering in my mind that Suman, tired of the constant harassment, had
left her matrimonial home voluntarily on 26.09.1993. I am further
fortified in my opinion by the fact that letter (Ex. DW-4/C) dated
06.10.1993, addressed by the ‗Department of Mother Dairy' to Ravinder
Rana rejecting the latter's request seeking cancellation of his transfer
order, categorically states that the reason stated by Ravinder Rana that
he had personal problems and his mother having undergone an eye
operation, was duly considered by the Dept. before rejecting the same.
46. On 18.10.1993, after a settlement, Suman once again went back to her
matrimonial home. However, peace did not last for long and the same is
revealed from the fact that Suman addressed yet another letter (Ex.
PW1/D; reproduced above), dated 10.01.1994 to her sister Kamlesh
(PW-2) pouring her heart out and about her misfortune to have been
married to appellant, Ravinder Rana. On 11.02.1994 Suman left her
matrimonial home once again. Thereafter Ravinder Rana filed an
application, Ex. DW-4/F dated 01.03.1994 before the DCP, Ashok Vihar,
Delhi Police and also filed an application, Ex.PW-2/DJ before the Legal
Aid Centre. Ex. DW-4/F reads as under:
―MANYAVAR,
MAIN RAVINDER RANA S/O SHRI JASWANT SINGH RANA,
NIWASI GAON KHERA GARI, THANA SAMAYPUR BADLI, DELHI,
APKO SUCHIT KARTA HOON KI MERI SHAADI AATH JULY, 92 KO
SHRI HUKUMCHAND VERMA KI PUTRI SUMAN SEY HUI THI, JO KI D-
1/2, JAANIWALA BAGH (MCD FLATS), AZAD PUR MAI REHTAI HAIN.
ABHI 11.2.94 KO MERI PATNI SUMAN SCHOOL SEY AAKAR, MERI
LAGBHAGH, NAU (9) MAHA KI BETI KO MEREY GHAR PAR
CHORKAR JHAGRAKARKEY APNEY PITA KEY GHAR CHALI AI THI, US
SAMAI MAI GHAR PAR NAHI THA, KAHIN BAHAR GAYA HUA THA.
GHAR PAR MERI MAA OR ............ (un comprehendible). KARAN
YEH HAI KI MAI GHAR CHORKAR, BAHAR RAHUN OR ISKEY LIYE
USKEY MAA-BAAP USKO BHARKATEY HAIN. KAFI INTZAR KARNEY
KEY BAAD MAI APKO SUCHIT KAR RAHA HOON.
PRARTHI
RAVINDER RANA.‖
47. In reply to the application filed by the appellant, Ravinder Rana, Suman
vide her reply, Ex.PW-1/F, stated the following.
―SHRIMANJI,
NIVEDAN HAI KI MERI SHADI 8 JULY, 1992, KO SHRI
RAVINDER RANA KEY SATH GAON KHERA GARI MAIN HUI THI
JINSEY MERI 11 MAHINEY KI LADKI HAI. MERI SAAS CHOTI-CHOTI
BAATON KO LEY KAR MAANSIK TANAV DETI HAI OR JUB MAIN
APNEY PATI KO KEHTI HOON TO WO YEH KEHTAIN HAIN KI TUJHEY
TERI MAA SIKHATI HAI. MAIN M.C.D., SWAROOP NAGAR, MAI A/T
KEY PAD PAR KAAM KARTI HOON. 11.2.94 KO SCHOOL SEY ANEY
KEY PASCHAT, MERI SAAS NEY MUJH SEY JAAN BUJH KAR LADAI KI
TATHA MERI BETI KO MUJH SEY CHIN LIYA, TATHA MUJHEY APNEY
GHAR JANEY KO KAHA. TUB SEY MAI APNEY MAATA-PITA KEY
SAAT REHTI HOON. MAIN CHAHTI HOON MERI BETI MEREY PAAS
RAHEY, PAR WOH DENA NAHI CHAHTEY. ISMAI MEREY MAATA-
PITA KA KOI KASOOR NAHI HAI.
SUMAN
5.4.94‖
48. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that as per the evidence on
record it is absolutely clear that Suman had been turned out of the
house for the reason that she had not yet brought the car from her
parents. Counsel submits that as per PW-1, on 11.02.1994, Suman
suddenly came to the parental house all alone wearing ordinary clothes
and bathroom slippers and was having injury marks on her person. PW-1
has further deposed that his daughter Suman had informed him that on
11.02.1994 when she returned from school, she was beaten by her
mother-in-law and Daljit Singh. Again said, the brother-in-law was Jagjit
Singh and not Daljit Singh. As per PW-2, on 11.02.1994, Suman ran
away from the house and came to the house of their father, in bathroom
slippers, for the reason that Har Devi (mother-in-law of the deceased)
had quarrelled with Suman as to why had she not brought a car despite
repeated demands and that she would throw Suman down from the roof
of their house. Her jeth-Jagjit, and Har Devi, snatched away the
daughter of Suman, and gave Suman a beating. She stayed at the house
of her father for more than a year.
49. In my considered opinion, a bare perusal of the reply Ex.PW-1/F, filed by
Suman clearly shows that she has not alleged any demand of dowry by
the appellants and has only stated about the mental agony inflicted
upon her by her mother-in-law for small issues. Further during cross-
examination, PW-1 was confronted with his statement (Ex. PW-1/A)
given before the SDM wherein he has only mentioned "PARANTU VEH
MERI LADKI KE SAATH MAAR-PEET KARTE RAHE. ISS SABSE TANG AA
KAR, KARIB 2 SAAL PEHLE MAIN APNI LADKI KO GHAR LE AAYA THA.
MERI LADKI LAGBAGH 1 SAAL MERE PAAS RAHI." PW-2 was also
confronted with her statement given before the SDM. I also find that
while Suman had stayed in her parental house for over an year, during
this time period, Suman did not file a complaint to the police or any
other authority. In fact there is a categorical admission by PW-1 (father
of the deceased) in his cross-examination wherein he has stated that in
the enquiry held subsequent to the complaint dated 01.03.1994, lodged
by appellant, Ravinder Rana, his daughter did not allege anything
regarding the demand of dowry by the appellant. PW-1 however
voluntarily stated that Suman had alleged with respect to the
harassment meted out to her. Therefore, I find that although Suman had
left her matrimonial home on account of the continuous harassment
meted out to her by her husband and mother-in-law, but at the same
time I find that the harassment cannot be said to have been on account
of any demand for dowry. Subsequently, Suman entered conciliation
proceedings and re-joined her matrimonial home in March, 1995.
50. It has further been brought to my notice that prosecution witnesses
suppressed material facts, did not state in their examination-in-chief
about the serious accident of Suman in which she nearly lost her life
when the tyre of a truck had passed over her body on 22.03.1996. This
fact stands affirmed not only by the admission of PW-1 and PW-2 in their
cross-examination, but also stands confirmed by the Discharge Slip
issued from Hindu Rao Hospital and application (Ex.DW-4/9) filed by
Suman before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, seeking
compensation. I also find that while PW-4 (Chander Kala), mother of the
deceased, has stated that she met Suman four days before her death
inasmuch as, that on 10.08.1997 she had gone to Vijeta Vihar where
appellant, Ravinder Rana; the deceased; and their daughter were
present in the house and that Suman had called her inside the bedroom
and informed her (PW-4) that she was being subjected to beatings by
appellant, Ravinder Rana, as to why had the car not yet been brought
by her and that Suman was being pressurized by appellant, Ravinder
Rana, to ask for a car from her parents. Thereafter, PW-4 has deposed
that she told Suman that she would talk to her father (i.e. PW-1)
regarding this, who was also present in the house at that time. As per
PW-4, however, Suman asked PW-4 to not to talk to PW-1 at that time,
as the appellant, would not hesitate in assaulting them. Thereafter PW-4
returned to her house and narrated the whole incident to her husband.
PW-4 was cross-examined by learned counsel for the appellant,
Ravinder Rana, wherein PW-4 was confronted with her statement,
Ex.PW-4/DA recorded before the SDM wherein it was not mentioned that
she had gone along with her husband to the house of the appellant at
Vijeta Vihar. It was also not recorded in Ex.PW-4/DA that a day before
PW-4 went to the house of the appellant, Suman had been beaten by
Ravinder Rana. Further, a careful reading of the evidence of PW-1,
father of the deceased, shows that in his evidence before the Court, he
has stated nothing insofar as the incident of 10.08.97 at the house of
Ravinder Rana is concerned.
51. Another anomaly in the evidence of PW-3, Shamsher Singh, (brother of
the deceased) is that, according to him, on 03.08.1997, Suman came to
their house for the last time before her death and informed them that
she was still being beaten by her mother-in-law; Ravinder Rana; and
both the jeths, who were also demanding a car. PW-3 further deposed
that Suman returned to her residence at Vijeta Vihar in the same
evening. However, I find that no other prosecution witness including
PW-1 (father of the deceased); PW-4 (mother of the deceased), have
corroborated the version of PW-3. PW-1 and PW-4 have not even
mentioned the fact that Suman had come to their house on 3.8.1997,
leave alone giving any details of 3.8.1997.
52. Learned counsel for the appellants has lastly contended that the
allegation levelled against appellant, Ravinder Rana that in March 1997,
he had requested PW-1 for arranging an accommodation near the school
for which the entire payment was made by PW-1, was not true. Counsel
has relied upon certain account statements to show that infact
appellant, Ravinder Rana had arranged the money for the flat, out if his
own resources. I have carefully gone through the documents relied upon
by counsel for the appellants. As per Ex.DW-4/H, an advance payment
of Rs.60,000/-, out of the total sale price of Rs.6.45 lakhs was given on
behalf of appellant, Ravinder Rana, to one Sh. B.R. Malhotra, for the flat
bearing No.A-19/G, Vijeta Vihar, Rohini. Further as per Ex.DW-4/J dated
25.05.1999 a certificate to the effect has been issued by the State Bank
of India that a sum of Rs.2.80 lakhs vide cheque No.835606 dated
07.04.19997 was withdrawn in favour of Sh. Ravinder Rana from
account No.SB-2065. In my considered opinion, appellant, Ravinder
Rana, has been unable to prove before this Court that the entire
payment for the purchase of the house was arranged out of his own
resources. PW-1 in his examination-in-chief before the Court deposed
that in March, 1997, Ravinder Rana had insisted that PW-1 should
arrange an accommodation for him. As per PW-1, a sum of Rs.2.50
lakhs was paid by him and a sum of Rs.75,000/- was given by his elder
daughter, Kamlesh (PW-2). In his cross-examination, PW-1 was
confronted with his statement, Ex.PW-1/A, wherein he had stated that
appellant, Ravinder Rana, had pressurized him to purchase a house near
DAV School, Pitam Pura, where the daughter of Suman and Ravinder
Rana had been admitted and that PW-1 accordingly bought a house in
Vijeta Vihar for which he paid the entire amount and thereafter
transferred it in the name of appellant, Ravinder Rana. However, PW-1
stayed put in his cross-examination that he had informed the SDM that
he had paid Rs.2.5 lakhs and that Kamlesh had paid Rs.75,000/-. PW-2
also affirmed in her deposition that her father (PW-1) had paid a sum of
Rs.2.50 lakhs and that Rs.75,000/- had been given by her (PW-2). In my
considered opinion, as per the material on record, although it stands
established that PW-1 and PW-2 had given money so as to purchase a
flat in Vijeta Vihar where appellant Ravinder Rana was last residing
along with Suman, however it is not established that the same was not
given as a loan but for dowry. In the suicide note (Ex.PW-1/DA) the
deceased has categorically stated that a sum of Rs.3.00 lakhs, which
had been taken by her (Suman) on loan from her father (PW-1), be
returned to her parents including the jewellery. The suicide note Ex.PW-
1/DA, reads as under:-
―Nobody is responsible for my death.
MAINEY IS MAKAN KEY LIEY APNEY PITA SEY PAISA (KARIN TEEN
LAKH) UDHAR LYA THA. MERA SARA PAISA OR GEHNA, MEREY
MAA-BAAP KO LOTA DIYA JAY.
SUMAN‖
53. As per the report (Ex.PW-14/A) of the Forensic Science Laboratory, the
said note was written under the hand of the deceased. I find merit in the
contention of learned counsel for the appellants that had the appellants
pressurized the parents of Suman to purchase them a house as dowry,
she would have definitely mentioned this fact in her suicide note.
However, Suman has affirmed in her suicide note that it was only a loan,
which had been taken from her father. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the sum of Rs.2.50 lakhs, was given by the family of Suman (deceased)
to appellant, Ravinder Rana as dowry. In the case of Satvir Singh v.
State of Punjab reported at (2001) 8 SCC 633 the Supreme Court
has categorically held that all amounts paid by the in-laws of the
husband of a woman cannot become dowry. The dowry mentioned in
Section 304-B should be any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given ―in connection with the marriage‖. The Apex Court
further observed that:
"21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One
is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage
and the third is ―at any time‖ after the marriage. The third
occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the
crucial words are ―in connection with the marriage of the
said parties‖. This means that giving or agreeing to give
any property or valuable security on any of the above three
stages should have been in connection with the marriage
of the parties. There can be many other instances for
payment of money or giving property as between the
spouses.‖
54. Further in the case of Appasaheb and Anr. Vs. State of
Maharashtra reported at AIR 2007 SC 763 it was inter-alia held
as follows:
In view of the aforesaid definition of the word
"dowry" any property or valuable security should be
given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly
at or before or any time after the marriage and in
connection with the marriage of the said parties.
Therefore, the giving or taking of property or valuable
security must have some connection with the
marriage of the parties and a correlation between the
giving or taking of property or valuable security with
the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal
provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a
fairly well known social custom or practice in India.
........... A demand for money on account of some
financial stringency or for meeting some urgent
domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot
be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is
normally understood. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution does not, therefore, show that any
demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as
what was allegedly asked for was some money for
meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing
manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304B
IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the
conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.‖
55. Lastly, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that no
telephone call was made by Suman to PW-1, on 13.08.1997 at around
8.30 p.m, inter alia, stating that the appellants had beaten Suman and
that they were demanding a car. I find that PW-1 has deposed in his
examination-in-chief that on 13.08.1997 at about 8.30 p.m. Suman had
given him a telephone call and informed him that she had been beaten
on that day again and that the appellants were demanding a car. As per
PW-1 he had told his daughter that he would visit her in the morning of
the next day. PW-1 in his cross-examination was confronted with his
statement, Ex.PW-1/A, recorded before the SDM wherein it was only
mentioned that he had received a call from his daughter at around 8.30
p.m., and it was not mentioned that Suman had been beaten and that
there was a demand of any car. PW-3, Shamsher Singh (brother of the
deceased), has also deposed that at the spot of the incident, his father
had informed him that on the previous night a telephone call had been
received by PW-1 and that Suman had informed PW-1 that she was
beaten by the appellants. PW-3 in his statement, Ex.PW-3/A, recorded
before the SDM, however, has stated that his father had informed him
that Suman had given a telephone call in the previous night and asked
PW-1 to come in the next morning. Thus, I find that PW-3 has neither
stated about any beating given to Suman nor stated about any demand
of car, before the SDM. However, while deposing before the Court, PW-
3, made a material improvement and stated that Suman had been
beaten by the appellants. In his cross-examination PW-3, admitted that
he had not told the SDM about any beating given to Suman. Thus I find
that although Suman had given a call to her father in the night of
13.08.1997 and that PW-1 had stated that he would visit her the next
day, but in view of the contradictions inherent in the statements of PW-1
and PW-3, it is not proved that Suman had alleged about any beating
given to her or that the appellants were demanding a car. However, at
the same time I find that counsel for the appellants has been unable to
explain as to why did appellant Ravinder Rana, not inform the family of
Suman about her death. And when PW-1 reached the house of Suman in
the morning, as per his conversation with Suman in the previous night,
Ravinder Rana still did not tell him that Suman had died and only stated
that she might be in the bedroom. Furthermore, I find no merit in the
contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the suicide note
(Ex.PW-1/DA; reproduced above) has exonerated the appellants. In my
considered opinion, what the deceased wanted to convey was that
nobody had committed any overt act, causing her death. I am also not
convinced by the argument of counsel for the appellants that Suman
had committed suicide on account of the pain which she was
undergoing because of her accident.
56. Torture and cruelty of a married woman often takes place within the
four corners and closed doors of the matrimonial home and
consequently there is none available to give evidence in support of the
cruelty and torture committed on the girl. In these circumstances,
letters (if any) written by the deceased, play a pivotal role in
determining the psyche of the girl before her death. As already noted
above, in the case of Gurucharan Kumar (supra) the Apex Court had
observed in the facts of that case that the letters written by the
deceased were significant and substantially contemporaneous because
they were written at a time when, according to the prosecution,
deceased was being subjected to harassment and cruelty for the failure
of her father to give a car in dowry. The letters were, therefore, said to
throw considerable light on the circumstances that prevailed during the
period of her stay in her matrimonial home; resulting ultimately in her
death. Coming back to the facts and circumstances of this case, I find
that it is clearly established beyond doubt that Suman had addressed
letters Ex. PW-1/C and Ex. PW-1/D to her elder sister, Kamlesh. In letter
(Ex.PW-1/C dated 20.9.1993) Suman had written that, ―Excess mental or
physical tension key karan mai chidchidi to hohi gai hoon, us par har
waqt in maa-betai ki tokataki. Koi bhi inkey yahan apna atmsamaan
leykar nahi reh sakta. Merey har kaam main kami nikalna inki aadat
bangai hai. ...." In Letter (Ex. PW-1/D dated 10.01.1994), Suman wrote
―ravi aur iskee maa ki mean mentality per kai baar hairani hoti hai.
sochti hun inme aur janwaro mai kya fark hai. School se ghar jati hun,
to pair kampne lag jate hain. Iss aurat se ab to ghyrna see ho gai hai.
har waqt ye kutch na kutch bolti rahti hai. Itnee abusing language
istemal karti hai, ki koi bhi sharmdar admi, jisne ye sab nahi dekha, mar
jana pasand kare ........" A bare perusal of the letters addressed by
Suman to her sister, bring out the untold apathy and harassment
suffered by Suman at the hands of her husband and mother-in-law. But
as stated above, neither of the two letters mention about any demand
of dowry/car or harassment in connection with dowry.
57. In view of the fact that there are serious anomalies in the evidence of
prosecution witnesses which go to the root of the matter, I find no merit
in the contention of learned counsel for the State that prosecution
witnesses have only explained the sequence of events before the Court
and not made material improvements. All the material witnesses PW-1;
PW-2; PW-3 and PW-4 were confronted on major portion of their
evidence led in Court, with their statements given before the SDM. In
my considered opinion, the trial court has committed a manifest error
and there is nothing on record to suggest that any dowry was
demanded from Suman by the appellants or that she was ever subjected
to harassment in connection with the demand of dowry, but there is
evidence to show that appellant, Ravinder Rana and his mother (Har
Devi) had subjected Suman to cruelty and harassment in terms of
section 498A, IPC. Accordingly, while upholding the judgment of
conviction passed against appellant Ravinder Rana under section 498A,
IPC, I find that no case is made out against him under section 304-B,
IPC.
58. As Smt. Har Devi has already expired during the pendency of the
matter, the appeal filed by her, stands abated.
59. At this stage it would be useful to reproduce portion of the decision in
the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. reported at AIR
2000 SC 2324 wherein the Apex Court condemned and deprecated the
practice of the prosecution in matters concerning 304-B; 498-A, IPC in
roping as many relatives of the husband as possible. It was held by the
Court as under:
―A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all
relations of the in-laws of the deceased-wives in the
matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely
to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real
culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek
conviction for maximum people, the parents of the
deceased have been found to be making efforts for
involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case
of the prosecution even against the real accused as
appears to have happened in the instant case.‖
60. In so far as appellants Kuldeep Singh and Jagjit Singh (brothers-in-law of
the deceased) are concerned, I find merit in the contention of learned
counsel for the appellants that Kuldeep Singh was not even residing in
the same house (in the joint family property), where the deceased and
Ravinder Rana were initially residing and that Jagjit Singh, who was
residing in the same house, had a separate kitchen, and as such had no
role to play in the married life of Suman and Ravinder Rana. In a similar
case of Prem Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported at (1998) 8 SCC
70, the Apex Court gave benefit of doubt to an accused and observed
that, ―when A-2 was residing separately from her son and when there
was no positive evidence on the record to show that either A-2 was
instigating A-1 to demand additional amount of dowry/money or for that
purpose telling him to cause ill-treatment or harassment to Sumitra, it
would be unsafe to hold A-2 responsible for an offence punishable under
Section 304-B IPC. Moreover, such an additional payment of money was
to benefit A-1 alone and not A-2 because there was no evidence on
record to suggest that A-1 was helping A-2 either by giving some money
and/or other benefits. If this be so, in our opinion, the High Court was
not justified in convicting Shanti (A-2) for the offence under Section 304-
B IPC. It is for this precise reason, we give benefit of doubt to A-2 and
acquit her of the charge under Section 304-B IPC." Be that as it may,
even otherwise, a perusal of the statements of prosecution witnesses
viz. statements made before the SDM; in examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, shows that they bristle with discrepancies and
contradictions. There seems to be an improvement or attempt to bring
Kuldeep Singh and Jagjit Singh, into the picture. As a matter of fact, no
allegations of any demand of dowry or harassment have been levelled
against the appellants, Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet Singh, in the FIR (Ex.
PW-1/A) or the brief facts (Ex. PW8/A) recorded by the SDM on the date
of occurrence of the incident. Although it has been alleged against these
two appellants that they were present in the house in the morning of the
day of the incident, however as per PW-12, SI Phulwari on 14.09.1997 at
about 7:45 p.m. he was informed by the SHO that one lady had died due
to hanging and whereafter he accompanied SHO Subhash Chand to the
spot of the incident at VIjeta Vihar where he found Ravinder Rana; PW-1
and PW-3. I find that PW-12 would have surely mentioned the presence
of appellants Kuldeep Singh and Jagjit Singh, had they been present
there. In fact PW-12 goes on to state that he removed the dead body to
the mortuary accompanied by the relations of the deceased. Thereafter,
PW-12 along with PW-1 returned to the spot of the incident and
searched the premises when, inside an almirah he found the suicide
note. In the meantime, Jagjit Singh arrived at the spot and the flat was
handed over to him and PW-12 came to the police station along with
Ravinder Rana. There is no reason for me to discredit the version of this
police witness examined by the prosecution themselves. Merely because
PW-12 is a police witness, it does not imply that he has been deposing
falsely.
61. Further the letters (Ex. PW-1/C dated 20.9.1993 and Ex. PW-1/D dated
10.01.1994) addressed by Suman to her elder sister, Kamlesh (PW-2) as
well as the reply (Ex. PW-1/F) filed by Suman to the application of
appellant, Ravinder Rana, indicate that she had a grievance only against
her husband and mother-in-law and not against any other family
members. Nothing has been mentioned with regard to these two
appellants by the deceased in her letter Ex. PW-1/C and Ex. PW-1/D, let
alone link any specific incident of harassment with them. Further. In the
absence of not only any specific averment against these appellants but
also general averments, in my considered opinion, it would not be wrong
to opine that appellants, Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet Singh have been
falsely implicated in this case and that no case is made out against
these two appellants under section 498-A, IPC.
62. For the reasons stated above, CRL. A. No.76/2001 is allowed and I find
that no case is made out against appellants, Kuldeep Singh and Jagjeet
Singh under section 498-A, IPC. Accordingly the judgment dated
30.01.2001 and order on sentence dated 31.01.2001 passed against
them by the trial Court, is set aside. Further, CRL. A. No.87/2001 is
partially allowed to the extent that no case is made out against
appellant Ravinder Rana under section 304-B, IPC, however the
judgment of conviction dated 30.01.2001 and order on sentence dated
31.01.2001 passed against appellant Ravinder Rana under section 498A,
IPC, by the trial Court is upheld.
63. Accordingly, both the appeals are disposed of.
G.S.SISTANI
( JUDGE )
January 15, 2010
‗ssn'
