Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 123 Del
Judgement Date : 12 January, 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W.P. (C ) NO. 7280/2005
Judgment delivered on :12 January, 2010
Shri Chander Pal ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. Nitinijya Chaudhary, Adv.
Versus
Delhi Transport Corporation ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Saroj Bidawat, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR:
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may Yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in the Digest?
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (ORAL)
By this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India the petitioner seeks quashing of
award dated 13.4.2004 passed by the Industrial Tribunal No-
III in I.D. No. 124/02, whereby reference was answered
against the workman by upholding the punishment awarded
to him and also quashing of the order of removal dated
4.6.1992 passed by the respondent Corporation.
The brief facts of the present case as per the
petitioner relevant for deciding the present petition are that
the petitioner was employed as a Conductor with the
respondent, Delhi Transport Corporation. The petitioner was
served with a charge sheet dated 24.9.1991 alleging that
the petitioner had not issued tickets to the passengers after
collecting due fare from them. It was alleged that his cash
was found to be in excess by Rs.7.50 and that he was found
sitting on some other seat. An enquiry was initiated in the
matter and the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of
misconduct. The respondent thereafter proceeded to pass an
order of removal dated 4.6.1992 against the petitioner
workman. Simultaneously, the respondent corporation filed
an application under Section 33(2) (b) of the I.D. Act seeking
approval of its decision for removal of the petitioner from
service and the learned Tribunal proceeded to grant approval
to the application filed by the respondent corporation vide its
order dated 28.2.2001. Aggrieved with the said order the
petitioner raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court
in which it was held that proper and fair enquiry was held by
the respondent Corporation and passed an award dated
13.4.2004 upholding the order of removal dated 4.6.1992.
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
learned Tribunal wrongly observed that there was an
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to raise the
industrial dispute after a lapse of about 10 years from the
date of removal of the petitioner. He placed reliance on the
judgment of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi
Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors. (2002) 2
SCC 244. He further contended that the petitioner had
raised the industrial dispute after the approval was granted
to the order of removal by the Industrial Tribunal under
Section 33 (2) (b) of the I.D. Act vide order dated 28.2.2001.
Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Industrial
Tribunal also erred in holding that the charges leveled in the
charge sheet against the workman stands proved, as no
evidence was produced on record by the respondent to prove
the charge of misconduct against the petitioner. Counsel for
the petitioner also submitted that the principles of natural
justice were blatantly violated by the enquiry officer as the
petitioner was not supplied with the requisite documents as
asked by him and also the assistance of a co-worker was not
provided to him, besides non-examination of the passengers
as witnesses. Counsel further submitted that even the
statement of the driver of the bus, Shri Jugwinder Singh, was
ignored by the enquiry officer, who, in his deposition clearly
stated that there were 8-10 passengers in the bus when the
bus was checked by the checking officials and no passenger
was found without a ticket. Based on the above submissions,
counsel for the petitioner submitted that the findings of the
Tribunal are illegal and unwarranted besides being perverse.
Refuting the said submissions of the counsel for the
petitioner, Ms. Saroj Bidawat counsel for the respondent
stated that the enquiry officer conducted a detailed enquiry
as per rules after following the due procedure. Counsel also
submitted that the petitioner had fully participated in the
enquiry proceedings and was given full opportunity to defend
himself and thus the petitioner cannot complain that the
principles of natural justice were violated by the enquiry
officer. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the
petitioner never made any request for summoning the
passengers and relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in
State of Haryana Vs. Ratan Singh AIR 1977 SC 1512(1)
wherein the Apex Court took a view that the evidence of the
passengers in cheating cases may not be easily available and
therefore, absence of the same cannot be held as fatal.
Counsel for the respondent also submitted that
the petitioner had raised the industrial dispute after a long
spell of about 10 years and that too after the approval was
granted by the Industrial Tribunal to the respondent
management under Section 33 (2) (b) of the I.D. Act. Counsel
thus submitted that the award passed by the Tribunal is legal
and justified and does not call for any interference by this
court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length and perused the records.
The petitioner workman was removed from the
service on the charge that he did not issue tickets to the
passengers after collecting the fare from them and his cash
was also found in excess by Rs.7.50 and a detailed enquiry
was held against the petitioner. In the proceedings before
the enquiry officer, the petitioner was offered the assistance
of a co-worker but the same was refused by the petitioner
himself. With regard to the submission of counsel for the
petitioner that the petitioner was not supplied copies of the
certain documents demanded by him during the enquiry
proceedings; no such application was moved by the petitioner
to seek direction for supply of the documents. The Tribunal
also found that no request was made by the petitioner
before the enquiry officer to summon the passengers who
were found travelling without the ticket. The enquiry officer
recorded the statements of the checking staff and their
testimonies could not be impeached by the petitioner during
the cross-examination. It is thus evident that the petitioner
had fully participated in the proceedings before the enquiry
officer and therefore, the petitioner cannot complain that the
principles of natural justice were violated by the enquiry
officer.
Based on the findings of the enquiry officer,
punishment of removal was awarded to the petitioner
workman by the order dated 4.6.1992. The Industrial Tribunal
found inconsistency in the defence of the petitioner as in his
reply to the charge sheet, he nowhere remotely indicated that
one passenger was found without ticket by the checking staff
whereas the same was admitted by him in court while
deposing as WW-1. It is also amazing to know that the
petitioner himself gave an explanation for the ticketless
passengers that since the area is populated by the majority of
Gujjars who do not purchase tickets and that they are
persuaded with great difficulty to purchase tickets.
The contention of the petitioner that there was non-
examination of the passengers as witnesses is of no legal
consequence in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in
State of Haryana Vs. Ratan Singh AIR 1977 SC 1512(1)
where it was held:
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The „residuum‟ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence -- not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.
5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the non-compliance with the departmental instruction that statements of passengers should be recorded by inspectors. These are instructions of prudence, not rules that bind or vitiate in the violation. In this case, the Inspector tried to get the statements but the passengers declined, the psychology of the latter in such circumstances being understandable, although may not be approved. We cannot hold that merely because statements of passengers were not recorded the order that followed was invalid. Likewise, the re-evaluation of the evidence on the strength of co-conductor‟s testimony is a matter not for the court but for the Administrative Tribunal. In conclusion, we do not think the courts below were right in overturning the finding of the domestic tribunal."
The Industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner after a gap
of about 10 years for which counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila
Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal
Sharma & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 244. In my considered
opinion, even if the delay is condoned in view of this
judgment, the same does not help the petitioner as he has
been unable to show any patent illegality or perversity in the
order of the Tribunal on the merits of the facts which is the
mandatory requirement for approaching this Court.
It is a settled legal position that while exercising power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of the India this Court
will not enter the domain to re-appreciate the facts and the
evidence led by the parties before the Tribunal or to disturb
the finding of the Tribunal unless the findings given by the
Tribunal are illegal or perverse either based on no evidence
or contrary to the evidence led before the Tribunal or where
any material fact or evidence has been ignored by the
Tribunal. It is also a settled legal position that the Labour
Court or the Tribunals are the final fact finding courts and it is
for both the parties to lead the necessary evidence before the
industrial court to establish and prove their case. It will be
useful to refer to the following observations by the Apex Court
in Management of Madurantakam, Co-operative Sugar Mills
Ltd. Vs. S.Vishwanathan (2005)3 SCC 193:
"12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these type of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High
Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere he has come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court is either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court."
In the facts of the present case counsel for the
petitioner has not advanced any reasons to point out any
patent illegality or perversity in the impugned award passed
by the Tribunal and therefore there is no scope for
interference with the same.
I, therefore, do not find any merit in the present
petition, and the same is hereby dismissed.
January 12, 2009 KAILASH GAMBHIR,J mg
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