Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 971 Del
Judgement Date : 19 February, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 19th February, 2010
+ CRL.APPEAL NO.750/2001
PARMANAND YADAV ..... Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajesh Mahajan, Advocate.
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.M.N.Dudeja, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the
Digest? Yes
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)
1. Vide impugned judgment and order dated
29.8.2001 the appellant has been convicted for the offence of
having murdered Sapna and Sandeep somewhere in the
intervening night of 11th and 12th January 1997.
2. The impugned judgment has not been penned in a
manner in which law mandates a decision pertaining to
circumstantial evidence to be penned. Law requires that in a
case where proof is by means of circumstantial evidence the
Court must list the incriminating circumstances held
established against the accused and thereafter give reasons as
to why the Court concludes that from the circumstances in
question the chain of circumstances is complete wherefrom
the guilt of the accused can be inferred and innocence ruled
out.
3. But, having perused the evidence of the
prosecution in the instant case, it can safely be said that
(though not specifically listed by the learned Trial Judge), the
learned Trial Judge has held against the appellant on account
of proof of the following:-
(A) The suspicious conduct of the appellant in the night
in question when the two children were murdered. The same
being proved through the testimony of Pavitra PW-1, the
mother of the unfortunate child.
(B) The appellant being seen in a nervous condition in
the early hours of the morning of 12th January 1997 at around
4:00 - 4:30 PM.
(C) The appellant pointing out the place where he
committed the crime. (i.e. conduct of pointing out).
(D) Recoveries of a jacket Ex.P-3 and a muffler Ex.P-4
pursuant to the disclosure statement Ex.PW-1/D made by the
appellant after he was apprehended on 12.1.1997; recoveries
being shown in the memo Ex.PW-1/H. The recoveries being
witness by Pavitra and SI Ranjit Singh. The incriminating
content of the recovery is the report Ex.PW-11/B of the
serologist as per which human blood of group 'A' i.e. the same
group as that of deceased Sandeep was detected on the
jacket.
(E) The appellant making a second disclosure
statement Ex.PW-6/B on 13.1.1997 and getting recovered a
chappal Ex.P-1 as recorded in the memo Ex.PW-1/E, a ligature
material (taar) Ex.P-10 recorded in the seizure memo Ex.PW-
1/F as also the counter part of the chappal Ex.P-1 i.e. the
chappal Ex.P-6 entered in the same memo and the recovery of
a knife Ex.P-8 and a stone Ex.P-11 as recorded in the seizure
memo Ex.PW-1/G. The incriminating value of the said
recoveries is the chappals being stated to be that of deceased
Sapna. The stone and the knife being detected with human
blood of group 'AB' i.e. the same blood group as that of
deceased Sapna as per the report Ex.PW-11/B of the
serologist.
4. In addition to the afore-noted incriminating
evidence used (presumably) by the learned Trial Judge,
learned counsel for the State submits that two more pieces of
incriminating evidence are to be found. The first is the false
answers given by the appellant when examined under Section
313 Cr.P.C. The appellant only admitted his casual
acquaintance with Pavitra who was working in the same
factory as he and his denial that he had nothing more to do
with Pavitra. Learned counsel for the State points out that
when Pavitra lodged the missing persons' report Ex.PW-5/A, as
deposed to by HC Naresh Kumar PW-5, the appellant had
accompanied Pavitra. Thus, learned counsel for the State
submits that false answers given by the appellant have to be
treated as a chain supplying the missing links in the
incriminating evidence against the appellant.
5. The other incriminating evidence, urges learned
counsel for the State, is that there is tell-tale evidence of the
appellant having some kind of a physical relationship with
Pavitra and his moving around with Pavitra till the crime was
detected. He absconded at that stage. The act of absconding
is established by the fact that the crime was detected in the
early hours of the morning of 12.1.1997 and the appellant was
apprehended in the evening of 12.1.1997. Learned counsel
submits that the conduct of the appellant of fleeing from
justice shows his guilty mind.
6. The first record of Sandeep and Sapna being not
found by their mother Pavitra, is as entered vide DD No.40-B
on 11.1.1997 at around 10:50 PM in the night when Pavitra
reported at the police station Okhla Industrial Area and
informed that her son Sandeep aged 7 years and her daughter
Sapna aged 11 years were missing since 5:00 PM. As deposed
to by HC Naresh Kumar PW-5, he scribed the said DD entry
Ex.PW-5/A, and at that point of time the appellant was
accompanying Pavitra.
7. The children could not be found till early hours of
the morning of the 12.1.1997, when as claimed by Pavtira PW-
1, she found her children on a wooden platform (takhat) at a
little distance from the jhuggi of one Anand. She thought that
she had found her children who were sleeping but was
shocked to find that the children were dead.
8. The first written document pertaining to dead
bodies of two children being found in the area is as recorded
vide DD No.2-B, Ex.PW-15/D, at 8:22 AM on 12.1.1997 wherein
the duty constable has recorded information at PS Okhla
Industrial Area that the PCR had informed that two dead
bodies have been found at Jhuggi No.B-153, Okhla, Phase-I.
9. SI Ranjit Dhaka PW-6 was handed over copy of DD
No.2-B at 8:22 AM and accompanied by HC Dharamvir and
Const.Satbir he reached jhuggi No.183/31, Mazbur Camp, Part-
I, Okhla Industrial Area and found two dead bodies of a female
and a male namely Sapna and Sandeep. He met Pavitra and
recorded her statement Ex.Pw-1/A. Making endorsement
Ex.PW-6/A beneath Pavitra's statement he dispatched the
rukka for FIR to be registered at around 10:45 AM on
12.1.1997.
10. Since learned counsel for the State heavily relied
upon the contents of Ex.PW-1/A to reflect upon the credibility
of the testimony of Pavitra, we may note that in her statement
Ex.PW-1/A Pavitra has disclosed that during the subsistence of
her first marriage, Sapna aged 12 years, was born to her and
during subsistence of her second marriage, her son Sandeep
aged 7 years was born to her. After her second husband
abandoned her she took up a job in a factory where
Parmanand (appellant) was employed as a security guard. He
started visiting her house. They became close. He desired to
marry her. Her children used to call him 'uncle' and used to
often visit his house. That yesterday evening she returned
from duty at about 6:30 PM and found that her children were
not in the house. She met Parmanand at around 7:00 PM at
the place where a jagran (religious ceremony) was being held.
She asked him as to where her children were. Parmanand told
her that he knew nothing about the children. She told
Parmanand that her children used to go nowhere except with
him. Parmanand insisted that her children had not
accompanied him. She searched for her children in the slum
cluster. Jeet Bahadur, the younger brother of her husband and
Parmanand accompanied her to the police station at 10:50 PM
when she lodged the missing persons' report. After lodging
the report she returned to her jhuggi and cried out of pain and
anguish due to her children being missing. Around 1:00 in the
middle of the night Parmanand volunteered to look for her
children and borrowed a blanket. At around 4:00 AM
Parmanand returned and handed over the blanket to her and
went to sleep in the jhuggi of Anand. She was tense. She
could not sleep and went out of her jhuggi to urinate. On the
way she peeped inside the jhuggi of Anand and saw that
Parmanand was tense and was not sleeping. Proceeding
further ahead she saw her children as if they were sleeping on
the wooden platform. Thinking that she had found her
children, in happiness, she proclaimed said fact to all. She
knocked the door of the jhuggi of Anand. Parmanand came
out. Her children were not moving. At the asking of
Parmanand, she and Parmanand brought the children inside
her jhuggi and at that time she realized that her children had
been murdered. Parmanand told her that he had found the
bodies of her children near a railway line and he had brought
the bodies and kept them at the wooden takhat.
11. After the FIR was registered, further investigation
was taken over by Insp.Rajender Singh PW-17. The bodies of
the two children were sent to the mortuary, where as per the
post-mortem report it was to be found that both were killed
due to strangulation. Asphyxia was the cause of death and
ligature marks were noticed on the neck of both the children.
On Sapna's neck, incised wound with a sharp edged weapon
were also noted.
12. As per Insp.Rajender Singh PW-17 and Pavitra PW-
1, the appellant was arrested around evening time (7:30 PM)
on 12.1.1997 near a bus-stop of Govindpuri and he made a
disclosure statement Ex.PW-1/D pursuant whereto he led the
investigating officer to his jhuggies and got recovered the
jacket Ex.P-3 and the muffler Ex.P-4, incriminating nature
whereof has already been noted by us hereinabove in para
3(D). The next day he made another disclosure statement
Ex.PW-6/B and got recovered a pair of chappals, a knife, a
muffler and a stone. The pair of chappals were got recovered
from two different places i.e. a foot each. The incriminating
nature of the said recoveries has been noted by us herein
above in para 3(E).
13. At the heart of the issue, learned counsel for the
appellant and learned counsel for the State so concede, is the
relevant fact pertaining to the conduct of the appellant, his
nervousness as deposed to by Smt.Pavitra PW-1.
14. We note that the testimony of Smt.Pavitra PW-1 is
in sync with her statement Ex.PW-1/A and for said reason it
has been urged before us by learned counsel for the State that
the credibility of Pavitra is to be gauged with reference to the
fact that when her statement Ex.PW-1/A was made to SI Ranjit
Dhaka, she was in mental pain and anguish. It is difficult to
believe that she had a scheming mind to fabricate lies to
implicate the appellant urges the counsel.
15. With reference to the events of 11.1.1997, as per
claim of Pavitra, after she returned from the police station
after lodging the missing persons' complaint, Pavitra has to
say as follows: (We extract from her deposition in Court):-
"I returned from home after lodging the report and when the children did not arrive till 11 PM I again went to the police station. I told the police that the children had still not returned home and thereafter I again returned home. At 12 midnight or 1 AM the accused asked me for a blanket and told me that he was going to look for the children. I went to the house of Jeet Bahadur and I was lying down when the accused returned at 4 AM and returned the blanket to me. After sometime when I crossed the jhuggi of Anand, I saw the accused lying down in the said jhuggi. He was in a nervous state. I had peeped at him from a peephole in the jhuggi door, as I was passing by from the said jhuggi in order to ease myself."
16. We note that this is exactly what Pavitra has said in
her statement Ex.PW-1/A. But, we find that Jeet Bahadur PW-
2, the brother-in-law of Pavitra to whom Pavitra had also made
a mention of not only in her statement Ex.PW-1/A but even in
her testimony in Court, has deposed as follows:-
"We traced the children of Pavitra namely Sandeep and Sapna till 7 or 8 PM but we could not trace them. In the meantime accused Parmanand today present in Court also reached there and we all three went to PS Okhla Ph.I and lodged report there regarding missing of the children. Police instructed us that we should further trace the children and if we fail to trace them then we should again go to police station. At about 11 PM Pavitra and accused Parmanand again went to Police Station and lodged police report there.
Thereafter Pavitra came to my house and slept there. In the morning hours when Pavitra came out of the house for urinating she saw both her children lying on a khadhak in front of a hotel."
17. A perusal of the testimony of Pavitra shows that she
states that after lodging the complaint at the police station at
11:00 PM about her children being missing she returned to her
house. But, Jeet Bahadur PW-2 states that after lodging
complaint at the police station of her children missing, Pavitra
came to his house and slept there. As per Pavitra, the
appellant came to her house at 12:00 or 1:00 in the midnight
and asked for a blanket telling her that he would be going to
look for children and at that point of time she went to the
house of Jeet Bahadur. It is apparent that there is a variation
in the testimony of Pavitra and Jeet Bahadur.
18. Pavitra states that she was sleeping in the house of
Jeet Bahadur when the appellant returned at 4:00 AM and
handed back the blanket to her. Jeet Bahadur does not depose
any such fact.
19. Assuming that when Pavitra said that after lodging
the complaint at the police station pertaining to her children
she returned home she meant the house of Jeet Bahadur, and
on said account there is no discrepancy in the first part of the
testimony of Pavitra and Jeet Bahadur in that it can be read
that both speak in harmony that Pavitra went to the house of
Jeet Bahadur, the problem which would then arise would be
that the act of the appellant in asking Pavitra to lend him a
blanket at 12:00 midnight or 1:00 AM would be an event in the
house of Jeet Bahadur. Jeet Bahadur has uttered not a word.
20. Looked at from any angle we find a material
variation in the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 as to where
Pavitra was and whether at all the appellant interacted with
Pavitra between 12:00 midnight to 1:00 AM and thereafter at
4:00 AM. The same has a very great bearing on the alleged
conduct of the appellant as per events which took place
between 12:00 midnight or 1:00 midnight as per the version of
Pavitra. The discrepancy is not a trivial discrepancy. It
assumes material proportions for the reason what is in issue is
the conduct of the appellant as sought to be proved by Pavitra.
21. That apart, the claim of Pavitra that at 4:00 AM
when she went out of the jhuggi of Jeet Bahadur to answer the
call of nature, she peeped inside the jhuggi of Anand and saw
the appellant in a nervous condition, is difficult to accept for
the reason, as noted above, we are speaking about the
morning of 12th January 1997. The place is the city of Delhi.
12th January; 4:00 AM. It is pitch dark. We wonder as to how
Pavitra, in complete darkness, by peeping inside the jhuggi,
where darkness would be even more, could see the facial
expression i.e. tension on the face of the appellant. From the
testimony of Pavitra and even her statement Ex.PW-1/A it is
apparent that she and the appellant were having some kind of
a liaison. Her daughter was aged 12 years. Pavitra sensed out
that her daughter was sensing something which the mother
never wanted her daughter to know. She was sensing that
even the appellant was aware that her daughter would be
sensing something more than a platonic relationship between
the two. Obviously, she felt suspicious of the appellant in
having a role to see that her children would not be around.
Thus, there is every probability that motivated by her strong
suspicion, Pavitra has weaved a story to inculpate the
appellant.
22. In view of the discrepancies in the testimony of PW-
1 and PW-2 where PW-2 discredits the version of Pavitra, of the
appellant meeting her in the night and borrowing a blanket
from her and then returned at 4:00 AM to return the blanket it
also becomes doubtful whether at all the appellant told Pavitra
that he found the children next to a railway line and brought
them till the takhat. Finding it difficult to believe that Pavitra
could have seen the tension on the face of the appellant or his
disturbed mind when he was inside the jhuggi of Anand at 4:00
AM on 12.1.1997, we are constrained to return a finding that
there is no incriminating evidence against the appellant with
reference to his being tense or his suspicious conduct or that
he had interacted with Pavitra in the midnight and thereafter
at 4:00 AM as sought to be proved by Pavitra.
23. Before proceeding ahead, we would like to
comment that we are unfortunately noticing that learned
Additional Sessions Judges are shying away from dealing with
evidence which the defence projects as worthy of
consideration for the defence or to discredit the testimony of
the witnesses. This has happened in the instant case as well.
The learned Trial Judge has just not bothered to juxtapose the
version and testimony of Jeet Bahadur PW-2 vis-à-vis what has
been deposed to by Pavitra PW-1 and as noted by us
hereinabove.
24. The role of a Judge at a criminal trial is that of a
neutral umpire. In the journey, where truth has to be
discovered, every sign-post has to be taken note of and only
then the route to be chartered has to be identified and walked
upon.
25. We are thus left with the recoveries pursuant to the
disclosure statement (two) of the appellant. The first made
immediately when he was apprehended on 12.1.1997 in the
evening and the other made on 13.1.1997 and the alleged
conduct of the appellant in pointing out the place of the crime.
26. The recoveries are of ordinary articles. As held in
the decisions reported as JT 2008 (1) SC 191 Mani vs. State of
Tamil Nadu, 1999 Crl.L.J. 265 Deva Singh vs. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 110 Surjit Singh & Anr. vs. State of
Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1753 Narsinhbhai Haribhai Prajapati etc.
vs. Chhatrasinh & Ors. and AIR 1963 SC 1113 Prabhu vs. State
of U.P. recoveries of ordinary articles are weak pieces of
evidence.
27. That apart, as per Pavitra, when she found her
children on the takhat and in happiness proclaimed that she
had found her children, people gathered and she and appellant
took her children inside the jhuggi, it could have happened
that the blood of Sandeep could have stained the jacket Ex.P-3
of the appellant. That apart, nobody has deposed that the
appellant was wearing the jacket. The part of the disclosure
statement of the appellant that he was wearing the jacket
Ex.P-3 when the crime was committed is inadmissible in
evidence and the only part admissible is the recovery of the
jacket pursuant to his disclosure statement. Through
independent evidence the prosecution had to prove that he
was wearing the jacket when the crime was committed. We
hasten to add that the prosecution had attempted to do so by
means of the report of the serologist as per which human
blood of the same group as that of Sandeep was detected on
the jacket. To our mind such a linkage, though is relevant and
admissible, is a weak linkage. Direct linkage would be the
testimony of somebody who would claim that on the day and
around the time in question, he saw the accused wearing the
jacket in question.
28. Pertaining to the recovery of the pair of chappal
Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-6 it would be relevant to note that Pavitra has
identified the same as that of her daughter. But, the recovery
of the same is pursuant to the disclosure statement Ex.PW-6/B
made by the appellant on 13.1.1997 i.e. a day after he had
made the disclosure statement Ex.PW-1/D.
29. Law has always treated with suspicion disclosure
statements which are in part or in piecemeal. Decision of the
Supreme Court reported as 2008 (1) Crimes 191 (SC) Sattatiya
@Satish vs. State of Maharashtra may be referred to. There is
also a possibility of the chappals being planted after picking up
the same from the jhuggi of Pavitra or Pavitra herself handing
over the same to the investigating officer.
30. Though not very relevant, but it may also be noted
that 3 recovery memos have been prepared on 13.1.1997
pursuant to the appellant's disclosure statement Ex.PW-6/B.
The three memos are Ex.PW-1/E, Ex.PW-1/F and Ex.PW-1/G.
We find that Babu Ram PW-3 is shown as a witness to the
recoveries reflected in the seizure memo Ex.PW-1/E and
Ex.PW-1/F but he is not a witness to the recoveries entered in
the memo Ex.PW-1/G although as per the investigating officer
the recoveries entered in the three recovery memos were
made in continuity and in the same sequence of events as
transpired after the statement Ex.PW-6/B was recorded. It is
also relevant to note that while deposing as PW-3, Babu Ram
has not even stated that the appellant was present when the
recoveries were made on 13.1.1997.
31. Pertaining to the evidence that the appellant
pointed out the place where the crime was committed, we
wonder wherefrom said submissions have been made for the
reason we find not a single pointing out memo proved at the
trial recording that the appellant has pointed out the place of
the crime. In fact, there is no evidence led that the crime was
committed at any particular place. The prosecution has
sought to link the place where the chappals Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-6
were recovered as the place where the crime was committed.
32. Pertaining to the plea of false answers, the law is
clear. Each and every false answer in the form of denial or
refusal to state or comment upon some evidence, cannot be
treated as incriminating for the reason the Constitution of India
gives the right of silence to the accused. Only when the case
of the prosecution has reached a level of proof of a fact where
the last step is the personal knowledge of the accused i.e. the
stage when Section 106 of the Evidence Act comes into play,
only in such circumstances can false answers or denial be
treated as the missing link. Decision of the Supreme Court
reported as AIR 1984 SC 1622 Sharad Birdichand Sarda Vs.
State of Maharashtra may be noted in this context as to how
the issue of false answers being incriminating evidence has to
be considered.
33. The appellant has been apprehended on the day
when the crime was detected. His apprehension has been
shown at 7:30 PM. It is doubtful whether it can be said at all
that the appellant absconded. We further note that no such
incriminating circumstance has been put to the appellant when
he was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Thus, assuming
that the appellant absconded, said incriminating evidence has
to be excluded from the chain of incriminating evidence
against the appellant.
34. Thus, the only incriminating evidence, at best,
would be the recoveries attributable to the appellant. As
noted above such recoveries of ordinary articles are weak
evidence and pertaining to circumstantial evidence law
requiring the journey to be terminated at 'should be' and not
'could be' as held in many decisions, the final step from 'could
be' to 'should be', though seems to be small but is a giant step
to be covered by the prosecution, we give the benefit of doubt
to the appellant. We allow the appeal. Impugned judgment
and order dated 29.8.2001 is set aside.
35. The appellant is acquitted of the charge of having
murdered Sandeep and Sapna.
36. Since the appellant is on bail we discharge the bail
bond and surety bonds furnished by the appellant.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE
(SURESH KAIT) JUDGE
February 19, 2010 dkb
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