Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 842 Del
Judgement Date : 15 February, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ OMP No.112/2003
15th February, 2010
M/S. MODERN FOOD INDUSTRIES (INDIA) LTD.
...Petitioner
Through: Mr. Raman Kapur, Advocate.
VERSUS
M/S. SHARDHA POLY PRINT 'N' PACK (P) LTD. ....Respondent.
Through: Mr. Saran Suri, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
% JUDGMENT (ORAL)
VALMIKI J.MEHTA, J
1. This petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 challenges the Award passed by the sole Arbitrator dated 29.11.2002.
The Award decides the disputes between the parties whereby the respondent
had to supply wicketted poly bags to various units of the petitioner. As per the
Award, the petitioner has been held disentitled to the difference of the
contracted price and the price paid by the risk purchase mode and also the fact
OMP 112/2003 Page 1 that shortage in weight benefit could not be given to the petitioner because of
the failure to adhere to 72 hours over time limit under the contract.
2. I may note that the Award deals with two units of the petitioner,
namely, the Madras Unit and the Banglore Unit. However, the two issues
pertaining to both the units are identical and it will therefore suffice if the issues
for both the units are taken together.
3. So far as the entitlement of the petitioner to purchase the contracted
items at the risk and cost of the respondent, the Award in my opinion, is ex facie
perverse. The Award holds that the petitioner is disentitled to the action of the
risk purchase on the ground that the petitioner failed to perform its obligations
of giving the samples of the product which included the art work. The
Arbitrator has held that on account of the repeated samples which were
provided by the petitioner, the time of performance did not remain to be of
essence. Accordingly, the Arbitrator has held the petitioner disentitled to the
action of the risk purchase.
From the detailed correspondence, which is filed before the
Arbitrator and also this Court, Mr. Raman Kapur, counsel for the petitioner, has
argued that it is quite clear that there was no failure on the part of the petitioner
to supply the requisite samples and the failure was in fact on the part of the
respondent herein not only with respect to the art work, but also with respect to
supply as per the specifications issued.
OMP 112/2003 Page 2
4. The first letter by which the petitioner's Madras unit supplied the
samples of the wicketted poly bags to the respondent is the letter dated
22.5.1997. It is not disputed that through this letter, the sample pouches with
respect to 600 gm. sweet bread, 400 gm. sweet bread and 400 gm. Special
sandwich bread were supplied. Thereafter, right from May, 1997 to December,
1997 there was an exchange of correspondence between the parties whereby the
petitioner brought to the notice of the respondent the defaults with respect to the
paper, whether the same pertained to machine performance of the paper,
packing and arrangement of the paper, printing quality being poor, ink going
away from the paper, dullness of the colour and so on. Surely, the petitioner
who was the purchaser, was entitled to insist that the wicketted poly bags which
were supplied by the respondent should be in terms of the specifications under
the contract. Under the contract, the respondent before going into bulk
production had to take necessary approval of the samples from the petitioner. It
is quite clear that where as the delivery had to commence from June, 1997, to
supplies thereafter made every month, by the middle of each month, the first
and only delivery was effected only six months later in December, 1997. If the
respondent was correct in its contention with regard to the paper being up to the
contractual specifications, it is not understood as to how and why no supply of
paper was admittedly made for six months out of the nine months of the period
of supply of the wicketted poly bags paper.
OMP 112/2003 Page 3
5. Mr. Suri, on behalf of the respondent, sought to contend that the
petitioner has time and again sought to change the specifications and did not
approve the samples, and he accordingly, therefore, contended that it was the
petitioner who was guilty of breach of contract. Firstly, the correspondence
does not bear out the fact that respondent performed its part of the contract of
giving the necessary samples as per the specifications for the petitioner to
approve the same. Various defects in the samples supplied by the respondent to
the petitioner, I have already narrated above. Therefore, the contention of Mr.
Suri that the petitioner has unfairly not approved the samples does not stand to
reason. Further, the contention of Mr. Suri that the contract papers should have
been of 365 mm length as per the contract and not of 380 mm length as was
asked for by the respondent by its letter dated 20.11.1997, is an argument not of
much substance because the petitioner immediately on 24.11.1997 clarified and
agreed that the paper can be as per the contractual standard of 365 mm,
however, the petitioner only stated that it was preferable if the pouches which
are supplied are of 380 mm in length. Surely, therefore, it was open to the
respondent to supply paper of 365 mm in length and it cannot be contended by
the respondent that it was entitled to refuse the supply the contractual length of
365 mm merely because a letter suggested the contractual length at 380 mm
which was corrected just within four days of the issue of that letter. The
admitted fact however is that though the requisite contracted paper had to be
supplied every month from June, 1997, the paper was for the first time supplied
OMP 112/2003 Page 4 only in December, 1997. Admittedly, there is no other delivery besides
December, 1997. Further, the petitioner had on account of the repeated monthly
failures of the respondent, taken action for risk purchase and therefore had
informed the respondent vide its letter dated 7.1.1998 that they have enough
paper for December, 1997 and therefore the respondent should not supply any
further paper for December, 1997. This letter, I may note, was written on
7.1.1998 i.e. after 15.12.1997 which is the cut of date for the supply of the paper
for December, 1997.
Mr. Kapur has rightly drawn my attention to the contractual clause
which specified that the production capacity of bread of the units depends on
the supply of the contracted goods and therefore time is of the essence
especially because bread is a quickly perishable item. This clause buttressed
this issue of time being of the essence by specifying that emergency supplies
will have to be effected if and when required on priority basis. All that I need to
add is that bread is indeed a perishable item and it would become stale
ordinarily within 24 to 48 hours and therefore supply of contracted paper, has
necessarily on account of the facts and circumstances of the case, to be within
the stipulated time and in such a case, it cannot be contended that time of
performance is not of the essence.
The finding of the Arbitrator therefore that time of performance is
not the essence of the contract is absolutely and completely perverse not only
because it was the respondent who failed to get the appropriate samples
OMP 112/2003 Page 5 approved before bulk production but also failed to supply paper right till
December, 1997, and hence the petitioner had to purchase paper at the risk and
cost of the respondent.
6. While hearing objections under Section 34, this Court can upset
absolutely perverse and unreasonable findings of an Arbitrator. The findings as
arrived at by the Arbitrator in the present case are totally perverse and which no
reasonable man could have arrived at because the same fails to refer to the
admitted correspondence, which I have referred to above and which clearly
shows that there was default on the part of the respondent and not the petitioner.
In ONGC Vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Ltd., 2007 (13) SCC 434
the Supreme Court has laid down in paragraph 30 of the judgment that there is
no such provision that Courts have to be slow in interfering with the
Arbitrator's Award even if the conclusions are perverse and the very basis of
the Award is wrong. In Security Printing & Minting Corporation of India Ltd.
and Anr. Vs. Gandhi Industrial Corporation, 2007 (13) SCC 236 in paragraph
16 it has been held by the Supreme Court that even though the courts are slow
in interfering with the Award it does not mean that if the Award is perverse the
Courts are powerless to interfere in the matter. In Numaligarh Refinery Vs.
Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd, 2007 (8) SCC 446 in paragraph 17 of the judgment
the Supreme Court has said that where it has been found that the Arbitrator has
acted without jurisdiction and has put an interpretation on a clause of the
agreement which is wholly contrary to law then in that case it cannot be said
OMP 112/2003 Page 6 that there is no provision for the courts to set the things right, even though the
Courts do not ordinarily substitute the interpretation for that of the Arbitrator
and that the finding of the Arbitrator is normally accepted.
7. Mr. Suri, on behalf of the respondent, finally argued that the
amount of risk purchase cost should not be recovered from the respondent
because the petitioner had failed to prove the difference in purchase prices at the
risk and cost of the respondent. Mr. Kapur, on behalf of the petitioner, has
rightly countered this by referring to the Chart at pages 143 and 144 of the
paper book in this Court, and it is also a part of the paper book in the arbitration
proceedings which gives in detail, in different columns, the person from whom
the paper was purchased at risk and cost, the invoice number, the type of paper,
the rate at which it was purchased and also the total amount of the invoice. An
Arbitrator is not bound by the strict rules of the Evidence Act, 1872 with respect
to proof. In the facts of this case, the petitioner, who was at the relevant time a
Government PSU, by giving such a chart can be said to have established and
proved the purchase at risk and cost as per the various invoices. Section 19 of
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 specifically provides that the
provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply to arbitration proceedings. In my
opinion, once this Chart was filed by the petitioner before the Arbitrator, it was
incumbent upon the respondent to deny, specifically, including how and in what
manner the Chart contains incorrect particulars, however, it is a fact on the
arbitration record that this was not done by the respondent. Obviously, this
OMP 112/2003 Page 7 could not have been done by the respondent, because, as stated above, the
petitioner was a Government PSU at that time and there would have been little
doubt that the details given in the Chart therein of the risk purchase from
different persons would not have been incorrect.
8. Accordingly, the action of the Arbitrator in disallowing the
petitioner the risk purchase cost is wholly perverse and I set aside this finding
and entitle the petitioner to recover and hold with it the amount which it has
recovered by adjusting money from the amount due to the respondent.
9. The other issue before the Arbitrator was with respect to the
recoveries made by the petitioner on account of the paper being supplied of a
lesser weight than the contracted weight. The Arbitrator has held this issue
against the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner failed to give notice
within 72 hours of receipt of the paper having lesser weight. In my opinion, this
technical aspect of not giving of a notice by the petitioner to the respondent
within 72 hours is not of any legal or substantive effect, in the facts of the
present case, inasmuch as no loss has been caused to the respondent on account
of the failure of the petitioner to give notice of shortage in weight within 72
hours. In any case, this is an admitted fact that the paper was in fact short in
weight and there is no dispute that paper was short in weight because the only
argument which was addressed was with respect to the non-compliance of the
notice period of 72 hours. Surely, a person is only entitled to payment with
respect to what it supplies. When it supplies by a particular weight and seeks
OMP 112/2003 Page 8 payment for the supply by weight, such person is not entitled to a higher
payment simply on technical grounds of the provision with regard to notice not
being complied with. There are always two types of Clauses in a contract;
mandatory clause and directory clause. Such clauses have also been sometimes
referred to as fundamental clauses and ancillary clauses. In my opinion, the
requirement of notice of 72 hours cannot be said to the fundamental to the
performance of the parties under the contract, where a supplier gets payment of
the material supplied by weight. In such cases, the supplier is entitled to the
payment for the weight of the paper supplied and not anything additional
because the same would otherwise amount to unjust enrichment. In my opinion,
therefore, Award on this ground also is ex facie perverse and is liable to be set
aside.
10. In view of the above, I accept the objection petition and the Award
is set aside and thereby the claims which are made by the respondent before the
Arbitrator stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave
the parties to bear their own costs.
VALMIKI J.MEHTA, J
February 15, 2010
Ne
OMP 112/2003 Page 9
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