Shri Kuldeep Raj Sharma vs General Manager, Canara Bank
2010 Latest Caselaw 744 Del

*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


+                       W.P.(C) No.7383/2009



%                                Judgment delivered on: 09.2.2010


Shri Kuldeep Raj Sharma                ...... Petitioner
                    Through: Ms. Sumedha Sharma, Advocate


                        Versus


General Manager, Canara Bank            ..... Respondent
                    Through: Mr. Naveen R. Nath


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR

1.     Whether the Reporters of local papers may           Yes
       be allowed to see the judgment?

2.     To be referred to Reporter or not?                  Yes

3.     Whether the judgment should be reported              Yes
       in the Digest?


KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (ORAL)

*

1. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

the petitioner seeks to direct the respondents to treat the suspension

period of the petitioner from 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 as period spent on

duty for all intents and purposes and to direct the respondents to grant

the consequential benefits including monetary benefits and to quash

and set aside the impugned order dated 20.7.2002 vide which the

suspension period of the petitioner has been treated as period not spent

on duty and the same shall not be reckoned for any purpose

whatsoever and order dated 28.10.2004 and 16.9.2008 vide which the

representations of the petitioner were rejected by non-speaking order

and without application of mind.

2. Brief facts of the case relevant for deciding the present petition

are that the petitioner was appointed as a cashier in August, 1965 in

Laxmi Commercial Bank, Balimaran, Delhi. Later on Laxmi Commercial

Bank merged into Canara Bank in 1988. The petitioner has two sons

named Pradeep Sharma and Manish Sharma. His second son Manish

Sharma married one Anita Sharma in the year 2000, but she died on

1.8.2000 and a case FIR No. 1643/2000 under Sections 498A/304B,

302/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was

registered against all the family members of the petitioner. After the

incident, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Dy. General

Manager Canara Bank vide its officer order No.DC/DAL/700/2000 dated

5.8.2000. The petitioner and his wife were granted bail by Session

Court of Ghaziabad (U.P.) on 30.09.2000. Consequently the suspension

order of the petitioner was revoked by respondent No. 2 vide officer

Order No. DC/DAC/1173/2002 dated 20.7.2002 but his suspension

period was treated as period "not spent on duty" and it was further

ordered that the same shall not be reckoned for any purpose

whatsoever. The learned Session Court finally acquitted the petitioner

as well as his family members from the charges vide order dated

19.1.2004. The petitioner made a representation against the order

dated 20.7.2002 for treating his suspension period as spent on duty for

all purposes and intents. The representation of the petitioner was

rejected, hence the present writ petition.

3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was

placed under suspension as he was arrested in a criminal case

registered under Sections 498A, 304B, 302/34 IPC and under Section

3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Counsel further submitted that the

petitioner was granted interim bail vide orders dated 30th September,

2000 by the Session Court of Ghaziabad and thereafter his suspension

order was revoked by the respondent vide order dated 20th July, 2002

and he was restored back in his service. Counsel further submitted that

the petitioner was honourably acquitted by the Court vide orders dated

19.1.2004. With the said acquittal, which has attained finality, the

petitioner is entitled to claim the difference of the salary amount for the

suspension period w.e.f. 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 and for treating the

said period as spent by the petitioner on duty for all intents and

purposes. Cousnel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is

entitled to the said full salary for the said suspension period under Rule

15 of Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976. In

support of her arguments counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on

the judgment of the Apex Court in General Manager, UCO Bank and

Anr. vs M. Venuranganath AIR 2008SC 732 .

4. Refuting the said submissions of counsel for the petitioner,

counsel for the respondent on the other hand, resisted the claim of the

petitioner submitting that the petitioner has not been honourably

acquitted from the charges leveled against him which were very

serious in nature. Inviting the attention of this Court to the operative

para of the judgment, the counsel pointed out that it was because of

the failure of the prosecution that the petitioner could succeed in the

case and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be considered to be

honourably acquitted. Placing reliance on sub-Clause (b) Clause 3 of

Rule 15 of the Canara Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations

1976, the counsel submitted that the period of absence from duty

cannot be treated as a period spent on duty unless a decision is taken

by the competent authority to specifically record reasons for treating

such continuous period as spent on duty. Counsel for the respondent

further submitted that if such a prayer of the petitioner is allowed then

it will set a wrong precedent in the administration of bank to grant such

similar relief to many other employees facing prosecution under the

penal statutes and for other serious offences.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length.

6. The petitioner was placed under suspension under Rule 12 of the

Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976 as he was

found involved in a criminal offence registered against him under

Sections 498A, 304B, 302/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry

Prohibition Act. The said suspension of the petitioner was revoked by

the respondent bank when the petitioner was granted bail by the

Sessions Court, Ghaziabad and it is not in dispute that thereafter the

petitioner remained in service and ultimately superannuated in

December, 2004. It is not in dispute that vide orders dated 19.1.2004

the petitioner has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Court and the

said order has already attained finality. Perusal of the said order clearly

shows that the learned Session Court made an observation that the

petitioner remained on duty in the bank from morning till 5.30 in the

evening on 1st August, 2000 and, therefore, in such a situation it was

held that presence of the petitioner at the site at 5 O'clock does not

arise. It was a categorical finding given by the learned Session Court

that the petitioner was not present on the spot and his role in killing the

deceased by burning her does not arise. In view of such observation

made by the learned Session Court, I do not find any merit in the

submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that it was

not a case where the petitioner was not honourably acquitted.

7. A bare perusal of the order of the competent authority dated

28.10.2004 would show that no reasons have been given as to why the

request of the petitioner for treating the period of suspension as period

spent on duty was not acceded to. The said non-reasoned order

smacks of arbitrariness besides being passed without application of

mind. The competent authority while exercising its powers under the

Canara Bank Rules & Regulations could not winnow black from white

and see that the petitioner was honorably acquitted by the court and

should not be made to suffer unnecessary consequences. Taking into

consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in General Manager,

UCO Bank and Another (Supra) and the aforesaid position,I am of the

considered view that the impugned orders dated 20.7.2002 and

28.10.2004 are liable to be set aside.

8. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is entitled to the

difference of salary for the period 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 and that the

said period shall be treated as the period "spent on duty" by the

petitioner for all intents and purposes.

9. The present petition is allowed in terms of the above directions.

FEBRUARY 09, 2010                          KAILASH GAMBHIR,J
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