Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 568 Del
Judgement Date : 2 February, 2010
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI
+ FAO (OS) No. 625 of 2009
Judgment reserved on: December 18, 2009
% Judgment delivered on: February 2, 2010
Dabur India Ltd.
8/3, Asaf Ali Road
New Delhi -110002. ...Appellant
Through: Mr. Sudhir Chandra, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Hemant Singh & Ms. Mamta
R. Jha and Mr. Sumit Rajput,
Advocates.
Versus
1. M/s Colortek Meghalaya Pvt. Ltd.
15th Mile, G.S. Road, Byrnihat
District Ri-bhoi
Meghalaya 793101.
2. M/s Godrej Sara - Lee
Pirjoshanagar
Eastern Express Highway
Vikhroli (E)
Mumbai 400079. ...Respondents
Through: Mr. Ashok Desai, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Rajiv Tyagi, Advocate.
Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
FAO (OS) No.625/2009 Page 1 of 15
MADAN B. LOKUR, J.
The Appellant manufactures and markets, among other
things, a mosquito repellant cream under its brand name Odomos and
Odomos Naturals. The Respondents also manufacture a mosquito
repellant cream, but under the brand name Good Knight Naturals.
2. The Respondents telecast their advertisement/commercial of
Good Knight Naturals mosquito repellant cream and according to the
Appellant, the advertisement/commercial disparages its product.
3. The question that arises before us is this: Does the
commercial telecast by the Respondents disparage the product of the
Appellant and if so, whether the Appellant is entitled to an injunction
against the telecast. In our opinion, the answer to the first question is in
the negative. Consequently, the second question does not arise. To this
extent, we confirm the view taken by a learned Single Judge in the
impugned order.
4. The commercial in question is in Hindi but for convenience,
the story board is reproduced below in Hindi (as it appears) and its
translation in English.
5. The submission of the Appellant is that its product Odomos
is an extremely popular mosquito repellant cream and it enjoys over
80% of the market share all over the country and in some parts of the
country it enjoys a 100% market share. The sales of the Appellant's
product run into crores of rupees and the advertisement and promotion
expenses also run into crores of rupees.
6. It is averred that the commercial of the Respondents' product
was telecast on a news channel on 8th October, 2009. We are told that it
has appeared on several occasions thereafter. According to the
Appellant, the commercial disparages its product and, therefore, the
Respondent should be injuncted from further telecasting it. It is
submitted that even though there is no direct or overt reference to the
Appellant's product, since the Appellant's product enjoys a huge market
share, the commercial is obviously targeting it. Serious objection was
taken to the suggestion in the commercial that the Appellant's product
causes rashes, allergy and is sticky.
7. On these broad facts and submissions, the Appellant
preferred CS (OS) No. 2029/2009 along with an application for
injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
being IA No.13875/2009.
8. A learned Single Judge heard the injunction application and
by the impugned order dated 4th December, 2009 expressed the view
that the commercial does not fall within the tort of "malicious
falsehood" and that it was not directed against the Appellant. The
learned Single Judge, therefore, rejected the application for injunction
and that is how the Appellant is now before us.
9. At the outset, we may state that there is a reference made by
the learned Single Judge to the use of Citronella in the product of the
parties and there was some debate before us whether "oil of Citronella"
is harmful to the human skin or not. In our opinion, there is absolutely
no need to get into this controversy because the commercial does not
even remotely suggest anything about the use or otherwise of "oil of
Citronella". If we jump into this controversy, we would really be
diverting our focus from the main issue in this case.
10. In Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 139
(paragraph 25) the Supreme Court held that "commercial speech" is a
part of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, what is "commercial speech" was
not defined or explained. In fact, it does not appear to be possible to
clearly define or explain "commercial speech" and, in any event, for the
purposes of this case it is not necessary for us to do so. The reason for
this is that the Supreme Court has said in Tata Press Ltd. (paragraph 23
of the Report) that advertising as a "commercial speech" has two facets
thereby postulating that an advertisement is a species of commercial
speech. The Supreme Court further said as follows:-
"23. ....Advertising which is no more than a commercial transaction is nonetheless dissemination of information regarding the product advertised. Public at large is benefited by the information made available through the advertisement. In a democratic economy free flow of commercial information is indispensable. There cannot be honest and economical marketing by the public at large without being educated by the information disseminated through advertisements. The economic system in a democracy would be handicapped without there being freedom of "commercial speech"....."
11. Earlier, the Supreme Court referred to Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., (1975) 421
US 748 and observed in paragraph 15 that it is almost settled law in the
United States that though "commercial speech" is entitled to the First
Amendment protection, the Government was completely free to recall
"commercial speech" which is false, misleading, unfair, deceptive and
which proposes illegal transactions.
12. In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.,
(1999) 7 SCC 1, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 36 of the
Report that a distinction would always have to be made and latitude
given for an advertisement to gain a purchaser or two. This latitude
cannot and does not mean any permission for misrepresentation but only
a description of permissible assertion. In this context, reliance was
placed by the Supreme Court on Anson's Law of Contract (27th Edn.)
which says that commendatory expressions are not dealt with as serious
representations of fact. The view remains the same in the 28th Edition
(page 239). "A similar latitude is allowed to a person who wants to gain
a purchaser, though it must be admitted that the borderline of
permissible assertion is not always easily discernible."
13. The Supreme Court recognized and applied in Colgate
Palmolive (India) Ltd. the rule of civil law, "simplex commendatio non
obligat" - simple commendation can only be regarded as a mere
invitation to a customer without any obligation as regards the quality of
goods. It was observed that every seller would naturally try and affirm
that his wares are good enough to be purchased (if not better than those
of a rival).
14. On the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the
guiding principles for us should be the following:-
(i) An advertisement is commercial speech and is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
(ii) An advertisement must not be false, misleading, unfair or deceptive.
(iii) Of course, there would be some grey areas but these need not necessarily be taken as serious representations of fact but only as glorifying one's product.
To this extent, in our opinion, the protection of Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution is available. However, if an advertisement extends beyond
the grey areas and becomes a false, misleading, unfair or deceptive
advertisement, it would certainly not have the benefit of any protection.
15. There is one other decision that we think would give some
guidance and that is Pepsi Co. Inc. & Ors. v. Hindustan Coca Cola Ltd.
& Another, 2003 (27) PTC 305 (Del.) (DB). In this decision, a Division
Bench of this Court held that while boasting about one's product is
permissible, disparaging a rival product is not. The fourth guiding
principle for us, therefore, is: (iv) While glorifying its product, an
advertiser may not denigrate or disparage a rival product. Similarly, in
Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition Reissue, Volume 28) it
is stated in paragraph 278 that "[It] is actionable when the words go
beyond a mere puff and constitute untrue statements of fact about a
rival's product." This view was followed, amongst others, in Dabur
India Ltd. v. Wipro Limited, Bangalore, 2006 (32) PTC 677 (Del). "[It]
is one thing to say that the defendant's product is better than that of the
plaintiff and it is another thing to say that the plaintiff's product is
inferior to that of the defendant."
16. In Pepsi Co. it was also held that certain factors have to be
kept in mind while deciding the question of disparagement. These
factors are: (i) Intent of the commercial, (ii) Manner of the commercial,
and (iii) Story line of the commercial and the message sought to be
conveyed. While we generally agree with these factors, we would like
to amplify or restate them in the following terms:-
(1) The intent of the advertisement - this can be understood from its story line and the message sought to be conveyed.
(2) The overall effect of the advertisement - does it promote the advertiser's product or does it disparage or denigrate a rival product?
In this context it must be kept in mind that while promoting its product,
the advertiser may, while comparing it with a rival or a competing
product, make an unfavourable comparison but that might not
necessarily affect the story line and message of the advertised product or
have that as its overall effect.
(3) The manner of advertising - is the comparison by and large truthful or does it falsely denigrate or disparage a rival product? While truthful disparagement is permissible, untruthful disparagement is not permissible.
17. In our opinion, it is also important to keep in mind the
medium of the advertisement. An advertisement in the electronic media
would have a far greater impact than an advertisement in the print
media. In D.N. Prasad v. Principal Secretary, 2005 Cri LJ 1901 the
Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that a telecast reaches persons of
all categories, irrespective of age, literacy and their capacity to
understand or withstand. The Court noted that the impact of a telecast
on the society is phenomenal. Similarly, it was observed in Pepsi Co.
that a vast majority of viewers of commercial advertisements on the
electronic media are influenced by visual advertisements "as these have
a far reaching influence on the psyche of the people ..." Therefore, an
advertiser has to virtually walk on a tight rope while telecasting a
commercial and repeatedly ask himself the questions: Can the
commercial be understood to mean a denigration of the rival product or
not? What impact would the commercial have on the mind of a viewer?
No clear-cut answer can be given to these questions and it is for this
reason that this Court has taken a view that each case has to be decided
on its own facts. (See Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd. v. Cavinkare Pvt.
Ltd., ILR (2007) II Delhi 368, paragraph 17). Consequently, this Court
has been called upon to decide the same issue time and time again
resulting in the same and very large number of decisions being cited.
18. On balance, and by way of a conclusion, we feel that
notwithstanding the impact that a telecast may have, since commercial
speech is protected and an advertisement is commercial speech, an
advertiser must be given enough room to play around in (the grey areas)
in the advertisement brought out by it. A plaintiff (such as the
Appellant before us) ought not to be hyper-sensitive as brought out in
Dabur India. This is because market forces, the economic climate, the
nature and quality of a product would ultimately be the deciding factors
for a consumer to make a choice. It is possible that aggressive or catchy
advertising may cause a partial or temporary damage to the plaintiff, but
ultimately the consumer would be the final adjudicator to decide what is
best for him or her.
19. Having said this, we are of the opinion after having gone
through the commercial not only in its text (as reproduced above) but
also having watched it on a DVD that there is absolutely nothing to
suggest that the product of the Appellant is targeted either overtly or
covertly. There is also nothing to suggest that the commercial
denigrates or disparages the Appellant's product either overtly or
covertly. There is also no hint whatsoever of any malice involved in the
commercial in respect of the Appellant's product - indeed, there is no
requirement of showing malice.
20. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted before us that
since his client has over 80% of the market share in the country and a
100% market share in some States, the obvious target of the commercial
is the product of the Appellant. In our opinion, this argument cannot be
accepted. The sub-text of this argument is an intention to create a
monopoly in the market or to entrench a monopoly that the Appellant
claims it already has. If this argument were to be accepted, then no
other mosquito repellant cream manufacturer would be able to advertise
its product, because in doing so, it would necessarily mean that the
Appellant's product is being targeted. All that we are required to
ascertain is whether the commercial denigrates the Appellant's product
or not. There is nothing in the commercial to suggest a negative content
or that there is a disparagement of the Appellant's product. The
commercial merely gives the virtues of the product of the Respondents,
namely, that it has certain ingredients which perhaps no other mosquito
repellant cream has, such as tulsi, lavender and milk protein. While
comparing its product with any other product, any advertiser would
naturally highlight its positive points but this cannot be negatively
construed to mean that there is a disparagement of a rival product. That
being so, whether the Appellant's product is targeted or not becomes
irrelevant.
21. Learned counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the
use of expressions such as an apprehension of getting rashes and allergy
or an allegation that other creams cause stickiness amounts to
disparagement of the Appellant's product. We cannot agree with the
submission of learned counsel. There is no suggestion that any other
mosquito repellant cream causes rashes or allergy or is sticky. All that it
is suggested is that if a mosquito repellant cream is applied on the skin
(which could be any mosquito repellant cream) there may be an
apprehension of rashes and allergy. Generally speaking, this may be
possible depending on upon the quality of the cream, the sensitivity of
the skin of the consumer and the frequency of use etc. - we cannot say
one way or the other. The commercial does not suggest that any
particular mosquito repellant cream or all mosquito repellant creams
cause rashes and allergy. In fact, the Respondents are also trying to
promote a mosquito repellant cream and it can hardly be conceived that
all mosquito repellant creams (which would naturally include the
Respondents' product) cause rashes or allergy. All that the Respondent's
are suggesting is that since their product contains tulsi, lavender and
milk protein such apprehensions are greatly reduced or that they should
not reasonably exist.
22. With regard to stickiness, this is entirely a matter of opinion.
What one person may perceive as stickiness, may not be considered as
stickiness by another. No injunction can be granted in a case such as the
present on an averment based on a perception. As mentioned above, a
plaintiff should not be hyper-sensitive. So far as this case is concerned,
we are left with an impression that the Appellant is being hyper-
sensitive. It does appear that the entry of another product in the market
may challenge the monopoly or the near monopoly of the Appellant and
this Court is being used to ward off that challenge through the injunctive
process.
23. Finally, we may mention that Reckitt & Colman of India
Ltd. v. M.P. Ramchandran and Anr., 1999 (19) PTC 741 was referred
to for the following propositions relating to comparative advertising:
(a) A tradesman is entitled to declare his goods to be best in the world, even though the declaration is untrue.
(b) He can also say that his goods are better than his competitors', even though such statement is untrue.
(c) For the purpose of saying that his goods are the best in the world or his goods are better than his competitors' he can even compare the advantages of his goods over the goods of others.
(d) He however, cannot, while saying that his goods are better than his competitors', say that his competitors' goods are bad. If he says so, he really slanders the goods of his competitors. In other words, he defames his competitors and their goods, which is not permissible.
(e) If there is no defamation to the goods or to the manufacturer of such goods no action lies, but if there is such defamation an action lies and if an action lies for recovery of damages for defamation, then the Court is also competent to grant an order of injunction restraining repetition of such defamation.
These propositions have been accepted by learned Single Judges of this
Court in several cases, but in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Tata Press that false, misleading, unfair or deceptive
advertising is not protected commercial speech, we are of the opinion
that propositions (a) and (b) above and the first part of proposition (c)
are not good law. While hyped-up advertising may be permissible, it
cannot transgress the grey areas of permissible assertion, and if does so,
the advertiser must have some reasonable factual basis for the assertion
made. It is not possible, therefore, for anybody to make an off-the-cuff
or unsubstantiated claim that his goods are the best in the world or
falsely state that his goods are better than that of a rival.
24. Having considered all the facts of the case, we are of the
opinion that there is no merit in this appeal. There is no occasion to
interfere with the impugned order of the learned Single Judge.
25. The appeal is dismissed.
MADAN B. LOKUR, J
February 2, 2010 MUKTA GUPTA, J
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