Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 5741 Del
Judgement Date : 16 December, 2010
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16th December, 2010.
+ W.P.(C) No.2540/2010
% HARPAL SINGH DHINGRA ..... PETITIONER
Through: Mr. H.S. Phoolka, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Sharat Kapoor & Ms. Prabhsahay
Kaur, Advocates.
Versus
PUNJAB TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY & ORS..RESPONDENTS
Through: Mr. Harish Malhotra, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Amrit Paul & Mr. Sandeep
Sharma, Advocates for R-1 to 5.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? NO
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported NO
in the Digest?
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The petitioner, appointed as an authorized Study Centre of the
respondent University under its Distance Education Programme for
conducting various Information Technology (IT) courses of the University
has filed this writ petition impugning the order dated 10 th February, 2010 of
the University holding that the term of the authorization letters earlier issued
to the petitioner and of the contract with the petitioner had already expired
and also terminating the authorization/contract with the petitioner for the
reason of the petitioner having indulged in activities detrimental to the
academic pursuits of a State Technical University and for the reason of the
Centre of the petitioner being a teaching shop for commercial gains and
bringing bad name to the University. The petition seeks restoration of the
status of the petitioner as the authorized center of the University and
direction to the University to refund/remit certain amounts, TDS Certificates
etc. to the petitioner.
2. The petitioner had earlier preferred W.P.(C) No.7327/2008 impugning
the order dated 3rd July, 2008 of the University suspending the petitioner's
Centre. During the pendency of that petition a cancellation order dated 24 th
October, 2008 was also served on the petitioner. The said writ petition was
dismissed vide order dated 24th October, 2008. The petitioner preferred an
Intra Court Appeal being LPA No.126/2009 which was disposed of vide
consent order dated 4th May, 2009 whereunder the University agreed to
withdraw the cancellation order dated 24th October, 2008 then issued to the
petitioner without issuing any show cause notice and to issue show cause
notice and to grant hearing to the petitioner before passing any fresh order.
However the orders suspending the Centre of the petitioner was allowed to
continue and it was further directed that the petitioner shall neither advertise
nor issue any Brochure or otherwise put up any signboard of the University.
3. Thereafter the University issued a show cause notice and gave hearing
to the petitioner and has thereafter passed a detailed order running into 14
pages cancelling the contract with the petitioner.
4. Aggrieved therefrom the present writ petition was filed. Notice
thereof was issued. A common counter affidavit has been filed by the
University and the other respondents and rejoinder whereof has been filed
by the petitioner.
5. Since the order impugned in this writ petition also recorded that the
term for which the petitioner was authorized to run the Study Centre of the
University had already expired, it was at the outset enquired as to in which
document was the said term prescribed. The senior counsel for the
respondents in this regard has drawn attention to a Certificate of
Authorization issued to the petitioner wherein the authorization of the
petitioner is shown to be from June, 2001 to May, 2006. Else, none of the
other documents filed show any such term. The senior counsel for the
petitioner has also contended that the calendar of the University also does
not provide for authorization for a certain period. It is further contended that
since the petitioner continued to be the authorized centre even after the year
2006, the term mentioned in the certificate is irrelevant and what has to be
seen by this Court is as to whether the reasons on which the cancellation has
been effected are made out or not.
6. In my view, the term mentioned in the certificate of authorization is
relevant. It shows that the parties knew that the authorization was for a
certain time only. The contract between the petitioner and the University is
of a nature which ordinarily is not specifically enforced. The same requires
work of a personal nature and involving minor details which cannot be
supervised by the Courts. It is also not as if the petitioner was entitled to
continue after 2006. The senior counsel for the petitioner admitted that a
suspension order was issued in 2006 also but was subsequently withdrawn
because the person who had issued the said order was not found to be having
a proper authorization to so act. Even if the suspension effected in the year
2006 suffered from technical flaws, the same nevertheless is also indicative
of the authorization of the petitioner being for a fixed period expiring in the
year 2006 and whereupon steps were taken to end the relationship with the
petitioner. The relationship between the parties being contractual,
irrespective of whether the grounds for cancellation existed or not, the
petitioner after the expiry of contractual period, has no right to continue as
the authorization centre of the University.
7. The gravamen of the case of the petitioner is that the action against
him is motivated and mala fide. It is contended that the University for its
Distance Learning Programme constitutes a Regional Learning Facilitating
Centre (RLFC) and there was one such RLFC in Delhi also. It is stated that
all was well till the year 2006 and neither the University nor its RLFC had
any grievance whatsoever against the petitioner. It is urged that thereafter
one Mr. Rajan Chopra (respondent no.3) took over the charge as Director,
RLFC at Delhi and realizing the commercial potential, in collusion with the
other officials of the University (impleaded as respondents no.4 & 5) set up
his own authorized centers of the University for the same courses for which
the petitioner was authorized and within the vicinity of the centre of the
petitioner; that however the said new centers were not able to compete with
the petitioner and said Mr. Rajan Chopra with a view to eliminate
competition from the petitioner devised the scheme for having the
authorization of the petitioner cancelled.
8. The petitioner in this writ petition has made detailed averments in this
regard. The respondents as aforesaid have filed a common affidavit and are
represented by the same Advocate. Taking a cue therefrom, the senior
counsel for the petitioner contended that collusion is evident from the
University joining hands with Mr. Rajan Chopra (respondent no.3) against
whom allegations of bias and mala fide have been made. It is urged that the
same shows that the suspension order, show cause notice as well as the final
order have been coloured by said Mr. Rajan Chopra to encourage his own
commercial interest to the detriment of the petitioner who has in the last
several years given the University a boost and a good name in Delhi.
9. As aforesaid, the cancellation order is voluminous and full of details.
It was enquired from the senior counsel for the petitioner as to how this
Court in writ jurisdiction can go into the facts. The senior counsel for the
petitioner relies on ABL International Ltd. Vs. Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553 laying down that in a writ
petition also if the facts require consideration of the evidence, it can be taken
and merely because disputed questions of fact arise, is no ground for
dismissing the writ petition. There can be no dispute with the said
proposition. However in the same judgment also, it has been laid down that
in such circumstances, writ "will not normally be entertained". Neither has
the senior counsel for the petitioner been able to satisfy nor have I been able
to fathom from the file as to why an exception should be made out in the
present case.
10. This Court is not to sit in appeal over the findings of the University
against the petitioner and forming the basis of the cancellation of
authorization of the petitioner. The scope of writ jurisdiction is limited.
The Supreme Court recently in Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa (2007)
14 SCC 517 held that the power of judicial review will not be permitted to
be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or to
decide contractual disputes. It was also held that a writ petition in
contractual matters would be only if there is an element of public interest in
the litigation. The senior counsel for the petitioner however relying on
Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd Vs. Girja Shankar Pant (2001) 1 SCC
182 has contended that the writ would lie because bias is clearly made out in
the present case. However I am of the opinion that to arrive at unassailable
conclusion of bias is distinct from mere apprehension of bias; one will have
to first return a finding of fact and which exercise ought not to be ordinarily
done here. The petitioner has a remedy of a suit or arbitration as the case
may be available to him and I fail to see why an exception should be made.
It was held in DD Suri Vs. A.K. Barren (1970) 3 SCC 313 that even where
substance in allegation of mala fide is found, the proper course in a given
case may still be to seek relief by way of a suit if several disputed questions
of fact are required to be adjudicated.
11. The arguments of bias as are being raised here were raised by the
petitioner in response to the show cause notice and in the hearing given by
the University also. Notwithstanding the same, the Dean of the University,
the highest authority in the University has found the petitioner guilty.
Rather, strong words have been used in the order, of the continuation of the
petitioner as an authorized centre being detrimental to the academic pursuits
of a State Technical University; the petitioner having brought a bad name
and having become teaching shop for commercial gains by ignoring the
interest of students' community; the petitioner having not performed the role
as expected of a Centre of learning and having not protected the integrity in
education system.
12. The question which arises is, can this Court on its own assessment
thrust a Distance Learning Centre on the University which it does not want.
The welfare of the students of such a Distance Learning Centre requires
constant interface between such Centre and the University. Unless there is
feeling of bon homie and well being between such Center and the
University, the welfare of the students is likely to suffer and which ought to
be the primary concern of this Court. The private rights of the petitioner
even if any affected ought to give way to the public good. Even if there
were to be merits in the contention of the petitioner that after the petitioner
has popularized and created a demand for the courses of the University in
Delhi, he has been summarily removed to give benefit thereof to another, the
petitioner on proving such case can always seek compensation from the
University.
13. The senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that the mala fides
of the University are apparent from, i) fresh allegations being included after
the earlier order of cancellation was set aside by the Division Bench as
aforesaid, ii) the impugned order not dealing with the reply of the petitioner
to the show cause notice; iii) only few students being subject matter of show
cause notice and who had also passed out in the year 2006 and 2008, iv)
contradictory allegations in the complaints of the said students; v) the earlier
complaints against the petitioner being given a complete go by; vi) all the
complaints of the students referred to, being not supplied to the petitioner;
viii) the study centre of Mr. Rajan Chopra having the same flaws/defects as
imputed to the petitioner; viii) grievances of the students being attributable
to the University itself.
14. I have recorded the grievance urged only to show that the nature
thereof is factual. I do not deem it appropriate to deal with the said pleas as
the same may prejudice the case of the parties before the fora competent to
adjudicate the same. Suffice it is to state that from the material on record, I
am unable to gather any breach of procedure for making the order or any
perversity on which ground alone, interference would be called for.
15. The academicians cannot be expected to write orders as lawyers and
judges. Thus the argument of the order not dealing with each and every plea
in reply to the show cause notice has to be seen in the said light.
16. Else, petitioner inspite of repeated enquires has failed to show any
right to continue. The only answer which has come is that since the
respondent University is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, it ought to act fairly and ought not to terminate its
contracts for oblique reasons. However, the relationship between the parties
was purely contractual and once the contract term has expired and after
complying with principles of natural justice the contract has been
terminated, this petition would not lie.
17. The senior counsel for the respondents has contended that the decision
of cancellation was taken upon finding that the petitioner had not been
following the norms of the University; it is contended that the petitioner has
increased the strength of centre from 1100 to 16000; that the petitioner in
violation of the University's norms was having as many as 132 students in a
class and it is virtually impossible to teach so many students in a class; it is
controverted that the complaints of the students relied on in the order were
not given to the petitioner; from the pleadings, it is shown that the pleading
is not of the same having not been given earlier but of having not been given
at the time of the show cause notice; no grievance in this regard were made
in the earlier writ petition or before the Division Bench. It is further
contended that the Institute of the petitioner was found without any lab for
Hotel Management and Bio Technology courses, having one lecturer for
Hotel Management course and lecturers for B.Sc. and M.Sc. Bio
Technology and other non-IT courses; that the petitioner also has admitted,
having collected fee from some of the students which was not submitted to
the University, amounting to misappropriation of University funds and
cheating the students; it is contended that the explanation of the petitioner of
taking Hotel Management students to the Hotels was not in consonance with
the norms of the University.
18. The writ petition is thus held not maintainable for the reason of
entailing disputed questions of fact and is dismissed with liberty to the
petitioner to approach the appropriate fora where such disputed questions of
fact can be adjudicated. No order as to costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) 16th December, 2010 bs
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