Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 5715 Del
Judgement Date : 15 December, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ BAIL APPLICATION NO. 1858/2010
Reserved on : 14.12.2010
Decided on : 15.12.2010
IN THE MATTER OF :
HARPAL SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Sidharth Luthra, Sr.Advocate
with Mr.Pawanjit Singh Bindra and
Mr.Ashish Dixit, Advocates
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through : Mr. Navin Sharma, APP
with Inspector Dharamvir Singh, PS SP Badli
CORAM
* HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may No
be allowed to see the Judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be No
reported in the Digest?
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under Section 438
Cr.PC for grant of anticipatory bail in FIR No.815/2006 lodged under Section
302 IPC registered with PS SP Badli.
2. The basis of the FIR is DD 24-A which was registered on
26.9.2006, at PS SP Badli recording that a murder had taken placed near
Haryana Glass House, Swarup Nagar. The said DD was handed over to the
IO who reached the spot and found there, a dead body of a sikh gentleman,
later on identified as Parminder Singh. The said body bore deep injuries on
it and nearby lay one pistol in a cocked position, three live cartridges and
one iron hammer. The informant, one Sh.Gurdeep Singh was present at the
site. He confessed his crime before the police and stated that he had a
quarrel with the deceased, Parminder Singh and during the quarrel he gave
a number of blows on his face and head which resulted in his death. After
the aforesaid FIR was lodged, investigation was started. In the course of the
investigation, it was revealed that on 8.7.2006, the wife of the accused,
Smt.Parvinder Kaur had left with her children for Punjab on 8.7.2006 and did
not return. She was constantly in touch with the deceased on mobile phone
and personally. Investigations further revealed that the accused was last
seen with the deceased and the call details of four mobile phones of both
accused and the deceased corroborated the same.
3. The charge sheet mentioned that during the course of
investigation, it was revealed that the deceased had got a GPA from
Smt.Gurdial Kaur and her family to fight the case against her brother, Baba
Gurdial Singh(father of the petitioner), with regard to his purported illegal
possession of her share of property from out of the estate of her deceased
brother, Sant Gurmail Singh relating to Gurudwara Hargobindsar, GT Karnal
Road, Delhi. It was found that the accused was actively helping the
deceased who filed several complaints in various police stations on behalf of
Smt.Gurdial Kaur against Baba Gurdial Singh, father of the petitioner herein,
and got one criminal case registered against him at PS Adarsh Nagar being
FIR No.488/2006. After the investigations were completed, a charge sheet
was filed on 4.1.2007. Thereafter, the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses were being recorded. During the pendency of the aforesaid
proceedings, in May 2010, the prosecution filed an application under Section
319 Cr.PC requesting the trial court to proceed against the petitioner and his
father on the basis of the deposition of Parvinder Kaur, wife of the
accused(PW-17) that had come on record. Vide order dated 30.9.2010, the
aforesaid application was allowed and the petitioner and his father were
summoned under Sections 302/120B IPC. Thereafter, an application filed by
them for exemption from personal appearance was dismissed vide order
dated 23.10.2010 and non-bailable warrants were issued against them. It
may be noted that the petitioner and his father have sought quashing of the
aforesaid orders in Crl.M.C. No.3743/2010, on which notice was issued vide
order dated 2.12.2010. Prior to filing the present petition, the petitioner
approached the Sessions Court for grant of anticipatory bail, which was
rejected vide order dated 16.11.2010. Hence the present petition for grant
of anticipatory bail.
4. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been
falsely implicated in the present case solely on the basis of the testimony of
the wife of the accused, Smt.Parvinder Kaur(PW-17), which is patently false
and unreliable. He submitted that the deceased was the former driver of the
petitioner's father and used to live in Gurudwara Hargobindsar earlier, but
had left the same in the year 2004. He further stated that Smt.Parvinder
Kaur also worked with the father of the petitioner in the said Gurudwara as
a sewadar upto the year 2004, but thereafter, neither she nor the deceased
came to the said Gurudwara. It is the case of the petitioner that
Smt.Parvinder Kaur was estranged from her husband and while all the three
were living under the same roof, she had developed intimacy with the
deceased, which was objected to by the accused who finally murdered him
and confessed to committing the crime in his disclosure statement. He
stated that Smt.Parvinder Kaur deserted the accused on 8.7.2006 and
immediately thereafter, she filed a divorce petition against him. He drew the
attention of this Court to the statement of Smt.Parvinder Kaur, recorded
under Section 161 Cr.PC, and marked as Ex.P-13, to point out that there is
not a whisper in the said statement against the petitioner or his father. It
was further canvassed by the counsel for the petitioner that the complaint
addressed by Smt.Parvinder Kaur, PW-17 to various authorities three
months after the date of the incident, was nothing but a part of a conspiracy
to involve the petitioner in a false case and though the said complaint was
all along within the knowledge of the prosecution, no effort was made by it
to carry out any investigations, till as recently as in May 2010, and then also
the application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was solely on the basis of the
testimony of Smt. Parvinder Kaur (PW-17), who, it is contended, has set up
an entirely different story than the one she had originally, narrated to
implicate the petitioner and his father.
5. As far as the antecedents of the petitioner is concerned, counsel
for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a NRI based in Canada
who has clean antecedents, that he has never been involved any criminal
case and he has deep roots in the society. His family comprises of his
father, wife and two children. He is a CEO of an educational institution
based in Canada which is providing training for unique identification projects
to the Government of India. It is submitted that the petitioner has always
been available to the police for interrogation, in the past four years and if he
is granted anticipatory bail, he shall not leave the country without the prior
permission of the court and he is ready and willing to join the investigation
and co-operate with the IO as and when required. In support of the
submission that the petitioner is entitled to grant of anticipatory bail in the
present case, counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following
judgments of the Supreme Court:
(i) Joginder Kumar Vs. State of UP and others, (1994) 4 SCC 260
(ii) Bharat Chaudhary and another Vs. State of Bihar and another AIR 2003 SC 4662
(iii) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (Criminal Appeal No.2271/2010) decided on 2.12.2010.
6. On the other hand, learned APP for the State has vehemently
opposed the present petition and submitted that the petitioner does not
deserve any relief and in view of the fact that the case is pending before the
Sessions Court, he ought to have approached the said Court by filing an
application under Section 439 Cr.PC. He, however, confirmed the fact as per
the record of local police station PS Badni, District Moga, Punjab, there is no
previous involvement of the petitioner. He stated that it was during the
course of recording of the evidence of Smt. Parvinder Kaur, PW-17 that
allegations regarding the involvement of the petitioner and his father
emerged, which made the prosecution file the application under Section 319
Cr.PC before the Sessions Court for summoning the petitioner and his father,
primarily on the basis of the evidence in the form of the testimony of PW-17.
A reference was made to the deposition of Smt.Parvinder Kaur, wife of the
accused, recorded on 21.4.2010 to the effect that the father of the
petitioner, his wife, and children had threatened her that they would
eliminate the deceased in her house and nobody could stop them from going
ahead with the land deal in respect of the Gurudwara, with a realtor by the
name of Ansals. The deposition of Sardar Jagmohan Singh (PW-3), son of
Smt.Gurdial Kaur, aunt of the petitioner was also pointed out to contend that
the said witness had deposed that the father of the petitioner had illegally
taken possession of Gurudwara Hargobindsar at Nangli Poona, along with its
assets, properties, bank accounts and vehicles and that his mother,
Smt.Gurdial Kaur had executed a power of attorney in favour of the
deceased, authorizing him to contest the case on her behalf in Delhi against
the father of the petitioner who resides in Canada. It was therefore urged
by the prosecution that the petitioner and his father had hatched a
conspiracy to eliminate the deceased, as he was meddling in their affairs and
preventing them from disposing off the land of the Gurudwara.
7. In so far as the testimony of Smt. Gurdial Kaur, aunt of the
petitioner( PW-5 ) as recorded on 11.8.2009 is concerned, learned APP
submitted that the said witness deposed that the deceased Parminder Singh
had negotiated with her husband and her son and had persuaded them to
file a number of complaints against Baba Gurdial Singh for getting her share
in the estate of her deceased brother, Sant Gurmail Singh. She, however,
stated that she was never extended threats regarding the dispute with her
brother and she had not stated anything to the police about any suspicion
regarding the murder of the deceased. She also stated that an amicable
settlement was arrived at between her and Sh.Gurdial Singh, in the course
of the proceedings in FIR No.488/2006. In her cross-examination, the
aforesaid witness denied that any threats were extended to her by the
petitioner or his father from Canada. In support of his submission that the
petitioner is not entitled to grant of anticipatory bail, learned APP for the
State relied on the following judgments:-
(i) Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs. State of Punjab (1980) 3 SCR 383
(ii) State rep.by the CBI Vs. Anil Sharma 1997 (3) Crimes 252 (SC)
(iii)Adri Dharan Das Vs. State of W.B. (2005) 4 SCC 303
8. This Court has heard the counsels for the parties and carefully
considered their respective submissions. Coming first to the objection raised
by the learned APP for the State that as the case is pending before the
Sessions Court, the petitioner should have approached the said court by
filing an application under Section 439 Cr.PC, it is well settled that in
appropriate cases, this Court is not prevented from granting anticipatory bail
to a party merely because cognizance on a complaint has been taken and
the investigating agency has filed a charge sheet. As observed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Chaudhary(supra) , there is no
restriction imposed in Section 438 Cr.PC in regard to exercise of the power
to grant an anticipatory bail in suitable cases either by the court of Sessions,
High Court or the Supreme Court even when cognizance is taken or charge
sheet filed, as the object of the aforesaid provision is to prevent undue
harassment of the accused person by pre-trial arrest and detention. The
approach that powers under Section 438 Cr.PC being extraordinary in
character should be exercised only in exceptional cases, has been held to be
contrary to the legislative intention by the Constitution Bench in Sibbia's
case (supra) . Hence reliance placed by the learned APP for the State in the
case of Adri Dharan Das(supra) would not be of any assistance to the
prosecution.
9. As far as the scope of Section 438 Cr.PC is concerned, it is trite
that grant or refusal to grant anticipatory bail depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and one case cannot be similar to the other.
Thus courts have not been in favour of laying down a formula of universal
application when facts are bound to differ from one case to the other. In a
recent exhaustive decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre(supra), the law relating to grant of anticipatory bail has
been expounded and apart from discussing its historical perspective, the
authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the aforesaid
provision have been highlighted in the context of the right to life and
personal liberty under the Constitution. Reference was also made to the
observation made by the Constitution Bench in Sibbia's case(supra) that
Section 438 Cr.PC is extraordinary because it was incorporated in the Cr.PC,
1973 and before that the other provisions for grant of bail were Sections 437
and 439 and not because it should be invoked in exceptional or rare cases.
Holding that the courts of smaller strength had erroneously observed on
earlier occasions that powers under Section 438 should be invoked only in
exceptional or rare cases, the Supreme Court held that such an approach is
contrary to the law laid down in Sibbia's case (supra). It was emphasized
that courts considering a bail application should try to maintain a fine
balance between societal interest vis-à-vis personal liberty, while adhering
to the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that the accused is
presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the competent court. It
was observed that while exercising its extraordinary powers under Section
438 Cr.PC, the Court ought to be mindful of the following considerations: -
"96. It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulous precision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion must be exercised on the basis of the available material and the facts of the particular case. In cases where the court is of the considered view that the accused has joined investigation and he is fully cooperating with the investigating agency and is not likely to abscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be avoided.
97. A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre- conviction stage or post-conviction stage.
98. XXXX
99. As aptly observed in Sibbia's case (supra) that a wise exercise of judicial power inevitably takes care of the evil consequences which are likely to flow out of its intemperate use. Every kind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to be used with due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hallmark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion. One ought not to make a bugbear of the power to grant anticipatory bail.
100. The Constitution Bench in the same judgment also observed that a person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints and conditions on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may deem fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall enlarged on bail."
10. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is an undisputed
position that the FIR in question was registered four years ago, in
September 2006. After the investigation was completed, a charge sheet was
filed on 4.1.2007 whereafter the trial has been going on and the evidence of
the prosecution witnesses was being recorded. The occasion for the
prosecution to file an application under Section 319 Cr.PC for summoning
the petitioner and his father is primarily arose in view of the testimony of
PW-17 as recorded in April, 2010. The fact that the petitioner and his father
have filed a petition challenging the summoning order dated 30.9.2010
passed by the Sessions Court, which is the subject matter of consideration
in Crl.MC No.3743/2010, need not detain this Court, as the scope of the
aforesaid petition is entirely different and no benefit can be claimed by the
petitioner merely because notice was issued on the said petition on
2.12.2010.
11. A perusal of the statement of Smt.Parvinder Kaur, PW-17 as
recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC, bears out the submission of the counsel
for the petitioner that no allegations were levelled by her against the
petitioner. Rather, she had levelled allegations against the accused to the
effect that he used to beat her up and her children and that she left her
matrimonial home on 8.7.2006, never to return. She specifically stated that
on the date of the incident, i.e., on 26.9.2006, she had received a call from
the deceased who informed her that the accused was calling him to his
house. Though she advised the deceased not to meet the accused, he still
went to the house of the accused and on the next day, she came to know
that the accused had murdered the deceased. She attributed money to be a
motive for the murder. Pertinently, a copy of the complaint made by PW-17
to various authorities, for the arrest of the accused after lapse of about three
months from the date of the incident, was duly received by the police
authorities. In the said complaint, PW-17 mentioned having received threats
from the petitioner and his father. She also mentioned that her husband
had told her that the father of the petitioner could kill her.
12. Despite the aforesaid evidence being available to the prosecution
for about four years, the lead was not followed up in the course of the
investigation and instead, the prosecution filed the charge sheet against the
accused alone. Now for the prosecution to oppose the anticipatory bail
application of the petitioner solely on the strength of the testimony of PW-17
as recorded on 21.4.2010, is unacceptable. Learned counsel for the
petitioner stated that if a bird's eye view of the testimony of PW-17, is
taken, it shows that she has been quite inconsistent. He pointed out that
at one place, PW-17 had stated that the deceased and she were threatened
by the petitioner and his family members and that the IO was told of the
said facts, but he pressurized her and placed a proposal before her of
receiving Rs.16,000/- to Rs.17,000/- per month from Gurudwara
Management so as to remain silent. She also stated that she had
complained about the pressurization on the part of the IO, Nagin Kaushik, to
the senior officers in Delhi Police and that she could produce the complaints
so lodged. However on 30.4.2010, in her cross-examination, PW-17 denied
having lodged any complaint when she and the deceased had received
threats. She also admitted that she did not state anything against the
aforesaid IO in her complaint(Ex.PW-17/A). It was canvassed by the
petitioner's counsel that similarly, in her examination-in-chief, PW-17
mentioned that the petitioner and his father were proposing to enter into
negotiations in respect of the land of the Gurudwara with a realtor, but in
her cross-examination, she admitted that she had no documents in her
possession to establish the said fact. Nor did she produce a copy of the
injunction order, purportedly restraining the petitioner from selling the land
to the realtor. On 7.12.2010, the State was directed to verify the status
with regard to the alleged transaction entered into by the petitioner and his
father for the sale of the land of the Gurudwara with the realtor, but there is
no mention made in the status report in this regard. On a query, learned
APP for the State had conceded that the prosecution had not been able to
verify the factum of such a transaction.
13. Just as the petitioner cannot take advantage of issuance of
notice in Crl.M.C.3743/2010, similarly, issuance of summons upon the
petitioner, pursuant to the order dated 30.9.2010, cannot be a ground to
decline anticipatory bail to him. As noted earlier, the incident is of
September 2006, and charge sheet was filed in January 2007. Trial of the
case has been going on ever since. As of now, except for the testimony of
PW-17, recorded in April 2010, there is no other evidence placed on the
record by the prosecution to connect the petitioner with the crime. The
deposition of PW-17 recorded in Court, is the sole piece of evidence available
with the prosecution for summoning him under Sections 302/120B IPC.
Pertinently, the said witness did not level any allegation against the
petitioner in her statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. There is
nothing brought on the record by the prosecution to establish that the
petitioner entered into a collaboration with a realtor, to dispose of the land
of the Gurudwara as alleged by PW-17. The profile of the petitioner reveals
that there is no pending case against him. Considering the antecedents of
the petitioner, it does not appear that he shall flee from justice or is likely to
abscond or misuse the liberty, if anticipatory bail is granted to him. It is not
disputed by the prosecution that the petitioner has been available for all
these years for interrogation and he has not made any attempt to evade
interrogation. The testimony of the material witnesses has already been
recorded.
14. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present petition is
allowed. It is directed that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be
released on bail, subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of
`50,000/- with one local surety in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the
investigating officer/arresting officer. It is directed that the petitioner shall
fully co-operate in the investigation and will not create any hindrance or
impediment during the course of investigation. It is further directed that
the petitioner shall not approach any of the witnesses or try to visit the area
where they reside, nor shall he seek to influence the investigation in any
manner. Further, as volunteered by him, the petitioner shall not travel
overseas without the prior permission of the trial court.
15. Needless to state that the observations made hereinabove are
limited to the scope of grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner and shall
not be treated as a reflection on the merits of the case.
16. The petition is disposed of.
DASTI.
(HIMA KOHLI)
DECEMBER 15, 2010 JUDGE
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