Delhi High Court
Vijay Kumar Aggarwal vs Union Of India & Anr. on 14 December, 2010
Author: Pradeep Nandrajog
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on : 3rd August, 2010
Judgment Pronounced on: 14th December, 2010
+ W.P.(C) 916/2007
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
W.P.(C) 2563/2007
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
W.P.(C) 2768/2007
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
W.P.(C) No.916/2007 & Conn.Matters Page 1 of 33
W.P.(C) 6669/2007
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
W.P.(C) 1653/2008
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
W.P.(C) 7321/2008
VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Atul Nanda, Advocate for UOI
Mr.Vinay S.Masurkar, Mr.Amol N.
Suryawanshi, Advocates for R-2/
State of Maharashtra.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed
to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not?
W.P.(C) No.916/2007 & Conn.Matters Page 2 of 33
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J.
1. The six captioned writ petitions are being decided by a
common judgment for the reason the factual matrix is inter-
twined and one event led to the other resulting in various orders
being passed. Unfortunately for the petitioner the joy of being
inducted as a member of the Indian Administrative Service was
short-lived and before he came out of his infancy in the service
he got embroiled in litigation after litigation. Except for a short
stint of service spanning about five years he discharged no
duties, being suspended, and ultimately got dismissed from
service on 2.4.2007. Having successfully cleared the Central
Civil Services Examination and being allocated Maharashtra
Cadre, as a Member of the Indian Administrative Service, the
petitioner joined service in the State of Maharashtra on
1.9.1982.
2. Claiming that he became eligible to be granted the senior
time-scale on 1.1.1986 and alleging that the same was illegally
denied to him, the petitioner filed WP(C) No.656/1986 before the
High Court of Bombay which was transferred to the Central
Administrative Tribunal upon constitution of the Tribunal where
the said writ petition was dismissed by the Tribunal vide
judgment and order dated 19.1.1987 against which the Supreme
Court granted Leave to Appeal and as a result Civil Appeal
No.3464/1987 came to be registered before the Supreme Court
against the decision dated 19.1.1987 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal.
3. When the Civil Appeal was pending before the Supreme
Court, the petitioner was suspended vide order dated 26.5.1988
and a charge-sheet was served upon him for major penalty
proceedings on 6.7.1988. The petitioner challenged his being
suspended as also the charge-sheet by and under WP(C)
No.1037/1988 before the Supreme Court.
4. Vide judgment and order dated 30.8.1988, Civil Appeal
No.3464/1987 was allowed by the Supreme Court and the
decision dated 19.1.1987 of the Central Administrative Tribunal
was set aside. As a result thereof, the petitioner became
entitled to be placed in the senior time-scale with effect from
the date persons junior to him were placed in the senior time-
scale; all consequential benefits as per Service Rules were held
to be enuring to the benefit of the petitioner.
5. An interim order dated 2.11.1988 was passed by the
Supreme Court in WP(C) No.1037/1988 in which the charge-
sheet issued and served upon the petitioner on 6.7.1988 was
stayed. Though prayed for, order dated 26.5.1988 under which
the petitioner was suspended was not stayed. Thus since
26.5.1988 the petitioner remained suspended.
6. In the meanwhile, vide order dated 1.10.1988 petitioner
was granted senior time-scale with effect from 25.2.1986 in
compliance with the decision dated 30.8.1988 passed by the
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3464/1987. Since petitioner
was under suspension since 26.5.1988, the Collector Kolhapur
sent a bill to be signed by the petitioner so that subsistence
allowance could be paid. None could be paid as the bill was not
signed. Thereafter, various communications were sent to the
petitioner on 27.3.1989, 19.12.1990, 9.5.1991, 13.5.1991,
23.5.1991, and 17.7.1991 calling upon the petitioner to submit
non-employment certificate and sign the bills sent to him from
time to time so that subsistence allowance could be released.
The petitioner ignored all of them.
7. The petitioner resorted to multiple litigation before the
Central Administrative Tribunal as also directly before the
Supreme Court on various issues and got no relief save and
except a direction from the Tribunal at Delhi to be granted a „No
Objection Certificate‟ by the Competent Authority to enable him
to obtain a passport. Petitioner filed Criminal Writ Petition
before the Supreme Court as also a Criminal Appeal pertaining
to some orders, details whereof need not be noted by us as they
are not relevant, but are being noted to highlight that the
petitioner resorted to all and sundry proceedings but did not
sign the bill sent to him for payment of subsistence allowance
nor furnished the non-employment certificate. Relevant would it
be to note that in Criminal Appeal No.605/1991, vide order
dated 31.10.1991 the Supreme Court was constrained to
dispose of Criminal Appeal No.605/1991 and we note the
contents of the order as they are of some relevance to the
decision of WP(C) 916/2007 and WP(C) No.2768/2007. The
order reads as under:-
"This appeal arises out of an order passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal dated 7.6.1991.
Against this very judgment the appellant had earlier
preferred Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2061/91,
which we have dismissed by our order dated
14.8.1991.
When this appeal came up for hearing the appellant
once again took us through the entire history of his
service career from 1982 to 1988 which gave us the
impression that certain events which had taken place
had led to a cycle of litigation. In the course of the
hearing he also invited our attention to a
representation which he made to the Central
Government for changing his allocation from
Maharashtra to any other State and stated that the
said representation had not yet been disposed of, at
least he was not communicated the outcome thereof.
We, therefore, requested the learned Attorney General
to look into his representation and having regard to
the past events to find a solution, if possible. The
appellant also stated before us that he would be
willing to withdraw all the proceedings provided he is
given a change of cadre allocation to another State
and the charges against him are also dropped. He
also stated that to show his bonafides he would not
press his appeal. We must make it clear that his
statement not to press the appeal will not affect any of
his pending litigation unless a solution is found as
stated earlier. We have, therefore, requested the
learned Attorney General to personally look into the
matter and see if a solution of the type suggested is
possible in the facts and circumstances of this case
and communicate the same in the pending appeal at
an early date, preferable within three months.
With these observations, we dispose of this appeal as
not pressed.
A copy of this order may be given to the learned
Attorney General to enable him to move in the matter.
As regards his application dated 30.10.1991
requesting us not to hear this appeal, we can only
state that the appellant himself later desired that we
should return it to him but since it was taken on record
we did not deem it appropriate to do so. We,
however, do not propose to comment on the
averments since the appellant participated in the
hearing and we have heard him and passed the above
order."
8. The order throws light on a fact i.e. the petitioner being
involved in multifarious litigation and probably taking an
obstinate and a rigid stand and being suspended having pent up
frustration evidenced by moving an application before a Bench
of the Supreme Court praying that the particular Bench should
not hear his Appeal. The order brings out the anxiety of the
Supreme Court to find a solution outside the four corners of law,
for the probable reason, no solution was possible within the four
corners of law; the solution being to effect a change in the cadre
by transferring the petitioner to outside Maharashtra.
9. The petitioner filed multifarious writ petitions, special leave
petitions etc. against various orders before the Supreme Court
as also contempt petitions and all of which got dismissed from
time to time, but relevant would it be to note that with respect
to the order dated 31.10.1991 aforenoted, the Supreme Court
closed the issue as far as judicial intervention was concerned
pertaining to petitioner‟s cadre being transferred under the
State of Punjab and for which the Supreme Court had passed an
order on 15.2.1993 directing that Government of India would
look into the matter. By 16.12.1993 the Supreme Court was
informed that there were some difficulties being encountered in
the inter cadre transfer of the petitioner. Relevant would it be to
note that on 15.2.1993, in Criminal Appeal No.605/1991 the
Supreme Court had observed that the State of Punjab was
willing to take the petitioner on deputation for one year and in
pursuance of the willingness expressed by the State of Punjab
on 1.3.1993 the petitioner submitted an application to the
Central Government for his being transferred, on deputation, to
the State of Punjab but on certain conditions. The same were
not accepted by the State of Maharashtra. The State of
Maharashtra, the Central Government and the State of Punjab
remained in touch with each other pertaining to petitioner‟s
inter cadre transfer to the State of Punjab and to facilitate the
same, petitioner‟s suspension needed to be revoked and thus on
13.5.1996, exercising power under Rule 3(7)(c) of the All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969 the Competent
Authority in the State of Maharashtra withdrew the order dated
26.5.1988 under which the petitioner was placed under
suspension. The said order records the reason why the
suspension was being withdrawn; the reason being to facilitate
petitioner‟s inter cadre transfer and preceding the same his
proceeding on deputation to the State of Punjab. The order
clearly records that the same was being passed in view of a
letter dated 15.2.1996 received from the Government of India as
per which petitioner‟s proceeding on deputation to the State of
Punjab required the suspension to be withdrawn.
10. Since the order suspending the petitioner was withdrawn
and it would have taken time for the Central Government to
finalize the procedural formalities required to be completed for
the State of Punjab before which petitioner could be sent on
deputation to the State of Punjab, he was required to be
assigned some work, and accordingly on 7.6.1996 he was
directed to take charge as a Deputy Secretary, Social Welfare,
Cultural Affairs and Sports Department Government of
Maharashtra. The petitioner did not join, and unfortunately for
him, the inter cadre transfer from the State of Maharashtra to
the State of Punjab as also petitioner being sent on deputation
to the State of Punjab could not materialize. The petitioner,
notwithstanding his suspension being revoked on 13.5.1996 and
he being directed to take charge as the Deputy Secretary of the
Social Welfare, Cultural Affairs and Sports Department of the
State of Maharashtra on 7.6.1996, did not join duty and thus on
4.5.1998 a second charge sheet was issued and served upon
him on the ground that he remained unauthorizedly absent from
duty as also had left the headquarters without the permission of
the Competent Authority. The petitioner filed a contempt
petition in Civil Appeal No.3464/1987 which had already been
disposed of, in which he did not disclose to the Court of his
having filed various interim applications pertaining to his inter
cadre transfer to the State of Punjab and all of which had been
disposed of. The contempt petition was disposed of as
dismissed vide order dated 12.11.1998 after the Supreme Court
noted that the issue of inter cadre transfer have been closed by
the Supreme Court vide its order dated 16.12.1993. The
Supreme Court found no contempt committed by the State of
Maharashtra. Relevant would it be to note that the pleadings in
the contempt petition numbered 457/1998 was an attempt to
stay the disciplinary proceedings initiated on 4.5.1998 as also a
subsequent memorandum dated 5.10.1998 under which a third
charge sheet was served upon him.
11. It is apparent that the petitioner was messing up his
career. On 27.2.1997 the Government of India rejected
petitioner being sent on deputation to the State of Punjab and
the State Government intimated the same to the petitioner
under cover of a letter dated 29.3.1997.
12. Once again, suppressing relevant facts, the petitioner filed
a contempt petition in the disposed of Civil Appeal
No.3464/1987 alleging that the State of Maharashtra was not
complying with the judgment and order dated 30.8.1988 by
which petitioner‟s Civil Appeal No.3464/1997 was allowed.
Needless to state he raised a grievance that he was not paid
salary in the senior time scale. It appears that the petitioner
raised a further issue of persons junior to him being promoted
and hence a claim by the petitioner to be paid salary in the
promotional post. We may immediately add a caveat here,
neither the petitioner nor the respondents were very sure
whether the petitioner had a grievance of not being paid salary
in the higher scale i.e. above the senior time scale, but
halfheartedly stated that probably it was so.
13. The State of Maharashtra informed the Supreme Court of
the facts aforenoted i.e. petitioner‟s suspension being revoked
on 13.5.1996 and he not joining for duty. As regards the issue
of subsistence allowance effective from the date when the
petitioner was suspended and till the suspension was revoked
i.e. the period 26.5.1988 till 13.5.1996, it was informed that
neither was the petitioner signing the bills sent to him for being
paid the subsistence allowance nor was he submitting a
certificate of not being gainfully employed. Vide order dated
19.9.2001, the Supreme Court directed that as an interim
measure, on ad-hoc basis, the complete salary be paid to the
petitioner with effect from 1.5.1988 to 13.5.1996. Tentatively
quantifying the amount payable being `10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten
Lakhs), it was directed that a draft would be brought to Court
within 3 weeks and in the meanwhile the State was directed to
calculate the exact salary payable to the petitioner on the basis
of the petitioner being placed in the senior time scale as
directed by the Supreme Court. The order dated 19.9.2001
reads as under:-
"Heard the applicant-petitioner appearing in person
and the learned counsel for the respondents.
By order dated 30.8.1988 passed in Civil Appeal
No.3464/1987 this Court has directed the State of
Maharashtra to give the appellant senior time scale
with effect from the date on which his juniors were
given and also directed the State to give the
consequential benefits as per the rules regulating his
service.
It has been pointed out that in compliance with the
said order petitioner was granted promotion in senior
time scale from 25.2.1986 i.e. the date on which his
junior K.P.Bakshi was promoted in the senior time
scale.
It is the contention of the applicant-petitioner that
neither the salary nor the suspension allowance is paid
to the petitioner. Admittedly, prior to the passing of
the order dated 1.10.1988 applicant was placed under
suspension by order dated 26.5.1988.
In this view of the matter, apart from taking any
further action for committing breach of the order
passed by this Court, respondent-State of Maharashtra
is directed to pay salary to the applicant-petitioner
from 1.5.1988 to 13.5.1996 for the time being on ad
hoc basis. Respondent to pay Rs.10 lacs (Rupees Ten
lacs only) within a period of three weeks from today by
demand draft. Meantime respondents are directed to
calculate the exact salary amount payable to the
applicant-petitioner on the basis of senior time scale.
To be placed on Board on 11.10.2001.
Mr.Yashank Pravin Adhyaru, the learned senior
counsel is appointed amicus-curiae to assist the
court."
14. The State of Maharashtra calculated the full salary payable
to the petitioner for the period 1.5.1988 to 13.5.1996 in sum of
`6,82,290/- and immediately filed an application before the
Supreme Court, with reference to the order dated 19.9.2001 and
requested the Supreme Court that since the amount payable
was far less than `10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs), the State
may be permitted to hand over a sum of `6,82,290/- to the
petitioner towards full salary for the period 1.5.1988 till
13.5.1996. The application by the State was disposed of by the
Supreme Court on 11.10.2001. The order reads as under:-
"Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Considering the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of
Maharashtra pointing out that if the suspension period
is regularized as a duty period, petitioner would be
entitled to have full salary for the period from
1.5.1988 to 13.5.1996 and that amount would be
Rs.6,82,290/-. Hence, our order dated 19.9.2001
directing the respondent-State to pay Rs.10 lac to the
petitioner is modified to the aforesaid extent and the
State of Maharashtra is directed to pay a sum of
Rs.6,82,290/- towards full salary for the period in
question. This amount is accepted as a correct figure
given by the authorities and considered to be a correct
figure subject to verification by the petitioner or
further calculation by the concerned officers. The
amount to be paid to the petitioner by demand draft
within seven days from today. I.A.s 9 & 10 stands
disposed of accordingly.
Stand over to 18.10.2001."
15. On the next date of hearing when the contempt petition
filed by the petitioner was listed i.e. 18.10.2001, a demand draft
in sum of `6,82,290/- was tendered to the petitioner in Court.
He refused to accept the same. Reason why he did not accept
the amount was the grievance that the same represented salary
calculated as per the senior time scale. He claimed that persons
junior to him had earned promotions and thus salary had to be
paid to him in the scale applicable to the promotional post. The
Supreme Court taking note of the obstinate stand of the
petitioner dismissed the contempt petition filed by the petitioner
as also pending applications, which as per the order dated
18.10.2001 shows were about 7 in number. The Supreme Court
noted that as regards the State Government, it had tendered a
sum of `6,82,290/- to the petitioner which he had refused. As
regards the stand of the petitioner that he was entitled to the
wages at a higher pay scale the Supreme Court held that the
said issue could not be decided in contempt and relevant for our
purposes would be to note certain observations of the Supreme
Court in its order dated 18.10.2001, the same read as under:-
"However, it cannot be said that State Government
has violated any order passed by this Court. For the
grievance of the petitioner that he was not given a
suitable posting, it has been pointed out by the
learned counsel for the respondents that despite the
posting order given by the State Government,
petitioner is not prepared to join the said post on the
ground that he is eligible for higher post. This
question cannot be dealt with or decided in contempt
proceedings. Secondly, an employee in government
service cannot himself decide that he is entitled to a
particular post and, therefore, if such posting is not
given he will not join service. If he is aggrieved by the
wrong posting he can challenge the same. Further,
considering the contents of the letter written by the
petitioner and various contempt petitions filed against
the learned Judges of this Court also. It appears that
these contempt proceedings are frivolous and no case
for contempt is made out. Hence, these contempt
proceedings are rejected.
Registry is directed not to entertain any petition for
the same cause."
16. There were yet various writ petitions, contempt petitions
and criminal appeals filed by the petitioner before the Supreme
Court, all of which were dismissed in default on 7.10.2002. The
order dated 7.10.2002 passed in WP(C) No.1037/1988 records:
"Despite the service of notice of hearing to the petitioner for
remaining present, the petitioner has not remained present. In
spite of that petitioner who appears in person has filed an
application for transfer of the matter to another Bench. In our
view, enough indulgence is shown to the petitioner and he has
misused the same. The petition therefore does not require any
further consideration. The writ petitions, contempt petitions,
criminal appeal and the I.A. are dismissed for default. Interim
order stands vacated." Thereafter, on an application filed, the
writ petition was restored. Rather than argue the writ petition,
the petitioner filed another writ petition No.75/2003 claiming
multifarious reliefs pertaining to his service which was dismissed
on 16.6.2003. Thereafter, vide order dated 9.12.2005 WP(C)
No.1037/1988 was dismissed with a direction that the petitioner
may avail the alternative remedy of approaching the Central
Administrative Tribunal.
17. The petitioner thereupon filed OA No.1714/2003 before the
Central Administrative Tribunal praying that the order dated
13.5.1996 revoking his suspension be set aside, to the extent it
was in contravention of Rule 5-B of the All India Services
(Discipline & Appeal) 1969. He further prayed that the order
dated 7.6.1996 posting him as Deputy Secretary, Social Welfare,
Cultural Affairs and Sports Department as also the two charge-
sheets dated 4.5.1998 and 5.10.1998 be quashed. He sought
quashing of an order dated 18.9.2002 where under an inquiry
officer was appointed as also the order dated 27.3.2003
intimating him that salary could not be paid to him as he was
not reporting for duty. Petitioner prayed that the State of
Maharashtra should reinstate him in compliance with Rule 5-B of
the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) 1969. He prayed that
full salary be paid to him w.e.f. 1.5.1988 till date, and the period
during which he remained under suspension i.e. 26.5.1998 till
13.5.1996 should be directed to be treated as spent on duty and
it be directed that he was deemed to be promoted to all the
ranks above the senior time-scale as and when persons junior to
him earned promotion.
18. The petitioner filed various miscellaneous applications in
OA No.1714/2003 and needless to state sought all and sundry
relief, whether or not the same fell within the scope of the main
relief sought for.
19. To put it in brief the challenge to the various orders and
consequential relief sought for by the petitioner was premised
on the plea that an order under Rule 3(7)(c) of the All India
Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969 revoking the
suspension had to be an order composite encompassing Rule 5
B of the said Rules for the reason sub-rule 1 of Rule 5 B enjoined
upon the authority competent to order reinstatement to pass a
specific order: (a) Regarding the pay and allowances to be paid
to the member of the service for the period of suspension
ending with reinstatement, and (b) Whether or not the said
period shall be treated as period on duty. He thus prayed that
the order revoking his suspension i.e. the order dated 13.5.1996
was a nullity inasmuch as the said order did not deal with (a)
and (b) as noted herein before. He justified his not joining duty
in terms of the order dated 7.6.1996 on the ground that the post
of Deputy Secretary was below his entitlement and to justify his
entitlement he claim to be treated at par with the person
immediately junior to him as said person had earned a
promotion. Relevant would it be to note that by the time
petitioner filed the Original Application he had received
`6,82,290/- i.e. the sum which was tendered to him before the
Supreme Court and acceptance whereof was denied by him, but
it appears that good sense prevailed over the petitioner and he
subsequently received the pay order. He did not disclose to the
Tribunal that in the super time-scale he had received full salary
for the period 1.5.1988 till 13.5.1996.
20. Vide order dated 18.11.2003 the Tribunal disposed of OA
No.1714/2003 and the Tribunal quashed the order dated
13.5.1996 and granted no further relief to the petitioner as
regards the other prayers, due to multifarious causes being
joined for which we note that the petitioner was free to take
resort to necessary action and he did but only qua the second
charge sheet dated 4.5.1998. The penalty imposed on him vide
order dated 2.4.2007 has been challenged before the Tribunal
and the matter is pending adjudication before the Tribunal.
21. The reasoning of the Tribunal is that while revoking the
suspension exercising power under Rule 3(7)(c), a composite
order contemplated by Rule 5 B had to be passed with respect
to the manner in which the suspension period had to be
reckoned and on the entitlement of payment of salary. Giving
no reasons as to why salary post June 1996 was declined, the
Tribunal held that if the petitioner joined service as a Deputy
Secretary, the salary shall be paid. However, the Tribunal
granted liberty to the State of Maharashtra to pass a fresh order
on the issue of revocation of suspension and while so doing pass
necessary orders contemplated by Rule 5 B. Petitioner sought
review of the order passed by the Tribunal by questioning the
liberty granted to the Department to pass a fresh order and
urged in the Review Petition, being RA No.73/2004, that having
quashed the order dated 13.5.1996, the Tribunal could not have
granted permission to the State to pass a fresh order. Vide
order dated 8.3.2004 the application seeking review was
dismissed. Another attempt made for review of the order dated
18.11.2003 by and under RA No.374/2003 met with a dismissal
vide order dated 7.1.2004.
22. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tribunal in
OA No.1714/2003 the petitioner has filed WP(C) No.916/2007
and as argued by the petitioner, he questions the order dated
18.11.2003, 7.1.2004 and 8.3.2004 passed by the Tribunal on
the ground that having not passed a composite order envisaged
by Rule 3(7)(c) and Rule 5 B of the All India Services (Discipline
& Appeal) Rules 1969 the order dated 13.5.1996 had to be
declared a nullity and the Tribunal could not have directed a
fresh order to be passed. The petitioner seeks from this Court
to have the order dated 7.6.1996, by which he was posted as a
Deputy Secretary post revocation of his suspension on
13.5.1996, declared as void on the plea that the department
could not post him to a post below one to which the person
immediately junior to him had earned a promotion. The
petitioner seeks quashing of the charge-sheet issued to him on
4.5.1998, alleging misdemeanour of not reporting for duty, on
the plea that he was justified in not reporting for duty to a post
to which he could not be made to join and consequently prays
that the inevitable conclusion of his success would be the
entitlement to be paid salary w.e.f. 13.5.1996 and as per the
scale applicable to the posts held by the person immediately
junior to him as said person had earned promotions, which
petitioner claims were wrongly denied to him.
23. It is apparent that as regards WP(C) No.916/2007, two
questions have to be answered by us. Firstly, whether as a
result of not passing an order contemplated by Rule 5 B of the
All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969 when
exercising power under Rule 3(7)(c), the suspension was
revoked, in that, the order dated 13.5.1996 not dealing with the
manner in which the period of suspension had to be treated,
renders the order void and as urged by the petitioner the effect
would be that he is required to be treated as under suspension
and for said reason it could not be alleged against him that he
did not report for duty when called upon to do so vide order
dated 7.6.1996. The second question to be answered is whether
the petitioner could insist that on being asked to join back he
had to be posted on a post to which the person immediately
junior to him was posted on having earned promotions?
24. Rule 5 B(1) and (7) of the All India Services (Discipline &
Appeal) Rules 1969 read as under:-
"5 B. Admissibility of pay and allowances and
treatment of service on re-instatement after
suspension. - (1) When a member of the Service under
suspension is reinstated or would have been so
reinstated but for the retirement under the All India
Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958
while under suspension, the authority competent to
order reinstatement shall consider and make specific
order -
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be
paid to the member of the Service for the period
of suspension ending with reinstatement or the
date of his retirement on superannuation, as the
case may be; and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be
treated as a period on duty.
(2) xxxx
(3) xxxx
(4) xxxx
(5) xxxx
(6) xxxx
(7) In a case falling under Sub-rule (5) the period of
suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on
duty, unless the authority competent to order
reinstatement specifically directs that it shall be so
treated for any specified purposes;
Provided that if the member of the Service so desires
such authority may order that the period of
suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind
due and admissible to the member of the Service."
25. We note that Rule 5 B of the All India Services (Discipline &
Appeal) Rules 1969 is pari materia with FR 54 B and in the
decisions reported as 1993(25) ATC 321 Girdhari Lal vs. Delhi
Administration & Ors, 1993 (24) ATC 641 Basant Ram Jaiswal vs.
Area Manager (North) MTNL Bombay, 1996 (3) (Supp.) LLJ 855
Hira Lal vs. DDA & Ors. and AIR 1987 SC 2257 O.P.Gupta vs. UOI
& Ors. it has been held that while revoking the suspension it is
the duty of the competent authority to pass an order regarding
pay and allowances for the period a government servant
remained under suspension and that the composite order has to
be a part of the same transaction having two parts and that the
power to revoke the suspension cannot be exercised in isolation
of the power to pass an order regarding pay and allowances.
But, the said decisions do not hold that if no order pertaining to
pay and allowances is passed, an order revoking suspension is
void and non-est. As clarified by the Tribunal in Basant Ram
Jaiswal's case (supra), in such situation the competent authority
cannot exercise the power under FR 54 B. Thus, the law is that
if while revoking the suspension or within a reasonable time
thereof, no order is passed pertaining to pay and allowances for
the period of suspension, the authority is denuded from passing
such order and the inevitable result would be the Government
servant being entitled to the fully salary for the period he
remained under suspension.
26. Thus, while disposing of the Original Application filed by
the Tribunal, vide order dated 18.11.2003, the Tribunal could
not have permitted the Government to pass a fresh order and at
the same time we hold that the Tribunal could not have quashed
the order dated 13.5.1996 revoking the suspension.
27. We hold that the only relief to which the petitioner would
be entitled to, at the most, would be to full pay and allowances
for the period he remained under suspension and which we note
had already been paid to him when he went to the Tribunal. It is
unfortunate that the Tribunal did not even bother to note that
pursuant to orders passed by the Supreme Court, the State had
tendered `6,82,290/- to the petitioner towards full salary for the
period 1.5.1988 till 13.5.1996, which amount he had refused to
take, but had later on received the same when he approached
the Tribunal. We may additionally note that the State of
Maharashtra had not revoked the suspension on its own, but as
noted herein above, had done so to facilitate petitioner‟s inter-
cadre transfer from Maharashtra cadre to Punjab cadre and thus
the order of revocation of suspension was really speaking not in
exercise of the power to revoke the suspension on the ground
that the petitioner was no longer required to be kept under
suspension and this peculiar circumstance has unfortunately not
been kept in mind by the Tribunal.
28. But, we need not unnecessarily trouble ourselves with the
issue for the reason we hold that the result of not passing a
composite order and the limb contemplated by Rule 5 B of the
All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969 not being an
integral part of the order dated 13.5.1996, and treating the said
order to be passed in exercise of power under Rule 3(7)(c) of the
All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1969, the
petitioner would be entitled to a declaration that the State of
Maharashtra would be prohibited to pass any order in exercise
of its power under Rule 5 B of the All India Services (Discipline &
Appeal) Rules 1969 and as a corollary thereof the petitioner
would be entitled to full salary for the period he remained under
suspension i.e. with effect from 26.5.1988 till 12.5.1996 and we
further note that the petitioner has been paid full salary for the
said period.
29. Now, the petitioner‟s contention that the order dated
13.5.1996 revoking his suspension has to be treated as void
having failed, we need to discuss whether the petitioner was
justified in not reporting for duty after suspension was revoked
and was posted as a Deputy Secretary, Social Welfare, Cultural
Affairs and Sports Department, Government of Maharashtra. As
noted above, two reasons were advanced by the petitioner for
not so joining. The first was that notwithstanding his suspension
being revoked, the order dated 13.5.1996 being void, he
continues to be under suspension and thus could not be asked
to report for duty and secondly he could not be made to join at a
post junior to the one held by the person immediately junior to
him.
30. The first limb of the contention has obviously to be
rejected for our preceding reasons where we have upheld the
order dated 13.5.1996. On the second limb, suffice would it be
to state that in spite of the Supreme Court clarifying on this
issue in its order dated 18.10.2001, contents whereof have been
noted by us in para 15 above, the petitioner continued to act
like an ostrich. Needless to state, promotion was not a matter of
right. It had to be earned. The petitioner was charge-sheeted
on 6.7.1988 and pending a charge-sheet for a major penalty
proceedings he could not be promoted till the disciplinary
proceedings were over. The disciplinary proceedings could not
proceed as the petitioner had obtained a stay from the Supreme
Court on 2.11.1988 in WP(C) 1037/1998. At best,
recommendations pertaining to the petitioner for promotion had
to be kept in a sealed cover. Thus, the petitioner could not
insist that till not made to join on a post equivalent to the one
earned by way of promotion by the person immediately junior to
him, he would not report for duty. Even otherwise, as clarified
by the Supreme Court in its order dated 18.10.2001, contents
whereof have been noted by us in para 15 above, the law is that
the petitioner could not have himself decided as to what post he
was entitled to and if he had a grievance pertaining to a wrong
posting, he was duty bound to join service and question the
posting order. The petitioner never challenged the order dated
7.6.1996 posting him as a Deputy Secretary till he filed OA
No.1714/2003. We may note that the petitioner has filed over a
fifty miscellaneous applications in various proceedings before
the Supreme Court and it may be that in a few he may have
questioned the order dated 7.6.1996, but he has got no relief.
Indeed, none was shown to us. The position would be that a
substantive challenge was raised to the order dated 7.6.1996 in
the year 2003 when OA No.1714/2003 was filed.
31. Having held as aforesaid pertaining to the order dated
13.5.1996 and the Tribunal‟s order dated 18.11.2003, it hardly
matters whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing RA
No.374/2003 and RA No.73/2004 vide orders dated 7.1.2004 and
8.3.2004. As a consequence the charge-sheet dated 4.5.1998
served upon the petitioner cannot be faulted. To conclude, no
relief can be granted to the petitioner in WP(C) No.916/2007
which merits dismissal.
32. We note that in the said writ petition four applications
being CM No.10455/09 as also CM No.11155/09, CM
No.11156/09 and CM No.7142/2010 are pending. The first is for
a correction of the order dated 21.7.2008, the second and the
third are for interim relief and the last one is for payment of
subsistence allowance.
33. Since the writ petition is dismissed we hold that the first
three applications have been rendered infructuous, and as
regards the last, suffice would it be to state, that having not
worked after suspension was revoked, the petitioner would be
entitled to no suspension allowance as he was not under
suspension and thus direction sought vide CM No.7142/2010
that suspension allowance be paid is dismissed. We reiterate
that for the period petitioner remained under suspension he has
been paid full salary calculated in terms of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3464/1987 as per the
judgment and order dated 30.8.1998.
34. Before dealing with the other writ petitions, we need to
note that so great is the confusion created by the petitioner that
notwithstanding he being paid full salary for the period he
remained under suspension, after the Tribunal decided OA
No.1714/2003 and permitted the Department to pass an order
pertaining to the period the petitioner remained under
suspension, an order was passed on 29.7.2004 declining to pay
full pay and allowance to the petitioner for the priod 26.5.1988
to 12.5.1996 i.e. the period during which he remained under
suspension. The said order was challenged by the petitioner
vide OA No.2507/2005 in which he filed as many as six
miscellaneous applications seeking all and sundry reliefs the
Tribunal disposed of all the applications as also Civil Appeal
No.2507/2005 holding that the order dated 29.7.2004 was
repugnant to the directions issued by the Supreme Court to pay
full salary to the petitioner for the period 1.5.1988 to 13.5.1996
but the Tribunal further noted that the petitioner had received
the salary for the said period in sum of `6,82,290.
35. Linked to the issues raised in WP(C) No.916/2007 are the
issues raised by the petitioner in WP(C) No.2768/2007 in which
the petitioner seeks quashing of the orders dated 18.5.2004,
28.9.2005, 6.1.2006 and 17.1.2007 by the Central
Administrative Tribunal with a prayer that all relief sought by
him vide OA No.3141/2003 be allowed.
36. Vide order dated 18.5.2004, three Original Applications
being OA No.2947/2003, OA No.3092/2003 and OA
No.3141/2003 have been disposed of by the Tribunal.
37. Vide OA No.2947/2003 the petitioner sought quashing of
the inquiry report dated 1.11.2003 pertaining to the second
charge-sheet in which misdemeanour alleged against him was of
unauthorizedly remaining absent from duty i.e. pertaining to the
charge-sheet dated 4.5.1998.
38. Vide OA No.3092/2003 the petitioner challenged the third
charge-sheet issued to him on 5.10.1998 alleging this
misdemeanor of not filing annual returns. He also sought
quashing of the letter dated 20.9.2003 reminding him that he
had not submitted a response to the charge-sheet dated
5.10.1998. Vide OA No.3141/2003 the petitioner sought
quashing of the order dated 7.6.1996, which as noted above is
the order directing the petitioner the report for duty as the
Deputy Secretary in the Social Welfare Department.
39. All the Original Applications were dismissed. We note that
in the writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order in so
far it relates to OA No.3141/2003 and not the other two OAs.
40. Suffice would it be state that we have already upheld the
order dated 7.6.1996 while deciding WP(C) No.916/2007 and
thus the corollary thereof would be that the petitioner could not
question the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him for
not reporting for duty inasmuch as on 13.5.1996 his suspension
was revoked and the stand taken by the petitioner qua the
language of the order dated 13.5.1996 and its effect is not what
was sought to be urged by the petitioner.
41. We uphold the order dated 18.5.2004 passed by the
Tribunal and as regards the order dated 28.9.2005, 6.1.2006
and 17.1.2007 we find that the repeated attempt by the Tribunal
was to keep on re-agitating that since order revoking his
suspension was void and he was still under suspension he could
not be directed to report to work as a Deputy Secretary and
alternatively that the post was below the rank of a post held by
the person immediately junior to him and for said reason also
the order dated 7.6.1996 was void. As the same issue which we
have already decided herein above is being re-argued by the
petitioner at each stage we hold that the subsequent orders
passed by the Tribunal are correct and as a consequence we
dismiss WP(C) No.2768/2007.
42. We note that in this writ petition CM No.11150/2009 is
pending adjudication which seeks interim relief and since the
writ petition has been dismissed, the said application stands
disposed of as infructuous.
43. The third writ petition which we need to decide in order of
chronology, so that continuity of thought and reasoning can be
maintained, is WP(C) 7321/2008. In the said writ petition the
petitioner is aggrieved by the decision dated 3.12.2007 passed
by the Tribunal declining interest claimed by the petitioner for
the full salary which he had received for the period 1.5.1988 till
12.5.1996 i.e. `6,82,290/- as also a subsequent order dated
11.9.2008. Vide OA No.157/2006, stating that the sum was paid
to him on 14.5.2004, petitioner sought interest on delayed
payment and met with a failure when the Tribunal noted that
the application was highly belated and additionally for the
reason, evidenced by the orders passed by the Supreme Court,
the petitioner was being offered the money and he was refusing
to accept the same. The petitioner also challenges an order
dated 11.9.2008 as per which the Tribunal noted that the claim
of the petitioner that its earlier order required correction was
without substance.
44. We cannot refrain from noting that the petitioner has
literally managed to create so much confusion and trouble
evidenced by his repeatedly filing substantive and
miscellaneous petitions before the Supreme Court and so
troubled was the State Government that in sheer disgust,
notwithstanding the petitioner being under suspension, the
State Government agreed to pay full salary for the entire period
the petitioner remained under suspension. The petitioner did no
work after he was suspended and has got more than his due,
which we feel is the result of his deluging the State with a
barrage of miscellaneous applications. That apart, we agree
with the Tribunal that it was too late in the day to claim interest
on the payment which was tendered to him before the Supreme
Court in the year 2001 and which petitioner declined and finally
received the same in the year 2004. The claim for interest in
the year 2006 was clearly barred by limitation.
45. The contention of the petitioner that there is a non-
application of mind by the Tribunal is absolutely incorrect. The
claim for interest is clearly barred by limitation and has been
correctly held barred by limitation by the Tribunal.
46. We feel that the next writ petition which needs to be dealt
with is WP(C) 6669/2007 in which the petitioner challenges the
order dated 17.1.2007 and order dated 14.5.2007 passed by the
Tribunal; the first order dismissing OA No.1112/2006 and the
second dismissing RA No.52/2007.
47. Facts to be noted are that after the Supreme Court decided
on 30.8.1988 in Civil Appeal No.3464/1987 that the petitioner
was entitled to be placed in the senior time scale with effect
from the date his juniors were placed in the scale, on 1.10.1988
the State of Maharashtra issued an order granting placement to
the petitioner in the senior time scale with effect from 25.2.1986
i.e. the date on which the person immediately junior to the
petitioner i.e. Sh.K.P.Bakshi was granted benefit of the senior
time scale. On 22.1.1999 another order was issued notifying
that the name of the person immediately junior to the petitioner
was Sh.Sumit Malik and not Sh.K.P.Bakshi and maintaining the
date 25.2.1986 a correction was made.
48. The petitioner‟s grievance raised in OA No.1112/2006 was
that Sh.K.P.Bakshi was his immediate junior and that he was
granted senior time scale on 3.1.1986. Petitioner further
claimed to be placed in the Junior Administrative Grade with
effect from 1.7.1991 and Selection Grade with effect from
1.7.1995 and for which he relied upon Rule 6(A) of the IAS
(Recruitment) Rules 1954.
49. That the claim was barred by limitation and that there was
no evidence that Sh.K.P.Bakshi was the immediate junior of the
petitioner. Thus, the correction incorporated vide memorandum
dated 22.1.1999 to the memorandum dated 1.10.1988 was
upheld. As regards the claim to be promoted to the Junior
Administrative Grade as also Selection Grade and probably for
the reason while arguing the Original Application the petitioner
sought further promotion to the super time scale, the Tribunal
held that merely because a junior had earned promotions, the
petitioner could not claim any parity.
50. Suffice would it be to state that Rule 6(A) of the IAS
(Recruitment) Rules 1954 reads as under:-
"6A. Appointments of direct recruits and officers
recruited by selection from among released
Emergency Commissioned Officers and short Service
Commissioned Officers to posts in the Senior time-
scale of pay." - (1) Appointments of officers recruited
to the Service under clause (a) or clause (aa) of sub-
rule (1) of rule 4 to posts in the senior time-scale of
pay shall be made by the State Government
concerned.
(2) An Officer, referred to in sub-rule (1), shall be
appointed to a post in the senior time-scale of pay, if
having regard to his length of service and experience,
the State Government is satisfied that he is suitable
for appointment to a post in the senior time-scale of
pay.
**Provided that, if he is under suspension or
disciplinary proceedings are instituted against him, he
shall not be appointed to a post in the senior time-
scale of pay, until he is reinstated in the Service, or
the disciplinary proceedings are concluded and final
orders are passed thereon, as the case may be;
Provided further that on the conclusion of the
disciplinary proceedings
(a) if he is exonerated fully and the period of
suspension, if any, is treated as duty for all
purposes, he shall be appointed to the senior
time-scale of pay from the date on which he
would have been so appointed, had the
disciplinary proceedings not been instituted
against him, and paid accordingly; and
(b) if he is not exonerated fully and if the State
Government, after considering his case on
merits, proposes not to appoint him to the senior
time-scale of pay from the date on which he
would have been so appointed had the
disciplinary proceedings not been instituted
against him, he shall be given an opportunity to
show cause against such action.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule
(2), the State Government may -
(a) withhold the appointment of an officer, referred to
in sub-rule (1), to a post in the senior time-scale of
pay,-
(i) till he is confirmed in the Service, or
(ii) till he passes the prescribed departmental
examination or examinations and appoint to
such a post, an officer junior to him and who
has passed the prescribed departmental
examination or examinations.
(b) appoint an officer, preferred to in sub-rule (1), at
any time to a post in the senior time-scale of pay as a
purely temporary or local arrangement."
51. We need not dilate on the issue for the simple reason the
petitioner could earn no promotion till he was exonerated in the
disciplinary proceedings and we note that the petitioner is facing
three inquiries and is himself responsible for the delay and we
note that in one of them i.e. the 2nd charge-sheet an order
dismissing him from service has already been passed which is
under challenge before the Tribunal.
52. Assuming Sh.K.P.Bakshi was the immediate junior to the
petitioner, the best which the petitioner could get would be to
be placed in the senior time scale with effect from 31.1.1986
and not 25.2.1986 having a trivial consequence to be paid a
petty sum of `6456/-, which we recommend to be paid as a
gratis payment to the petitioner for the reason we are confident
that he will litigate ad-nauseam.
53. Suffice would it be to state that till the petitioner clears
himself of the charge-sheets issued to him and as long as he
remains under a cloud no direction can be issued to promote the
petitioner to the higher post, which promotions have to be
earned by dint of hard work and upon being found fit at a duly
constituted Departmental Promotion Committee.
54. It would now be convenient to deal with WP(C) 2563/2007
in which the petitioner challenges the order dated 17.1.2007
passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissing OA
No.1386/2006 as also the subsequent order dated 6.3.2007
whereby the Tribunal dismissed RA No.28/2007 under which the
petitioner sought a review of the order dated 17.1.2007.
55. By and under OA No.1386/2006 the petitioner sought
quashing of the charge-sheet dated 6.7.1988 and also an order
dated 20.12.2002 under which an inquiry officer was appointed
to conduct an inquiry pertaining to the charge sheet in question.
It may be highlighted that the inquiry officer was appointed on
20.12.2002, for the reason, as noted above in para 5 the
petitioner had obtained a stay on 2.11.1988 pertaining to the
charge sheet dated 6.7.1988 and as noted in para 16 above the
writ petition in which he had obtained a stay from the Supreme
Court came to be dismissed on 7.10.2002 and when said fact
was intimated to the department the inquiry officer was
appointed vide order dated 20.12.2002. In this OA
No.1386/2006, the petitioner filed various miscellaneous
applications all of which were dismissed as frivolous.
56. The Original Application has been dismissed by the
Tribunal holding that no mala-fide against any officer and much
against the one who has issued the charge-sheet has been
established. It has been held that the charges are not vague. It
has been held that it is impermissible to consider the evidence
relied upon by the petitioner to determine whether the charges
are maintainable. It has been held that it cannot be said that
the charges do not attract a disciplinary action.
57. We may note that during arguments before us, the
petitioner was not understanding the difference between the
maintainability of an action vis-à-vis its sustainability. It appears
that before the Tribunal the petitioner was arguing with
reference to the material on which he wanted to rely and
thereupon show that the charges could not be sustained;
needless to state the issue, when a charge-sheet is challenged,
is not whether the charge can ultimately be sustained. The
issue is whether there is prima facie material to maintain the
charge and whether on the allegations made in the statement of
imputation a charge is attracted.
58. We may note that before the Tribunal and also before us
the petitioner relied upon the following 10 authorities:-
(i) State of Punjab vs. V.K.Khanna AIR 2001 SC 343;
(ii) Zunjarrao B.Nagarkar vs. Union of India AIR 1999 (SC)
2881;
(iii) Partap Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1964 (SC) 72;
(iv) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 (SC) 604;
(v) D.J.S.A. vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1991 (SC) 2176;
(vi) Arun Vyas vs. Anita Vyas AIR 1999 (SC) 2071;
(vii) Dr.U.N.Biswas vs. Union of India 1998 (8) SLR 8;
(viii) A.K.Dutta vs. Union of India 82 CWN 539;
(ix) A.V.S.Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1988 (7)
ATC 119; and
(x) Virendra Prasad vs. Union of India 1988 (8) ATC 190.
59. We may note that some of the decisions cited are totally
out of context, for example the decision at Sl.No.(iv) and (vi)
which relate to framing of a charge and discharging an accused
respectively in criminal proceedings. A few other decisions
such as the one in A.K.Dutt‟s case at Sl.No.(viii) which pertains
to a departmental inquiry without furnishing statements of
witnesses and denying inspection of relevant documents, are
again irrelevant. Thus, we are not noting the ratio of law which
can be culled out in the aforesaid 10 decisions, but would state
that the principles on which a charge memo can be quashed are
well known, being, if on the facts stated no misdemeanour is
made out, or the Court is satisfied that the charge memo is for
an oblique purpose or where the charge memo is vague or there
is malice in law or fact. It is settled law that no Court can
evaluate the material which has yet to take the shape of
evidence during inquiry and go into the merits thereof to
determine whether the charge can be sustained, for that would
be within the domain of the inquiry officer and/or the disciplinary
authority. Further, any grievance pertaining to a charge sheet
needs to be first brought to the notice of the disciplinary
authority requiring the disciplinary authority to decide and
thereafter the court to be approached. The petitioner has not
alleged any malafide against any officer and none has been
impleaded as a respondent. During arguments the petitioner
wanted us to look into the material which has yet to take the
shape of evidence and thus we refrain from commenting upon
the issue for the reason it would be pre-mature for us to express
any view on the material on basis whereof the charge sheet has
been issued. Thus, we find no merit in WP(C)No.2563/2007 and
concur with the reasoning of the Tribunal that it would be pre-
mature to express any opinion and as clarified by the Tribunal in
para 83 of the impugned decision, in case any final order is
passed against the petitioner, he may raise all legally
permissible pleas.
60. This takes us to the last writ petition being
WP(C)1653/2008 where the grievance pertains to 2 orders dated
30.9.1987 and 31.8.1987 which were challenged vide OA
No.121/2006.
61. The grievance pertains to leave sanctioned for the period
19.11.1986 to 18.3.1987 and further extended up to
18.10.1987; the extended period being treated as extra-ordinary
leave. The Tribunal has noted the grievance of the petitioner in
para 2 and para 3 of the impugned order. The Tribunal has held
that no satisfactory reasons have been given by the petitioner in
support of his claim and for said reason has held that the
Tribunal was not inclined to condone the delay in approaching
the Tribunal pertaining to the grievances relating to the orders
dated 30.9.1987 and 31.8.1987.
62. As we understand, the Tribunal has attempted to see
whether a fundamental wrong which nobody could accept as
legal, was committed against the petitioner; for the reason the
law relating to condonation of delay in approaching a court, as it
has evolved in India, is that procedural laws are treated as hand
maid of justice and not the mistress of justice and as long as the
language of a statute or the facts permit to so interpret, the
interpretation/inference which further the cause of substantive
justice has to be accepted. This approach is to be found in
various judgments where the courts have held that meritorious
claims should not be sacrificed at the altar of limitation.
63. We find no illegality committed by the Tribunal for the
reason it was too late in the day for the petitioner to have filed
OA No.1214/2006 to question orders served upon him way back
on 30.9.1987 and 31.8.1987.
64. The said writ petition merits dismissal.
65. To end, we dismiss all the writ petitions as also hold that
all pending applications would be disposed of as infructuous.
66. No costs.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
(MOOL CHAND GARG)
JUDGE
December 14, 2010
dk/mm
