Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 5555 Del
Judgement Date : 7 December, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M.A. No. 14096/2010 & Crl. LP No. 304/2010
% Date of Decision: 07.12.2010
State .... Appellant
Through Mr. Jaideep Malik, APP
Versus
Kamlesh Kumar & Anr. .... Respondent
Through Nemo
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.L.BHAYANA
1. Whether reporters of Local papers YES
may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be NO
reported in the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
* Crl. M.A. No. 14096/2010
This is an application by the appellant/applicant seeking
condonation of delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal on the
ground that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 28th January,
2010 and considerable time was taken in procuring the certified copy of
the judgment.
The applicant has given the details as to who has considered the
file to decide whether a petition for leave to appeal is to be filed or not.
The applicant has relied on Collector of Land Acquisition Vs.
Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao, 2005 (3)
SCC 752 holding that sufficient cause should be considered with
pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than a technical
defection of sufficient causes for explaining every days delay having
regard to considerable delay of procedural red tape in the decision
making process of the government, certain amount of latitude is
permissible and should be given. The applicant has contended that the
State Government is the impersonal machinery working through its
officers or servants- hence it cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual.
The petitioner/applicant, in the circumstances, has contended
that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 102 days in
filing the petition for leave to appeal.
Considering the averments made in the application, it is apparent
that the petitioner has been able to make out sufficient cause for
condonation of delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal.
Consequently, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition for leave to
appeal is allowed and delay is condoned.
Crl.L.P.No. 304/2010
The petitioner has sought leave to appeal against the order dated
28th January, 2010 passed by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.
108/2008 titled as State Vs. Kamlesh Kumar and Avdesh arising out of
FIR 207/2006 under Section 498A/302/34 of IPC, at P.S. Kapashera
acquitting the accused persons on all charges.
The case of the prosecution is that Priyanka, was admitted in
Safdarjung hospital by her husband Kamlesh, while she was
unconscious, on 31st May 2006. On receipt of information from the
hospital to this effect at 9:20 pm police reached there and it transpired
that Priyanka and Kamlesh were married only last year, however
Priyanka was not in a position to make any statements. On 1st June
2006 crime team had come to inspect the spot and photographs were
taken. It was on 3rd June 2006 that information was received from the
hospital that Priyanka had died and DD No. 17 B was recorded in this
regard.
Since the death of Priyanka had occurred in suspicious
circumstances, and during the second year of marriage itself,
information was given to the SDM, who recorded statement of Surinder,
father of deceased, who was called and came to Delhi on 6th June
2006. He alleged harassment, cruelty and demands of dowry at the
hands of husband Kamlesh. He also stated that after marriage a
buffalo and a gold chain was given when demanded and he raised
suspicion for the death of his daughter Priyanka, on accused Kamlesh
as well as the brother of Kamlesh. Directions to register an FIR were
given by the SDM on 6th June 2006. The site plan of the place of
incidence was prepared vide Ex. PW15/A.
It is also the case of the prosecution that post mortem on the
dead body of Priyanka was conducted on 7th June 2006 and doctor
gave the cause of death, being shock due to hypoxic encephalopathy
produced by ante-mortem constriction of neck by ligature and gave the
time of death to be about three days.
As per charge sheet, the FIR in view of post mortem report was
registered u/s 498A and 304B of IPC and accused Kamlesh was
arrested on 8th June 2006. After recording of statement of witnesses,
accused Avdesh Singh was also interrogated on 10th June 2006, who
made a disclosure statement admitting to having committed the murder
of Priyanka and Section 302 of IPC was also added in the FIR against
accused Avdesh Singh. Subsequently at his instance a key and a
handkerchief used while throttling the deceased was also recovered.
On the basis of such averments the learned sessions judge
framed charges on 14th December 2006, against accused Kamlesh u/s
498 A IPC for subjecting her to cruelty in order to get unlawful
demands of dowry fulfilled and a charge u/s 302 IPC was framed
against accused Avdesh Singh for causing murder of Priyanka on 29th
May 2006 at an unknown time at house No. 840, Near Appu Ghar,
Kapashera, Delhi.
The Trial Court has concluded that the death of Mrs. Priyanka was
clearly on account of homicide and not suicide, relying on the
deposition of PW-13 Dr. Yogesh Tyagi. He has categorically stated in his
post mortem report Ex. PW13/A that there were two ante mortem
injuries in the shape of contusion over left thenar region of palm 5x5
cm. and faint ligature narks in the form of scabbed abrasion present in
front of the neck, starting from mid line front where the mark was 2.5
cm broad and 7 cm below chin and cm above supra sterna notch. From
there it goes over to both angle of mandible. Beyond that it is not
present. Over right side of the neck, it is 2.5 cm wide and 3.5 cm below
right angle of the mandible where it just disappears few cm. Back. Total
length of the ligature was 14 cm. and it is absent over back of the neck
for a distance of 18 cm. The cause of death as deposed by him is due to
hypoxic encephalopathy produced by ante mortem constriction of neck
by ligature.
As for the allegations made against the accused Kamlesh u/s 498
IPC the Trial court held that they weren't successfully proved by the
prosecution. The main witnesses on whose testimony reliance has been
placed by the prosecution are PW-14, PW-5 and PW-8, which are
fraught with glaring inconsistencies.
The father of deceased, PW-14 Surinder Prakash is the one on
whose statement the FIR had been registered u/s 498A/304 B. PW-14
had deposed about the alleged dowry demands made by the accused's
father. As per his deposition Priyanka was married with Kamlesh on
22nd May 2005 and an exorbitant amount was demanded by the father
of Kamlesh, however, on intervention of family members the amount
was reduced to 31,051 which was duly paid in cash. Also further
demands of a gold idol of Hanumanji, a gold chain and a buffalo were
made. Even though a gold idol of Hanumanji weighing 5 gms. was
given, the father of deceased could not make good on the demand for
the gold chain and the buffalo. Henceforth PW-14 had informed his son
Sanjay, PW-5 to pay the amount towards gold chain. Thereafter the
buffalo too was send to the village Toria, where the parents of the
accused Kamlesh used to reside.
Trial court however observed that these demands were specifically
made by the father of the accused and not the accused himself and also
that PW-14 had not deposed any instances of the deceased being
harassed or pressurized for meeting the dowry demands. It is further
observed that he wasn't even aware of the exact amount paid by PW-5
to the in-laws of the deceased.
As per the deposition of PW-5 Sanjay Kumar, the brother of the
deceased he had stated that the accused was responsible for the death
of his sister since on many occasions he used to consume liquor and
quarrel with his sister, which he used to tell him not to do. He further
deposed that he paid a total sum of Rs. 4000/-, i.e 2000/- each on two
occasions. However in his entire deposition there is no mention of any
demands of the gold chain and buffalo or that his father, PW-14 had
asked him to pay cash to the accused nor does he specifically state that
his sister was beaten by the accused Kamlesh or was harassed or
tortured in any manner which negates the basic requirement of treating
with cruelty.
PW-8 is the only witness who has made an assertion as to the
demands for dowry being made by the accused Kamlesh and accused
Avdesh and the beatings given to the deceased in view of the demands.
However his deposition is contrary to the depositions of PW-14 and PW-
5 as neither have stated any instances of beatings being given to the
deceased nor have they imputed any demands of dowry being made by
the accused persons. Also even though PW-8 had leveled allegations of
demanding dowry against accused Avdesh, in his cross-examination he
has stated that prior to the incident he did not know of Avdesh, nor had
he seen or met him. This clearly goes to show that the averments made
by PW-8 are not true and the Trial court has rightly not relied on it in
view of the various inconsistencies and contradictions in the
statements of witnesses. In the circumstances the inferences of trial
Court cannot be held to be un-sustainable or perverse nor any such
perversity has been pointed out from the Trial Court record which will
entail grant of leave to the petitioner against the impugned judgment of
acquittal of the respondents.
The Trial court has also observed that the aspect of motive
attributed to the accused Avdesh, of being involved in an illicit
relationship with the deceased has not been successfully proved by the
prosecution. The only witness supporting the case of the prosecution is
PW-5 who has deposed that he was having the impression that accused
Avdesh had illicit relations with Priyanka and had even told her
husband Kamlesh about the same. However he had not paid any heed
to it nor did he take any measures to prevent Avdesh from having
access to the house. Even PW-12 Daya Chand the landlord of the
premises where the accused Kamlesh and Priyanka were residing has
not supported the case of the prosecution with respect to the motive,
stating that he had never suspected any illicit relations between
Priyanka and Avdesh. In the circumstances no such cogent evidence
has been pointed out by the Learned Public prosecutor on the basis of
which it can be inferred about the illicit relations between the deceased
and accused Avdesh nor any evidence has been pointed out which has
not been considered by the Trial Court.
The Trial Court has disbelieved that accused Avdesh visited the
place of occurrence on the day of incident as PW-12 categorically
deposed that none of his family members had seen the accused
entering the premises. From the cross examination of the said witness
and other material on record it cannot be held that the deposition of
said witness Pw 12 is unreliable. Also the version of the incident told by
the lady tenant to PW-12, asserting the presence of the accused Avdesh
cannot be believed as she has not been examined and on this account
PW-12 is only a hearsay witness and due reliance cannot be given to
his deposition.
The trial court has rightly disbelieved the photocopy of the
attendance sheet, Ex PW9/B which reflects that from 26th May 2006
itself, accused Avdesh was absenting himself from duty, as it cannot be
connected to the incident which occurred on 30th May 2006. The
accused has made a statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C that he had
taken leave as he was ill and had gone to Loni and had come back only
on hearing about the death of Priyanka. When he attended the
cremation he was arrested by the police. The link of leave taken on
26th May 2006 and the incident of 30th May 2006 seems to be too far-
fetched and the benefit of doubt has been given to the accused by the
Trial court.
This is settled law that in reversing the finding of acquittal the
High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of
innocence is still available in favor of the accused which is rather
fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favor.
Even if on fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and perusal of
the material on record, if the High Court is of the opinion that another
view is possible or which can be reasonably taken, then the view which
favors the accused should be adopted and the view taken by the trial
Court which had an advantage of looking at the demeanour of
witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court is not to be
substituted by another view which may be reasonably possible in the
opinion of the High Court. Reliance for this can be placed on 2009(1)
JCC 482=AIR 2009 SC 1242, Prem Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan; 2008
(3) JCC 1806, Syed Peda Aowlia v. the Public Prosecutor, High Court of
A.P, Hyderabad; Bhagwan Singh and Ors v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
2002 (2) Supreme 567; AIR 1973 SC 2622 Shivaji Sababrao Babade &
Anr v. State of Maharashtra; Ramesh Babu Lal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat, (1996) 4 Supreme 167; Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana,
2000 (1) JCC (SC) 140. The Courts have held that the golden thread
which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be
adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that
miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may
arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of
an innocent.
The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue,
reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in
place of the findings recorded by the trial Court, if the findings are
against the evidence or record or unsustainable or perverse. However,
before reversing the finding of acquittal the High Court must consider
each ground on which the order of acquittal is based and should record
its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to
the view of the trial Court that the accused is entitled to acquittal.
The trial Court has also disbelieved the recovery of the keys of the
room of the deceased from the drain at the instance of the accused
Avdesh as none of the witnesses have specifically stated the place at
which the recovery was made. Now nala (drain) being an open and
accessible place does not inspire any confidence as to the recovery of
the keys. Also none of the witnesses have deposed that Avdesh too had
the keys to the room in his possession and it's has not been disputed
before the Trial court that he used to reside in altogether different
premises. On perusal of deposition of these witnesses from the Trial
Court record which was called by this Court and perused it cannot be
held that the findings of the Trial Court are un-sustainable and not
based on evidence or has been arrived at by ignoring any evidence.
As per the deposition of PW-12, on the day of the incident at about
6:00 pm the accused Kamlesh had opened the locked door with a key in
his possession and in his presence had given water and food to
Priyanka and taken her to the doctor. It has been noted by the Trial
Court that the lock which was opened by accused Kamlesh on the day
of the incident has not been identified by PW-12 in whose presence the
lock was opened. The recovery of the key of the lock from the nala
(drain) has not been proved. The fact that clearly draws further
suspicion is that Priyanka had ample opportunity to name Avdesh on
being found by her husband subsequent to opening the door, however
she does nothing of the sort and remains silent on as to who has
throttled her. Also the Ex.PW8/E is dated 8th June 2006 while it is the
case of the prosecution itself that accused Avdesh was arrested on 10th
June 2006. Hence the recoveries described in Ex. PW8/E were rightly
not believed by the Trial Court.
The recovery of the handkerchief which was allegedly used to
strangle the deceased, from the house of accused Avdesh has also not
been relied on as it was never shown to the doctor for his opinion as to
whether it could be used for the purpose of throttling nor was it sent to
the FSL for seeking opinion or collecting DNA of deceased Priyanka.
Furthermore the seal on the pullanda of handkerchief was also found
to be a damaged one when it was firstly opened during the testimony of
PW-8 in the Court. Thus the trial court was of the opinion that none of
the circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused. The learned public prosecutor has not been able to raise any
such ground which will entail any interference by this Court in the
facts and circumstances.
On perusal of the Trial Court record and the evidence of all the
witnesses, it is apparent that there is no allegation against the accused
Kamlesh for demanding dowry or even treating his wife, the deceased
with cruelty. PW-14 has merely stated one occasion on which Priyanka
had told him on the phone that the accused Kamlesh was demanding
dowry. However he does not seem able to tell the exact date on which
this demand was made nor has he stated that he took any action on
account of this demand nor asked his daughter to come to Bihar or
himself make a trip to Delhi nor does he even talk to the family
members of Kamlesh. This does not seem to be the normal conduct of
the father from whose daughter dowry is demanded and she is allegedly
harassed. Other than this there are no allegations of any demands
being made by the accused or that Priyanka was perturbed because of
any such demands made by the accused either prior to the marriage or
with respect to the demands that remained unfulfilled. Rather as per
PW-14 himself the accused and the deceased shared a very normal
husband and wife relationship. The inconsistencies in the depositions
of PW-14, PW-5 and PW-8 are also too glaring to be ignored and the
trial court has rightly disbelieved them. This court finds no perversity
or illegality in the finding of the Trial Court.
On perusal of the testimonies of the other witnesses also, this
Court is unable to find any cogent evidence against the accused Avdesh
on the basis of which it can be inferred that he had committed the
murder of Priyanka. The recoveries of the key and the handkerchief
have been carefully scrutinized and have not been sufficient in
imputing guilt against the respondent Avdesh. The trial court too has
observed that so far as the charge u/s 302 of IPC is concerned, the
evidence against the accused is circumstantial in nature and hence
requires to form a link that would beyond all reasonable doubt lead to
the inference of guilt, which the prosecution was unsuccessful in
proving.
In the circumstances, the petitioner has failed to make out a
case of cruelty and murder against the accused persons. Thus, there
are no grounds to grant leave to appeal to the petitioner and the
decision of the Trial Court dated 28th January, 2010 cannot be faulted.
The learned counsel for the State Mr. Malik is also unable to
point out any illegality or perversity in the said order, which would
require any interference by this Court.
The petition for leave to appeal, in the facts and circumstances,
is without any merit and therefore, the prayer of the petitioner to grant
leave is declined and the petition is dismissed.
ANIL KUMAR, J.
S.L. BHAYANA, J.
DECEMBER 07, 2010
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