Delhi High Court
Sandeep Khanna & Another vs State & Others on 30 August, 2010
Author: Sanjiv Khanna
REPORTABLE
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS CASE NO. 3308 OF 2008
Reserved on: 18 August, 2010
Date of Decision:30th August, 2010
SANDEEP KHANNA & ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Vijay Aggarwal
and Mr. Gurpreet
Singh, Advs.
Versus
STATE & OTHERS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. T.K. Ganju, Sr.
Adv. with Mr. A.K.
Thakur, Mr. R.K.
Mishra and Mr.
Anesh Paul, Advs.
for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes.
SANJIV KHANNA, J.:
1. Mr. Sandeep Khanna, sole proprietor of M/s. Kripa
Overseas, has filed the present petition under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
Code, for short) for quashing of the order dated 26th April, 2006
taking cognizance and summoning him in the complaint case
No.1965/2005 titled ―NAFED Vs. Kripa Overseas‖ filed under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1882 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, for short).
2. NAFED has filed the said complaint on account of
dishonour of cheque No.411372 drawn on Canara Bank, Chandni
Chowk, Delhi, of Rs.10 crores. The cheque was presented for
encashment on 19th October, 2005. The allegation made in the
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 1
complaint is that the petitioner had approached the NAFED in
the month of February, 2004 with the proposal to import
asafetida (Heeng) and rolling scrap in the name of NAFED from
Tazikistan/Kyrgystan and was advanced a sum of Rs.10 Crores
for this purpose. A Memo of Understanding dated 20th
September, 2004 was executed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not referred or
controverted the allegations made in the complaint on merits.
However, four contentions are raised. These contentions have
been dealt with below.
4. It was submitted that the summoning order dated 26th
April, 2006 was a non-speaking and mechanical order which
was passed without application of mind by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate (Magistrate, for short). The
summoning order placed on record is not cyclostyled. It is a
computer print-out which is also partly hand written. The first
line of the order states that the Magistrate had heard the learned
counsel for the complainant and had perused the affidavit of the
complainant filed on record. It records that the complaint was
well within the period of limitation. It states that the learned
Magistrate was of the opinion that prima facie there was
sufficient evidence and grounds to summon the accused.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the date of
hearing, the date for which notice was issued and the name of
counsel were filled up by hand and this proves and establishes
that a pre-written or composed computer print-out was filled up
and notice has been issued. The said contention is merely a
presumption. Petitioner has not placed on record any other
order passed by the same Magistrate in a different case wherein
the same alleged pre-written/pre-composed computer printout
was used. I have already quoted above the language of the order.
Merely because the dates and presence of the counsel are hand-
written, it does not show that the order dated 26th April,2006
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 2
was pre-dictated/composed order which was filled-up and the
summoning/cognizance order was passed mechanically without
examining the allegations in the complaint and the pre-
summoning evidence.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Mr.
Sandeep Khanna is a Proprietor of M/s. Kripa Overseas and the
learned Magistrate has overlooked the fact that Mr. Sandeep
Khanna and M/s. Kripa Overseas had been made two separate
accused. Thus it was submitted that the Magistrate did not apply
his mind and read the complaint.
6. In the cause title of the complaint, the accused have been
described as under:-
―1 M/s. Kripa Overseas
(Importers & Exporters)
469 - Ishwar Bhawan
Khari Baoli
Delhi-110006.
2 Mr. Sandeep Khanna
Prop.
M/s. Kripa Overseas
469 - Ishwar Bhawan
Khari Baoli
Delhi- 110006.
Also at :
E-18, East of Kailash, New Delhi.‖
7. If a sole proprietor or an individual carries on business in
a different or a trading name, the individual is the person
responsible and liable. It is apparent that the complaint in
question is drafted by an advocate. The individual and the
business name in which the individual carries on business have
been made separate accused. This may have happened because
of abundant caution. This error or mistake does not merit or
justify interference with the summoning order dated 26th April,
2006. The net effect of the order and the complaint is that Mr.
Sandeep Khanna, who is a sole proprietor of M/s. Kripa
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 3
Overseas, has been summoned to enter appearance in the
complaint.
8. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that as per the complaint itself the cheque of Rs.10
Crores was given as a security and, therefore, no offence under
Section 138 of the Act is made out on dishonour of a cheque
given as a security. He relies upon M.S. Narayana Menon @
Mani versus State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 and
a judgment of this Court in K.S. Bakshi & Anr. versus State
& Anr., 146 (2008) DLT 125.
9. The complaint has to be read as a whole and one or two
sentences are not to be read out of context. Allegations made in
the complaint in brief have been stated above. It is stated in the
complaint that pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 16th September, 2004, the respondent/NAFED had paid a
sum of Rs.10 Crores to the petitioner by way of a cheque. It is
further alleged that the petitioner did not comply with its
commitment and supply the goods for which advance of Rs.10
Crores was paid. Several meetings and phone calls were made
and letters were written and thereafter cheque of Rs.10 Crores
was presented for encashment but was dishonoured for
insufficient funds. In the case of K.S. Bakshi (Supra), there
was an agreement between the builder and the owners for
construction on a property as per the terms and conditions
mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding, creating
mutual rights and obligations. As per the Memorandum of
Understanding the owners had received Rs.11.5 lakhs from a
confirming party but no payment was made by the owners to the
builder or any third party. Clause V (a) of the Memorandum of
Understanding stipulated that the builder would deposit with
the owners a total sum of Rs.138 lakhs towards security
including Rs.11.5 lakhs which was paid to the owners by the
confirming party. This security deposit was to be paid by the
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 4
builder to the owners in 30 equal and monthly installments and
was in the form of a deposit which was to be refunded to the
owners without interest upon the builders handing over to the
owners' possession of their portion in the to be constructed
building. There was stipulation for refund/adjustment of the
security deposit. Some cheques towards payment of the security
deposit in 30 equal monthly installments were dishonoured. A
question arose whether these dishonoured cheques were issued
in discharge of a debt or other liability. It was observed that the
words ―other liability‖ cannot be interpreted in the light of the
preceding word ―debt‖ and the rule of ejusdem generis is not
applicable as the word ―debt‖ is a single word and it is not a case
where a particular category, class or genus is followed by a
general word. Accordingly, the expression ―other liability‖
should be given ordinary grammatical meaning and within its
broad sweep it would include ―any liability to pay‖. Learned
Single Judge thereafter referred to the doctrine of fundamental
terms of a contract and observed that an obligation which is a
condition, if breached, hits at the root of the contract. Further,
by a contract it is open for the parties to make a term, a
condition which otherwise under ordinary circumstances may
not be. Thereafter reference was made to Clause V (b) of the
agreement, which for the sake of the convenience is reproduced
below:-
―(b) Payment of the said cheques on the
due dates is the essence of the contract. In
the event any cheque is dishonoured for any
reason, the Builder shall replace the cheque
with a demand draft within 7 days of the
receipt of an intimation from the Owners
failing which the Owners shall be entitled to
take recourse to any right or remedy
available to or accruing to the Owners by
such dishonour.‖
10. It is accordingly observed as under:-
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 5
―29. Under the agreement, the accused
company had a liability to pay Rs.138 lakh to
the complainant and other owner of the said
property and discharge of this liability was
treated fundamental to the agreement, non-
performance thereof would entitle the
complainant and the other owner to rescind
the contract.
30. In the instant case, money in sum of
Rs.126.5 lakh was to be paid by the accused
company to the complainant and other
owner. It is irrelevant whether such money
was to be retained and returned in future on
due performance of the agreement. What is
relevant for purposes of Section 138 of the NI
Act is the fact that at the time of issuance of
cheques the accused company had a liability
to pay money to the complainant and other
owner of the said property.
31. A distinction has to be drawn between
a cheque issued as security and a cheque
issued towards discharge of a liability to pay
notwithstanding that the money is by way of
security for due performance of the contract.
A cheque given as security is not to be
encashed in presaenti. It becomes
enforceable if an obligation is future is not
enforced. It is not tendered in discharge of a
liability which has accrued.
32. Thus where a cheque forms part of a
consideration under a contract it is paid
towards a liability.‖
(emphasis supplied)
11. The ratio of the said judgment, rather than supporting the
case of the petitioner, supports the case of the respondent
NAFED. In any case, at this stage (without trial) prima facie it
cannot be said that no case is made out. In the present case as
per the allegations in the complaint Rs.10 Crores was paid to the
petitioner and the petitioner has issued a cheque of Rs.10 Crores
to the respondent. Mere use of the word ―security‖ in the
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 6
complaint is irrelevant. What is relevant is in the context and
purpose for which the cheque was issued and whether the
cheque which was dishonoured can be regarded as paid towards
payment of debt or other liability. As observed in the aforesaid
judgment, when a cheque forms part of the consideration under
the contract it is paid towards a liability. Learned Single Judge
after the aforesaid quote (paras 29 to 32) has referred to the
definition of the term ―consideration‖ in Section 2 (d) of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 and observed that the term
―consideration‖ is very vide and paragraph 57 in the case of
M/s. Narayana Menon (Supra) was quoted by the learned
Judge and it was emphasized that the said observations are
clarificatory in nature. Paragraph 57 of the judgment in M/s.
Narayana Menon case (supra) reads as under:-
―57. We in the facts and
circumstances of this case need not go into
the question as to whether even if the
prosecution fails to prove that a large portion
of the amount claimed to be part of debt was
not owing and due to the complainant by the
accused and only because he has issued a
cheque for a higher amount, he would be
convicted if it is held that existence of debt in
respect of large part of the said amount has
not been proved. The appellant clearly said
that nothing is due and the cheque was
issued by way of security. The said defence
has been accepted as probable. If the
defence is acceptable as probable the cheque
therefore cannot be held to have been issued
on discharge of the debt as, for example, if a
cheque is issued for security or any other
purpose the same would not come within the
purview of Section 138 of the Act,‖
12. Learned counsel for the respondent had submitted that in
the complaint itself it is mentioned that the petitioner had given
another cheque of Rs.1 Crore which was dishonoured but
subsequently payments in lieu thereof were made. It is stated in
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 7
the complaint that this cheque of Rs.1 Crore was towards earnest
money. Payment of this cheque towards earnest money cannot
be set off and reduced from the cheque of Rs.10 Crores which
was advanced and given pursuant to the advance payment of
Rs.10 Crores made by the respondent to the petitioner. In view
of the said submission, I do not think at this stage, the petitioner
is entitled to any relief. It may be appropriate here to refer to the
observations of the Supreme Court in I.C. D.S. Ltd. versus
Beena Shabeer & Another, (2002) 6 SCC 426, which are as
under:
―10. The language, however, has been rather
specific as regards the intent of the legislature.
The commencement of the section stands with
the words ―Where any cheque‖. The abovenoted
three words are of extreme significance, in
particular, by reason of the user of the word
―any‖ -- the first three words suggest that in
fact for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on
an account maintained by him with a banker in
favour of another person for the discharge of
any debt or other liability, the highlighted
words if read with the first three words at the
commencement of Section 138, leave no
manner of doubt that for whatever reason it
may be, the liability under this provision cannot
be avoided in the event the same stands
returned by the banker unpaid. The legislature
has been careful enough to record not only
discharge in whole or in part of any debt but the
same includes other liability as well. This
aspect of the matter has not been appreciated
by the High Court, neither been dealt with or
even referred to in the impugned judgment.
11. The issue as regards the coextensive
liability of the guarantor and the principal
debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview
of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls
for any discussion therein. The language of the
statute depicts the intent of the law-makers to
the effect that wherever there is a default on the
part of one in favour of another and in the event
a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or
other liability there cannot be any restriction or
embargo in the matter of application of the
provisions of Section 138 of the Act. ―Any
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 8
cheque‖ and ―other liability‖ are the two key
expressions which stand as clarifying the
legislative intent so as to bring the factual
context within the ambit of the provisions of
the statute. Any contra-interpretation would
defeat the intent of the legislature. The High
Court, it seems, got carried away by the issue of
guarantee and guarantor's liability and thus has
overlooked the true intent and purport of
Section 138 of the Act. The judgments recorded
in the order of the High Court do not have any
relevance in the contextual facts and the same
thus do not lend any assistance to the
contentions raised by the respondents.‖
13. It may be also appropriate to reproduce observations
made in the Constellation Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
versus P.E.C. Limited, 127 (2006) DLT 733:
―14. As regards the second point even if a
post dated cheque is given as security and the
payment is not made as promised, then the said
post dated cheque itself becomes payable
because that is the agreement and
understanding between the parties otherwise
the security would have no meaning. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has cited a judgment
tiled M/S. Nijjer Agro Foods Limited and
Ors. v. Shri Nasib Chand and Another,
reported in 2003 (3) JCC 304 , in support of his
contentions. The facts in that case were that
post dated cheques were given as security
subject to the terms and conditions that the
said cheques were to be replaced by demand
drafts for the equivalent amount. The accused
in that case had made the payment by way of
demand drafts but the the complainant instead
of returning the cheques presented them. The
court opined "once the payment against those
cheques was made by way of Demand Drafts
the liability qua these cheques ceased to exist
and therefore the complainant was not entitled
to present those cheques even if some amount
or balance was outstanding".
14. In Mojj Engineering Systems Ltd. & Others versus
A.B. Sugars Ltd., 154 (2008) DLT 579, it has been observed
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 9
as under:-
―7. Even otherwise, prima facie, it was the
petitioners who had handed over the undated
cheque for a certain amount to the respondent
in terms of a contract between the parties.
Since an undated cheque cannot be encashed, it
can only mean that the petitioners had
authorized the complainant to enter an
appropriate date on it. In Young v. Grote,
(1827) 4 Bing. 253 it was held that when a
blank cheque is signed and handed over, it
means the person signing it has given an
implied authority to any subsequent holder to
fill it up. Similarly, in Scholfield v. Lord
Londesborough, (1895-1899) All ER Rep 282,
it was held that whoever signs a cheque or
accepts a bill in blank, and then puts it into
circulation, must necessarily intend that either
the person to whom he gives it, or some future
holder, shall fill up the blank which he has left.
This common law doctrine was also affirmed by
Justice Macnaghten in Griffiths v. Dalton,
(1940) 2 KB 264, where it was held that the
drawer of an undated cheque gives a prima
facie authority to fill in the date. This aspect
has also been incorporated in Section 20 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, which deals with
Inchoate Stamped Instruments. The Supreme
Court in T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Murlidhar,
IV(2008)SLT694=II(2008)CCR398(SC)=II(20
08)DLT(Crl.)19(SC)=(2008)5SCC633 while
discussing the scope of Section 20 held that by
reason of this provision, a right has been
created in the holder of the cheque. Prima
facie, the holder thereof is authorized to
complete the incomplete negotiable
instrument. In that view of the matter, all
further issues that may be raised by the
petitioners regarding the nature and scope of
the authority of the respondent to put any
particular date on the cheque in question, are
all matters for trial.‖
15. The aforesaid decision also negates the contention of the
petitioner with regard to the fact that the cheque was undated.
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 10
Reference in this regard can be also made to Section 20 of the
Act, which for the sake of the convenience is reproduced below:-
"20. Inchoate stamped instruments.--
Where one person signs and delivers to another
a paper stamped in accordance with the law
relating to negotiable instruments then in force
in 1[India] and either wholly blank or having
written thereon an incomplete negotiable
instrument, he thereby gives prima facie
authority to the holder thereof to make or
complete, as the case may be, upon it a
negotiable instrument, for any amount
specified therein and not exceeding the amount
covered by the stamp. The person so signing
shall be liable upon such instrument, in the
capacity in which he signed the same, to any
holder in due course for such amount:
Provided that no person other than a holder in
due course shall recover from the person
delivering the instrument anything in excess of
the amount intended by him to be paid
thereunder.‖
16. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner was based upon the compromise/Memorandum of
Understanding dated 3rd May, 2007. It was submitted that by
this Memorandum of Understanding the parties had
compromised the matter which amounted to and resulted in
compounding of the offence. Reference was made to a judgment
of learned Single Judge of this Court in Venkatesh Dutt
versus M.S. Shares East Ltd., 2004 (109) DLT 610. The
said contention has to be rejected in view of the reasons given in
Thakur Arora versus State, 2009 (157) DLT 737. In this
case it was observed:
―7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner
submits that the judgment of this Court in
Venkatesh Dutt is no longer good law in view
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Lalit Kumar Sharma and Anr. v. State of UP.,
V(2008)SLT1=III(2008)DLT(Crl.)114(SC)
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 11
=III(2008)BC204=II(2008)CCR430(SC).
He submits that when the compromise did
not materialize, the cheques issued
thereunder could not be said to have been
issued in discharging the liability of the
original debts and therefore no subsequent
complaint would be maintainable.
8. In the present case the MOU contained a
clear stipulation that if the cheques issued
pursuant to the MOU were dishonoured, the
MOU would come to an end and the original
complaint would revive. The complaint was
not disposed of on the basis of the said MOU
and was kept pending, at which stage the
Petitioner filed an application seeking
discharge.
9. In the judgment in Venkatesh Dutt the
facts were that during the pendency of the
criminal complaint in relation to dishonour
of a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1 crore a
compromise was arrived at between the
parties. Pursuant to the compromise several
cheques were issued and accepted by the
complainant. These subsequent cheques on
presentation for payment were dishonoured.
Clause 8 of the terms of compromise, similar
to Clause 5 of the MOU in the present case,
stipulated that in the event the cheques were
dishonoured, the complainant shall have the
"right to continue the above referred cases"
and "to further initiate both civil and
criminal actions including under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act with
reference to the cheques issued under this
Agreement." In those circumstances this
Court held that-
―8. The very fact that a party enters
into a compromise during the
pendency of a complaint filed under
Section 138 of the Act shows the cause
of action pertaining to the initial
cheque ceases to be available to the
complainant as fresh cause of action
becomes available in respect of the
cheques issued pursuant to the
agreement between the parties in case
those cheques are dishonored.‖
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 12
10. It was further held as under:
―9. By no stretch of imagination
complaints under Section 138 relating
to several cheques given by a party to
the complainant on account of the
agreement between the parties
towards liability against initial cheque
leading to the filing of original
complaint can be allowed to go
simultaneously. Reason is simple.
Section138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act specifically refers to
only that cheque which is issued
towards the liability drawn by a
person on an account with a banker
for payment of money and no other
cheque. Once the parties enter into an
agreement during the pendency of
such complaint or proceedings and
complainant accepts the cheques
given by the accused in lieu of the
subject matter of original complaint
every cheque gives rise to a fresh
cause of action if it, on presentation is
dishonored as in that case original
complaint becomes extinct. Aggrieved
person has a right to file as many
complaints as many cheques were
given to him as every cheque under
the Act provides an independent and
fresh cause of action to the aggrieved
person.‖
11. It was therefore concluded that-
―12. In view of the foregoing reasons,
the petition is allowed, the
complaint filed by the respondent
under Section 138 of the Act for
cheque of Rs. One crore and the
proceedings arising therefrom stand
quashed whereas the subsequent
complaints filed by the respondent
arising out of as many as seven
cheques shall continue being
independently maintainable.‖
12. It appears that the aforementioned
enunciation would no longer good law in
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 13
view of the subsequent judgment of the
Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Sharma. The
facts in this case were that M/s. Mediline
India (P) Limited borrowed a loan of Rs. 5
lakhs from the complainant and in
repayment thereof issued two cheques dated
30th November 1999 and 10th December
1999 for Rs. 3 lakhs and Rs. 2 lakhs
respectively. The Company had two
directors, namely, Ashish Narula and Manish
Arora. The cheques on presentation were
dishonoured with the remarks "insufficient
funds". The complainant then filed a
criminal complaint against Manish Arora
and Ashish Narula under Section 138 NI Act.
13. An agreement was entered into between
the parties during the pendency of the
criminal complaint. Pursuant thereto Manish
Arora on 29th July 2000 issued a cheque in
favour of the complainant in the sum of Rs.
5,02,050/- . This cheque when presented for
payment was also returned dishonoured with
the remarks "insufficient funds". In regard to
the dishonour of subsequent cheques the
complainant filed another criminal not only
against Manish Arora and Ashish Narula.
Lalit Kumar Sharma, who became a director
of the said company on 15th February 2000
and another person who became a Director
on 1st December 1994, were also arrayed as
accused. Both of them had resigned from the
post of directorship on 30th November
2000. The learned MM summoned all the
accused. Their challenge in the revision
petition was negatived by the High Court and
thereafter they approached the Supreme
Court.
14. The Supreme Court categorically held
that in the above circumstances a separate
complaint could not be maintained since the
cheque issued in terms of the compromise
was not towards any liability for which the
earlier compliant had been filed and further
when the accused there had been convicted
and sentenced. The Supreme Court held as
follows:
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 14
―15. Evidently, therefore, the second
cheque was issued in terms of the
compromise. It did not create a new
liability. As the compromise did not
fructify, the same cannot be said to
have been issued towards payment of
debt.‖
17. Paragraph 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding
relied upon by the petitioner reads as under:-
―13. NAFED shall withdraw all legal cases
in the courts all over India/Police/EOW/CBI
or any other agency that may be involved by
NAFED or otherwise, after entire payment is
made in terms of the offer for settlement.‖
18. Thus, as per the terms of the Memorandum, the cases
including criminal cases were not to be withdrawn by the
respondent till payments were made as per the offer of
settlement. The payments were not made. In view of the said
clause, it is not possible to accept that the offence in question
was compounded by entering the Memorandum of
Understanding. It may be appropriate here to reproduce the
observations of the Supreme Court in Lata Construction
versus Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah (Dr), (2000) 1
SCC 586, with reference to Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872.
It has been observed as under:
―10. One of the essential requirements of
―novation‖, as contemplated by Section 62, is that
there should be complete substitution of a new
contract in place of the old. It is in that situation
that the original contract need not be performed.
Substitution of a new contract in place of the old
contract which would have the effect of rescinding
or completely altering the terms of the original
contract, has to be by agreement between the
parties. A substituted contract should rescind or
alter or extinguish the previous contract. But if
the terms of the two contracts are inconsistent
and they cannot stand together, the subsequent
contract cannot be said to be in substitution of the
earlier contract.
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 15
11. In the instant case, the rights under the
original contract were not given up as it was
specifically provided in the subsequent contract
that the rights under the old contract shall stand
extinguished only on payment of the entire
amount of Rs 9,51,000. Since the amount was
not paid by the appellants as stipulated by the
subsequent contract, the rights under the original
contract were still available to the respondents
and they could legally claim enforcement of those
rights. Obviously, under the original contract, the
appellants were under an obligation to provide a
flat to the respondents. This right would come to
an end only when the appellants had, in
pursuance of the subsequent contract, paid the
entire amount of Rs 9,51,000 to the
respondents. Since they had not done so, the
respondents could legally invoke the provisions of
the earlier contract and claim before the
Commission that there was ―deficiency in service‖
on the part of the appellants.‖
19. The said observations are opposite as compounding it is
alleged is pursuant to a contract between the parties. In this
connection it may be also noted that another associate of the
petitioner-Mr. Rajesh Khanna had filed a similar petition before
this Court being Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.507/2008. In
this petition, one of the contentions raised was that there was a
settlement or a Memorandum of Understanding and, therefore,
the offence was compounded. This contention was rejected after
observing that since the compromise has not adhered to by the
petitioner therein, there was no question of the petition for
quashing being entertained.
20. In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any merit in the
present petition and the same is dismissed. Observations made
above are for the disposal of the present petition and will not be
construed as observations on merits, which are binding on the
trial court.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
JUDGE
AUGUST 30, 2010
J/VKR
CRL.M.C.3308/2008 Page 16
