Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 3827 Del
Judgement Date : 17 August, 2010
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment : 17th August, 2010.
+ R.S.A.No.192/2007
BHARAT BHUSHAN GULATI ...........Appellant
Through: Mr.B.S.Mann and Mr.Jai
Prakash, Advocates.
Versus
HARI SINGH ..........Respondent
Through: Mr.Siddharth Luthra, Sr.Adv.
with Mr.Ashok Kaushik, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J.(Oral)
1. This second appeal has impugned the judgment dated
29.5.2007 which had endorsed the finding of the trial judge dated
20.03.2003 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff/appellant had filed a suit for possession stating to
be the owner of land measuring 200 sq. yds. bearing no.A3/29, Dal
Mill Road, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi. He had purchased it from
Hari Prakash on 28.11.1981. Defendant was permitted to use the
property as a licensee which license has since been terminated
but in spite of request to the defendant to evict the property; he
has not vacated the property. The defendant had refuted the
claim of the plaintiff. He had claimed ownership
by way of adverse possession. The trial court had
framed three issues. Issue no.1 was as to whether the plaintiff
is owner of suit property ? While dealing with this issue,
R.S.A.No.192/2007 Page 1 of 5
the trial court had recorded that the plaintiff has filed copy of
Khasra Girdawari for the year 1994-95 of the village Hastsal as
also a copy of Khatoni for the year 1978-79. It had further held
that in the first document the Gram Sabha has been shown to be
as a Bhumidar of land measuring 4.13 bighas comprised in Khasra
no.76, Katoni No.694, Killa no.9/2/2 and the latter document
shows that Khasra no.72/2/2/2, 76/9/2/2 vests in the Gram Sabha
by virtue of Section 81 of Delhi Rent Control Act. In these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was the owner of
the suit property as the same had vested in the Gram Sabha. The
registered sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff dated 28.11.1981
does not pass any title as the vendor had no right to sell this suit
property. It was further held that defendant is not a licensee in
the suit property. Suit of the plaintiff was dismissed.
3. The first appellate court endorsed the finding of the trial
judge. The relevant extract of which reads as follows:
"8. The provisions quoted by Ld.counsel for appellant
does not create right or title in the suit property as owner
thereof on the basis of documents executed by Hari
Prakash on 28.11.81 in favour of the plaintiff as Hari
Prakash too was having no title to the suit property even
from so called original owners/bhoomidars of the suit land
namely Daya Nand, Khshi Ram and Ishwar Singh and
their successor in interest who executed documents of the
property in favour of Hari Prakash as was discussed in
detail by the Ld.Civil Judge. It is well settled proposition
of law that a person having no title cannot pass on any
title in respect of the property. Since the land in suit
belongs to gram sabha as per khasra girdawari and
khatoni of the village and was also vested in the gram
sabha under Section 81 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act by
order of the SDM Punjabi Bagh in case no.93/84, no other
person other than gram sabha could create a title of
R.S.A.No.192/2007 Page 2 of 5
ownership in favour of the plaintiff as on 28.11.81 the
date when one Hari Prakash executed documents in
favour of the plaintiff on which basis ownership was
claimed by the plaintiff including one of the substituted
plaintiff namely Bharat Bhushan who was brought on
record vide order dt.14-2-2000 after death of the plaintiff
on 15.11.99. As such, the sale deed in favour of Bharat
Bhushan also does not create right or title as owner of the
suit property in favour of Bharat Bhushan which has been
proved on record by the appellant as Ex.PW1/6 i.e. the
sale deed dt.27.8.98 by the plaintiff in favour of his own
son namely Bharat Bhushan. The same principle that
person having no title cannot pass any title applies to this
sale deed also against one of the plaintiff namely Bharat
Bhushan."
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the
judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is liable to be set
aside for the reason that the disputed land has been notified under
Section 507 (a) of the the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as „the DMC Act‟) as „urban land‟ and as
such it is taken out of the purview of the Delhi Reforms Act. For
this proposition reliance has been placed upon a judgment of
Division Bench of this court in W.P.(C) 4143/2003 Smt.Indu
Khorana vs. Gram Sabha & Ors. wherein it has been held that
once a rural area is urbanized by issuance of a notification under
Section 507 (a) of DMC Act, provisions of Delhi Reforms Act will
cease to apply. There is no dispute to this proposition. However,
it is to be noted that the notification under Section 507 A of DMC
Act had not been brought on record by the plaintiff. This is an
oral submission which is made at this stage. No court below had
any such evidence to draw a finding that the disputed land had
become urbanized under Section 507 (a) of the DMC Act and was
R.S.A.No.192/2007 Page 3 of 5
excluded from the provisions of the Delhi Reforms Act. This
judgment is inapplicable.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance
upon 162 (2009) DLT 684 Mahesh Chandra Agarwal vs.
Rameshwar & Ors. to support his submission that question of
ownership cannot be decided only by looking at the revenue
records and Khasra Girdawari and the Khatoni were not
documents sufficient to hold that the plaintiff was not the owner of
the suit property. Reliance by the learned counsel for the
appellant on this judgment is totally misplaced. It was the plaintiff
himself who had placed the Khasra Girdawari for the year 1994-95
and Khatoni for the year 1978-79 to substantiate his claim of title
to the suit property. These were the documents of the plaintiff
himself which had been relied upon by the courts below to draw a
conclusion that they are contrary to his submission that he is
owner of the suit land. This judgment also does not come to help
of the appellant.
6. The substantial questions of law have been formulated on
page 16 of the memo of appeal; they are nine in number. The
same have been perused. They relate to findings of fact that the
disputed land has vested in the Gaon Sabha. They cannot by any
stretch of imagination be termed as substantial questions of law.
Arguments addressed have already been aforenoted.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has
submitted that no question of law has arisen before this court.
There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the
respondent. Arguments addressed before this court have in fact
raised no substantial question of law.
R.S.A.No.192/2007 Page 4 of 5
8. Both the fact finding courts below had on a detailed analysis
of the evidence adduced before them, both oral and documentary,
drawn the fact finding conclusion that the plaintiff is not owner of
the suit property. The plaintiff not being the owner was not
entitled to the relief sought for by him. This court is not a third
fact finding court. No substantial question of law having arisen,
appeal is dismissed in limine.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
AUGUST 17, 2010 rb
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