Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 3782 Del
Judgement Date : 13 August, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on :05.08 2010
% Date of decision :13.08.2010
+ WP (C) No.255/2000
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ...PETITIONERS
Through: Ms.Avnish Ahlawat, Ms.Latika
Chaudhary, Ms.Simran and
Mr.Nitesh Singh, Advocates.
Versus
SUB INSPECTOR OM PRAKASH MEENA & ANR.
...RESPONDENTS
Through: Mr.Shyam Babu,
Advocate for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be YES
reported in the Digest?
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The legal question which arises for consideration in the
present case is as to whether a probationer, who during
the extended period of probation is proceeded against
departmentally, can be deemed to have been confirmed
on the expiry of the extended period of probation even
though departmental proceedings were pending and _____________________________________________________________________________________________
subsequently culminated in punishment being imposed
on the concerned probationer.
2. SI Om Prakash Meena/R-1 was appointed as a temporary
SI(Executive) in Delhi Police on 10.04.1972 and was
confirmed on 10.03.1976. The service tenure of R-1 was
chequered inasmuch as his conduct invited censures on
three occasions. There were adverse ACRs for two
periods and one increment withheld for a period of one
year with the suspension period not treated as spent on
duty.
3. The case of R-1 was considered by the Departmental
Promotion Committee on 11.03.1985 for Promotion List
(F) Executive which decision was deferred because of
pendency of departmental enquiry. On conclusion of
enquiry, R-1‟s name was brought on the said Promotion
List (F) Executive with effect from 11.03.1985. The R-1
was actually promoted to officiate as Inspector
(Executive) with effect from 01.09.1986 giving him pro
forma promotion form 13.06.1985 to 31.08.1986. The
period of probation specified in Delhi Police (Promotion
and Confirmation) Rules, 1980 {„the said Rules‟ for
short} is two years and thus in normal course R-1 was
due for confirmation in the rank of Inspector (Executive)
with effect from 01.11.1987. However, his probation was
extended for a period of one year with effect from
01.11.1987 due to indifferent record of service. This
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
order came to be passed on 11.04.1988 on account of
initiation of departmental proceedings against R-1. The
case of R-1 was examined for confirmation on the expiry
of the extended period of probation on 31.10.1988, but
since he was facing departmental enquiry, the issue of
confirmation was kept pending till finalization of the
departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry
resulted in an order dated 11.12.1989 whereby the
punishment of reduction to the rank of Sub Inspector was
imposed on R-1 for a period of three years. The ACR of
R-1 even thereafter for the period 01.04.1989 to
31.03.1991 was recorded as adverse.
4. It is the case of R-1 that under the said Rules applicable
to him, there could not have been an extension of
probation for a period beyond 31.08.1989 and he should
be deemed to have been confirmed irrespective of
pendency of the departmental proceedings against him.
This plea is predicated on a premise that nothing
prevented the petitioner from reverting R-1 to the
original post without any stigma during the period of
probation.
5. The aforesaid plea found favour with Central
Administrative Tribunal („CAT‟ for short) before whom R-1
moved an OA and in terms of the impugned order dated
16.07.1999, the challenge laid by the petitioner to the
order dated 22.02.1994 proceeding on the assumption
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
that R-1 had failed to complete his probation period was
quashed and the petitioner was directed to restore R-1 to
the rank of Inspector permanently from the date on
which he was reverted to the post of SI with all
consequential benefits in accordance with rules and
regulations.
6. We may notice at this stage that the order dated
22.02.1994 records that since R-1 has been reduced to
the rank of Sub Inspector as a measure of penalty on
11.08.1989, he is deemed to have been reverted to the
rank of Sub Inspector with effect from 11.12.1989 for his
failure to successfully complete the probation period. It
is this decision which is now sought to be impugned by
the petitioner/Govt. of NCT of Delhi by filing the present
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to
reproduce the relevant rules and thereafter proceed to
interpret their effect. The same are Rule 5 and Rule
18(i) and (iv) of the said Rules.
"Rule 5 : General Principles of
Promotion
i).....
ii) All the promotions form one rank to
another against temporary or permanent vacancies, except in the case of ad hoc arrangements shall be on officiating basis and the employees shall be considered for confirmation only on availability of permanent posts and on successful completion of probation period of minimum 2 years provided that _____________________________________________________________________________________________
the appointing authority may, by a special order in each case permit periods of officiating service to count towards the period of probation. On the conclusion of the probationary period, the competent authority may either confirm the promotee or revert or, if it so thinks fit, extend the period of probation by the year and on the cancellation of the extended period of probation pass such orders as it may deem fit provided that the period of probation shall not be further extended in any case while on probation, an officer may be reverted without departmental proceedings.
Such reversion shall not be considered reduction in rank for the purpose of Rule 8(b) of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980.
Rule 18 Confirmation
i) Save as otherwise provided in these rules, confirmation in all ranks shall be strictly on the basis of seniority when permanent posts become available.
ii)...
iii)...
iv) No member of subordinate rank, who is under suspension or facing departmental/criminal proceedings shall be eligible for confirmation. Their cases shall be decided by the DPCs concerned after such proceedings are over. A departmental enquiry shall be deemed to have been initiated after the summary of allegations has been served."
8. We may also extract the Circular No. 13794-876/CB
dated 19.04.1980 governing confirmation and the
relevant para 4(ii) of the same reads as under:
" Where an officer has been awarded a punishment either minor or major for an act of misconduct reflecting adversely on his integrity, he will be placed on probation for two years from the date of the availability of _____________________________________________________________________________________________
permanent post and will not be given the benefit of converting his officiating period into probation as in the case of others."
9. It is the interplay of the aforesaid rules which would
certainly determine the controversy in question and it is
the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the CAT has referred to and mis-interpreted Rule
5(ii) without noticing rule 18(iv) of the said Rules.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out to
us that even during the period of reversion, R-1 was
awarded a major penalty of forfeiture of six years
approved service for a period of six years which
punishment was also upheld by the CAT in OA
No.1474/2002 clarifying that R-1 was not to get any
increment during these periods of six years when his pay
was reduced.
11. This conduct of R-1 also invited a show cause notice
under Rule 7(ii) of the said Rules on 06.04.1994 for
removal of the name of R-1 from Promotion List (F) and
his name was removed on 09.09.1994.
12. Now proceeding to the said Rules, it is quite apparent
that the salient features of Rule 5(ii) of the said Rules
laying down the general principles of promotion are as
under:
All promotions form one rank to another against
temporary or permanent vacancies shall be on
officiating basis.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
An employee shall be considered for promotion only
on availability of permanent posts.
An employee can be considered for promotion on
successful completion of probation period of minimum
two years.
On the completion of probation period, the competent
authority may either confirm or revert the promotee
as it deems fit or extend the period of probation by
one year.
In case of extension of probation period by one year,
on completion of such extended period the competent
authority may pass such orders as it deems fit.
The period of probation shall not be further extended
in any case while on probation, an officer may be
reverted without departmental proceedings.
13. Similarly, the salient features of Rule 18(iv) of the said
Rules are as under:
No member of the subordinate rank, who is under
suspension or facing departmental/criminal
proceedings, shall be eligible for confirmation.
The cases of such candidates will be decided by DPC
concerned after such proceedings are over.
The departmental enquiry shall be deemed to have
been initiated after the summary of allegations has
been served.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
14. Insofar as the factual matrix is concerned, learned
counsel for R-1 initially sought to contend that since
name of R-1 was brought on the Promotion List (F) with
effect from 13.06.1985, the period of two years of
probation and one year of extended period of probation
should be counted from the said date. However, this
plea is without any merit for the question of probation to
begin would only arise when a person starts working on a
post though he may have got some other benefits
retrospectively. Undoubtedly, R-1 started functioning on
the promoted post only from 01.09.1985. His probation
has been counted from the said date and also extended
accordingly which was never challenged. The day to
reckon would thus be 01.09.1985.
15. The departmental proceedings were initiated on
11.04.1988 and were in progress when R-1 completed
the extended period of probation on 31.10.1988. The
case of R-1 was kept pending for such consideration of
confirmation or reversion in view of the departmental
enquiry which resulted in a punishment only on
11.12.1989. The moot point which thus arises for
consideration is whether pending such enquiry in the
absence of either confirmation or reversion, can R-1 be
deemed to have been confirmed.
16. We may notice at this stage that there was apparently
amendment to the Rules with effect from 09.05.1989
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
during the pendency of the proceedings and the relevant
amended Rules are as under:
"Rule 5 : General Principles of
Promotion
i).....
ii) All promotions from one rank to another temporary or permanent vacancies, except in the case of adhoc arrangements shall be on officiating basis. The competent authority on completion of probation period of two years may assess the work and conduct of the officer himself and in case the conclusion is that the officer is fit to hold the higher grade, he will pass an order declaring that the person concerned has successfully completed the period of probation. If the competent authority considers that the work of the officer has not been satisfactory or needs to be watched for some more time, he may recruit him to the post or grade from which he was promoted, or extend the period of probation, as the case may be.
Rule 18 Confirmation
i) Confirmation shall be made only once in the service of an official which shall be in the entry grade. Confirmation is delinked from the availability of permanent vacancy in the grade. In other words, an officer who has successfully completed the period of probation may be considered for confirmation.
ii)....
iii)....
iv) No member of subordinate rank, who is under suspension or facing departmental/criminal proceeding shall be eligible for confirmation. Their cases shall be decided by competent authority _____________________________________________________________________________________________
concerned after such proceedings are over. A departmental enquiry shall be deemed to have been initiated after summary of allegations has been served."
17. We may, however, note that the impugned order also has
proceeded on the basis that unamended Rules would
apply. In any case, insofar as R-1 is concerned, we may
say that the unamended Rules are more beneficiary
especially Rule 5(ii) of the said Rules on which R-1 has
relied.
18. The legal issue relating to „deemed confirmation‟ has
been noticed in a catena of judgments of the Supreme
Court. There have been different lines of reasoning on
this principle being applied to service jurisprudence. The
various judgments have been discussed in a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in Khazia Mohammed
Muzammil v. The State of Karnataka & Anr; JT 2010 (7)
SC 149.
19. The Supreme Court has itself re-cognized that there are
two views prevalent in the Supreme Court. The first view
is that there can be deemed confirmation after an
employee has completed the maximum period of
probation provided under the said Rules. The second
view is that there would be no deemed confirmation and
at best after completion of maximum probation period
provided under the said Rules governing an employee,
the employee becomes eligible for being confirmed in his
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
post. The period of probation remains in force till written
document of successful completion of probation is issued
by the competent authority. In fact, the Supreme Court
observed "having examined the various judgments cited
at the bar, including that of all larger Benches, it is not
possible for this Bench to state which of the view is
correct enunciation of law or otherwise. We are of the
considered opinion, as to what view has to be taken,
would depend upon the facts of a given case and the
relevant Rules in force."
20. The fact that the purpose of probation is to ensure that
before an employee attains the status of confirmed
regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his
duties and functions to enable the Authorities to pass
appropriate orders, has been recognized in para 12 of the
judgment in Khazia Mohammed Muzammil v. The State of
Karnataka & Anr.‟s case (supra). Thus, the scheme of
probation is to judge the ability, suitability and
performance of an officer under probation. Thereafter
there is discussion on the different judgments earlier
pronounced by the Supreme Court. We would like to cull
out the substance of the views expressed in different
judgments.
21. In State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh; AIR 1968 SC 1210, it
was observed that there would be confirmation by
implication when there is certain period beyond which
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
the probation period cannot be extended. The Seven-
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shamsher v. State
of Punjab; (1974) 2 SCC 834 while examining the
question whether termination during probation could be
viewed as a punitive action in some cases or always has
to be as discharge simplicitor during the said periods,
also discussed at some length whether a probationer can
automatically be confirmed on the expiry of period of
probation. It was held that though the principle of
deemed confirmation existed in that case, any
confirmation by implication was negatived because
before the completion of three years, the work as well as
the conduct of the concerned officer was found to be
unsatisfactory and a notice was given to the officer.
Where such a notice is given, it was observed, that the
period of probation gets extended till the enquiry
proceedings come to an end in pursuance to that notice
and the period of probation shall be deemed to have
been extended impliedly. In Dayaram Dayal v. State of
MP; (1997) 7 SCC 443, the Supreme Court specifically
noticed the two lines of rulings pronounced by that Court
in its different judgments. The conclusion was that there
was no serious conflict between the two sets of decisions
and it depended on the conditions contained in the order
of appointment and the relevant rules applicable.
Similarly, in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
v. S.Manjunath; (2000) 5 SCC 250, it was observed that a
person should not be considered to have satisfactorily
completed the period of probation unless specific order
to that effect is made and the delay in issuance of
certificate would not entitle the person to be deemed to
have satisfactorily competed the period of probation.
While observing so, a reference was also made to the
view in Wasim Beg v.State of UP; (1998) 3 SCC 321. In
that context, it was observed that one line of cases held
that if the rule or order of appointment specified a period
of probation, power to extend probation is also conferred
and the officer is allowed to continue beyond the
prescribed period of probation, he cannot be deemed to
be confirmed and there is no bar on the power of
termination of the officer after expiry of the initial or
extended period of probation. This is so, as at the end of
probation, the officer merely becomes qualified or
eligible for substantive permanent appointment.
22. The second line of cases are where even though there is
a provision in the said Rules for initial probation and
extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension
is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to
extend probation. It is in this line of cases that the
continuation beyond period of probation as a probationer
stood negatived by the fixation of a maximum time-limit
for the extension of probation.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
23. The third string which emerges from Shamsher v. State
of Punjab‟s case (supra) is that despite indication of a
maximum period of probation, the implied extension was
held to render the maximum period of probation a
directory one and not mandatory and an order of
confirmation is a must. In such a situation, what is also
material is whether there is anything else in the Rules
which had the effect of whittling down the right to
deemed confirmation on account of the prescription of a
maximum period of probation beyond which there is an
embargo upon further extension being made.
24. In High Court of Madhya Pradesh v. Satya Narayan
Jhavar; (2001) 7 SCC 161, the Supreme Court declined to
accept the contention that the employee was entitled to
an automatic confirmation after expiry of the probation
period. The rule provided maximum period of probation,
but it depended on the fitness of such employee and his
passing departmental examination by high standards.
This view has been followed in Registrar, High Court of
Gujarat v. C.G.Sharma (2005) 1 SCC 132.
25. It is in the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments that
the Supreme Court in Khazia Mohammed Muzammil v.
The State of Karnataka & Anr.‟s case (supra) came to the
conclusion that the pith and substance of the stated
principles of law is that it will be the facts and the Rules
which will have to be examined by the Courts as a
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
condition precedent to the application of the dictum
stated in any of the line of cases noticed. There can be
cases where rules require a definite act on the part of the
employer before officer on probation can be confirmed
and in those cases automatic confirmation would not
arise. On satisfactory completion of probation period,
the authorities shall have to consider the suitability of the
probationer to hold the post to which he was appointed.
26. If the aforesaid principles and Rules are applied to the
facts in the present case, we find that Rule 5(ii) of the
said Rules requires "successful completion of probation
period of minimum 2 years". This is a pre-requisite for
confirmation on an available permanent post. This of
course has to be read with the stipulation that the
competent authority may either confirm or revert or
extend the period of probation by a year without further
extension of period of probation. However, in our
considered view, the successful period of probation is
mandatory and it can hardly be said that there is a
successful completion of the period of probation when
during the extended period of one year, a departmental
proceeding itself is initiated which has culminated in a
punishment.
27. The most important aspect is that Rule 18(iv) of the said
Rules seems to have been lost sight of and not even
noticed in the impugned order. It has already been
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
observed in Khazia Mohammed Muzammil v. The State of
Karnataka & Anr.‟s case (supra) that in determining the
question of such deemed confirmation, the play of other
rules has also to be taken into account as to whether
they whittle down this principle. If in this context Rule
18(iv) of the said Rules is analyzed, it is obvious to us
that where departmental proceedings are initiated, no
person is eligible for confirmation and the competent
authority has to decide the issue of confirmation only
after such departmental proceedings are over. This is
exactly what has happened in the present case. The
departmental proceedings had commenced well before
the expiry of the extended period of three years. When
the extended period of three years was expiring on
31.08.1988, it was deemed appropriate to keep the
matter in abeyance pending departmental enquiry.
These departmental proceedings ultimately culminated
in a punishment of reduction of rank of R-1 to SI for a
period of three years vide order dated 11.12.1989. If we
were to accept the contention of learned counsel for R-1,
that the absence of exercise of power of reversion
without any stigma ought to have been exercised within
the extended period and the petitioner ought not to
have waited till the conclusion of the departmental
enquiry, an anomalous position would emerge where R-1
himself would have challenged any such reversion on the
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
ground that it is tainted by a view taken in view of the
pendency of the departmental proceedings which had
not culminated against or in favour of R-1. It would be
travesty of justice if a person like R-1 was to be given the
benefit of such deemed confirmation while departmental
proceedings are pending against him.
28. The career graph of R-1 from the inception has been
tardy inviting three censures, two adverse ACRs and one
increment being withheld for one year even prior to his
being placed on Promotion List (F). When R-1 got the
benefit to serve on the promoted post, he failed to render
satisfactory service to an extent that the department
instead of merely reverting him deemed it appropriate to
initiate proceedings even during the probation period
which culminated in R-1 being imposed with the
punishment of reduction of rank for a period of three
years vide order dated 11.12.1989. Even thereafter in
another departmental enquiry, R-1 has been awarded a
major penalty of reduction of pay in six stages for a
period of six years on 28.09.1990 apart from subsequent
censure.
29. If the facts of the present case are thus examined along
with the relevant Rules, we have no doubt in our mind
that R-1 can hardly be said to be a person who has been
found suitable to hold the post or that he has
satisfactorily performed his duties. In fact, it is a case of
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
deemed extension of probation period in view of
departmental proceedings having commenced against R-
1 during the period of probation. The impugned order is
predicated on only Rule 5(ii) of the said Rules ignoring
Rule 18(iv) of the said Rules.
30. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, the impugned
order of the CAT dated 16.07.1990 is set aside and the
Rule is made absolute. The parties are left to bear their
own costs.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
August 13, 2010 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. dm
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
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