Citation : 2010 Latest Caselaw 3781 Del
Judgement Date : 13 August, 2010
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO(OS) No.157/2010
%
Date of Decision: 13.08.2010
Haryana Power Purchase Centre. Appellant/applicant
Through Mr. Parag Tripathi Sr. Advocate with
Raghav Gupta, Advocate for the
Appellant.
Versus
P.T.C. India Ltd. and Another .... Respondents
Through Mr.Ashish Bernard & Mr.Varun Pathak,
Advocates for respondent No.1.
Mr.Shanti Bhushan, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.Vishal Gupta, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in NO
the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
1. The appellant/applicant, Haryana Power Purchase Centre
(hereinafter referred to as the 'HPPC) has filed this appeal under Section
37 (1) (a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 seeking inter-alia
to set aside the order dated 19th February, 2010 passed in OMP No.25
of 2010 filed by the P.T.C. India Ltd. against the Jaypee Karcham Hydro
Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the JKHCL) under Section 9
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966. The appellant/applicant
has also sought a direction to PTC India Ltd., respondent No.1 and
JKHCL, respondent No.2 to approach Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'CERC') and to make an interim
arrangement for three weeks for continuation of order dated 29th
January, 2010 passed by the Division Bench in FAO (OS) No.73 of 2010
whereby Single Judge was directed to dispose off the matter
expeditiously and the counsel for JKHCL had stated that the said
company shall not enter into any agreement with any other party for
the sale of power, so as to allow the HPPC to approach the CERC and
to obtain the order under Section 94 (2) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
2. By order dated 19th February, 2010, the application filed by the
PTC India Ltd. under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1966, seeking stay of termination of PPA (Power Purchase Agreement)
by JKHCL and directions against the JKHCL from entering into any
agreement for sale of power with any other party, was dismissed by the
learned Single Judge by the said order.
3. In the said petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1966 being OMP No.25 of 2010, titled as 'PTC India
Ltd. v. JKHCL', an application for impleadment of the
appellant/applicant, HPPC under Order I Rule 10 (2) read with Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 19th February, 2010 was also
filed. In the application, the appellant/applicant contended that it had
entered into a power sale agreement dated 25th September, 2006 for the
purpose of 200 MW of power from PTC India Ltd. in which power was to
be procured by the PTC India Ltd. under the Power Purchase Agreement
dated 25th March, 2006 from JKHCL.
4. The allegation of the appellant/applicant was that the Power Sale
Agreement (PSA) was executed for procurement of power on continuous
basis for 35 years from the commercial operation date (COD) of the
Hydro Electricity Power Project developed by the JKHCL in the State of
Himachal Pradesh. The plea of the appellant/applicant is that the tariff
payable by the appellant/applicant to PTC India Ltd. had to be
determined by the said Central Electricity Regulatory Commission in
accordance with its Regulations and reliance was placed on Clause
9.1.2 of Power Sale Agreement.
5. The appellant/applicant further asserted that JKHCL suffered
cost escalation and approached CERC for its approval and filed a
petition bearing No.153 of 2009 seeking grant of approval for the
revised capital cost of Rs.7080.38/- crores and to declare and confirm
that the CERC shall consider the final cost and/or tariff for the project.
According to the appellant/applicant by order dated 26th October, 2009,
the CERC had adjudicated the prayer for approval of revised capital cost
and did not consider final capital cost and/ or tariff for the project. It
was also pleaded that under Regulation 5 of the CERC (terms and
condition of tariff) Regulation, 2009 JKHCL was to approach six months
before the commercial operation date. According to the
appellant/applicant ultimate beneficiary of power generated from the
project is the appellant/applicant as PTC India Ltd. is only entitled to
recover and retain its trading margin for the supply of power for the
project, and in case PPA and PSA are terminated and parties are
directed only to pay damages, it will not be an adequate relief to the
appellant/applicant, and if cost of procuring power would be more, the
appellant/applicant shall be forced to pass it on to the consumer which
will be against the public interest. In the circumstances, it was asserted
that the Court is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of disputes
between the PTC India Ltd. and JKHCL, and Electricity Act, 2003 is a
comprehensive Act with respect to all the matters pertaining to
electricity which should be determined by the CERC.
6. The appellant/applicant also contended that in the
circumstances, under Section 79 (1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003 the
CERC has the statutory responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes
involving generating company with regard to the matters connected with
Clause 'a' to 'd' of Section 79 (1). The appellant/applicant also
contended that in terms of Section 94 (2) of the Electricity Act, 2003,
the CERC also has the power to grant interim relief and on these
allegations, the appellant/applicant sought to be impleaded as party to
OMP No.25/2010, the petition filed by the PTC India Ltd. under Section
9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 against JKHCL to seek
the declaration that the said petition under section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the PTC India Ltd. was not
maintainable and for direction to PTC India Ltd. to approach the CERC
for adjudication of his disputes with JKHCL.
7. The grievance of the appellant/applicant is that though on 19th
February, 2010, application for impleadment was filed by the
Appellant/applicant in OMP No.25 of 2010, and the fact about filing of
the application for impleadment was mentioned before the Learned
Single Judge, however, he has not taken into consideration the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant/applicant. According to
the appellant/applicant even if the application for impleadment of the
appellant/applicant was not on record, while dismissing OMP
No.25/2010, the petition of the PTC India under section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the learned Single Judge should
have considered the pleas and contentions raised by the
appellant/applicant.
8. Mr. Tripathi, learned senior counsel for the Appellant has also
pointed out by referring to para 18 of the appeal stipulating that the
application for impleadment filed by the appellant was withdrawn by
the appellant on 24.2.2010 as the main petition being OMP No.25/2010
under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had been
disposed of by the Single Judge by order dated 19th February, 2010. Mr.
Tripathi, senior Advocate has further contended that despite withdrawal
of application of the appellant for impleadment to the proceedings
under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on
account of non consideration of pleas and contentions of the
applicant/appellant, the decision of the Single Judge dated 19th
February, 2010 has been impacted and in the circumstances the
present appeal shall be maintainable.
9. The learned senior counsel has relied on (1983) 3 SCC 75, M/s
M.Ramnarain Private Limited Vs State Trading Corporation of India Ltd;
(2002) 10 SCC 668, V.D.Barot Vs State of Gujarat and Ors. (1998) 6
SCC 507, P.R.Despande Vs Maruti Balaram Haibatti and (2000) 5 SCC
44, Jagdish Lal Vs Parma Nand in support of his contention that
though the application for impeachment was withdrawn by the
appellant before the learned single judge and no order had been passed
on the pleas and contentions of the appellant, yet the appeal against the
impugned order passed in the petition of respondent no.1 is
maintainable.
10. In Jagdish Lal (supra) the tenant had given an undertaking before
the High Court to vacate the premises and thereafter, had approached
the Supreme Court. It was held that the right of the tenant to approach
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not
curtailed because of undertaking given to the lower Court. It was
further held that the Supreme Court could examine the circumstances
under which the undertaking was given and decide whether the
tenant's special leave petition misled the Court or deceived the other
party. The Supreme Court had however, left the question moot where
the tenant himself requested to the Court to vacate the premises and
gave the undertaking and thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Apparently the case of the appellant is quite distinguishable as the
application for impleadment was withdrawn by the appellant on his
own.
11. In P.R.Deshpande (supra) it was held that the appeal by a tenant
against an order of eviction would be maintainable notwithstanding any
undertaking given by him before High Court that he would vacate the
premises within specified time. In V.D.Barot (supra) a writ petition was
withdrawn by a petitioner in order to file a representation to the
authorities and after representation was rejected, a fresh writ petition
was filed which was held to be maintainable despite petitioner not
withdrawing the earlier writ petition with liberty to file the writ petition
after adjudication of his representation. In M/s M.Ramnarain Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) an appeal which was not competent was withdrawn and
subsequently another appeal was filed incorporating grounds which
were taken in earlier appeal. The Supreme Court had held that such an
appeal was maintainable.
12. The ratio of all these cases relied on by the appellant are different
and distinguishable and does not support the plea of the appellant that
after withdrawing his application for impleadment before the Single
Judge, he can challenge the order passed by the learned Judge in the
main petition in which impleadment was sought by the appellant. It is
no more res integra that the ratio of any decision must be understood in
the background of the facts of that case. What is of the essence in a
decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what
logically follows from the various observations made in it. It must be
remembered that a decision is only an authority for what it actually
decides. It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a
decision. The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to
another case without having regard to the fact situation and
circumstances in two cases.
13. On 19th February, 2010 when the Single Judge decided the
petition of the respondent no.1 under section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 pursuant to the order of the Division Bench in
FAO (OS) 73 of 2010 dated 29th January, 2010 to decide the petition
expeditiously, though the application for impleadment was filed by the
appellant, however, it was neither listed nor could be termed to be
pending, so as to take the same into consideration by the Single Judge.
14. Whether the appellant was a necessary party to be impleaded in a
petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has
not been adjudicated by the Single Judge. Without impleadment of the
appellant, whether the appellate Court should interfere with the
discretionary interim order passed by the Single Judge. In the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case it would not be appropriate to take
up the pleas and contention of the appellant in order to determine the
validity of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19th February,
2010.
15. This also cannot be disputed that the appellate Court is not to
interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and
substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been
shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or
where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating
grant or refusal of interim orders. An appeal against exercise of
discretion is appeal on principle and the appellate Court is not to
reassess the material and to reach a conclusion different from the one
reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellant could contest the
grant or decline of interim order by respondent No.1 against respondent
No.2 after being impleaded as a party to the petition. The appellant for
the reasons known to him opted to withdraw the application for
impleadment and consequently the pleas and contentions of the
appellant remained undetermined by the Learned Single Judge.
16. After withdrawing the application for impleadment to the petition
under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by
respondent No.1, if the appellant was of the view that he was a
necessary party and should have been heard and its pleas considered
by the Single Judge, the appellant could have filed another application
for impleadment and could have sought review of order dated 19th
February, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in OMP No.25/2010
the petition of respondent No.1 under Section 9 of Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 or could have initiated any other proceedings
deemed appropriate. This observation by this Court, however, does not
adjudicate that after withdrawing the application for impleadment
without seeking leave of the Court to file a fresh application, whether
such a subsequent application would be maintainable or not.
17. In the circumstances the facts which have emerged are that the
application for impleadment was withdrawn by the appellant and the
appellant was not impleaded by the learned Single Judge. The pleas and
contentions raised by the appellant in respect of the order under
Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 dated 19th
February, 2010 have not been considered and adjudicated by the
learned Single Judge. In the circumstances, whether this appellate
Court should consider the pleas and contentions of the appellant and
interfere with the impugned order dated 19th February, 2010 which is a
discretionary order passed by the Single Judge, is to be determined by
this Court.
18. If the jurisdiction of the appellate Court is restricted and the
appellate Court is not to interfere with the exercise of discretion of the
Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where
the discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or in
ignorance of settled principles of law, it will not be appropriate for the
appellate Court to exercise jurisdiction in favour of the appellant whose
pleas and contentions were not considered because the
appellant/applicant had opted to withdraw his application for
impleadment and consequently even the pleas and contentions raised
by the appellant could not be considered by the learned Single Judge.
19. In the totality of facts and circumstances and taking into
consideration all the facts, it would not be appropriate for the appellate
Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction against the order dated 19th
February, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in a petition under
Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 by respondent
No.1 against respondent No.2 on the basis of pleas and contentions of
the appellant. Consequently the appeal of the appellant cannot be
entertained and is rejected.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on
(2008) 4 SCC 755, Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. S.R.Power Ltd
holding that conduct of arbitration under Section 86(1) (f) of Electricity
Act, 2003 would be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 to the extent there is no conflict with any
provisions of Electricity Act and in case of conflict the Electricity Act
would prevail. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that
while considering the order of the Single Judge dated 19th February,
2010 passed on a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by respondent No.1 against respondent
No.2, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd (Supra) be considered. The learned counsel has also placed
reliance on Order 1 Rule 8A of Code of Civil Procedure authorizing
Court to permit a person or body of persons to take opinion or to allow
persons to take part in the proceedings. In the circumstances, it is
contended that since the appellant is also an interested person in
questions of law and pleas and contentions raised by respondent No.1
and respondent No.2, therefore, the said precedent be considered by
this Court while adjudicating the challenge to the order dated 19th
February, 2010 of the learned Single Judge.
21. This has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the
appellant, Mr.Prag Tripathi, Senior Advocate that the said precedent is
referred to by both the parties, respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 in
the appeal being FAO (OS) No.146/2010 titled PTC India Ltd v. Jaypee
Karcham Hydro Corporation Ltd as the said appeal was listed along
with the present appeal and was argued by respective counsel for
respondent No.1 & 2. Therefore, the said precedent, Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd shall be considered by the Court in the appeal filed by PTC
India Ltd against J.P.K.H.C.L against the order dated 19th February,
2010. In the circumstances the appellant is not to be given any further
permission under Order 1 Rule 8A of Code of Civil Procedure to take
part in the proceedings as the appeal No.FAO (OS) No.146/2010 had
been heard before the present appeal.
With these observations the present appeal is disposed of.
ANIL KUMAR, J.
August 13, 2010 MOOL CHAND GARG, J. 'vk'
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