Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3889 Del
Judgement Date : 22 September, 2009
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 21.08.2009
Judgment delivered on: 22.09.2009
Crl. Appeal No. 160/2006 &
Crl. M. (Bail) 558/2009
TEJA @ TEJVEER SINGH @ TEJ PAL ..... Appellant
Vs
N.C.T. GOVT. OF DELHI (STATE) ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellants : Mr Naresh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr Amit Sharma, Addl. Public Prosecutor
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment ?
2. To be referred to Reporters or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J
1. This is an appeal preferred by the appellant against the
judgment and sentence dated 21.12.2005 rendered by the
Additional Session Judge (ASJ), Karkardooma, Delhi. The learned
ASJ, by virtue of the impugned judgment, has sentenced the
appellant to a rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years for
each of the offences under Section 363/366 and 376 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short the „IPC‟). In addition, a fine of
Rs 5,000/- has been imposed in respect of each of said offences. In
default, the appellant/accused would be required to undergo simple
imprisonment for a further period of one year for each of the
offences. The sentences are to run concurrently.
2. The appellant/accused who is convicted for an offence of
kidnapping and rape has primarily pivoted his defence on the
ground of consent of the prosecutrix (PW1), who he claims,
willingly accompanied him in fleeing from her home, and
subsequently got married to him. However, this by itself would not
end the travails of the appellant/accused because even if the
prosecution fails to establish that there was a lack of consent, it
could still succeed in getting the appellant/accused convicted at
least under Section 376 of the IPC, if it is able to prove that on the
date of the incident, i.e., 16.01.2002 the age of the prosecutrix
(PW1) was less than 16 years, as it would then, constitute a rape
within the provisions of the 6th circumstance provided for under the
provisions of Section 375 of the IPC. Unfortunately, the trial court
has confined its examination of the case only to this aspect and,
therefore, returned a finding only as regards the issue as to
whether the prosecutrix (PW1) on the date of incident was below
the age of 16. This, according to me, is an approach which should
be abjured by the trial courts. The trial court ought to have
determined both the issues. Given the fact that nearly 7 years have
passed from the date of the incident, and the appellant has already
undergone nearly half of the sentence, awarded to him, it would be
inappropriate for this court not to examine all the contentions of the
appellant/accused based on the evidence, available on record.
3. It is in this background that one is called upon to examine the
case of the prosecution. The prosecution has examined Sixteen (16)
witnesses, out of which three (3) are the relatives of the prosecutrix
(PW1) being; the father Mool Chand (PW3), mother Kaushalya
(PW7), and cousin brother Rajesh (PW2). The land lord of the
house, where the prosecutrix (PW1) and the appellant/accused
stayed for nearly one month, Mahesh (PW5), has also been
examined. Dr. Usha Upreti, who examined the prosecutrix (PW1)
on 27.02.2002 is PW9, while Dr. S.B. Jangpangi, who examined the
appellant/accused, is PW10. The remaining witnesses, apart from
the prosecutrix (PW1), are police witnesses, who were involved with
various facets of the investigation. The edifice of the prosecution‟s
case, therefore, rests mainly on the testimony of the prosecutrix
(PW1) herself, the members of her family, the land lord and the
doctors, who examined her and the appellant/accused.
4. The prosecution version is as follows: On 19.01.2002, ASI
Chanchal Sharma (PW4) was on duty at police station Mandawali,
Delhi. At about 1.50 p.m., he received a complaint from the father
(PW3) of the prosecutrix (PW1), which inter alia, brought to fore the
fact that the prosecutrix (PW1), had attended her school on
16.01.2002 for her pre-board examination along with her younger
sister Monika. Since the prosecutrix (PW1) did not return from her
school, the complainant/father (PW3) tried to look for her at all
known places, including the house of his relatives and friends. The
complainant/father (PW3) also made enquiries with the owner of
the van, which each day took the prosecutrix (PW1) along with
other children to the school and brought them back. Through his
enquires with the van owner that PW3, the father of the
prosecutrix, learnt that the appellant/accused had been removed
from employment. It is in these circumstances, that the
complainant/father (PW3) informed the police that he suspected the
appellant/accused of having kidnapped the prosecutrix (PW1).
Based on his complaint, a FIR bearing no. 19/2002 under Section
363 of the IPC was registered on 19.01.2002.
4.1 The ASI Chanchal Sharma (PW4) proved the registration of
FIR being Ex. PW3/A. He also deposed that the FIR was handed
over to SI D.K. Tejwan (PW15) through constable Pawan Kumar
(PW8).
4.2 SI Pawan Kumar (PW8), in his testimony, deposed that on
receipt of the FIR he handed over the same to SI D.K. Tejwan
(PW15). He further deposed that they visited the village of the
appellant/accused in Ghazipur, U.P. where they met his sister Saroj
as well as his brother. In their visit to Ghazipur, they were
accompanied by PW3, the father of the prosecutrix (PW1). It is
here that they were handed over a passport size photograph of the
appellant/accused, which SI D.K. Tejwan (PW15) took in his
possession and drew up a memo (Ex. PW8/A). In his examination-
in-chief, even though he deposed that it was the prosecutrix (PW1)
who had handed over the birth certificate issued by St. Andrews
Scots Senior Secondary School, where she was studying at the time
when the incident took place; in his cross-examination, however, he
slipped into amenisia and, stated that he did not remember having
made any statement with regard to having taken into possession
the age certificate of the prosecutrix (PW1). PW8, however, stated
that the I.O. seized the birth certificate and drew up a memo being
Ex. PW 8/B.
4.3 S.I. D.K. Tejwan, I.O. (PW15) confirmed the events of
19.01.2002, that is, receipt of information from the father (PW3)
about his daughter having been kidnapped by the
appellant/accused. He testified that on receipt of information,
notices were published with respect to, the prosecutrix (PW1) and
the appellant/accused which he proved as Ex. PW15/A and
Ex.PW15/B respectively. He also testified that wireless messages
were flashed with regard to the kidnapping of the prosecutrix
(PW1). He testified having collected the age certificate of the
prosecutrix (PW1) from the complainant/father (PW3). He deposed
that on 26.02.2002, secret information was received that the
appellant/accused was residing with the prosecutrix (PW1) at DD-
221, Krishna Colony, Palwal, Haryana. Thereafter, on receipt of
information, he testified, a raiding party comprising of himself,
cousin brother of the prosecutrix, Rajesh (PW2) and constable
Somdutt (PW14) reached Palwal (Haryana) along with the informer,
at about 11.00 p.m. At 6.00 a.m. in the morning, the next day they
entered the house situated at DD-221, Krishna Colony, Palwal,
Haryana, where both the prosecutrix (PW1) and the
appellant/accused were found present. The prosecutrix (PW1) was
identified by her cousin brother Rajesh (PW2). A recovery memo
(Ex. PW2/A) was prepared. He proved his signatures at point „A‟ on
the recovery memo. He also testified that a site plan (Ex. PW15/D)
of the place of recovery was also prepared. He testified with regard
to his signatures at point „A‟ on the site plan. He also deposed with
respect to the fact that a statement of the owner of the house,
Mahesh (PW5) was also recorded by him. He also testified with
regard to the medical examination of both the prosecutrix (PW1)
and that of the appellant/accused. He further deposed with respect
to having received two sealed packets (pulandas) and one sample
containing the vaginal swab. He deposed having received the blood
sample of the appellant/accused. He further testified that the
sealed packet (pulanda) (Ex. PW12/A) containing underwear and
blood sample of the appellant/accused, and the other packet
(pulanda) (Ex. PW11/A) containing undergarments and vaginal
swab of the prosecutrix (PW1) were sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory (FSL), Malviya Nagar, Delhi, through Constable Kheta
Ram (PW13) for examination. He testified with regard to the fact
that the said reports are exhibited as Ex. PW/E1 to Ex. PW/E3 as
also the fact that the Ossification report of the prosecutrix (PW1) is
Ex PW15/F. In his cross-examination, he testified that prosecutrix
(PW1) and the appellant/ accused were lying on a cot when they
were apprehended and the prosecutrix (PW1) was wearing salwar
and shirt, while the appellant/accused was wearing pant and shirt
at that point in time. He accepted the fact that at the time when
the prosecutrix (PW1) and the appellant/accused were apprehended
they did not attempt to run away. He had no recollection, however,
as to whether the prosecutrix (PW1), at the time when she was
apprehended, had applied sindhoor on her forehead. He denied the
suggestion that the prosecutrix (PW1) had told him, at the time
when she was apprehended along with the appellant/accused, that
the appellant/accused was her husband, and that she wanted to live
with him and not go back to her parents. In his cross-examination
he seems to have contradicted himself as to whether the appellant/
accused, at the time when he was apprehended, was carrying a
mobile phone. At one point he said that the appellant/accused had
a mobile phone with him, and immediately thereafter, he denied
this fact.
4.4 As indicated by me, the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW1) is
crucial for the purposes of this case. In her testimony, the
prosecutrix (PW1) has stated that she had been travelling in the
van, driven by the appellant/accused, for about two months prior to
the date of incident. She has also testified that the appellant/
accused had, on one such trip, handed over a letter to her, in which
he had expressed his love and affection for her, which was not
reciprocated by the prosecutrix (PW1). On 16.01.2002, the
prosecutrix (PW1) travelled by the van to appear for her pre-board
examination. In the afternoon she got into the same van. The van
was empty, according to the prosecutrix (PW1), as younger children
were on vacation, due to pre-board examination being held for
students of classes Xth and XIIth. The prosecutrix (PW1) testified
that the appellant/accused instead of taking the van home, took the
van to some other place. On the way she, however, screamed.
Since the appellant/accused threatened to harm her and her family
members, she remained quiet. The van, according to her, took her
to a place outside Delhi, wherefrom she did not attempt to
telephone her parents, since the appellant/accused issued threats
both vis-à-vis her and her family members. The prosecutrix (PW1)
deposed that she started living with the appellant/accused, and it is
then that he subjected her to sexual intercourse repeatedly over the
period of one month, that she lived with him, in a tenanted
accommodation, outside Delhi. She testified that her date of birth
was 18.07.1986. In her cross examination, she deposed that she
knew the appellant/accused for nearly two months prior to the
incident. The appellant/accused used to telephone her at her
residence; however, she was not aware of the mobile number of the
appellant/accused. She also testified that even though threats were
meted out to her while they were travelling in the van, the
appellant/accused did not, at any point in time, leave his seat. The
prosecutrix (PW1) testified that at the various traffic signals, where
the van stopped, she did raise an alarm but persons passing by
could not hear her, since the windows of the van were rolled up.
4.5 What is important is that in her testimony, she accepts the
fact that even though she got acquainted with the ladies of the
tenanted house, where they were living, however, at no point in
time did she disclose to them that she had been kidnapped or
subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant/accused against
her will. In the prosecutrix‟s (PW1) testimony, it has clearly come
out that she informed the other ladies of the house where she was
residing with the appellant/accused, that she was the wife of the
appellant/accused. The prosecutrix (PW1) also testified to the
effect that the appellant/ accused did step out of the house for a
period of 1 to 3 hours daily, at which point in time she was alone,
and even so, she made no attempt to escape from the house where
they were living. She also deposed that it was the appellant/
accused who would cook and wash clothes for both of them, while
they were living in the house. She denied the suggestion that the
appellant/accused had sexually assaulted her prior to 16.01.2002,
i.e., the date of the incident. The prosecutrix (PW1) denied the
factum of her marriage with the appellant/accused. In her
testimony, the prosecutrix (PW1) accepted that she did not resist
the sexual assault of the appellant/accused though she had tried to
push the appellant/accused away. She stated that since the
appellant/accused would shut her mouth, it prevented her from
raising an alarm, while being subjected to sexual intercourse. She
deposed that the appellant/accused was in love with her. However,
the feeling was not reciprocated by her.
4.6 The cousin brother Rajesh (PW2) testified with respect to the
fact that he had gone along with the police to the appellant‟s/
accused village at Ghazipur, U.P., where they were handed over a
photograph of the appellant/accused by his family members. He
also testified to the effect that he had accompanied S.I. D.K. Tejwan
(PW15) on 26.02.2002 on their raid at the house in Palwal
(Haryana), from where the prosecutrix (PW1) and the appellant/
accused were apprehended. In his cross examination, he denied
the suggestion that the prosecutrix (PW1) was a major, and that she
was married to the appellant/ accused.
4.7 The complainant/father (PW3) of the prosecutrix (PW1) in his
testimony detailed the events of 16.01.2002. He deposed with
respect to lodgement of the complaint by him with the police
station, Mandawali, Delhi, on 19.01.2002. He proved his signatures
on the FIR (Ex. PW3/A) at point „A‟. He deposed with respect to the
medical examination of the prosecutrix (PW1) at Lal Bahadur
Shahtri Hospital (in short the „Hospital‟) on 27.02.2002. In his
cross-examination, PW3 testified that at the time of his daughter‟s
admission at St. Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School, he had
submitted a school leaving certificate issued by the school in which
she was earlier admitted, which is, Sarvodaya Laghu Mahyamik
Vidyalya at Ghajipur, U.P. He testified that the prosecutrix (PW1)
was admitted to St. Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School in
1997, and that his younger daughter Monika was admitted to the
same school in 1999. He denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix
(PW1) had informed him about being teased by the appellant/
accused at any time prior to 16.01.2002. He denied the suggestion
that the prosecutrix (PW1) was 22 years old. He denied the
knowledge of the fact that the prosecutrix (PW1) received
telephone calls from the appellant/accused at their residence.
4.8 The landlord, Mahesh (PW5), identified the appellant/accused
as the one who had stayed at his house. He testified that on
16.01.2002 the appellant/accused came to his house looking for a
room on rent along with the prosecutrix (PW1), who he claimed to
be his wife. He deposed that he had let out the house on a monthly
rent of Rs 400. He deposed that while the appellant/ accused was
away from his house, the prosecutrix (PW1) had often accompanied
his wife and other ladies to the market. In his cross-examination,
he testified that the prosecutrix (PW1) used to apply sindhoor, and
also wore chutaki in the fingers of her feet, and also, a mangalsutra,
and that she dressed like a married woman. He further testified
that the prosecutrix (PW1) had attended a „jasotan‟ ceremony held
at his house. It was also brought out in his cross-examination that
he had a telephone installed in his house to which the prosecutrix
(PW1) had access. He further testified that he had seen both the
appellant/accused and the prosecutrix (PW1) in a compromising
position. He testified that the prosecutrix (PW1) never made any
complaint against the appellant/accused to him or any other
members of the family.
4.9 Ms P.L. Rana (PW6), Principal of St. Andrews Scots Senior
Secondary School testified that the prosecutrix (PW1) was admitted
to their school on 30.07.1997, and as per their record her date of
birth was 10.07.1986. She testified that the certificate (Ex PW6/A)
was issued by her, on 19.01.2002. She proved the application form
(Ex. PW6/B) for registration of admission of the prosecutrix (PW1)
which was filed by her parents, on 23.07.1997. She also proved the
certificate issued by the school in which the prosecutrix (PW1) was
admitted (Ex. PW6/C). She testified that as per the original register
of all the students, maintained by the school, the prosecutrix‟s
(PW1) name appeared at serial no. 1687, and that as per the said
register her date of birth was 10.07.1986. In her cross-
examination, she accepted the fact that there was over-writing in
Hindi of the word „swecha‟ and, also with respect to, the date of
birth which has been evidently changed from 10.07.1985 to
10.07.1986. She also testified that there was over-writing of the
word „naukri‟ after the name, Mool Chand.
4.10 Sh. Ram Karan Singh Yadav (PW16), who at the relevant time,
was the Asst. Head Master of Sarvodya Laghu Mahyamik Vidyalya,
Gazipur, U.P., deposed that as per their record, the date of birth of
the prosecutrix (PW1) was 10.07.1986. He testified that the
prosecutrix was admitted to their school on 18.07.1996, in Grade VI
and, continued in the school till 11.07.1997. He proved the transfer
certificate being Ex. PW6/C, which bore the signatures of the
Principal at point „A‟. In his cross-examination, it was observed by
the Court, that except the entry pertaining to the prosecutrix
(PW1), the Principal had not signed any of the entries in the
register.
4.11 The appellant/accused in his statement under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the „Cr.P.C.‟) clearly
stated that at the relevant point in time on 16.01.2002, he was not
in the service of the school. He made a categorical statement that
he had left the job of the school one month prior to the date of the
incident, and that it was the prosecutrix (PW1), who had called him
to school; and after initial reluctance, on the prosecutrix‟s (PW1)
insistence, he agreed to visit her at the school. He categorically
stated that the prosecutrix (PW1) had informed him that she was 19
years of age, and that the prosecutrix (PW1) had willingly
accompanied him to Palwal (Haryana) as she was in love with him;
a relationship which was objected to by her family members. He
also stated that they had got married and were staying at Palwal
(Haryana) as husband and wife for a period of one month before
they were apprehended by the police. The appellant/accused‟s
defence was one of false implication.
4.11 Dr. Usha Upreti (PW9), who examined the prosecutrix (PW1),
proved the MLC (Ex.PW9/A). She confirmed the opinion rendered
by her in the MLC. In her deposition she clearly testified as
follows:-
"No injury marks over thigh or vulva, bilateral labia majora and minora normally developed, hymen - torn, old tear + no fresh injury mark, carunculae myritiformis.
P/S - Cervix healthy; vagina healthy. P/V vagina patulous, admitting two fingers easily, uterus deviated to left side, normal size, mobile, R/V bilateral fornices free, non tender."
4.12 In her cross-examination, PW9 testified that when the vagina
admits two fingers, it can be concluded that the person concerned
is sexually active.
4.13 Dr. S.B. Jangpangi (PW10) proved the MLC (PW10/A) with
regard to clinical examination of the appellant/accused. He
testified that the appellant/accused was capable of performing
sexual activity. He also testified that the under garments of the
appellant/accused as well as his blood samples were sealed and
handed over to the I.O. (PW15).
Submissions of Counsel
5. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted that
the reading of the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW1),
complainant/father (PW3), mother Kaushalya (PW7), cousin brother
Rajesh (PW2) and more importantly, the land lord Mahesh (PW5)
would show that the prosecutrix (PW1) went away with the
appellant/accused of her own will; the prosecutrix (PW1) was living
with the appellant/accused as his wife in Palwal (Haryana); and that
therefore, it could not be said that the prosecutrix (PW1) was
subjected to sexual intercourse against her will.
5.1 As regards the age of the prosecutrix (PW1), the learned
counsel for the appellant submitted that the Ossification report
clearly shows [which has been proved by the I.O. (PW15) and
marked as „X‟] that the prosecutrix (PW1) was between 18 to 22
years of age at the time of the incident. He also referred to the
application form (Ex. PW6/B) for registration of admission as well
as the certificate (Ex. PW6/C), issued by the Sarvodya Laghu
Mahayamik Vidyalya, Ghazipur, U.P., to demonstrate that there was
over-writing in the first one with respect to the date of birth, in
particular, the year which has been changed from 1985 to 1986,
and in the second certificate (Ex. PW6/C), there was over-writing
with respect to the column where details of the father had to be
given in so far as the words „naukri‟ was concerned, as also the date
of birth, which was once again quite evidently over-written and
changed from 1985 to 1986. He submitted that the admission and
withdrawal register, on which reliance has been placed by the
prosecution, in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix (PW1) was
given as 10.07.1986 being Ex. PW6/D, would have no relevance
since the entry was on the face of it made on 04.04.2002, much
after the date of the incident, as well as, the filing of the FIR. He
also took me through the testimony of the mother Kaushalya (PW7)
to show that her deposition with regard to the age of the
prosecutrix (PW1) cannot be relied upon. In brief, his submission
was that in view of the fact that there is overwhelming evidence of
the fact that the prosecutrix (PW1) went away with the
appellant/accused of her own volition, and lived with him as his
wife, the offences of kidnapping and rape were not made out. He
further submitted that in view of the fact that the Ossification
report indicated that the age of the prosecutrix (PW1) was 18 to 22
years on the date of the incident, and given the fact that there was
tampering with the record of the case, and the inherent
unreliability of the evidence of the other witnesses being interested
witnesses, it could not be held that the case of the
appellant/accused came within the ambit of the definition of the
„rape‟ as provided under the 6th circumstance of Section 375 of the
IPC.
6. As against this, Mr Amit Sharma, the learned APP, laboriously
took me through the evidence of prosecutrix (PW1) to show lack of
consent on her part. He submitted that there was apprehension of
danger to her life which inhibited her from disclosing the fact that
she was being subjected to sexual intercourse against her will. As
regards the age, the learned APP submitted that the birth
certificate was a vital piece of evidence which the courts have
accepted for determination of the age of a rape victim. He relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs Gajanan Hemant Janardhan Wankhede
(2008) 8 SCC 38.
Reasons
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as
the learned APP for the State. I am of the view that the benefit of
doubt will have to be given to the appellant/accused for the
following reasons: The testimony of prosecutrix (PW1) as well as
that of the land lord, Mukesh (PW5), clearly raises the following
issues and hence a doubt with regard to the prosecution version:
(i) How is that the prosecutrix (PW1) travelled from Delhi to
Palwal (Haryana), which is a journey of nearly two hours, in broad
day light, and it did not attract anyone‟s attention despite the fact
that prosecutrix (PW1) testified that she had raised an alarm. It is
not conceivable that the prosecutrix (PW1) could have been
controlled by the appellant/accused while he was driving the van in
which they were travelling. It is also inconceivable and therefore,
difficult to accept that she could not attract any passerby‟s
attention even though the van stopped at various traffic signals as
per her own testimony.
(ii) How is it that despite the fact that the prosecutrix (PW1) was
left alone for long hours by the appellant/accused while he went
away for work or, to attend to his personal chores, the prosecutrix
(PW1) did not use the circumstance to her advantage. This fact
raises doubts as regards the prosecution‟s case that she was unable
to physically free herself from the clutches of appellant/accused. It
is not the prosecution‟s case that while the appellant/accused was
away, the prosecutrix was tied, locked or gagged.
(iii) The acceptance by the prosecutrix (PW1) in her testimony
that she informed the ladies of the house, in which she was staying
in Palwal (Haryana), that she was the wife of the appellant/accused;
a fact which is also substantiated by the testimony of the land lord
Mahesh (PW5). The argument put forth by the prosecution that the
prosecutrix (PW1) could not divulge the truth to the other
occupants of the house or any person in locality because the
appellant/ accused had threatened her and her family members, is
difficult to believe, given the time span over which the
appellant/accused and the prosecutrix (PW1) lived in the house of
PW 5.
(iv) The testimony of the land lord, Mahesh (PW5), clearly brings
out the actual scenario, which was, that the appellant/accused and
the prosecutrix (PW1) were living in the house as husband and wife.
As a matter of fact, PW5 testified that in her appearance, the
prosecutrix (PW1) always brought to bear on her persona
accompaniments which are associated with a married woman. In
this regard, he made reference to the fact that she applied sindhoor
and wore chutaki on her toes which are attributed to a married
lady.
(v) The prosecutrix (PW1), on her own showing, as per the
testimony of the land lord Mahesh (PW5) clearly had several
opportunities to escape the clutches of the appellant/accused or at
least divulge her ordeal, if any, to the landlord (PW5) or, to the
other ladies of the house at Palwal (Haryana). The fact that she
freely visited the nearby market with the other ladies of the house
at Palwal (Haryana), where they were residing, only fortifies the
suspicion that the prosecutrix (PW1) was not confined to the house
against her will.
8. Based on the evidence on record, I am not persuaded to
accept the case, set up by the prosecution, that the prosecutrix
(PW1) was subjected to sexual intercourse against her consent.
9. This brings me to the other aspect of the matter, as to
whether the prosecutrix (PW1) on the date of the incident was less
than 16 years of age. The prosecutrix (PW1) in her testimony has
deposed that her date of birth is 18.07.1986. The record of both St.
Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School (Ex. PW6/B) as well as
Sarvodya Laghu Mahyamik Vidyalya (Ex. PW6/C) seems to indicate
that the prosecutrix‟s (PW1) date of birth is 10.07.1986. The
Ossification report, mark „X‟, shows the age of the prosecutrix
(PW1) between 18 to 22 years. Both the father (PW3) and the
mother (PW7) have denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix
(PW1) was a major on the date of the incident. Ordinarily, the
courts accept the date of birth certificate, issued from a
corporation, hospital or even one issued by the school. This is
based on the rationale that there would be no reason to incorporate
an incorrect date of birth on such like documents, as it could not
have been anticipated at the time when such information is entered
in the records of such authorities that the prosecutrix (PW1) would
get involved in an incident such as a rape. However, this statutory
rule of prudence is given a go-by when, in a given case, a doubt is
cast with regard to the quality of evidence produced in that regard.
In the instant case, the doubts are cast for the following reasons:
(i) Constable Pawan Kumar (PW8), in his examination-in-chief,
says that the prosecutrix (PW1) had handed over the birth
certificate issued by the principal of St. Andrews Scots Senior
Secondary School. In his cross-examination, he further stated that
he did not remember if he had made a statement regarding taking
possession of the birth certificate from the prosecutrix (PW1).
(ii) On the other hand, the I.O. (PW15), in his testimony, has
stated that the birth certificate of the prosecutrix (PW1) was
collected by him from the complainant/father (PW3).
(iii) Ms P.L. Rana (PW6), principal of St. Andrews Scots Senior
Secondary School clearly stated in her testimony that the entry as
regards the date of birth of the child at the stage of admission is
made as per the information given by the parent. In her cross-
examination, she produced both the application form (Ex. PW6/B)
filled up by the parents, as also the certificate issued by school
where the prosecutrix (PW1) was studying prior to her admission to
St. Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School (Ex. PW6/C). There is
undoubtedly an over-writing with regard to the word „naukri‟,
„swecha‟, as well as the year of birth, which has been changed from
1985 to 1986.
(iv) Similarly, Sh. Ram Karan Singh Yadav (PW16), Asst. Head
Master of Sarvodya Laghu Mahyamik Vidyalya, Gajipur, U.P. clearly
accepted in his cross-examination that the original certificate did
not bear the signatures of the principal. Furthermore, the court
had observed that the original register which contained the records
of the students did not bear the signatures of the principal.
(v) Furthermore, the testimony of the mother (PW7) would
indicate that while she claims to be an illiterate in court; however
her qualification recorded in Ex. PW6/B, which is the application
form for registration of the admission of the prosecutrix (PW1) in
St. Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School disclose her
qualification as High School. PW7 has also clearly contradicted
herself in so far as the age of the prosecutrix (PW1) is concerned.
Before the court PW7 has given her age as 45 years. The testimony
of PW7 was recorded in court on 04.07.2003. She has claimed that
they had been residing in Delhi for about 8 to 9 years, which would
fix the year as 1994 or 1995. She has stated that she admitted the
prosecutrix (PW1) to Grade VI. In 1993-94, if the date of birth of
the prosecutrix (PW1) is taken as 10.07.1986, her age would be
around 7 or 8 years. It does seem unlikely that the prosecutrix
(PW1) could have gained admission to Grade VI when she was 7 or
8 years old. Furthermore, in her cross-examination PW7 said that
when she gave birth to the prosecutrix (PW1), she was about 19 to
20 years of age. In 2002, if the PW7‟s claim is accepted, that the
prosecutrix was 16 years then, by this calculation in 2003, PW7
should have been around 37 years of age, and not 45 years, as she
had stated on oath before the court.
(vi) The reliance by the learned APP on the judgment of Gajanan
Hemant Janardhan (supra) is of no help for the reason that, in
that case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the High
Court should not have ignored the evidence which emerged with
regard to the date of birth of the prosecutrix from the school
leaving certificate and the school register. In the instant case, it
has clearly come out in the cross-examination that there is over-
writing in both exhibits, Ex. PW6/B, which is the application form
for registration/admission of the prosecutrix in St. Andrews Scots
Senior Secondary School, and Ex. PW6/C, which is a document
produced by Sarvodya Laghu Mahyamik Vidyalya, in respect of date
of birth of the prosecutrix (PW1).
10. If the date of birth of the prosecutrix (PW1) is taken as
10.07.1986, then, on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix (PW1)
would be around 15 years and six months. Keeping in mind the
evidence which has emerged in the present case vis-à-vis the age of
the prosecutrix (PW1), I am of the view that the benefit of doubt
should go to the appellant/ accused for the reason that both the
Exhibits, Ex. PW6/B, which is the application form for registration/
admission of St. Andrews Scots Senior Secondary School, and Ex.
PW6/C, which is a document produced by Sarvodya Laghu
Mahyamik Vidyala, clearly indicate that there is over-writing
crucially with regard to the year of birth of the prosecutrix (PW1).
The said interpolation, when seen in the light with the ossification
report (Ex. Mark „X‟), and the contradictions in the testimony of the
mother (PW7), and the inconsistency as to who handed over Ex. PW
6/B to the police, as has emerged from the testimony of constable
Pawan Kumar (PW8) and I.O. (PW15), clearly casts doubt with
respect to the age of the prosecutrix (PW1) on the date of incident,
as propounded by the prosecution.
11. In these peculiar circumstances, I would grant the benefit of
doubt to the appellant/accused. Unfortunately, in the impugned
order, as observed by me above, the trial court has not only not
dealt with the aspect, as to whether or not the prosecutrix (PW1)
was subjected to sexual intercourse with her consent, but also
failed to deal with the other crucial aspect which is discussed
above, that is, the interpolation of Ex. PW6/B and PW6/C. The trial
court, without discussing the anomalies in the said evidences, came
to a conclusion of conviction, in my view erroneously, by applying
the case law, without appreciating or weighing the evidence which
has come on record in the instant case. As to how the trial court
has recorded the conclusion in paragraph 21 of the impugned
judgment to the effect, that it is proved that the prosecutrix (PW1),
on the date of the incident, was below the age of 18, is a complete
mystery.
12. For the reasons given hereinabove, the appeal is allowed and
the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant/accused is
acquitted of the offences, with which he has been charged in the
instant case. The appellant/ accused shall be set free, in the event,
he is not required in any other case.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 kk
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!