Shri Mangal Sain Mittal vs M/S Ppa Impex Limited
2009 Latest Caselaw 3851 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                 Date of Reserve : 15.09.2009
                                                 Pronounced on : 18.09.2009

+                   IA NoS.3384/2008 & 3385/2008
                                           in
                                   CS (OS) 909/2007
Shri Mangal Sain Mittal                                               Plaintiff

                    Through : Mr. S.K. Puri, Sr. Advocate with
                    Mr. Pawan Kumar Mittal and Ms. Hrishika Pandit,
                    Advocates

                                           Versus.

M/s PPA Impex Limited                                                 Defendant

                    Through : Mr. J.C. Mahindroo, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

1.    Whether the Reporters of local papers                    Yes
      may be allowed to see the judgment?

2.    To be referred to Reporter or not?                       Yes

3.    Whether the judgment should be                           Yes
      reported in the Digest?

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. This order will dispose of the plaintiff's applications for decree on admission (IA 3384/2008) and under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2, Civil Procedure Code (CPC), being IA 3385/2008.

2. The plaintiff claims to be owner of suit property, i.e S-6, Green Park Extension. It was let out, though four separate registered lease deeds dated 6-6-2002, covering four portions of the suit property. The property was sold, through a registered sale deed, to Mrs. Raj Rani Sethi, on 7-6-2002; the plaintiff contends having entered into an agreement to purchase the property from Mrs. Sethi, on 27-9-2002, for a consideration of Rs. 49,05,000/-. It is submitted that the said vendor delivered

IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 1 constructive possession of the premises to the plaintiff, on 1-9-2002; it is alleged that a letter of attornment was sent to the defendant company, inspite of which the latter did not pay the arrears of rent, or pay any lease rent, as agreed, to the plaintiff. The premises, contends the plaintiff, were leased through separate lease deeds, but in the same terms, for the same tenure; though they concerned separate portions, they formed a composite tenancy. According to the plaintiff, the total monthly rent payable was Rs. 2,16,000/-. It is contended that in terms of the lease deed, the defendant's lease was to end on 31-12-2004; they could, however, continue in the premises on payment of enhanced rent. It is submitted that the defendant continued in the premises for a further period of 27 ½ months, without existence of a valid lease deed, since the lease period was never extended.

3. The plaintiff submits that the defendant has fallen in arrears of rent from 1-9- 2002 and that after execution of the agreement to sell, in favour of the plaintiff, and handing over constructive possession, as well as the execution of sale deed in its favour on 29-12-2006, it became full owner of the premises, entitled to claim all rights in relation to it. The plaintiff alleges having served a notice dated 8-4-2005 to the defendant asking it to vacate the premises, for default in paying rent, besides damages. It also claims having served a notice dated 19-1-2007, and followed it up with a reminder dated 1-2-2007, repeating the demand for vacation of the premises, after the Sale Deed was executed in its favour. The plaintiff, therefore, claims a decree for possession and damages. The plaintiff, in the application, alleges that the defendant's written statement has admitted the service of notice (asking it to vacate the premises), and has not raised any substantial defence, but has instead, set up a false case that it was intending to purchase the suit property, and therefore, could not be evicted. There is, according to the plaintiff, no worthwhile defence to the claim for possession, and the court should, in the interests of justice, decree that relief.

IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 2

4. The defendant does not deny its occupation of the suit premises, and the circumstances under which it secured possession. It, however alleges having started an 'A class' restaurant and Bar, called M/s Fareinheit. The defendant contends that the plaintiff had been instrumental in causing mischief to it, by blocking water supply and electricity from the generator installed on the top floor, in spite of the previous owners (of the premises) not objecting to the activity. It is contended that the defendant spent more than Rs. 4.4 crores in renovating the premises. The defendant sets up a case of "suspension" of its liability to pay rent, saying that the plaintiff's acts disentitled it to payment of any amount, since the amenities were intentionally denied to it.

5. The defendant argues that the plaintiff had represented that the suit property would be transferred in favour of its (defendant's) director, Mr. P.P. Singh for Rs. 50 lakh for which stamp paper worth Rs.4,00,000/- was purchased. Thereafter, the plaintiff and the previous landlady Mrs. Raj Rani Sethi kept on delaying the deal on one pretext or the other, after having received Rs. 6,00,000/- as advance and despite it (the defendant) getting drafts worth Rs. 20 lakhs. It is further argued that two other amounts, through cheques in the names of M/s B.L. Mittal and M.S. Mittal were prepared, and further, that the sum of Rs. 14,00,000/- was lying with the previous landlady Mrs. Sethi.

6. It is argued that the plaintiff's mischievous activities and obstructions have resulted in the defendant being unable to meaningfully use the premises, since its restaurant and bar activities had to be stopped. It is argued that the defences mentioned in the written statement, nowhere disclose any clear or unequivocal admission, or for that matter, any admission, which is the only basis for a court to decree any suit claim, under Order 12 Rule 6.

7. The above discussion would reveal that the parties do not dispute the facts pertaining to the manner in which the defendant obtained possession of the suit premises, on 6-6-2002, through a registered lease deed. The plaintiff alleges to have

IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 3 secured title, through a registered sale deed, dated 29-12-2006. The defendant seeks to prevaricate about the liability to pay rents or damages; it avers that the sale deed, in favour of the plaintiff, is "of no avail" since the landlady had entered into an agreement to sell the property to it. The defendant no doubt also mentions about the alleged mischief of the plaintiff, due to which it had to stop its restaurant. However, no Agreement to Sell, in support of the arrangement, or particulars when it was arrived at, has been disclosed in the suit, or details, averred. Likewise, the defendant's allegations that it spent over Rs.4.4 crore is unsubstantiated; no details again are provided. The defendant has in fact mentioned that the plaintiff was a party to the agreement to sell the suit property to it.

8. Order 12 Rule 6 is intended to enable expeditious grant of decree, to a plaintiff, in a proceeding where the defendant has made any admission in the pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. The plaintiff, in such case, need not wait for completion of the trial. The object of such provision is to curtail the period for determination of disputes and to see that a decree on admission is passed without any unnecessary hindrance. The expression 'admission' comprehends admissions by a party in pleadings or otherwise, orally or in writing. The provisions are to be liberally construed. The Court should essentially satisfy itself that all the elements which constitute admission are present, before issuing a decree. An admission to enable the plaintiff, to relief, should be unambiguous, clear and unconditional.The judgment of the Supreme Court, in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. v. Union Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 2740 is an authority on the issue; it states that :

"Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Order 12 Rule 6 comes under the heading 'admissions' and a judgment on admission could be given only after the opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, made; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission, that even though, the provision reads that the Court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with Order 8 Rule 5(1) of CPC and Court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 4 such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently, that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression 'admissions' made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression 'otherwise' will have to be interpreted ejusdem generies.

As to the object of the Order 12 Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the Legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that 'where a claim ia admitted, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.' We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.

The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial Court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial Court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the Court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable."

9. A court, considering whether to decree a claim, under Order 12 Rule 6, has to see the written statement as a whole; the order cannot also be claimed as a matter of course, since it is discretionary, and the court has to base its exercise of discretion on sound principles. Here, the defendant does not deny having executed the lease

IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 5 deed; it does not also deny that the lease period ended in December 2004. In the circumstances, the lease ended by efflux of time. Its main defence is that the plaintiff's predecessor - and also the plaintiff agreed to sell the suit property to it. No details are given in support; even the date is not averred. Instead, the defendant banks on copies of demand drafts supposed to have been prepared, to be given for the agreement to purchase, and photocopies of stamp paper, said to have been purchased by it. However, the defendant has not set up any substantive claim in this regard; concededly, the period of limitation to enforce such a claim has ended. Equally, the plea about it having spent Rs. 4.4 crores, appears to have been made casually; there is no claim for that amount. Assuming that such amount was spent, at the time the defendant secured the premises, the period for recovering it has long since expired. As regards the plea of "suspension of rent" apart from the averment, there is no basis; no letter or document, entitling the defendant to withhold such rents, has been brought to this court's notice.

10. In view of the above circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the written statement contains unambiguous admissions about the lawful tenancy of the defendant having expired on 31-12-2004; there has been no extension of the lease arrangement, which ended by efflux of time, and the plaintiff sent notices asking the defendant to vacate the premises. The plaintiff, is, in this court's view, clearly entitled to the decree of possession he seeks, through the present application. In view of these findings, the relief sought in the other application is rendered infructuous; the plaintiff would have to prove his entitlement to damages, and the amount he seeks as a decree, for the purpose.

11. IA 3384/2008 is accordingly allowed; let a decree for possession in terms of Para 18 (a) of the suit, be drawn. The defendant is allowed one month's time to vacate the premises, and hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the said suit premises. For the above reasons, IA 3385/2008 cannot succeed; the plaintiff is

IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007 Page 6 however at liberty to claim any such amounts, as it seeks, in the suit. The said application is therefore, dismissed in these terms.

September 18, 2009                                    (S.RAVINDRA BHAT)
                                                            JUDGE




IA Nos.3384 & 3385/2008 in CS (OS) 909/2007                               Page 7