Delhi High Court
Chunni Lal vs The State, Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 18 September, 2009
Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 18.09.2009
+ CRL. A. No.232 of 1996
CHUNNI LAL ...APPELLANT
Through: Mr.Sumeet Verma, Advocate.
Versus
THE STATE, GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI ...RESPONDENT
Through: Mr. Pawan Sharma, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be No
reported in the Digest?
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. (Oral)
1. The appellant Chunni Lal has been convicted and
sentenced in Sessions Case No. 233/95 arising out of FIR
No.4/93 registered at PS Rajouri Garden for having
committed the offence punishable under Sections 302,
IPC and sentenced accordingly.
2. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of
conviction dated 19.09.1996 and order on sentence of the
even date, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal.
3. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant moved
an application for urging additional grounds being
Crl.M.A.7576/1998 pleading that he was a „child‟ within
the meaning of the definition of the expression „child‟
under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and that he ought to have
been tried under the said Act instead of the IPC.
4. In support of his prayer, the appellant filed photocopy of
his School Leaving Certificate wherein his date of birth is
shown as 05.01.1978 suggesting that on 31.12.1992,
date of commission of offence, he was a juvenile being
under 18 years of age.
5. The said application was allowed vide the order dated
17.12.1998 allowing the appellant to raise the additional
grounds at the time of final hearing of the appeal. The
respondents were permitted to have the facts verified and
oppose the grounds on merits. Thereafter vide the order
dated 15.04.1999 the Sessions Judge was directed to
determine the age of the appellant at the time of the
alleged incident. On 07.09.2009 learned counsel for the
appellant stated that he had a copy of the Age Estimation
Report, School Leaving Certificate and Janampatri and the
learned APP was directed to get the same verified. It was
also noted that the report from the District & Sessions
Judge was not on record and the same was called for. A
letter dated 15.09.2009 has been received from the
learned ASJ stating that no age verification report was on
record.
6. The respondent has filed a report dated 18.09.2009 under
the signatures of Inspector B.R. Sankhla PS Rajouri
Garden stating the School issuing the School Leaving
Certificate had got closed 14/15 years ago but the Head
Master of the School in 1986 had already filed an affidavit
in 1999 stating that he had issued the certificate. As per
the admission register the date of birth of the appellant is
05.01.1978. The age estimation report of the appellant
has also been verified. His age was examined to be
between twenty and twenty one years as per report given
by doctor on 21.09.1999.
7. It may be noticed here that the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
has been repealed by The Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 („the said Act‟ for short)
as amended up to date and Rules framed thereunder and
grant of benefits under said Act and Rules framed
thereunder.
8. In view of the said position, learned counsel for the
respondent has not disputed that the age of the appellant
on the date of commission of offence was less than 18
years. Thus, it is obvious that he was a juvenile as per
Section 2 (k) of the said Act wherein it is provided that a
„juvenile‟ or a „child‟ means a person who has not
completed eighteenth year of age.
9. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the
appellant, on instructions from the appellant, submitted
that the appellant does not wish to press the appeal on
merits and prayed for grant of benefit under 7-A of the
said Act to him.
10. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned
counsel for the appellant, it would be useful to reproduce
Section 7-A of the said Act, which is as follows:
"7-A Procedure to be followed when
claim of juvenility is raised before
any court - 1) Whenever a claim of
juvenility is raised before any Court or a
Court is of the opinion that an accused
person was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence, the Court shall
make an inquiry, take such evidence as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so
as to determine the age of such person,
and shall record a finding whether the
person is a juvenile or a child or not,
stating his age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be
raised before any Court and it shall be
recognized at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall
be determined in terms of the provisions
contained in this Act and the rules made
thereunder, even if the juvenile has
ceased to be so on or before the date of
commencement of this Act.
2) If the Court finds a person to be a
juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence under sub-section (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for
passing appropriate order, and the
sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall
be deemed to have no effect."
11. From a perusal of Section 7-A of the said Act, it
transpires that as per clause (1), whenever a claim of
juvenility is raised before any Court, the Court shall make
an inquiry and take such evidence as may be necessary
so as to determine the age of such person and shall
record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child
or not stating his precise age as nearly as possible.
12. We have already concluded above that the
appellant was a juvenile on the date of commission of
offence as his age then was about 15 years. Clause 2 of
Section 7-A of the said Act provides that if the Court finds a
person to be juvenile on the date of commission of offence,
it shall forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board for
passing appropriate orders, and the sentence, if any, passed
by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect. The import
of this provision is that sentence awarded by the impugned
order of sentence will have no effect and the matter ought
to be referred to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing
appropriate orders. We may, however, note that as per
Section 15 of the said Act, the maximum period for which a
juvenile can be sent to a Special Home is three years. As
per the nominal roll of the appellant, the appellant Chunni
Lal has already suffered detention for a period of more
than six years.
13. In view of the fact that the appellant has suffered
incarceration for a period which is more than the
maximum period of detention in Special Home
permissible under the said Act, we do not deem it
appropriate to refer the matter back to the Juvenile
Justice Board for passing appropriate orders and direct
formal release of the appellant in the present appeal.
14. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
15. Bail-cum-surety bonds of the appellant are
cancelled and discharged.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
SEPTEMBER 18, 2009 AJIT BHARIHOKE, J.
dm
