Shri Harbans Singh vs M/S Juggat Pharma
2009 Latest Caselaw 3753 Del

*           IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                       W.P.(C.) No. 11649/2009

%                 Date of Decision: 14th September, 2009

# SH. HARBANS SINGH
                                                      ..... PETITIONER
!                 Through:    Mr. Yakesh Anand, Advocate.

                                 VERSUS

$M/S JUGGAT PHARMA
                                                          .....RESPONDENT

^                 Through:   Nemo.


CORAM:
Hon'ble MR. JUSTICE S.N. AGGARWAL

1. Whether reporters of Local paper may be allowed to see the judgment? NO

2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? NO

S.N.AGGARWAL, J (ORAL)

C.M. No. 11518/2009 (Exemption) in W.P.(C.) No. 11649/2009

Exemption as prayed for is granted subject to all just exceptions.

W.P.(C.) No. 11649/2009

The petitioner in this writ petition seeks to challenge an industrial

award dated 25.04.2009 by which his termination from the services of

the respondent has been found to be legal and justified and for that

reason, he has been denied any relief by the Industrial Adjudicator.

2     Heard on admission.

3     Mr. Yakesh Anand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner, contends that the impugned award suffers from perversity

because according to him, the court below has completely failed to look

into the evidence of the management to ascertain the nature of duties

performed by the petitioner in the course of his employment. He has

drawn my attention to para 31 of the impugned award at page 48 of the

paper book. I have gone through the impugned award line by line and

word by word and have considered the submissions made by counsel for

the petitioner. The contention of Mr. Anand appearing on behalf of the

petitioner is that the petitioner, though appointed as Area Sales Manager

at the time of his termination, was performing duties of clerical nature

and therefore was not excluded from the purview of definition of

'Workman' given in Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On

a perusal of the impugned award, I find that the court below has reached

to a conclusion that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning

of Section 2 (s) on the basis of cogent evidence. It is not disputed that

the petitioner while working as Area Sales Manager with the respondent

acted as an appointing authority for the medical representatives. In fact

the advertisement for filling up of vacant posts of medical

representatives in the respondent establishment was issued in the name

of the petitioner. He was a member of the Interview Board. The

appointment letters to the medical representatives selected by the

petitioner were issued under his signatures. The petitioner in fact has

admitted in the petition in ground VI (i) & (iii) at pages 12 & 13 of the

paper book that he was the best executive of the respondent company

and that he was elevated from the designation of Field Sales Manager to

Area Sales Manager because of his best performance. It is an admitted

case of the petitioner himself that he had been heading the team of Field

Sales Managers and of medical representatives for promoting the sale of

products of the respondent company. He was getting facilities of air

travel and stay in hotel as and when he used to be on official duties. The

salary of the petitioner at the time of his termination was admittedly

more than Rs.1,600/-. Under the circumstances, the conclusion arrived at

by the court below that the petitioner does not fit in the definition of

workman given in Section 2 (s) cannot be faulted with. The court below

has also taken note of the fact that the petitioner after his services were

allegedly terminated by the respondent management had settled his

accounts with the respondent management vide document Ex. MW-1/16

and was paid Rs.67,008/- in full and final settlement of his accounts with

the respondent management. Not only that, the petitioner after leaving

the employment of the respondent admittedly took up a higher job with

M/s Lark Laboratories as admitted by him in his cross-examination.

4 In view of what has been stated above, I do not find any infirmity,

perversity or illegality in the impugned award that may call for an

interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary discretionary

writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition

therefore fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.

September 14, 2009,                                  S.N.AGGARWAL, J
A