Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3555 Del
Judgement Date : 4 September, 2009
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI
FAO No. 360 of 2004
% Judgment reserved on: 27th August, 2009
Judgment delivered on: 4th September, 2009
National Insurance Co. Ltd.
Through Asst. Manager
Delhi Rgional Office-II
2E/9, Jhandewalan Extension
New Delhi-55. ....Appellant
Through: Mr. S.L. Gupta, Adv.
Versus
1. Ranbir Sharma (since deceased replaced by his
Widow and Minor daughter)
a) Smt. Kajol Widow 31 years
b) Miss Mamta Minor daughter 04 years
(Through her mother, natural guardian Smt. Kajol
widow of the deceased)
R/o. VIII-Jaun
Tehsil & Distt-Sonipat
Haryana
Present Address:
H.No. 358/2B,
Hanuman Mandir Gali,
Mandawali- Delhi -92
2. Raj Kumar Khanna
R/o. H-83, G.S. Apartment
Sector-13, Rohini,
FAO No.360/2004 Page 1 of 8
Delhi ...Respondents.
Through: Ms. Pratima Chaudhary, Adv.
Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
V.B.Gupta, J.
National Insurance Company-appellant, has filed
this appeal challenging order dated 27th September,
2004 passed by Commissioner under Workmen
Compensation Act, 1923 (for short as „Act‟).
2. Brief facts are that, Ranbir Sharma (deceased)
was employed as driver of respondent No.2 on his
vehicle bearing registration No. HR-38-G-5936(Truck).
On 19.9.2003, he received injuries in an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment. He
was removed to Heritage Hospital, Varansi, from
where he was discharged on 22.9.2003.
3. Thereafter, he got admitted in Pernami Hospital,
Shalimar Bagh, Delhi and was operated upon and was
discharged on 23.10.2003. After accident, he became
100% disabled and his earning capacity had been
totally reduced. Accordingly, he filed claim petition.
4. Respondent No.2 in reply to claim petition
admitted that, Ranbir Sharma (deceased), was
employed as a driver on his vehicle and on 19.9.2003,
he received personal injury in an accident, arising out
of and in the course of employment.
5. Appellant on the other hand, raised some
preliminary objections that, no claim form has been
filed by insured regarding accident or injuries suffered
by claimant, therefore, liability of appellant to pay
compensation or interest does not arise. But factum of
insurance of vehicle was not denied.
6. Vide impugned order, Commissioner awarded a
compensation of Rs.3,98,485.98 to the claimant-Ranbir
Sharma.
7. Being aggrieved with the impugned order,
appellant has filed this appeal.
8. During pendency of the appeal, Ranbir Sharma
died and his legal heirs were brought on record.
9. It is contended by learned counsel for appellant
that, impugned judgment is contrary to law since
Commissioner has wrongly taken the disability as
100%, without any proof of medical certificate issued
by competent authority.
10. Secondly, appellant is not liable to pay interest
and penalty. The liability to pay the same, is of
employer/owner of vehicle, under the Act.
11. On the other hand, learned counsel for
respondents No.1, contended that Commissioner under
the Act, is a quasi judicial authority and is not strictly
bound by the Rules of Evidence. In support learned
counsel for respondents, cited decision of Supreme
Court reported as State of Mysore v. S.S. Makapur
1963, 2 (SCR) 943.
12. It is also contended that disability certificate has
been duly proved on record, as Commissioner had
written letter to Chief Medical Officer, Sonepat, who
examined the deceased, qua his disability. There is,
thus, no ambiguity in the impugned judgment.
13. In S.S. Makapur (Supra), Court observed;
"The sole point for determination in this appeal therefore is whether the procedure adopted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in admitting the statements of witnesses examined before Mr. Majumdar in evidence is opposed to the rules of natural justice. The question is one of importance, because as appears from the cases which have come before us the procedure followed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in this case is the one followed by many tribunals exercising quasi judicial powers. For a correct appreciation of the position, it is necessary to repeat what has often said that tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and that
therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in Courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike Courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure, which govern proceedings in Court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but where such an opportunity had been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in courts."
14. Claimant in his evidence by affidavit Ex.AW1/A,
stated that due to this accident, he has been disabled
and is not in a position to stand and is confined to bed.
He further stated that he has become 100% disabled
for the purpose of his employment as driver and his
earning capacity has been totally reduced.
15. There is no rebuttal to this statement of the
claimant.
16. Commissioner vide letter dated 12th February,
2004, wrote to Medical Superintendant, Sonepat, that
disability certificate in respect of injuries received by
the claimant is required by the court for computing the
amount of compensation. Therefore, he requested the
doctor to examine the claimant and also asked for a
report in respect of injuries and to issue the disability
certificate.
17. Since Commissioner is a quasi judicial authority,
as per principles of law laid down in S.S. Makapur
(Supra), he was within his right to ask for Disability
Certificate from Medical Board of General Hospital,
Sonepat. Consequently, Disability Certificate
Ex.AW1/AB, was issued by Medical Board of General
Hospital, Sonepat. As per this Certificate, claimant
was having 100% disability. In view of this
convincing evidence, Commissioner rightly awarded
compensation to claimant for 100% disability.
18. Regarding contention of learned counsel for
appellant to pay interest and penalty, the
Commissioner only ordered for issuance of show cause
notice, on the issue of interest and penalty. There is
nothing on record to show, as to whether any interest
or penalty was ever imposed upon the appellant. So,
this issue is of no consequence.
19. Hence, there is no ambiguity in the impugned
order. The appeal stands dismissed.
20. Amount lying deposited, if any, in this Court be
paid to the claimants, after the expiry of period of
limitation of appeal.
21. Parties shall bear their own costs.
22. Record of Commissioner‟s Court be sent back.
4th September, 2009 V.B.GUPTA, J.
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