Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3485 Del
Judgement Date : 1 September, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M. C. No.1845/2008
Reserved on : 22.07.2009
Date of Decision : 01.09.2009
Sh. T. V. Ramanathan ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. D.C. Mathur, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. I.Ghosh, Adv.
Versus
Government of NCT of Delhi ...... Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawan Bahl, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers can be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J.
1. The petitioner by virtue of the present petition has prayed
for quashing of complaint dated 4th January, 2008 and the
summoning order passed by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate on 10th January, 2008.
2. Briefly stated facts of the case are that on 2nd November,
2007 an inspection of the premises bearing No. B-24
Okhla, Industrial Area, Phase-I, New Delhi was conducted
by the Inspector of Factories and it is alleged that there
were 30 persons employed who were servicing and
repairing the batteries. Sixteen workers were found to be
working at the relevant time. Accordingly, a panchnama
was prepared on a factory inspection form and signatures
of one Alok Bose representative of the management were
obtained. On the basis of the aforesaid inspection, a show
cause notice dated 22nd November, 2007 was issued to Sh.
T. V. Ramanathan, M/s Exide Industries Ltd. who was
alleged to be running a servicing and repairing centre of the
Exide Batteries. Interestingly, the inspection report shows
the name of the occupier as Sh. T. V. Ramanathan
although it is not explained as to why his signatures were
not obtained.
3. The M/s Exide Industries Ltd. gave a reply to the show
cause notice on 18th December, 2007 and took the plea that
no manufacturing of battery was taking place at the
premises in question in as much as no new article or goods
were brought into existence having distinct name,
character or use resulting from particular process. It was
stated that a mere servicing and repairing of batteries
cannot amount to manufacturing process as defined in
Section 2 (k) of the Factories Act, 1948, and therefore, no
violation of provisions of the Factory Act, 1948 or the rules
framed thereunder was allegedly committed by them.
4. The petitioner after receipt of the reply chose to file the
present complaint against Sh. T. V. Ramanathan, Director
in the capacity of occupier of M/s Exide Industries Ltd.
under rule 3, 3(A), 4, 5, 11(A), 63, 102 of the Delhi
Factories Rule, 1950 read with Sections 6, 7, 9(b) and 45 of
the Factories Act, 1948. The complaint is filed by Sh. P.K.
Goswami, Inspector of Factories, Delhi during the discharge
of his duties and it is stated that since he is busy public
servant, therefore, his personal appearance may be
dispensed with.
5. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, the learned
Magistrate issued an order dated 10th January, 2008
wherein it has been observed that the complaint has been
filed by a public servant during the discharge of his official
duties and written examination of the complainant under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. is dispensed with. The petitioner
feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid summoning order filed
the present petition praying for quashing of the complaint
and the summoning order.
6. I have heard the learned senior counsel Mr. D.C. Mathur
for the petitioner and Mr. Pawan Bahl, APP for the State.
7. The first contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner is that a perusal of the complaint would show
that the first four paragraphs and the last three paragraphs
are in printed proforma, but only the columns have been
filled with hand and the name of the petitioner has been
shown as a Director and the occupier of the premises in
question. Similarly, the name of the Exide Industries Ltd.
has been mentioned though the spelling is wrong. But no
evidence whatsoever has been placed on record to show
wherefrom the respondent learnt about the fact that Sh. T.
V. Ramanathan was occupier of the premises in question.
It is stated that Sh. T. V. Ramanathan was neither present
on the spot nor his signatures were obtained to show that
he was actually the occupies of the lessee of the premises,
therefore, the complaint against Sh. T. V. Ramanathan was
without any basis whatsoever. It was contended by the
learned senior counsel that even though the complaint was
filed by a public servant in the official discharge of his
duties but it must reflect from the complaint as well as
from the documents annexed that how the averments made
by him in the complaint were sustainable. Since this has
not been done, therefore, there was absolutely no reason on
the part of the learned Court to have issued summons
against the petitioner Sh. T. V. Ramanathan.
8. The second contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner is to the effect that the complaint is admittedly
on typed proforma in which only two columns have been
written with hand. Further, it has not been mentioned in
the complaint that this is a complaint filed by the Inspector
of Factories in the official discharge of his duties, and
therefore, by virtue of Section 200 proviso of Code of
Criminal Procedure his examination may be dispensed
with. But instead it has been stated in the complaint that
it is filed by the Inspector of Factories, namely, the
respondent in the official discharge of his duties and since
he is a busy public servant, therefore, the complainant may
be exempted from personal appearance. That means the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate ought not to have written
in the impugned order that this is a complaint filed by the
petitioner in the official discharge of his duties, and
therefore, the examination of the complainant under
Section 200 Cr. P.C. is dispensed with, although there was
no such prayer from the side of the Inspector of Factories.
Consequently, both the complaint as well as the impugned
order shows the lack of application of mind on the part of
the Inspector of Factories as well as the Court in issuing
the order. Various judgments of this Court have been cited
in order to substantiate his contention that there must be
an application of mind both by the complainant as well as
by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate while passing an
order of summoning reliance in this regard can be placed
on:
Ravinder Goel & Anr. Vs. State & Anr. 2007 (1) JCC 465
D.A. Mehta & Ors. Vs. The Regional Director, ESI, Corporation 1991 (3) Crimes 72
Flex Foods Ltd. Vs. Registrar of Companies (Delhi & Haryana) 1996 (37) DRJ 60
Charnjeet Vs. DDA & Anr. 94 (2001) DLT 334
9. The third contention raised by the learned senior counsel
for the petitioner is to the effect that the inspection report
dated 2nd November, 2007 itself shows that what was being
carried out by the petitioner on the premises in question
was only service and repairing of batteries and the said
factum of service and repair of batteries being carried out
by the petitioner could not be said to be tantamounting to
manufacturing process under Section 2 (k) of the Factories
Act, 1948. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner
further contended that the manufacturing process means a
new article or a good being brought into existence or a new
or a different article having distinct name, character or use
which may result from a particular process. The learned
senior counsel for the petitioner in this regard referred to
various judgments which are as under:
Employee State Corporation Vs. Ram Chander 1988 (1) SCR 835
Dunlop India Ltd. Vs. UOI 1994 (4) SCC 686
Dy. Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. M/s Coco Fibres 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 419 UOI Vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills 1963 (1) (Supp.) SCR
Tega India Ltd. Vs. CCE 2004 (2) SCC 727
In Re: A.M. Chinniah Manger 786 Sangu Soap Works, AIR 1957 Mad 755
10. The learned APP has refuted the contention of the learned
senior counsel for the petitioner, however, no case has been
cited.
11. I have carefully considered the respective submissions. So
far as the question of Sh. T. V. Ramanathan being
impleaded as Director/occupier of the premises in
question, no doubt, an averment has been made in the
complaint that he is a Director/occupier of the premises in
question but there is not even a single shred of evidence
which has been placed on record to show as to how the
Inspector of Factories came to form an opinion that it was
Sh. T. V. Ramanathan who was a Director of M/s Exide
Industries Ltd. and the occupier of the premises in
question. The occupier of premises in question is
admittedly exide industry and Sh. T. V. Ramanathan is not
the only Director of the said company. Only if there was a
lease deed in respect of the premises in question executed
by the land lord in his favour and a copy thereof seized by
the Inspector of Factories it could be said that he was the
occupier of the premises or alternatively if he was present
at the spot at the time of inspection, some inference could
have been drawn that he was the in-charge of the service
and repairing center, and therefore, there was a reason to
assume that he was the occupier of the premises in
question. Merely because during the course of inspection
the factory Inspector got to know that Sh. T. V.
Ramanathan was the occupier of the premises thereby
enroped him in criminal proceedings is not sufficient
enough to summon him for a criminal offence.
12. Therefore, in my considered view there is absolutely no
reason or justification or shred of evidence against Sh. T. V.
Ramanathan as Director and the occupier of the premises
for which summons could have been issued by the learned
Magistrate to the petitioner. This clearly shows lack of
application of mind by the Court. On this score, reliance
can be placed on D.A.Mehta & Ors. Vs. The Regional
Director ESI Corporation 1991 (3) Crimes 72, Flex Foods
Ltd. Vs. Registrar of Companies (Delhi & Haryana)
1996 (37) DRJ 60, Charanjeet Vs. DDA & Anr. 94(2001)
DLT 334 and Ravinder Goel & Anr. Vs. State & Anr.
2007 (1) JCC 465.
13. So far as the complaint is concerned the same is
substantially on a typed proforma but some of the columns
have been filled with the hand. So much so even the
printed clause 6 where the complaint is stated to have been
made by the Inspector of Factories in the discharge of his
official duties it has not been stated that this is a complaint
which is being made by the Inspector of Factories in the
official discharge of his duties, and therefore, the
examination of the complainant be or is dispensed with in
terms of Section 200 proviso Cr. P.C. What has been
claimed in the said clause is that the complainant is in the
discharge of his official duties and since
complainant/respondent is busy public servant, therefore
he may be exempted from personal appearance. Under
these circumstances it becomes a stereo typed complaint
which is prepared without any application of mind as the
learned Magistrate could have dispensed with the recording
of the statement of the complainant only if such a benefit
was claimed. There was no occasion on the part of the
learned Magistrate to have dispensed with the examination
of the complainant or such other witnesses as might have
been present at the time of the presentation of the
complaint. Thus, both order of summoning as well as the
complaint itself are suffering from non-application of mind.
This Court has repeatedly in various judgments as have
been cited above come down heavily on the complaints or
the summoning order being passed without any application
of mind in a printed proforma.
14. For this reason not only the summoning order dated 10th
January, 2008 but even the complaint suffers from the vice
of arbitrariness and non-application of mind, and therefore,
both the order of summoning and the complaint itself
deserves to be quashed.
15. So far as the third contention of the learned senior counsel
for the petitioner is concerned that the service and
repairing of the batteries did not tantamount to
manufacturing process, I do not feel that it is necessary to
go into such a question as the complaint itself has been
directed to be quashed for the reason that it is passed
without any application of mind and along with the
summoning order, and therefore, it is not necessary for this
particular Court to dwell on the point that the service and
repairing center does not fall within the definition of
'manufacturing process'.
16. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the considered
view that both the complaint as well as the summoning
order dated 10th January, 2008 deserves to be set
aside/quashed. With these directions, the petition stands
disposed of.
V.K. SHALI, J.
September 1st, 2009 KP
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