Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4202 Del
Judgement Date : 20 October, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M.C. No. 2687/2009
Date of Decision : 20.10.2009
Sudesh Jain ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. Nitesh Kr. Singh,
Adv.
Versus
State of NCT (Delhi) & Anr. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Pawan Bahl, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers can be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. This is a petition filed by the petitioner for quashing of the
complaint case no. 4123/2008 under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act registered at P.S. Mandawali,
Delhi in case titled Anil Kumar Jain Vs. State & Ors.
pending before Mr. Sanatan Prasad, the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent
no. 2 filed a criminal complaint against the present
petitioner, her husband Mr. Anil Kumar Jain and their
company, M/s Freedom Measures Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter
referred as "the company") to whom he had advanced the
loan of Rs.2,40,000/-. The said loan amount carried the
interest @18% per annum. It is alleged that in discharge of
the said liability of repayment of loan, the company M/s
Freedom Measures Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Anil
Kumar Jain issued a cheque of Rs.2,68,000/- drawn on
The Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. Chawri Bazar, Delhi
dated 23rd April, 2008, however, the said cheque on
presentation had bounced. It is alleged that the present
petitioner was the Director of the company in question, and
therefore, the petitioner was vicariously liable for the
offence under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act. Since the aforesaid liability was not discharged despite
a statutory demand notice having been issued, accordingly,
the complaint in question was filed. The learned
Metropolitan Magistrate after recording the pre summoning
evidence passed the summoning order not only against the
petitioner but also against her husband Anil Kumar Jain
and the Company M/s Freedom Measures Pvt. Ltd. The
petitioner feeling aggrieved by virtue of the said summoning
order has not only challenged the same by way of present
petition but has also prayed for quashing of the complaint.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well
as the learned counsel for the respondent. The main
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has
been that before making a Director of a Company
vicariously liable under the provisions of 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act the complainant must not only
make an averment in the complaint that the said Director
was in-charge and responsible for the day to day conduct of
the business of the company but he must also adduce the
evidence in this regard. Reliance in this regard is placed
on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla & Anr.
(2005) 8 SCC 89, T. Stanes & Co. Ltd. Vs. A. Jaffarullah
(2000) 1 SCC 1 174, K.K. Ahuja Vs. V.K. Vora & Anr.
2009(9) SCALE 87, Sabhitha Ramamurthy Vs. R.B.S.
Channabasavaradhya AIR 2006 SC 3086.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent has contested the
plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner and urged that
the question as to whether the petitioner was in-charge and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company
at the time when the cheque was dishonoured is the
question of fact which can be proved only when the parties
adduce their respective evidence before the Court for
adjudication of the case on merits.
5. I have gone through the judgments cited by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. This is a settled legal
proposition of law by now that in order to bring the Director
of the company within the ambit of vicarious liability in
terms of the Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
for commission of an offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, not only there has to be an
averment in the complaint that the said Director was in-
charge and responsible for day to day conduct of the
business of the firm or a company at the time when the
cheque was dishonoured but it must also be prima facie
established by way of documents or by way of evidence
which is led at the stage of preliminary evidence to show
that he was actually holding such a position so as to
conduct the day to day business. It is not merely holding of
an office of a Director which would be considered sufficient
to bring a person within the ambit of vicarious liability for
having committed an offence. Reliance in this regard is
placed on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals' case (supra).
6. The recent trend in these cases of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act especially where there are
private limited companies closely held by the family
members and where female family members are holding the
position of a Director, the complainant wants to enrope
such family members knowingly fully well that once such
lady Directors are made as an accused and she is
summoned, it is bound to put pressure on the other co-
accused persons to come round and either pay the debt or
settle the same across the table. I feel that this is a gross
abuse of the processes of law in case there is a person who
is simply alleged to be a Director but it is not shown as how
he is the incharge of day to day conduct of the business of
the company at the relevant time is summoned to face the
trial. In the light of the aforesaid legal position the only
averment which has been made in the complaint against
the present petitioner is that she is the Director of the
company. There is not even an iota of averment that she
was in-charge and responsible for day to day conduct of
business of the company at the relevant time when the
cheque in question is purported to have been issued or
bounced much less is there prima facie evidence in this
regard. The affidavit which has been sworn by the
petitioner at the pre-summoning stage is nothing but the
replica of the complaint. This factual matrix in my
considered opinion does not satisfy the basic requirement
of law under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
for making the petitioner vicariously liable for having
committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
7. For these reasons mentioned above, there is a merit in the
contention of the petitioner that the complaint does not
make out a prima facie a case against the present
petitioner for having committed an offence under Section
138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act vicariously and accordingly the complaint itself against
her is quashed. A copy of this order be sent to the learned
Trial Court.
V.K. SHALI, J.
October 20, 2009 KP
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