Shree Narayan Singh vs Union Of India & Ors.
2009 Latest Caselaw 4189 Del

*          HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI


+          I.A No. 8565/2008 in CS (OS) No. 2199/2003

                                  Reserved on: July 23, 2009

%                                 Decided on: 20th October, 2009

Shree Narayan Singh                                           ...Plaintiff
                        Through   : Mr. Surat Singh, Adv. with
                                    Mr. Sudhamu Palo and Ms. Pratibha
                                    Chopra, Adv.

                        Versus

Union of India & Ors.                                      ...Defendants
                        Through   : Mr. Nikhil Nayyar with Mr.T.V.S.
                                    Raghuvendra Sreyas, Advs. for D-4
                                    Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy with Mr.
                                    Ashok Kumar Singh, Ms. P.R. Mala
                                    and Mr. Naresh Kumar Garg, Advs.
                                    for D-5
                                    Mr. D.K. Garg with Mr. Vijay Pratap
                                    Singh, Advs. for D-6

Coram:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
   be allowed to see the judgment?                      Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                   Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported
   in the Digest?                                       Yes

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. By this order I shall dispose of I.A No. 8565/2008 filed by

defendant no. 4 under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d) read with Section 151

of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for rejection of the plaint.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed the

present suit questioning the presence of Defendant no. 4 on Indian

territory, who allegedly escaped to India from China, and who was

proclaimed to be the 17th Karmapa as per the Kagyu School of Tibetan

Budhism. As per the plaintiff, another child had been proclaimed as the

17th Karmapa, but the same has never been recognized as such as he was

born in India and hence is not of Tibetan origin. The plaintiff has alleged

that the authenticity of defendant no. 4 is very much suspect as a medical

examination of defendant no. 4 was carried out by Post Graduate

Medical Institute at Chandigarh whereby the biological age of the said

defendant, who had been asserted by defendant no. 3, the Dalai Lama, to

be of a mere 15 years of age was determined to be a full grown adult of

24-26 years. Further, the plaintiff has alleged that as per the DVD‟s

submitted by him, it will be amply clear that defendant no. 4 has been

intentionally placed by the People‟s Republic of China in keeping with

China‟s larger scheme of secession of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh

and eventually, annexation of the entire Himalayan region.

3. The plaintiff has also submitted that the Government of

China has made a statement to the effect that defendant no. 4 is in India

to collect the Black Vajra Crown and other religious objects from the

Rumtek Monastery to bring the same to the Tibetan Autonomous Region

in China. In addition to this, in May 1997 the Chief Secretary Sikkim

had submitted a report to the Intelligence Bureau, CBI as well as to

defendant nos. 1 and 2, i.e. the Ministry of Home Affairs and the

Ministry of External Affairs respectively and the same has been

completely ignored by the said two defendants. The said report

explained the existence of a long term game plan of China to annex the

Buddhist Himalayan Region of India. It also stated that through the

selection of defendant no. 4 as the 17th Karmapa, the Government of

China was targeting the soft underbelly of the country, using religion to

bring about the secession of Sikkim from India. Despite all these clear

evidences, defendant nos. 1 and 2 did nothing to verify either the identity

or the age of defendant no. 4 and granted full protection to the same

based on the name, goodwill and assertions of defendant no. 3 thereby

allowing a possible anti-state element to not only reside in the country

but in fact, to reside in the country with full protection of the

Government. On February 2, 2001, defendant nos. 1 and 2 granted

refugee status to defendant no. 4 in violation of Article 32 of the

International Convention on Refugees, 1951.

4. Defendant no. 4 has filed the present application stating that

the plaintiff has no enforceable civil right and as such, no cause of

action. It is also submitted that as the plaintiff has no personal interest in

the matter, the suit is barred under Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963.

5. The plaintiff, however, has stated he belongs to the Karma

Kagyu sect of Buddhism and that the 17th Karmapa has been appointed

as the head of this sect by virtue of a „prediction letter‟ written by the

16th Karmapa. There are various questions raised by the plaintiff, viz.

whether there is a letter as alleged, whether it bears the hand writing of

the 16th Karmapa, whether the contents of the letter are genuine or not.

These questions are stated to effect the plaintiff in his personal capacity

as he doubts the authenticity of the appointed Karmapa and in fact

believes that the same is dangerous for the security of Indian territory.

6. The plaintiff has contended that he has the right to profess

and practice any religion and the right to profess a religion includes the

right to raise an objection if a wrong person is appointed as the head of

his sect.

7. It is further submitted by defendant no. 4 that the plaintiff has

concealed several material facts from this court as regards the

multifarious litigations started by him against the defendants in the

present case. The details of these litigations are as follows:

i) A Writ Petition titled 'Dr. Ambedkar Bodhi

Kunj Foundation v. Union of India and Ors.' being

C.W.J.C No. 2378/1997 before the Hon‟ble High Court of

Bihar at Patna wherein defendant nos. 3 to 5 were

respondents. By order dated March 31, 1997 the High Court

of Patna dismissed the said writ petition observing that the

petitioner should move the appropriate authority of the

Central Government to address its grievances.

ii) A civil suit titled 'Shree Narayan Singh v.

Tenzing Gyatsho & Ors.' being Suit No. 57/1997 before the

Court of Munsif -II, Munger, Bihar and the same is pending

adjudication.

iii) A criminal complaint titled 'Shree Narayan

Singh v. Tai Situ Rinpoche and Ors.' being 41/I/1998

before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi which was

dismissed by order dated January 13, 1999.

iv) A Writ Petition under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India being W.P (C) No. 613/2000 before the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court wherein the allegations made were

the same as those in the present suit. The same was dismissed

in limine by the Apex Court by order dated January 2, 2001.

v) A Writ Petition being W.P (C) No. 4507/2001

before this Court wherein Defendant nos. 1 to 5 were

impleaded. By order dated July 27, 2001 the said petition was

dismissed with the observation that the issues raised were

essentially relatable to a policy decision taken by the

Government of India and therefore it would be inappropriate

to interfere in the matter.

8. The plaintiff contends that though it has filed the suits

and petitions as submitted by defendant no. 4, none of these have

been decided on merit. In fact, the High Court of Patna passed

an order granting liberty to the plaintiff to approach the

appropriate forum of the Central Government with his

grievance. It is also submitted that the scope of Civil Writ

Petition is very different from Civil Suit. Dismissal of writ petition in

limine does not amount to the bar of res judicata in filing of the civil

suit.

9. The plaintiff further contends that there are several issues to

be settled, for instance whether there has been interference by defendant

nos. 2 to 5 in the plaintiff‟s right to practice religion, whether the

„prediction letter‟ is valid or not, whether the 17th Karmapa‟s age as

alleged by defendant no. 3 is correct or not, whether there is any threat to

India‟s security keeping in mind the report of the Chief Secretary,

Sikkim and whether the plaintiff has the right to challenge the suspicious

appointment of a possible imposter as the head of his sect.

10. The next contention of defendant no. 3 and 4 is that this court

has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit as no part of the cause

of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as

except defendant nos. 1 and 2, none of the other defendants either reside

or carry on business in the local limits of jurisdiction of this court.

11. The contention of the plaintiff is that the cause of action arose

in Sikkim where the monastery is located, in Dharamsala in Himachal

Pradesh where defendant no. 3 resides and in New Delhi as there are

specific allegations against two ministries of the Central Government. It

is settled law in view of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 that if part of the cause of action arose in a certain location, the

courts that are situated there shall have territorial jurisdiction.

12. It is also contended that the plaintiff‟s suit is not a civil suit as

envisaged in Section 9 of the Code and as such is not maintainable as the

plaintiff is seeking declaration as regards religious honours and

privileges and it is settled law that questions of religious ceremonies do

not deal with the legal rights of parties. The court does not pronounce on

any religious doctrine unless it is necessary to do so in order to

determine a right to property, which is not the case in the present suit.

13. The plaintiff has submitted that he has a right to practice the

religion of his choice without anybody‟s interference under Article 25 of

the Constitution. This right to practice religion includes the right to

challenge the appointment of an imposter as the head of one‟s sect. To

support his contention, the plaintiff has referred to Most Rev. P.M.A.

Metropolitan & Ors. v. Moran Mar Marthoma & Etc. JT 1995 (5)

SC 1 wherein it has been held that civil courts in India, under section 9

of CPC read with Section 25 of the Constitution of India, have

jurisdiction to try suits relating to religion. It was also observed as

follows:

"In Ugamsingh & Mishrimal v. Kesrimal & Ors. 1971 (2) SCR 836, it was held that it is clear that a right to worship is a civil right, interference with which raises a dispute of civil nature.

Similarly in S. Ramnuja Jeer (supra) this court observed as

under:

"From the aforesaid passage it is clear that so long as the holder of a purely religious office is under a legal obligation to discharge duties attached to the said office for the non-observance of which he may be visited with

penalties, a civil court could grant a declaration as to who would be or could be the holder of such office.

31. Religious right is the right of a person believing in a particular faith to practice it, preach it and profess it. It is civil in nature. The dispute about the religious office is a civil dispute as it involves disputes relating to rights which may be religious in nature but civil in consequence. Any infringement with a right as a member of any religious order is violative of civil wrong. This is the letter and spirit of Explanation to Section 9."

14. In view of this observation, the plaintiff contends that it is

preposterous to contend that he has no legal right to file the present suit.

15. It is also contended that the plaintiff‟s suit is barred by

limitation as the recognition of the 17th Karmapa occurred in 1992 and

the present suit has been filed in 2003. However, the plaintiff contends

that on the one hand defendant no. 3 and 4 are contending that the

plaintiff has been filing suit after suit in various forums and on the other

hand they are alleging that the plaintiff‟s claim ought to be barred by

limitation as he has not been vigilant in pursuing the same. The plaintiff

submits that he has been agitating this particular issue at one forum or

the other since 1997. Further, the substantial evidence in the present case

was made available to the plaintiff as late as in 2001-2002. Further, since

the 17th Karmapa is still in the same position, there has been a

continuous wrong and the cause of action still subsists.

16. Lastly, it is stated by defendant no. 3 that matters concerning

international relations, political asylum, refugees etc. concern functions

of the Government of India and being matters of policy, the same are not

open to judicial review.

17. It appears from the record that a similar application under

Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) for rejection of plaint filed by the

defendant no. 1 Union of India is also pending wherein it has been

alleged that the plaintiff has no right to claim expulsion of defendant no.

4 from India as the retention/ expulsion of defendant no. 4 in/from India

is the subject matter of the sole discretion of the Union of India. With

respect to this discretion of the Union of India, neither does the plaintiff

have a right to interfere in religious matters as regards persons who are

followers of Budhism as the plaintiff is not the Office Bearer of the party

nor is he authorized to act on behalf of the party.

18. I have perused the submissions of both parties. As defendant

no. 4 has filed the present application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) and (d),

there are two possible grounds for allowing the present application

being:

i) the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or/and

ii) the suit appears, from the statement in the plaint, to be

barred by any law.

19. As regards the question of cause of action, in Liverpool and

London S.P and I Asson. Ltd. v. M.V Sea Succes I and Anr. (2004) 9

SCC 512 it was observed as follows:

"Rejection of plaint

139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the

averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in its entirety, a decree would be passed.

Cause of action

140. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit. For the aforementioned purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful, default, or undue influence.

146. It may be true that Order 7 Rule 11(a) although authorises the court to reject a plaint on failure on the part of the plaintiff to disclose a cause of action but the same would not mean that the averments made therein or a document upon which reliance has been placed although discloses a cause of action, the plaint would be rejected on the ground that such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining reliefs claimed in the suit. The approach adopted by the High Court, in this behalf, in our opinion, is not correct.

147. In D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1128, this Court held:

"It is well settled that in all cases of preliminary objection, the test is to see whether any of the reliefs prayed for could be granted to the appellant if the averments made in the petition are proved to be true. For the purpose of considering a preliminary objection, the averments in the petition should be assumed to be true and the court has to find out whether those averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue as such. The court cannot probe into the facts on the basis of the controversy raised in the counter."

151. In ascertaining whether the plaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to ascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown. In Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh AIR 1962 SC 941 this Court held:

"By the express terms of Rule 5 Clause (d), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the

allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him."

152. So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. [See Mohan Rawale (supra)]"

20. I have perused the vase law cited by both the parties. The first

and foremost question for determination is whether this court has

jurisdiction to try the present suit. Earlier in this order, it has been

mentioned that the Supreme Court as well as various other courts have

dismissed similar suits filed by the plaintiff observing that the matter is

one of government policy and the judiciary ought not to interfere with

the same. Notwithstanding the same, based on the present suit‟s own

plaint, I find that it is not within this court‟s jurisdiction to preside over

the plaintiff‟s suit.

21. By the plaintiff‟s own admission in the plaint, the cause of

action arose in Sikkim where the monastery is located, in Dharamsala in

Himachal Pradesh where defendant no. 3 resides and in New Delhi

where the two ministries of the Central Government are located. The

plaintiff‟s argument is that in view of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, if part of the cause of action arises in a certain location,

the courts that lie there shall have territorial jurisdiction and therefore,

since the two ministries i.e. defendant nos. 1 and 2 are located in New

Delhi, this court possesses the jurisdiction to try the present suit.

22. At this point, I have to disagree with the contention of the

plaintiff. Defendant nos. 3 and 4 are clearly not within this court‟s

jurisdiction.

23. The only way this court can have jurisdiction over the present

suit is by virtue of the plaintiff‟s argument qua the ministries. In Kusum

Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 2321

the Supreme Court overruled the decision in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill

Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow v. State of U.P. & Ors.,

MANU/SC/0422/1995 and held that framing of a statute, statutory rule

or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction

upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof.

24. Further, in Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC

368, the following observation has been made :

"96. In a constitutional democracy, Parliament is supreme and policies have to be framed and approved by Parliament. Parliament had constituted CABE and NCERT and if

CABE has any objection to the National Curriculum nothing prevented it from expressing its opinion accordingly. It is ultimately for Parliament to take a decision on the National Education Policy one way or the other. It is not the province of the Court to decide on the good or bad points of an educational policy. The Court‟s limited jurisdiction to intervene in implementation of a policy is only if it is found to be against any statute or the Constitution."

25. I do not agree with the submission of the plaintiff as regards

the reference to the judgment in Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan (supra).

That judgment can be distinguished from the present case in In my

opinion, the said judgment has not expanded the scope of section 9

beyond what was already pronounced on the subject by the Supreme

Court. Para 29 of the said judgment refers to S.A.L. Narayan Rao v.

Ishwarlal Bhagwandas (AIR 1965 SC 1818) wherein it was observed

that a proceeding for relief against infringement of civil right of a person

is a civil proceeding. In para 30 it has been questioned whether the right

to worship in a religious place, entry in a temple, administration of

religious shrines etc. is a right of civil nature. Para 32 refers to

Srinivasalu Naidu v. Kavalmari Munnuswami Naidu, AIR 1967

Mad 451 wherein as regards Explanation I to Section 9, it was held that

the explanation only states that though religious rites and ceremonies

may form the basis of a right which is claimed, such right being a right

to property or to office, a suit to establish such a right would be a suit of

a civil nature. In the present case, no such right as mentioned above has

been claimed. In para 35, the following paragraph from Shri Sinha

Ramanuja Jeer v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Ors., AIR 1960 SC

1720 has been cited :

"prima facie suits raising questions of religious rites and ceremonies only are not maintainable in a civil court, for they do not deal with legal rights of parties. But the explanation to the Section accepting the said undoubted position says that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of civil nature notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of a question as to religious rites or ceremonies. It implies two things, namely, (i) a suit for an office is a suit of a civil nature; and (ii) it does not cease to be one even if the said right depends entirely upon a decision of a question as to the religious rites or ceremonies."

26. Further, it is well settled law that before a court decides a

particular matter, it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit before

it but must also have the authority to allow the relief prayed for. In my

opinion the judgment of Most. Rev. P.M.A. (supra) is not applicable to

the facts of the present case as that judgment approves and endorses the

earlier judgments on the scope of Explanation I of Section 9 of CPC. In a

later suit (also cited by the plaintiff) being Urgan Singh (supra) the right

to worship has been declared a civil right and the same has been held to

be a matter of a civil suit. It is not denied that the plaintiff has a right to

worship whichever deity he pleases, however he is not a contender for

the office held by defendant no. 4. In fact, the positions held by

defendant nos. 3 to 5 have been stated to not be „offices‟ but positions

occupied by persons who are reincarnations of their predecessors etc.

27. In light of this observation, very little remains to be said. I am

of the considered opinion that this court has no jurisdiction to intervene

in the present matter as the same is a matter of policy as it is not against

any statute or the Constitution. As regards the latter part of the previous

sentence, I would like to elucidate that the plaintiff‟s contention that his

right to practise religion is being hampered allows him ground to file a

writ or perhaps a PIL, but definitely not a suit. As per his own

admission, a writ as well as a PIL have been filed but have been

dismissed.

28. The suit filed by the plaintiff is also barred by limitation as it

is an admitted position, as per para 50 of the plaint, that first time the

cause of action in the present suit arose in August/September, 1992

when at the instance of defendant No.5, the defendant No.3 officially

recognised defendant No.4 as the 17th Karmapa by faxing his approval.

29. The present suit has been filed on 17th December, 2003. The

contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff is that he has been filing

the various litigations from time to time, therefore, the cause of action

has been a continuous one and there also has been no undue negligence

on part of the plaintiff in pursuing the matter. I do not agree with the

contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff. A similar point arose for

consideration of this court in Dr. Samir Majumdar v. M/s. Exxon

Mobile Co. India (P) Ltd. & Anr., decided on September 2, 2009

wherein it was held that filing various litigations, viz. suits, writs and

PILs one after the other in same or different forums as regards the same

cause of action would not lengthen/ draw out or make the cause of action

continuous. In the present case, filing of writs, suits and PIL by the

plaintiff cannot serve to elongate the rising of the cause of action, which

admittedly arose in and around 1992. Prima facie it appears that the suit

is barred by limitation. The plaintiff cannot take the benefit of the

earlier litigation initiated by him against the defendant.

30. After thoughtful consideration of the matter I am of the

considered view that the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII

Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. I.A. No. 8565/2008

is allowed. Plaint is rejected. No costs.

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

OCTOBER 20, 2009 nn