Tilak Raj Bedi vs State Thru. Cbi & Anr
2009 Latest Caselaw 4072 Del

*             THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                         Judgment Reserved on: 20.07.2009
                          Judgment delivered on: 09.10.2009

                         Crl. M.C. 1139/2009


TILAK RAJ BEDI                                   ..... Petitioner

                                     vs

STATE THRU. CBI & ANR.                           ..... Respondent

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr Sunil Dalal, Mr Deepak Sharma, Ms Rakhi Singhal, Mr Ashish Sharma & Mr Akshay, Advocates.

For the Respondent : Mr Harish Gulati & Mr Anindya Malhotra, Advocates.

CORAM :-

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER

1.     Whether the Reporters of local papers may
       be allowed to see the judgment ?                YES
2.     To be referred to Reporters or not ?            YES
3.     Whether the judgment should be reported
       in the Digest ?                                 YES

RAJIV SHAKDHER, J

1. This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the „Cr.P.C.‟) seeking to

quash FIR No. RC3(E)/98/CBI/BS&FC/ND dated 10.08.1998 and the

proceedings emanating therefrom, which are pending in the Court of

Sh. V.K. Maheshwari, Spl. Judge, CBI.

1.1 It would perhaps be important to mention, at the very outset,

that the petitioner/accused had come to this Court by way of a

Criminal Revision Petition bearing No. 471/2004 against the order

dated 29.10.2004 passed by the then Spl. Judge, CBI whereby charges

were framed against the petitioner/accused. The revision petition was

dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 24.04.2006 passed by this

Court.

1.2 Since then, charges have been framed against the

petitioner/accused, i.e., Tilak Raj Bedi and, one Satish Kumar, the

erstwhile manager of the Syndicate Bank, Mayur Vihar Branch, New

Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the „Bank‟). Both the

petitioner/accused as well as the other accused have been charged

under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter

referred to as the „IPC‟) read with Section 420 of the IPC and Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 (hereinafter referred to as the „PC Act‟). In addition, the

petitioner/accused has been charged for a substantive offence under

Section 420 of the IPC, while the said Satish Kumar has been charged

for the substantive offence under Section 13(2) read with Section

13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

2. The background circumstances in which the present petition has

arisen, to the extent they are necessary for adjudication of the present

petition, are set out hereinafter:-

2.1 The petitioner/accused, who at the relevant time was the

authorized signatory of a current account of a concern by the name of

Priya Textiles, and a proprietor of another concern by the name of

Priya Exports, engaged in certain transactions with the Bank.

2.2 It is broadly alleged that the said Priya Textiles had its credit

limits enhanced in October, 1994. For achieving this end, Satish

Kumar demanded graft which was paid to him by the

petitioner/accused. Resultantly, Satish Kumar made recommendations

and obtained approvals by suppressing vital information pertaining to

the account of Priya Textiles. It is also alleged that for the very same

reason Satish Kumar deliberately ignored security norms mandated

by the Export Finance Committee of the Bank, while approving the

Packing Credit Loan (in short the „PCL‟) in favour of Priya Textiles. It

is further alleged that in order to facilitate the aforesaid, Satish

Kumar, who desired to purchase a maruti car, demanded a sum of

Rs 10,000/-, which was paid by the petitioner/accused, in the manner

detailed out hereinafter. It is also alleged that because of the

following specific illegal and unauthorized acts committed by the

petitioner/accused, the Bank was cheated of monies to the tune of

Rs 1.80 crores.

3 First and foremost, it is alleged that on 19.01.1995, the initial

sanction limit of loan of Rs 2.25 crores, which was obtaining in favour

of Priya Textiles since 1992, was enhanced to Rs 3.17 crores primarily

because Satish Kumar suppressed the irregularities in the account of

Priya Textiles.

3.1 Second, one Meghna Garments Ltd, a Dhaka based company,

opened a Letter of Credit dated 13.03.1995 for approximately

Rs 25.50 lacs favouring Priya Exports. The Letter of Credit was

issued by Arab-Bangladesh Bank Ltd, Dhaka (in short the „ABL‟). The

petitioner/accused, who was, as indicated hereinabove, the proprietor

of Priya Exports, unauthorizedly, without informing ABL, transferred

the entire amount of the Letter of Credit in favour of Priya Textiles, in

which the petitioner/accused was the authorized signatory. Satish

Kumar, who was dealing with the account, permitted sanction of loans

in favour of Priya Textiles after the date for negotiation of documents

had expired. As per the Letter of Credit conditions, the last date for

shipment was 30.03.1995, and the last date for negotiation of the bill

was 14.04.1995. Against the export order of Meghna Garments ltd.

Priya Textiles despatched two export consignments in March, 1995 to

Meghna Garments Ltd. The Bangladeshi buyer, however, did not get

them released. Consequently, the entire amount of PCL amounting to

Rs 25.50 lacs, obtained by Priya Textiles, remained outstanding.

3.2 Third, there is an allegation with regard to exports made to APT

Impex, Dhaka. The funds which were released to Priya Textiles were

against six transactions of PCL. Out of these six, three were dealt by

Satish Kumar. It is alleged that substantial part of the funds, which

were released under the PCL, were diverted to the account of one

Kalpana Bedi, wife of the petitioner/accused, in violation of the terms

and conditions of the PCL.

3.4 Fourthly, it is also alleged, as indicated hereinabove, that Satish

Kumar, who was desirous of purchasing a maruti car, approached one

S.P. Bhai for a loan of Rs 10,000/-. The said S.P. Bhai politely

declined to give the loan. However, the petitioner/accused told S.P.

Bhai that Satish Kumar had approached him with a demand of

Rs 10,000/-. S.P. Bhai also confirmed to the investigators that

petitioner/accused had told him that he had paid Satish Kumar a sum

of Rs 10,000/- after withdrawing the same from the Bank.

Investigation also revealed that Satish Kumar allowed the

petitioner/accused to unauthorizedly withdraw on 25.10.1994 a sum

of Rs 25,000/- from account no. 3246 of Priya Textiles, when the

balance in the said account was only Rs 1,005.70. Furthermore,

Satish Kumar also permitted withdrawal of another sum of Rs 25,000/-

from the current account no. 3335 of Priya Exports by the

petitioner/accused, when the balance in that account was only

Rs 153.50. None of the accounts enjoyed overdraft facilities.

Investigation also revealed that on 25.10.1994, Satish Kumar had

issued a cheque for withdrawing the sum of Rs 10,000/- from an

overdraft account no. 594, which was subsequently cancelled.

3.5 The aforesaid allegations were investigated; whereupon the

investigators filed a chargesheet, as referred to hereinabove, against

petitioner/accused along with Satish Kumar in respect of the offences,

mentioned above. As indicated hereinabove, the Spl. Judge, CBI, vide

his order dated 29.10.2004 framed charges against the

petitioner/accused as well as the said Satish Kumar.

3.6 It is pertinent to note that in the interregnum, that is, on

31.10.2002, in the suit filed by the Bank before the Debt Recovery

Tribunal (in short the „DRT‟) under the Recovery of Debts Due to

Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the petitioner/accused

arrived at a settlement with the Bank. In accordance with the

settlement, arrived at with the Bank, the petitioner/accused paid a

sum of Rs 77,61,055/- in the form of one-time settlement towards

fulfillment of all dues owed by the petitioner/accused to the Bank. As

a matter of fact, by an order dated 31.01.2002, the DRT not only

recorded the factum of settlement but also returned a finding that the

original application filed by the Bank stood satisfied. Consequent

thereto, directions were also issued by the DRT for return of original

title deeds to the mortgagor by the mortgagee Bank.

SUBMISSION OF COUNSELS

4. Based on the aforesaid the learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused Mr Sunil Dalal submitted as follows:

(i) The transaction between Priya Textiles, which acted through the

medium of the petitioner/accused, was in sum and substance a civil

dispute. The Bank had initiated the criminal proceeding against the

petitioner/accused only to coerce the petitioner/accused to repay the

amount.

(ii) The petitioner/accused having arrived at a settlement with the

Bank, no purpose would be served in continuing with the petitioner‟s/

accused criminal prosecution. For this purpose, the learned counsel

for the petitioner/accused relied upon the judgments of the Supreme

Court in following cases:

B.S. Joshi & Ors. vs State of Haryana & Anr. JT 2003 (3) SC 277, Nikhil Merchant vs CBI & Anr. JT 2008 (9) SC 192 , Manoj Sharma vs State & Ors. JT 2008 (11) SC 674, Ananda Bezbaruah vs UOI; 1994 Cri. L.J. 12, M. Krishna Reddy vs State Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad; (1992) 4 SCC 45, Madan Mohan Abbot vs State of Punjab; AIR 2008 SC 1969, B.B. Aggarwal & Ors. Vs CBI; Crl. MC 5722-30/2006 & Crl. M.A. 9675/2006 dated 18.04.2009, Pawan Jaggi vs CBI & Ors. Crl. M.C. 3759/2008 & Crl. M.A. 14053/2008 dt.

09.04.2009, Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia vs State of Punjab; 2009 (7) SCALE 85

(iii) In support of his submissions, made above, the learned counsel

drew my attention to the chargesheet, wherein in the second-last

paragraph of the chargesheet it is stated as follows:

".....The allegation that M/s Priya Textiles used a forged export order purported to have been issued by M/s APT Impex, Dhaka, Bangladesh, could not be substantiated. The

investigation did not reveal any criminality in any other loan transaction. However, it was revealed that M/s Priya Textiles had a liability of Rs 1.08 crores as on 10.08.1998....."

a) It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused that there was, in sum and substance, no

criminality that could have been attached to the transactions in issue,

which are the subject matter of the chargesheet; and on the basis of

which charges had been framed. Therefore, it was contended that the

criminal proceeding, as prayed for, ought to be quashed.

5. As against this the learned counsel for the CBI, Mr Harish

Gulati, instructed by Mr Anindya Malhotra, Advocate submitted as

follows:

(i) The prosecution has cited 21 witnesses out of which 14 have

already been examined. The perusal of the evidence on record would

show that the prosecution has a good chance for bringing home the

conviction against the petitioner/accused.

(ii) The judgments of the Supreme Court, cited by the

petitioner/accused, were distinguishable on facts. The learned

counsel submitted that for quashing the criminal proceedings, the

power available to a court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., will

necessarily be governed by the facts and circumstances obtaining in

each case cited by the petitioner/accused. In the instant case, he

submitted that the criminal conspiracy, which was entered into

between the petitioner/accused and Satish Kumar, which led to the

Bank being financially defrauded of Rs 1.08 crores, resulted in

commission of the offences with which the petitioner/accused and

Satish Kumar are charged. In order to buttress his submissions the

learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:

Rumi Dhar vs State of West Bengal 2009 (5) SCALE 471,

Sushil Suri vs CBI; Crl. M.C. 3842/2008 dt. 21.05.2009, Rajiv

Khanna vs State (CBI) & Ors Crl. M.C. 588/2009 dated

01.05.2009, CBI vs A. Ravishankar Prasad & Ors (2009) 6 SCC

351, State of M.P. vs Rameshwar & Ors JT 2009 (5) SC 171

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the

view that before dealing with the facts of the instant case it may

perhaps be relevant to delineate the principles enunciated in the

judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts.

6.1 The question which arose in the case of B.S. Joshi (supra) was

whether in the absence of power under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. for

compounding of offences under Section 498A and 406 of the IPC the

Court could quash the charges in exercise of its inherent power under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion

that the power to quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect

of offences which are not compoundable is not denuded by virtue

of the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in

that regard noted as follows:

"8. It is thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of

power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

9. The High Court has also relied upon the decision in case of Surendra Nath Mohanty's case (supra) for the proposition that offence declared to be non-compoundable cannot be compounded at all even with the permission of the Court. That is of course so. The offences which can be compounded are mentioned in Section 320. Those offences which are not mentioned therein cannot be permitted to be compounded. In Mohanty's case, the appellants were convicted by the trial court for offence under Section 307. The High Court altered the conviction of the appellants and convicted them for offence under Section 326 and imposed sentence of six months. The trial court had sentenced the appellants for a period of five years RI. The application for compounding was, however, dismissed by the High Court. This Court holding that the offence for which the appellants had been convicted was non-compoundable and, therefore, it could not be permitted to be compounded but considering that the parties had settled their dispute outside the court, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. It is, however, to be borne in mind that in the present case the appellants had not sought compounding of the offences. They had approached the Court seeking quashing of FIR under the circumstances above stated."

6.2 In Nikhil Merchant (supra) the Division Bench of the Supreme

Court followed the dicta laid down in the case of B.S. Joshi (supra).

It is important to note that in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra)

the accused were charged under the provisions of Sections

120B/420/467/468/471A of the IPC read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d)

of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988. The brief background facts were

as follows: The appellant had been granted financial assistance by

Andhra Bank. On default in repayment of loan, Andhra Bank filed a

suit for recovery in 1992. Two years thereafter, i.e., on 19.09.1994

Andhra Bank lodged a complaint. The CBI after a period of four

years, i.e., on 30.12.1998 filed a chargesheet against the accused.

Notably, the Supreme Court in coming to the conclusion that the

criminal proceeding against the accused merited being quashed

considered the following submissions: made on behalf of the accused:

the accused was only the Managing Director of the company which

had procured the loan, and in sum and substance was not the direct

beneficiary of the loan; Andhra Bank had not taken any action against

employees who were allegedly involved in the illegal transactions;

after the filing of the chargesheet on 30.12.1998, the CBI had taken

no action in the matter and that, even charges have not been framed

(it is only in 2006 that the proceeding came to be stayed by the

Supreme Court upon a Special Leave Petition being filed by the

accused); the matter had been compromised and in terms of clause

(11) of the settlement arrived at between the accused and the Bank,

wherein it was specifically stated that neither party, that is, the

accused nor the Bank had any claim against the other, and that, they

had withdrawn the allegations and counter allegations made by them

against each other; and lastly, the dispute was in substance a civil

dispute with criminal overtones.

6.3 It is in these background facts and circumstances that in

paragraph 27 of the Judgment the Court, while noting that technically

the State was right in its contentions made on its behalf that the

criminal proceeding should not be quashed, nevertheless quashed the

same keeping in perspective the aforementioned facts of the case.

6.4. In the case of Manoj Sharma (supra) once again the offences,

with which the accused was charged, were also under Sections

420/468/471/34/120B of the IPC. In this case the court proceeded to

exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in quashing the

criminal proceedings keeping in perspective that the "dispute was

essentially of a private nature".

6.5. As against this, in the case of Rumi Dhar (supra) the Supreme

Court rejected the plea of the accused to quash the criminal

proceeding pending against them in exercise of its power under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Briefly the facts with which the court

grappled were as follows: the accused and her husband alongwith the

officers of Oriental Bank of Commerce had taken overdrafts without

furnishing the requisite security. In order to recover the amount

proceedings were filed before the DRT. In addition, criminal

proceedings were also initiated. The proceedings filed before the

DRT were settled, and in furtherance thereto, the accused paid to

Oriental Bank of Commerce a sum of Rs 21.51 lacs. It transpires that

the CBI had returned the title deeds which were given as security by

the accused to the bank for the purposes of obtaining the loan. The

accused moved an application under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for

discharge, before the trial court on the following grounds:

".....i) That having regard to the settlement arrived at between her and the Bank no case for proceeding against her has been out.

ii) That she having already paid Rs. 25.51 Lacs and the CBI having returned the title deeds which had been kept as security for the loan from the said bank, the criminal proceeding should be dropped relying on or on the basis of the said settlement.

iii) That the dispute between the parties were purely civil in nature and that she had not fabricated any document or

cheated the bank in anyway what so ever, charges could not have been framed against her...."

6.6 The trial court dismissed the application for discharge. Against

which a revision application under Sections 401 and 402 of the

Cr.P.C. was filed in the High Court of Calcutta. The single Judge of

the High Court of Calcutta dismissed the revision application.

Consequently, the matter travelled to the Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court, while reaching its verdict, considered the ratio of its

judgments both in the case of CBI vs Duncans Agro Industries Ltd.

1996 (5) SCC 591 as also that of Nikhil Merchant (supra). In

arriving at its conclusion the Supreme Court made the following

crucial observations, in paragraphs 16 to 19 at pages 474 to 479 of

the judgment. The same being relevant are extracted hereinbelow:

"..........16. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 of the Code specifies the offences which are compoundable in nature; Sub-section (2) providing for the offences which are compoundable with the permission of the court.

17. Appellant is said to have taken part in conspiracy in defrauding the bank. Serious charges of falsification of accounts and forgery of records have also been alleged. Although no charge against the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption Act has been framed, indisputably, the officers of the bank are facing the said charges.

18. It is now a well settled principle of law that in a given case, a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding can proceed simultaneously. Bank is entitled to recover the amount of loan given to the debtor. If in connection with obtaining the said loan, criminal offences have been committed by the persons accused thereof including the officers of the bank, criminal proceedings would also indisputably be maintainable. When a settlement is arrived at by and between the creditor and the debtor, the offence

committed as such does not come to an end. The judgment of a tribunal in a civil proceeding and that too when it is rendered on the basis of settlement entered into by and between the parties, would not be of much relevance in a criminal proceeding having regard to the provisions contained in Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act.

19. The judgment in the civil proceedings will be admissibile in evidence only for a limited purpose. It is not a case where the parties have entered into a compromise in relation to the criminal charges. In fact, the offence alleged against the accused being an offence against the society and the allegations contained in the first information report having been investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, the bank could not have entered into any settlement at all. The CBI has not filed any application for withdrawal of the case. Not only a charge sheet has been filed, charges have also been framed. At the stage of framing charge, the appellant filed an application for discharge. One of the main accused is the husband of the appellant. The complicity of the accused persons was, thus, required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the application for discharge upon taking a realistic view of the matter. While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code, it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law."

6.7 A careful perusal of the ratio of the judgment in Rumi Dhar

(supra) would show that this was a case in which investigation were

complete and chargesheet had been filed. It was at the stage of

framing of charge that an application for discharge had been moved

by the accused. Furthermore, the accused had not been charged with

an offence under the PC Act, despite which the Supreme Court

refused to interfere with the order of the Special Judge and that of the

Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta who had found that a prima

facie case had been made out against the accused for the framing of a

charge. The Supreme Court while preserving the power of the High

Court to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the

Cr.P.C. and that of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India did not, in the facts of that case, deem it

necessary to interfere with the orders of the High Court and quash

the criminal proceedings against the accused. The ratio of this

judgment has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in its recent

judgment in the case of A. Ravishankar Prasad (supra).

7. I may also touch upon certain other judgments cited by the

learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused apart from the ones

referred hereinabove.

7.1 In the case of Ananda Bezbaruah (supra) the allegation

against the accused was that he had amassed huge wealth by

dishonest and corrupt means during his service career which was

grossly disproportionate to his known sources of income. The Single

Judge of the Gauhati High Court quashed charges primarily on the

ground that the special Judge while framing the charge had included

in the value of assets, land and building owned by his wife on the

ground that it was a benami property of the petitioner. There was

another error in the order framing charge in as much as certain sums

of money which was really in the nature of an expenditure were

shown as savings by the Spl. Judge while calculating the value of

assets disproportionate to the known sources of income of the

accused. If these errors were corrected there was evidently no case

of „disproportionate assets‟ made out. The High Court quashed the

charges on the ground that the documents relied upon by the

prosecution, which includes, income-tax returns of the wife of the

accused did not establish a prima facie case that the ingredients of

the offence under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were made out. As is evident, the

facts of the said case are quite different from facts obtaining in the

instant case.

7.2 In M. Krishna Reddy (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing

with a criminal appeal against the judgment of the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh whereby the conviction of the appellant had been

sustained under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This judgment, in my view, has

no relevance to the facts of the present case. Particularly, in view of

the fact that in the instant case we have not reached the stage of

conviction.

7.3 In Madan Mohan Abbot (supra) the court quashed the FIR,

wherein the appellant had been accused of offences under Sections

379/406/409/418/506/34 of the IPC. The High Court had declined to

quash the FIR on the ground that the offence under Section 406 of the

IPC was not compoundable as it involved an amount of more than

Rs 250/-, and also for the reason that the case was already ripe for

examination of the prosecution witness. A perusal of the observations

made in paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court would

show that the Supreme Court was persuaded to exercise its power to

quash the FIR as the dispute was purely of a „personal nature‟

between contesting parties, who had arrived at a compromise, and

there was "absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of

the allegations" made against the petitioner/ accused. It is in this

context that the court came to the conclusion that no useful purpose

would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the

compromise between the complainant and the petitioner/ appellant.

Once again, as is evident, the ratio of the judgment is not applicable

to the facts of the instant case. The present complainant, here, is a

nationalized bank; which undoubtedly is dealing with public monies.

7.4 In B.B. Aggarwal (supra) the court exercised its power under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. by relying primarily on the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Nikhil Merchant (supra) and Manoj Joshi

(supra). The court did not have the benefit of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Rumi Dhar (supra).

7.5 In the case of Pawan Jaggi (supra) once again the judgment of

this court is based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case

of Nikhil Merchant (supra) and B.S. Joshi (supra). This was also a

judgment pronounced by this court prior in point of time to the later

judgment of Supreme Court in Rumi Dhar (supra).

7.6 In Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia (supra) the complainant

(wife) had filed a FIR under Sections 406/420 of the IPC against the

accused (husband) and his parents. The court came to the conclusion

that in the facts of the said case the necessary ingredients in respect

of the offences with which the accused was charged were not made

out, and hence it came to the conclusion that the accused had made

out an „exceptional case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction‟ under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. No such circumstances are made out in the

present case.

Discussion:

8. An overview of the Judgments of the Supreme Court and other

High Courts adumbrated above seems to suggest that the following

broad principles ought to guide a court in reaching a conclusion as to

whether or not to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

to quash criminal proceedings:-

(i) There is no doubt that notwithstanding the provisions of Section

320 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court in exercise of its power under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can quash a criminal proceeding.

(ii) The said power has to be exercised sparingly having regard to

the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case.

(iii) The accused ought to come to court at the earliest. After

evidence is recorded the case for quashing would become weaker, if

not entirely disappear. The reason for this is that the raison d‟etre

for quashing a criminal proceeding, that the accused should be

relieved of his tyranny, which he gets inflicted on account of a delayed

and futile trial would lose force, once the trial is complete (see Nikhil

Merchant's case). This is not to say, however, that the court cannot,

in a given case, even after evidence is led quash criminal proceedings

in exercise of its inherent power, where continuing with criminal

proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law.

(iv) Where the dispute is primarily of a private nature having no

overtones of public policy, in the event of a compromise the court may

in the given facts and circumstances of the case chose to exercise its

inherent power to quash criminal proceedings, given the fact that it

may be an exercise in futility as the prosecution may not have

witnesses and/ or evidence to support its case.

9. Applying the aforesaid broad principles to the facts of the

present case it appears that in the instant case, I am not inclined to

exercise my power to quash the criminal proceeding for the following

reasons:

(i) A perusal of the trial court record would show that not only the

prosecution evidence is complete but also the statement of the

accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has been recorded.

(ii) The petitioner has also been charged with offences under

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act read with

Section 120B of the IPC. This is apart from the fact, that he has been

charged with a substantive offence under Section 420 of the IPC.

(iii) The employee of the bank, that is, Satish Kumar, who is the co-

accused, has been charged with a substantive offence under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Apart from these

offences, as indicated hereinabove, Satish Kumar is also charged

under Section 120B and 420 of the IPC. Satish Kumar has not

challenged the framing of charges against him at this stage. Any

order in these proceedings is likely to impact the proceedings against

the petitioner/ accused. [See A. Ravishankar Prasad (supra)]

(iv) Unlike the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra), where the CBI had

procrastinated in the prosecution of the case after filing of the

chargesheet on 30.12.1998; after the complaint was filed with it on

19.12.1995, in the present case, the CBI, as seen from a perusal of the

record, after it filed the chargesheet on 05.07.2001, has diligently

prosecuted its case.

(v) Furthermore, the petitioner herein is allegedly a direct

beneficiary of the offence, which he committed in criminal conspiracy

with Satish Kumar, that is, the employee of the bank. The Bank in the

present case unlike in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra) has taken

action against Satish Kumar by dismissing him from service.

(vi) There is no compromise arrived at by the Bank in the present

case with the petitioner, whereby, the Bank agreed to withdraw the

criminal proceeding, which was one of the factors that the Supreme

Court had taken note of, in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra).

(vii) Similarly, what persuaded the Supreme Court to quash criminal

proceeding in Manoj Sharma (supra) was that it was essentially a

„private dispute‟.

10. In my opinion given the facts of the present case, and the

distinguishing features obtaining in Nikhil Merchant (supra) and

Manoj Sharma (supra), which have been referred to hereinabove,

the instant case appears to be closer to the facts obtaining in Rumi

Dhar (supra) case.

11. For the reasons given hereinabove I am of the view that the

petition deserves to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.

12. Needless to say, any observations made herein shall have no

bearing on the merits of the case.

RAJIV SHAKDHER, J OCTOBER 09, 2009 kk