Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4844 Del
Judgement Date : 26 November, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 26.11.2009
+ CRL. A. No.82 of 1997
MANOHAR @ MANNU ...APPELLANT
Through: Mr. Navin Chawla, Advocate.
Versus
THE STATE (DELHI ADMN.) ...RESPONDENT
Through: Mr. Pawan Sharma,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in the Digest? No
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. (Oral)
1. The appellant, Manohar @ Mannu, has been convicted
and sentenced in Sessions Case No.114/1996 arising
out of FIR No.185/1991 registered at P.S. Gandhi Nagar
for having committed the offence punishable under
Sections 302 IPC and sentenced accordingly.
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 13.8.1991,
Veena (deceased) had an altercation with her landlady
Fatto. Fatto asked the deceased to immediately
vacate the house and the appellant, son of Fatto, ________________________________________________________________________
started throwing articles of the deceased from the
house onto the street. On the protest of the deceased,
Fatto caught hold of the deceased. The deceased
managed to release herself from the clutches of Fatto
and ran towards the street. Fatto is stated to have
exhorted the appellant to attack Fatto and when the
deceased was collecting her household goods from the
gali, the appellant gave knife blows to the deceased
causing injuries, which resulted in her death. Fatto
and the appellant were both charged, but in terms of
the impugned judgment, Fatto has been acquitted and
only the appellant was convicted.
3. The appellant aggrieved by the impugned judgment of
conviction dated 13.1.1997 and order of sentence of
the even date, has preferred the present appeal.
4. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for
the appellant, on instructions from the appellant, has
not pressed the grounds of appeal against conviction.
He, however, has submitted that the appellant was a
juvenile in terms of Section 2 (k) of The Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, wherein it
is provided that a „juvenile‟ or a „child‟ means a person
who has not completed eighteenth year of age. Thus,
he is entitled to be dealt with under the provisions of
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000.
________________________________________________________________________
5. As per order dated 28.10.2009, learned counsel for the
appellant sought to take advantage of the age of the
appellant mentioned in the order on sentence and
statement of accused recorded under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. to contend that the appellant was a juvenile on
the date of commission of offence, i.e. 13.8.1991. On
such a plea of the learned counsel for the appellant,
appellant was directed to undergo an ossification test.
In terms of the said order the report of the ossification
test was directed to be submitted before the Court on
the next date of hearing, i.e. today.
6. The report of the ossification test dated 21.11.2009
has been placed before us. We have perused the
report of the ossification test carried out at All India
Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi. In
terms of the report, the panel of doctors opined the
age of the appellant between 30-35 years on the date
of ossification test. Since the incident is of 13.8.1991,
the appellant would be of age between 12+ and 17+
years and thus would definitely be under 18 years of
age.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through
the scheme of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 and submitted that Section 2(k)
of the Act has expanded the definition of juvenile by
increasing the age from 16 years to 18 years. He has
submitted that Section 7-A(1) of the Act provides for ________________________________________________________________________
the procedure to be followed when the claim of
juvenility is raised before any court and Section 7-A(2)
provides that if the court finds a person to be juvenile
on the day of commission of offence, it shall forward
the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order
and the sentence if any passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect. He has also drawn our
attention to Section 20 of the Act which deals with the
pending cases of the persons who are covered under
the definition of juvenile because of the definition of
juvenile under Section 2(k) of the Act increasing the
age from 16 to 18 years, and submitted that in view of
the aforesaid provisions of the Act, the order of
sentence awarding life imprisonment to the appellant
is uncalled for and it needs to be modified.
8. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned
counsel for the appellant, it would be useful to
reproduce Section 7-A of The Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which is as follows:
"7-A Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court - 1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any Court or a Court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the Court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and ________________________________________________________________________
such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act.
2) If the Court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub- section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence, if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect."
9. From a perusal of Section 7-A of The Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, it
transpires that as per clause (1), whenever a claim of
juvenility is raised before any Court, the Court shall
make an inquiry and take such evidence as may be
necessary so as to determine the age of such person
and shall record a finding whether the person is a
juvenile or a child or not stating his precise age as
nearly as possible.
10. Section 20 of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 provides for the procedure to be
followed in respect of pending cases pertaining to the
juveniles in any court in any area on the date on which
the Act comes into force in that area. It provides that
such pending cases against the juvenile shall continue
in the said courts as if this Act has not been passed
and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed
an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
passing any sentence in respect of juvenile, forward
the case to the Board which shall pass appropriate
________________________________________________________________________
orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with
the provisions of the Act.
11. Since the appellant has conceded his pleas against the
impugned judgment of conviction on merits, we
dismiss the appeal to that extent. So far as the appeal
against the order of sentence is concerned, we have
already concluded above that the appellant was a
juvenile on the date of commission of offence as his
age then was less than 18 years. Clause 2 of Section
7-A and Section 20 of The Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 provides that if the
Court finds a person to be juvenile in terms of
definition under Section 2(k) of the Act on the date of
commission of offence, it shall forward the juvenile to
the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate
orders, and the sentence if any, awarded by a Court
shall be deemed to have no effect. The import of this
provision is that sentence awarded by the learned trial
Judge in terms of the impugned order of sentence will
have no effect and the matter has to be referred to the
Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders.
We may, however, note that as per Section 15 of The
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000, the maximum period for which a juvenile can be
sent to a Special Home is three years. As per the
nominal roll of the appellant, the appellant has already
served the maximum period of three (3) years. ________________________________________________________________________
12. In view of the fact that the appellant has suffered
incarceration for the maximum period of detention in
Special Home permissible under The Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, we do not
deem it appropriate to refer the matter back to the
Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders
and direct formal release of the appellant in the
present appeal.
13. The appeal is partly accepted and order on sentence is
modified accordingly.
14. Bail-cum-surety bonds of the appellant stand
discharged.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
NOVEMBER 26, 2009 AJIT BHARIHOKE, J. b'nesh
________________________________________________________________________
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