Delhi High Court
Aarti Sabharwal vs Jitender Singh Chopra & Ors on 18 November, 2009
Author: Vikramajit Sen
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Cont. Appeal (C) No.15/2009 & CM No.12865/2009
AARTI SABHARWAL .....Appellant through
Mr. Maninder Singh, Sr.
Adv. with Mr. Kirti Uppal,
Mr. Sanjeet Singh & Mohd.
Amanullah, Advs.
versus
JITENDER SINGH CHOPRA & ORS.....Respondent through
Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Kanwal Choudhary,
Adv. for Respondents 2 & 3
Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ravi Shankar
Nanda, Mr. Shakil Akhtar &
Mr. Ranvir Singh, Advs. for
Respondent No.6
% Date of Hearing : November 11, 2009
Date of Decision : November 18, 2009
CORAM:
* HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SEN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the Judgment? No
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.
1. The Appellant, who has filed a Suit for Maintenance under
Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956
(HAM Act for short), has filed the present Appeal being
aggrieved by the Order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing
the Contempt Petition filed by her. Her complaint was that
contrary to interim orders passed by the learned Single Judge, a
Sale Deed has been executed in respect of one of the properties
which, according to her, belong to her husband. At the
threshold, a Preliminary Objection has been taken pertaining to
the maintainability of the present Appeal.
2. There is no gainsaying that keeping in view the punitive
nature of orders that may be passed by the Court in contempt
proceedings, which may include incarceration for a period upto
six months, the Court must be fully satisfied that a party has
wilfully disobeyed Court orders before punishment is delivered.
Such a decision would perforce be predicated on a persuasive
preponderance of evidence, as in the case of criminal
proceedings. The natural sequel is that if the learned Single
Judge comes to the conclusion that contempt has not been
committed, it would well-neigh be impossible for the Appellate
Court to reverse that finding. A person cannot be convicted for
contempt of Court if one Judge finds that the case has not been
sufficiently made good by the Complainant since the benefit of
two opinions would invariably work in favour of the alleged
contemnor. In our view, these two abiding principles of law find
expression in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
which speaks in the negative, namely, that an appeal is available
only where punishment has been imposed on the contemnors
and reads thus:-
19.Appeals.--(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any
order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt--
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single
Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the
Court;
(b) where the order or decisions is that of a Bench, to
the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the
Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union
Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order
that--
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed
against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released
on bail; and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the
appellant has not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against
which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court
that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may
also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-
section(2).
(4) An appeal under sub-section(1) shall be filed--
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High
Court, within thirty days;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court,
within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed
against.
3. A detailed, yet perspicuous, exposition of the law can be
found in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal
Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399. The decisions on this question have
been discussed by their Lordships and thereafter the following
digestion has been culled out:-
11. The position emerging from these decisions, in
regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings
may be summarised thus:
I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only
against an order or decision of the High Court passed in
exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is,
an order imposing punishment for contempt.
II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings
for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for
contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for
contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the
contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act.
In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge
under Article 136 of the Constitution.
III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can
decide whether any contempt of court has been
committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and
matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not
appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to
the merits of the dispute between the parties.
IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High
Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will
not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for
contempt" and, therefore, not appealable under Section
19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such
direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably
connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which
event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also
encompass the incidental or inextricably connected
directions.
V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an
issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the
dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings,
the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an
order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the
order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a
provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special
leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India (in other cases).
4. There was some debate before us as to whether or not
propositions 4 and 5 above are attracted to the present case. We
are of the view that a composite order has been passed by the
learned Single Judge where almost the entire discussion
pertaining to facts as well as the law has been rendered in
respect of the contempt petition. Thereafter, applications not
connected with contempt have been summarily decided
obviously on the strength of discussions which preceded them.
In other words, the learned Single Judge has intended the
discussion recorded in the Order dismissing the Contempt
Petition to prevail upon all the applications pending before him.
In doing so, he has avoided needless prolixity and repetition.
For this reason, we do not think it at all relevant to delve into
the intricacies and esoteric of whether the impugned Order
dismissing the Contempt Petition contains reflection on the
merits also. The Appellant has separately challenged, in terms
of FAO(OS) No.402/2009, the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law on several applications contemporaneously
deciding the Contempt Petition.
5. Based on our reading of Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act as well as of our understanding of the law as
available in Midnapore, we are of the opinion that the present
Petition is not maintainable. The conclusions of the learned
Single Judge touching upon the merits of the dispute will,
however, be dealt with in full detail as assailed in FAO(OS)
No.402/2009.
6. The present Contempt Petition is not maintainable and is
dismissed.
( VIKRAMAJIT SEN )
JUDGE
( SUNIL GAUR )
November 18, 2009/tp JUDGE
