Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4675 Del
Judgement Date : 17 November, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Date of Decision : 17.11.2009
Sh. Jagmohan Chawla ......Petitioner
Through: Ms. Shobhana, Adv.
Versus
Yes Bank & Ors. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. S. Das, Adv. for R-1.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers can be
allowed to see the judgment? NO
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? NO
V.K. SHALI, J. (oral)
1. This is a petition filed by the petitioner for quashing of a
complaint titled M/s Yes Bank. Vs. M/s Three Star Paper Mills
Ltd & Anr. bearing no. 723/2009 pending in the Court of Sh.
Ankur Jain, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Dwarka, Delhi
and the proceedings arising therefrom.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the
respondent/complainant M/s Yes Bank filed a complaint under
Section 138 read with section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act read with section 420 IPC against M/s Three Star Paper Mills
Ltd and Jagmohan Chawla, the Director of the said paper mills.
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Page 1 of 6
The allegations were that the aforesaid company through its
Director had availed certain loan facilities, and thereafter, issued
cheques for repayment of the outstanding amount due. It is
alleged that cheques no. 871063 and 871065 dated 15th August,
2008 for a sum of Rs.53,479/- each were issued in favour of the
respondent/complainant M/s Yes Bank. These cheques were
drawn on Bank of Baroda, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. On
presentation both these cheques bounced on the ground that
they exceeded the arrangement. The return memo dated 29 th
October, 2008 was issued by the banker of the accused person to
the respondent no. 1 herein. The respondent/complainant
issued a notice dated 4th November, 2008 to the paper mills as
well as to the present petitioner Jagmohan Chawla accused
through registered post requiring them to make the payment
within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice.
It is alleged that this notice of the petitioner was replied by the
present petitioner on 25th November, 2008 wherein it was stated
that the petitioner has resigned as a Director on 20th September,
2007 which was accepted by the company on 21st September,
2007 and a requisite form no. 32 was also filed with the Registrar
of Companies on 5th February, 2008, and therefore, the petitioner
was not responsible for the commission of any offence as the
cheque got dishonoured at a later date.
3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the factum of reply sent by the present petitioner was not
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Page 2 of 6
mentioned in the complaint and as a consequence of this the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate after recording preliminary
evidence passed the order of summoning dated 15th January,
2009 against the petitioner. The petitioner feeling aggrieved
both by filing of the complaint as well as by the summoning
order has challenged the same.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance
on case titled DCM Financial Services Ltd. Vs. J. N. Sareen &
Anr. 2008 VII AD (S.C.) 446 the Court held that as the person
concerned had ceased to be the Director much prior to the
alleged dishonour of the cheque, therefore, he could not be held
liable. Similarly, it was contended that since the petitioner had
ceased to be the Director much before the presentation of the
cheque by the respondent, and therefore, on that ground also he
could not have been summoned.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent contested the claim
of the petitioner and urged that the present petitioner is raising
disputed question of fact as to whether he had resigned as a
Director much before the date of presentation of cheque or not,
which can be decided only after the parties are permitted to
adduce evidence and secondly the petitioner admittedly is the
signatory of the cheque in question, and therefore, he could not
escape the liability of facing the prosecution by this method. It
was also contended that the judgment which is sought to be
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Page 3 of 6
relied upon by the petitioner is distinguishable from the facts of
the present case.
6. I have carefully considered the respective submissions and
gone through the record. There is no denial of the fact that the
complaint is not very happily drafted. It is not the job of the
Court to find the defects in the complaint and throw the
complaint away, only on account of the bad drafting, if from a
plain reading of the entire complaint the offence against the
petitioner is made out. Admittedly, in the instant case there are
two accused persons one is the paper company and the other is
present petitioner Jagmohan Chawla. Sh. Jagmohan Chawla
has been shown in the memo of parties both in the official
capacity as well as in the individual capacity. Sh. Jagmohan
Chawla is the person who has signed the offending cheque and
thus he is a signatory to the cheque which was dishonoured.
The other accused is a company which is admittedly a juristic
person. The juristic person cannot operate a bank account of its
own, the cheque has to be signed by some natural person which
in the instant case has been signed by the present petitioner Sh.
Jagmohan Chawla. Noticeably the complainant does not make
any averment in the complaint that Jagmohan Chawla is sought
to be made vicariously liable in the instant case by invoking
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This is the point
which the learned counsel for the petitioner is missing when she
contends that the petitioner had resigned much prior to the date
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Page 4 of 6
of issuance of the offending cheque. Since the petitioner has
been a signatory to the cheque, therefore, the question of
resignation of the petitioner even if it is assumed to be correct
pales into irrelevance because the petitioner is impleaded as a
party in his capacity as a drawer of the cheque rather than as a
Director.
7. The judgment of the Apex Court in DCM Financial Services
(supra) which is sought to be relied upon by the petitioner in the
instant case is distinguishable on facts. In the said case a
person was sought to be enroped as an accused in a complaint
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by invoking
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act unlike in the
present case. Further, there was no averment in the complaint
regarding the role of the said Director and thirdly it was in this
back ground that the resignation of the said Director before the
dishonour of the cheque which was in the knowledge of the
complainant was considered fatal by the Apex Court. In the
instant case, the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that is the resignation of the Director is not a plea which can be
considered as a ground for quashing of the complaint or the
summoning order especially when he is summoned as an
accused as drawer of the cheque and not as the Director by
invoking Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
Page 5 of 6
8. For the foregoing reasons mentioned above, I am of the
considered opinion that the present petition of the petitioner is
totally misconceived and accordingly the same is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
November 17, 2009 KP
Crl. M.C. No. 1668/2009
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