Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4499 Del
Judgement Date : 6 November, 2009
HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 06.11.2009
+ FAO 289/2004
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY .... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Kamaldeep, Advocate
versus
PAPPU & ANR ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Pratima Chaudhary, Advocate for Respondent No.1 CORAM:-
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest?
VEENA BIRBAL, J
1. By way of present appeal under Section 30 of Workmen‟s
Compensation Act 1923 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟),
appellant has challenged order dated 15.07.2004 passed by the
Commissioner under the Workmen‟s Compensation Act, Ashok
Vihar, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the "Commissioner") in
granting compensation to Respondent No.1-claimant in respect of
application filed by him seeking compensation for the injury caused to
him in an accident arising out of and in course of employment.
2. The case of respondent No.1, i.e., claimant before the
commissioner under the Act is that he was employed as a cleaner by
respondent No.2 on his vehicle bearing No. HR-36-6083. On
26.12.2002, respondent No.1 was on duty on the said vehicle and had
gone on a commercial trip. When the said vehicle reached near
Lakhoti village under P.S. Mainpuri, it met with an accident as a
result of which respondent No.1/claimant received serious injuries and
became unconscious at the spot. His left leg was crushed and was
taken to Civil Hospital at Etah, where his leg was operated and a steel
rod was fitted. Thereafter, he was taken to Lady Harding Medical
College and Smt. Sucheta Kriplani Hospital where minor surgery was
done on the Left leg on 31.12.2002. Despite that, there was no
recovery on 30.1.2003. Ultimately his left leg was amputated as a
result of which the petitioner became disabled to the extent of 100%
and his earning capacity was reduced to zero. A case was registered
with the P.S. Mainpuri. Respondent No.1/claimant at the time of
accident was drawing a salary of Rs. 2,833/- per month. Besides this,
Rs.50/- per day was given to him as daily allowance and he was 18
years of age at the time of accident. Respondent No.2 on coming to
know of accident had immediately informed appellant, i.e., Insurance
Company. Even otherwise, notice under Section 10 of the Act was
also served upon respondent No.1. As per him, the accident had
occurred during the course of employment. By way of his claim
petition, respondent No.1 had claimed compensation to the extent of
100% disability as per the Act.
3. Respondent No.2, i.e., employer filed the written statement
wherein he admitted that the respondent No.1 was employed by him
as a cleaner on aforesaid vehicle. He also admitted the factum of
accident and that in the said accident, respondent No.1 sustained
injuries. He also admitted the wages as are stated by the appellant
No.1. It is further stated in the written statement that the vehicle in
question was insured with the appellant and they were informed well
in time and appellant are liable to indemnify the insured.
4. Written statement was also filed by the appellant, i.e., Insurance
Company before the Commissioner under the Act wherein the factum
of vehicle in question being owned by respondent No.2/employer and
it being insured with appellant is not denied. As per appellant, claim
is exaggerated and disproportionate.
5. Parties led evidence before the Commissioner. After hearing
arguments, the Commissioner held that it was a case of leg amputation
and the respondent/claimant was disabled by 100%. Accordingly, the
commissioner held that earning capacity of respondent No.1/appellant
has been reduced to zero, as such, awarded compensation of
RS.5,43,312/-.
6. Aggrieved with the same, present appeal is filed.
7. Learned counsel for appellant has contended that in the present
case, leg of claimant i.e., respondent No.1 was amputated below knee
and the same comes under the "List of injuries" deemed to result in
"permanent partial disablement" described in part II of Schedule 1 of
the Act and percentage of loss of earning capacity stated therein for
the said injury is 50% whereas Commissioner has taken percentage of
loss of earning capacity as 100% which is totally contrary to law. It is
further contended that there is no opinion of the doctor that there was
100% loss of earning capacity as such impugned order is liable to be
set-aside.
8. On the other hand, counsel for respondent no.1 has contended
that the impugned order is legal and valid in all respects. It is
contended that leg of respondent no.1 is amputated. Appellant is
unfit to do work. The counsel referred to the case of K. Janardhan
v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 2008 ACJ 2039, wherein
as per Schedule I under the Act, there was a loss of 50% earning
capacity to the claimant but the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had affirmed
the view taken in the matter by the court below by taking it a case of
100% disability. The above judgment also refers to the judgment of
Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr., 1976 ACJ
141, wherein also compensation has been awarded on the basis of loss
of 100% earning capacity.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for parties at length and
perused the record.
10. In order to appreciate the controversy, the relevant provisions
under the Act are as under:
"a. Section 2 (1) (g) of the Act defines „Partial disablement' which means that where the disablement is of a temporary nature, such disablement as reduces the earning capacity of a workman in any employment in which he was engaged at the time of the accident resulting in the disablement, and, where the disablement is of a permanent nature, such disablement as reduces his earning capacity in every employment which he was capable of undertaking at that time: provided that every injury specified [in Part II of Schedule I] shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement. b. Whereas 'Total disablement' is defined under Section 2 (1) (l) of the Act, which means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement: [provided that permanent total disablement shall be deemed to result from every injury specified in Part I of Schedule I or from any combination of injuries specified in part II thereof where the aggregate percentage of loss of earning capacity, as specified in the said part II against those injuries, amounts to one hundred percent or more."
11. Whereas Section 4 of the Act deals with the amount of
compensation, relevant for the case in hand is Clause (c) which is
extracted as:
"4. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION. -
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:-
(a) xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
(b) xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx
(c) Where permanent partial disablement
results from the injury
(i) in the case of an injury specified in Part II of Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is specified therein as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury, and
(ii) in the case of an injury not specified in Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury;
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
12. Part I of the Schedule I enumerates the list of injuries deemed
to result in "permanent total disablement" and the percentage of loss
of earning capacity with respect to the injury described in the list. Part
II of the Schedule I of the Act enumerates the list of injuries deemed
to result in "permanent partial disablement". Serial 20 of part II
describes the injury of amputation below knee with stump exceeding
8.89 cms but not exceeding 12.70 cms serial and Serial 21 of the same
part describes the amputation below knee with stump exceeding 12.70
cms. In both the cases the percentage of loss of earning capacity is
specified as 50 percent.
13. The Supreme Court, in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo
v. Shri Nivas Sabata and Anr., (supra), while construing the
expression „total disablement‟ as defined in section 2 (1) (e) of the Act
held that if injury makes the workman unfit for the work which he
was discharging prior to the accident, the disablement is total and not
partial. In that case a carpenter while doing work in course of
employment fell down and sustained injuries as a result of which his
left arm above elbow was amputated and he became unfit for the work
of carpenter and as per Schedule I of the Act, it was a case of
"Permanent Partial Disablement". In the above case, the Supreme
Court held that the disablement was total and not partial as the work
of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only.
14. In K. Janardhan vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR
2008 SC 2384, where appellant was a tanker driver, while driving
vehicle he met with an accident as a result of which he sustained
injuries and also amputation of right leg upto the knee joint. The
Commissioner found that as the claimant had suffered amputation of
his right leg upto knee, he was said to have suffered a loss of 100% of
his earning capacity as a driver and on that basis awarded
compensation to him. An appeal was thereafter taken to High Court
of Karnataka by the Insurance Company. The High Court accepted
the plea raised in the appeal that as per Schedule to the Workmen‟s
Compensation Act, the loss of a leg on amputation amounted to 60%
reduction in the earning capacity and the doctor had opined it to 65%
disability, and as such above figure was to be accepted and
accordingly reduced the compensation. In these circumstances, the
claimant moved to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court relying on
its decision in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shri Nivas Sabata and
Anr (supra) held that appellant suffered 100% disability and
incapacity, in earning as a driver as his right leg had been amputated
from the knee and set aside the judgment of High Court and restored
that of the Commissioner.
15. A Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Punambhai
Khodabhai Parmar v. G. Kenal Construction and Anr. (1985-I-
LLJ-98) wherein the workman was employed as driver who sustained
permanent disability of his right hand finger, right elbow and right
thigh, on evidence, observed that the injured workman has been
rendered unfit for the job, relying on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Pratap Narayan Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr.
(supra) held that permanent total disablement is to be judged from the
point of view of the job which the workman was doing and if the
disablement renders him unfit to do that job, the disablement is total
and not partial.
16. A Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Siddappa v. The
General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. and Anr, (1988) I ACC 539,
explained the scope of extent of percentage of loss of earning
capacities specified in part II of the Schedule and has pointed out that
the extent of permanent disablement specified therein should be
deemed to have been taken place in the instances specified in column
2 of the schedule. But there is no bar upon the claimant from proving
his case that he had suffered higher percentage of loss of earning
capacity.
The ratio of the aforesaid judgment was applied in National
Insurance Company Ltd. V. R. Vishnu and Anr, 1992 ACJ 590,
wherein injured workman was employed as a driver of a tourist bus
which met with an accident and his both legs were injured and finally
his left leg was amputated below knee. The Commissioner concluded
that the claimant had suffered total permanent disablement. In appeal,
the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court observed that the extent
of permanent disability suffered as specified in the schedule to the Act
is no bar for pleading and proving that actually the concerned
workman has suffered higher percentage of or total, disability.
17. A learned Judge of Orissa High Court in case of National
Insurance Company v. Narendra Samal and Anr, 1993 ACJ 1095,
wherein the injured workman was a helper and was going in the truck
from Ramgarh to Baripada, the truck dashed against a tree at road-side
and over turned whereby left leg of the workman was crushed
resulting in compound fracture, which was amputated, observed that
it was a case of total disablement and not partial as the injured
workman was not able to perform his duties as a helper in the truck.
18. In the present case, it is not disputed that because of amputation
of leg, respondent no. 1 has been incapacitated to do the duties of
cleaner. Cleaner has to do various kinds of jobs like cleaning the
vehicle, loading - unloading the goods from vehicle, changing
punctured tyre, etc. Such type of work can‟t be handled by a person
whose leg has been amputated and who is not able to walk without the
support. Medical documents including that of amputation below knee
are on record Exhibit AW 1/1 to 1/20. There is an evidence of
respondent no. 1/claimant in the form of an affidavit in the trial court
record wherein it is stated that due to injuries he has become disabled
to the extent of 100% and his earning capacity has been reduced to
zero. Even in pleadings he has set up his case to that effect. Nothing
contrary is placed on record by the appellant to rebut the same. It is a
clear case of "permanent disablement". The Commissioner has
rightly held that respondent no. 1/claimant is disabled by 100%. His
earning is reduced to 100% and awarded the compensation
accordingly. As the respondent no. 1/claimant has become
permanently disabled and it being a case of total disablement,
respondent no. 1/claimant is not debarred from claiming
compensation more than that specified in the schedule for the loss of
earning capacity, as has been held by Supreme Court in Pratap
Narain Singh Deo v. Shri Nivas Sabata & Anr. (supra), K.
Janardhan v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (supra) and
other cases discussed above. There is no illegality in the impugned
order which calls for interference by this Court. Order of Ld.
Commissioner is upheld. Appeal stands dismissed with no order as to
costs.
VEENA BIRBAL, J.
November 6th, 2009
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