Delhi High Court
Mrs. Lovely Jyoti vs Mount Carmel School & Anr. on 23 March, 2009
Author: Kailash Gambhir
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No. 7701/2009
Judgment delivered on: March 23, 2009
Mrs. Lovely Jyoti ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rajiv Bajaj, Adv..
Versus
Mount Carmel School & Anr. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mohammad Sajid, Advocate for
respondent no. 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may Yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in the Digest?
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (Oral)
*1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking direction for quashing
the termination letter dated 20.2.2009.
2. The brief facts of the case as set out in the petition are that the
petitioner was engaged as a teacher for teaching political science to
the students of XI standard of the respondent school vide letter dated
17/12/2007. The petitioner was teaching students and performing her
services with due diligence but the respondent school vide termination
letter dated 20.2.2009 terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f.
1/4/2009.
3. Mr. Rajiv Bajaj counsel for the petitioner contends that the services
of the petitioner were terminated without any rhyme or reason by the
respondent school. The counsel submits that the petitioner taught her
students diligently and as a result the students were affectionate to
her. He further maintains that even the other staff members and the
principle of the school were happy with petitioner's conduct and there
were no complaints against her. The counsel urges that the petitioner
was given all the benefits as the other teachers were getting. The
counsel contends that the termination letter dated 20/2/2009 is
arbitrary and illegal and the same deserves to be quashed.
4. Per contra, Mr. Mohammad Sajid, counsel for the respondent no. 2
Director of Education, drew attention of this court to the letter of
appointment issued by the respondent no. 1 school on 17/12/2007 and
also the termination letter dated 20/2/2009, wherein it is mentioned
that the petitioner was appointed on probation for a period of one year
and her services were to come to an end with efflux of time on
31/12/2008.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on
probation or ad hoc basis or contractual basis, for a specific period of
time, comes to an end with the efflux of time and the person holding
such post can have no right to continue on the said post. As per clause
1 of the letter of appointment dated 17/12/2007, the services of the
petitioner were engaged by the respondent school for a period of one
year, which automatically ended on 31/12/2008 unless extended by
November 2008. Further, as per clause 5 the management reserved
the right to terminate her services at anytime after giving one month's
notice or one month's salary in lieu of notice. Vide termination letter
dated 20.02.2009 the petitioner was directed to hand over charge on
24/3/2009 to the Head of the Department. The said termination letter
simply states that the contract of the petitioner expired on 31/12/2008
and her services were not required after 31/3/2009. In the instant case
as noticed above, the petitioner accepted the appointment including
the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment letter and
joined the respondent no. 1 school as a teacher for teaching Political
Science to students of standard XI and continues on the said post till
31/3/2009. The petitioner having accepted the terms and conditions
stipulated in the appointment order and since the period for which she
was appointed has elapsed by efflux of time, she cannot permitted now
to turn round and say that her appointments could not be terminated
on the basis of the appointment letter nor she could be treated as
temporary employee. The petitioner was well aware of the fact from
the day one that with the lapse of time she will have to leave the
school and her services will be terminated. The submission made by
the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the said effect has no merit
and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. Furthermore, simply because
petitioner remained in service of the respondent no. 1 school for about
2-3 months more than the contractual period will not entitle her to
claim any vested right or permanency on the said post. The
appointment of the petitioner being purely contractual on the said post
terminable at the end of 31/12/2008 does not entitle the petitioner to
claim regular appointment on the said post. Also, the said contention
of the counsel for the petitioner cannot withstand the scrutiny of law,
in the light of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case
of Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),(2006) 4 SCC 1, the
relevant paragraph of the same is reproduced as under:
"38. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised
by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the
consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or
contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory
of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when
an appointment to the post could be made only by following a
proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in
consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the
theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully
advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It
cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise
while engaging these persons either to continue them where
they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot
constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the
theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being
made permanent in the post."
7. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the present
petition.
8. Dismissed.
March 23, 2009 Kailash Gambhir, J.
pkv
